

INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS ON PALESTINE

1968

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PREFACE

This is the second volume of the Institute for Palestine Studies' *International Documents on Palestine*, a collection of documents whose aim is to record the attitudes and policies of the international community—including Israel and the Arab World—towards the Palestine problem. The collection is divided into three sections: International (including Israel), United Nations, and the Arab World. The documents focus principally on the development of the Middle East crisis and attempts to settle it during 1968.

The contents of the International and Arab World sections have mainly been selected from the speeches and statements of political leaders and government officials—e.g. heads of state, prime ministers, ministers, ambassadors, and leaders of political and guerrilla movements. In order to present all important currents of opinion on Palestine, the volume also contains items describing the positions of leading and influential organisations and political parties in the case of the Great Powers, Israel and the Arab World. The source materials are generally public policy statements, joint communiqués, parliamentary debates and resolutions, news conferences and interviews. Press articles and editorials have been reproduced where news media are used as the vehicle for expressing official policy.

The United Nations section concentrates primarily on complaints submitted to the United Nations by the parties to the conflict concerning cease-fire and human rights violations, and the pertinent resolutions adopted on these issues. The section also includes the most important United Nations material on the Palestine refugee problem and relevant extracts from addresses delivered in the forum of the General Assembly.

The documents are arranged chronologically. The word "excerpt/s" is used to indicate that only the part or parts of the text most relevant to the Palestine problem have been reproduced. The spelling of names of persons and places is left unchanged in texts which appear in their original untranslated version. In the transliteration of names in documents translated from the Arabic a compromise has been adopted: names already familiar to the Western reader

appear as they are generally printed in the English-language press; others are transliterated according to a system which, while avoiding diacritical marks, reproduces the Arabic spelling as closely as possible.

The Institute expresses its gratitude to the University of Kuwait, and particularly to its President and Secretary-General, for invaluable aid towards the publication of this volume.

The Institute further expresses its gratitude to Dr. George J. Tomeh, Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic at the United Nations, for his valuable assistance in the compilation of the United Nations Documents.

The International section was mostly compiled by Fuad A. Jabber, the United Nations section by Dr. George Dib, and the Arab World section by George K. Nasrallah. Translation from Arabic into English was done by Meric Dobson, Muhammad J. Tutungi, Rudolf Nassar and Mrs. Abla Hijab, and Michael Simpson assisted Zuhair Diab with the editing. The index was prepared by Mrs. Suha Tuqan.

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International

Interview Granted by the Israeli Chief of Staff General Bar-Lev to the Israeli Daily "Davar."¹ [Excerpts]

Tel Aviv, January 1, 1968

Q. Is not the supplying of the Arab countries with arms to be regarded as upsetting the balance of power between them and Israel?

A. The balance of power is not a correct expression in this case. We should talk of power relations, or an effective aspect of Israel's deterrent capacity. The criterion is to what extent the Israel Defence Army has the power to make it capable of deterrence, and if this is not satisfactory, what is its ability to decide the issue. From our point of view, the power relations are better than they were before the war. They [the Arabs] have not yet recovered the strength they had before the war, and we are at the height of our strength. Before the war their military strength was deployed near our population centres, but now it is a long way from our frontiers.

Q. How does the French embargo affect the power relationship?

A. We exaggerate the harm done to the Israeli Defence Army by the embargo. There is, in fact, an embargo on one item only—Mirage planes. The Mirage is an excellent plane, and we like it, but it is not the only plane. What really annoys us about the embargo on Mirages is that we are old clients of the French aircraft industry; we concluded the deal and paid for the planes. But the Israel Defence Army is not without planes. First and foremost, we have planes, and secondly, with the exception of French Mirages, there is no embargo on planes.

Q. What are the prospects of Israel supporting the Israel Defence Army through domestic production?

A. We are trying to produce more items; we already produce a lot, and in the future we shall produce more.

Q. Was the deterrent capacity of the Israel Defence Army before the war disappointing?

A. Clearly, the deterrent capacity of the

Israel Defence Army was not really put to the test. Had it not been for this, Abdel Nasser would not have dared to close the Straits of Tiran, for when he decided to do so he was obliged to take into account the fact that war might break out.

Q. What must be done to recreate the deterrent capacity?

A. The fact that we act in every incident all along the frontier has a deterrent effect—when one of their tanks is burnt, or when a plane penetrates our airspace and does not return to base—that has a deterrent effect. And the fact that our strength is increasing, and that they know it, also has a deterrent effect. Since the war nothing has been published about the increased strength of the Israel Defence Army. But as time passes things will change. The war itself also played its part in the deterrent capacity of the Israel Defence Army.

Q. But the various leaders in the Arab countries are not even convinced of the ability of the Israel Defence Army to decide the issue. They claim that they were the victims of an accident, and of an "Israeli invention" that they could imitate by obtaining Mirage planes and making a surprise air attack.

A. I think that their claim that we won because of some invention is a matter of providing a justification for home consumption. All military experts agree that without air superiority it is impossible to carry out attacks in a desert area, though it is possible to fight valuable defensive and delaying battles.

But the whole of the Egyptian army collapsed after three days, as did half the Syrian army, with its terrific fortifications, after 28 hours. It is impossible to attribute this to the absence of an air arm alone; all military experts confirm this. What we must ask is how it came about that the Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian air forces, and the Iraqi air force too, which attacked us at the beginning, were destroyed in a few hours, and how an army consisting of 1,000 tanks, 100,000 men and hundreds of guns could be destroyed as quick as lightning. The fact is that the Arab armies were not ready for war and did not fight.

Q. Is there any truth in the allegation that after the great victory in the war there was considerable

¹ *Davar* (Tel Aviv), 1/1/1968.

weakness in the Israel Defence Army?

A. I have not heard of it. If there is any one who makes such allegations—we do not know what they are based on.

Q. If another "round" breaks out, in what way will it differ from the Six Day War?

A. The side that begins the attack—the Arabs—will be obliged to surmount grave territorial obstacles between us and them.

In the future the war will be a war of air superiority. All will depend on the time when it breaks out; and in the more distant future missiles will also be used in the fighting. But we must remember that, in the end, missiles are a means of fire power only—with missiles alone it is impossible to occupy any territory.

Q. In the meantime the Arabs are threatening to increase their terrorist activities against Israel. Does the war against saboteurs require special forces, bases, means and methods?

A. This is a problem we have been struggling with for several years. The solution will not be definite and conclusive—it will be achieved through many and varied ways and means. We are employing all means that have proved effective, but it is impossible to solve this problem in a short time. As time goes on perhaps we shall succeed in putting an end to it, but it will not be soon. All of us—the army and civilians alike—will have to be alert and prepared on this matter.

Q. Does the war against saboteurs include the employment of electronic devices, wires and so on?

A. I said various means, and that includes technical means. There are many things which work together to decrease this activity, which is not so great as it was before or directly after the war.

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Radio Interview with the Former Israeli Chief of Staff General Rabin.¹ [Excerpts]

Jerusalem, January 4, 1968

Q. General Rabin, in winding up your four years as Chief of Staff, what would you say are the major achievements in the army?

A. Well, I would say that the major achievements were the results of the six-day war; because when you try to test or try to learn something about armed forces, the major role and the major test for armed forces is the fighting. I would say there is no need to talk much now about the Israeli armed forces and about the achievements of the six-day war . . .

Q. Do you think that Israel in the long run stands to lose its superiority?

A. This is a very difficult question because, if you are talking about centuries, I would not try to be a prophet to tell what will happen then. But if you are talking about the near future—let us say five, ten years from now—I do not believe that they can achieve a greater improvement than they have achieved, let us say, in the last 10 years. We had in the six-day war an opportunity to see what Nasser's regime achieved in 10 years in developing his armed forces, and I would not call it a great achievement. I must admit that before the war I thought that the achievement would be greater than it proved to be in the war.

Q. What would you say was the main reason for Israel's victory?

A. Well, I believe it was the will, understanding, and the capability of the Israeli individual to fight. . . I believe that the nature of the army is derived from the nature of the nation. And if, as I believe, there is no formality in the way of life in Israel as a whole especially among the youngsters—those who were born here—we had to adjust the behaviour of the army to the natural behaviour of the people. But there is no lack of discipline. Without discipline no army can win a war. It is the forms which are different. . .

Q. Before we leave the military field—do you believe that Israel has created a strategy which is unique

¹ *Israel in English* 11.00 GMT, 4/1/1968. B.B.C., ME/2663/A/8-9.

in military history?

A. I would not like to try to compare what we have done to all of history. I would say that we have found our ways, our methods, our organisation, our doctrines of strategy and tactics which are suitable and adjustable to our own conditions... Generally I would say that good methods which are suitable for certain conditions are not necessarily appropriate somewhere else...

Q. Do you feel that the mentalities of Arabs and Jews are reconcilable?

A. Well, what we seek here is a peace. A peace can be achieved between nations which are different in mentality, in culture and in everything. Therefore, there is no need to find a basis for conciliation of mentalities, but just to seek a situation where the Arab countries will become reconciled to the existence of Israel and recognise the fact that we are here to stay.

Q. Do you think that the Arabs understand only strong words and tough measures?

A. Well, this is of course what experience has showed us. We hoped that once (i.e. one day) they would learn to understand a different language, but for the time being we must be prepared for both: to be ready to talk in normal language but, on the other hand, to be prepared to keep our strong hand ready for any eventuality.

Q. Do you think that peace is conceivable with the present leadership in the Arab countries? Do you think that the key to peace still lies in Cairo?

A. I would say that a general agreement between Israel and the Arab countries—the key to achieve it still lies in Cairo. I would not say that it is in the hands of some specific ruler, but Egypt is the largest country and, for the time being and for many years to come, the leading country in the Arab world.

Q. Do you feel that peace is possible on a local level between Israel and the Arab countries without agreement between the two world blocs?

A. It would be much more difficult to achieve a local settlement without the influence of the big Powers; or, one can say that if, hypothetically, the big Powers were eliminated from the area, the prospects of peace might increase.

Q. If there are no peace talks for many years,

is there a danger of Israel becoming a modern Sparta, a garrison State?

A. I do not normally like to use historical comparisons because I do not believe history repeats itself. I do not know what they mean by the name of Sparta. There is no doubt that living here and to withstand all the difficulties which are involved in living in Israel requires a tough attitude and a tough way of life...

Q. Do you feel that the morale of the Israelis is strong enough to withstand years and years of terrorist activities?

A. Well, without question in the last 20 years I would say that we have passed many tests and have stood against them. I believe that we have the power to continue in this way.

3

News Conference Remark by the U.S. Secretary of State Rusk on the Middle East.¹ **[Excerpt]**

Washington, January 4, 1968

Q. Can you evaluate for us the role of the Soviet Union in the Middle East today?

A. The question was evaluating the role of the Soviet Union in the Middle East today.

Q. Mr. Secretary—

A. I'm not going to say very much about that. You gentlemen asked me a good many questions today about the future and about the evaluations that I should not get into. We hope that they will give their full support to the Security Council's resolution of late November. We believe that their own interests would lead them to want peace in the Middle East, as our interests would lead us to want peace in the Middle East.

We know that there are some differences about the order in which one proceeds from one question to the next. As you know, they have felt in the past that full withdrawal by Israeli forces to the pre-June 5 position was a prerequisite for action on other questions.

¹ U.S. Department of State Bulletin, 22/1/1968, p. 122.

The Security Council resolution found, I think, a better and more comprehensive answer to that question, and they voted for that resolution.

We would hope that they would work within the framework of the Security Council and in support of Ambassador Jarring to help find the basis for a permanent settlement there. And I think that there is some possibility that their influence can be in the direction of moderation.

We also would hope that they would become more interested in finding some means of limiting the arms race in that area. Because none of these countries can feel secure unless there is some sense of limit on the arms or the build-up in one or another country. And on that they can make a very substantial contribution.

But the real answer to your question is we will just have to see as we move in the weeks ahead to support Ambassador Jarring's efforts.

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4

Joint Communiqué on the Yugoslav President Tito's Official Visit to Afghanistan, 7-10 January.¹ [Excerpt]

Kabul, January 6, 1968

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The President of Yugoslavia and the King of Afghanistan expressed their particular concern over the slow way in which the Middle East crisis provoked by Israeli aggression, was being resolved. They also confirmed the determination of their two countries to continue to contribute fully to the endeavours of the non-aligned and other peace-minded countries to erase the consequences of the aggression and to find a just and lasting solution. Withdrawal of Israeli troops from occupied territories and settlement of the problem of the Palestine refugees are essential to the achievement of these objectives.

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¹ *Socialist Thought and Practice*, No. 29, January-March 1968, p. 114.

5

Joint Statement on the Israeli Premier Eshkol's Talks With President Johnson During His Visit to the U.S.²

San Antonio (Texas), January 8, 1968

President Johnson invited Prime Minister Eshkol to be his guest at the Texas White House on January 7 and 8, during the Prime Minister's visit to the United States.

The President and the Prime Minister held several meetings during which they discussed recent developments in the Middle East as well as a number of questions of mutual interest in the bilateral relations between their two countries.

The President and the Prime Minister considered the implications of the pace of rearmament in the Middle East and the ways and means of coping with this situation. The President agreed to keep Israel's military defense capability under active and sympathetic examination and review in the light of all relevant factors, including the shipment of military equipment by others to the area.

The President and the Prime Minister restated their dedication to the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East in accordance with the spirit of the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967. They also noted that the principles set forth by President Johnson on June 19³ constituted an equitable basis for such a settlement.

The President and the Prime Minister noted that under that Security Council resolution the Secretary General of the United Nations has designated Ambassador [Gunnar] Jarring as his Special Representative. They also noted with satisfaction that Ambassador Jarring is already engaged in discussions with the governments concerned and affirmed their full support of his mission.

The President and the Prime Minister reviewed with satisfaction developments in the relations between the United States and Israel since their last meeting in 1964 and expressed their firm intention to continue the traditionally

² U.S. *Department of State Bulletin*, 5/2/1968, p. 174.

³ See *International Documents on Palestine, 1967*, pp. 116-118.

close, friendly and cooperative ties which link the peoples of Israel and the United States.

Noting the mutual dedication of their governments and people to the value of peace, resistance to aggression wherever it occurs, individual freedom, human dignity and the advancement of man through the elimination of poverty, ignorance, and disease, the President and the Prime Minister declared their firm determination to make every effort to increase the broad area of understanding which already exists between Israel and the United States and agreed that the Prime Minister's visit advanced this objective.

6

Joint Communiqué on the Turkish Foreign Minister Caglayangil's Official Visit to India, 4-9 January.¹ [Excerpt]

New Delhi, January 9, 1968

The two sides also discussed other international problems. On the problems arising from the situation in West Asia (Middle East) their views broadly coincided and they expressed the hope that a just and lasting settlement will be found in the area.

7

Speech by the Soviet First Vice-Premier Mazurov During His Official Visit to the U.A.R.² [Excerpt]

Aswan, January 9, 1968

The Arab East is one of the areas where the struggle between the forces of imperialist reaction and the national liberation movement is sharpest.

The main aim of the Israeli aggressors and their imperialist patrons was to crush the progressive system in the United Arab Republic and

other advanced Arab countries and to halt the development of the revolutionary process in the whole area.

In the time of trial, however, the people of the United Arab Republic have shown their deep national and political consciousness by resolutely defending their social gains.

True to its internationalist policy, the Soviet Union, along with the fraternal socialist states, will continue to give the U.A.R. the necessary assistance and support in its struggle to restore its legitimate rights and to get rid of the consequences of the Israeli aggression.

Together with all peaceloving forces, we will insistently continue the struggle to make Israeli troops withdraw to the positions they held before June 5, 1967.

This demand is the main and indispensable condition for the restoration and consolidation of peace and security in the Middle East.

By mobilising the people and its internal resources and relying on the assistance and support of friendly countries, the U.A.R. government is successfully overcoming the economic difficulties caused by the Israeli aggression.

The defence potential of the United Arab Republic and the other Arab states that were the victims of aggression is being strengthened. The struggle to rally the Arab countries and to strengthen their anti-imperialist unity goes on.

Our position of solid support for the just cause of the U.A.R. and the other Arab countries in their struggle against imperialism and colonialism, to get rid of the consequences of the Israeli aggression and for social progress is unshakable.

8

Joint Communiqué on the Kuwaiti Ruler al-Salem al-Sabah's Visit to Iran.³ [Excerpts]

Teheran, January 13, 1968

At the invitation of H.M. Muhammad Reza Pahlavi Shahanshah Arya Mehr, H.H. the Ruler

¹ Indian Foreign Affairs Record, January 1968, p. 8.

² Soviet News (London), 16/1/1968.

³ Teheran home service in Persian, 16.30 GMT and Kuwait home service in Arabic, 17.00 GMT, 13/1/1968. B.B.C., ME/2670/E2/1.

of Kuwait, Shaikh Sabah al-Salem al-Sabah paid an official visit to Iran from 10th to 13th January at the head of a delegation of Kuwaiti officials...

The two sides discussed the current Middle Eastern situation, the continued occupation of Arab soil by Israel and its effects—violation of the UN Charter and a threat to world peace—and stressed the need for the withdrawal of the Israeli forces from the occupied Arab territories and the return of Jerusalem to its former status on the basis of the UN General Assembly resolution issued in this respect.¹ They also reaffirmed the right of the Palestinian refugees to return to their homeland in accordance with the UN resolutions.² The two sides noted the need for close cooperation between the Muslim States—a cooperation which emanates from the religious ties which bind these countries.

9

Joint Communiqué on the Soviet Vice-Premier Mazurov's Visit to the U.A.R.³
[Excerpts]

Cairo, January 13, 1968

At the invitation of President Gamal Abdel Nasser, President of the United Arab Republic, a delegation of the Soviet Government headed by Mr. K.T. Mazurov, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party and Deputy Prime Minister of the U.S.S.R., paid a friendly visit to the United Arab Republic from January 7 to January 13, 1968.

Mr. K.T. Mazurov held extensive and friendly talks with President Gamal Abdel Nasser in which special attention was paid to the problems related to the liquidation of the consequences of the Israeli aggression, particularly the withdrawal

of the Israeli forces from all Arab occupied regions to the lines which they occupied on June 5.

The possibility of increasing all aspects of cooperation between the Soviet Union and the U.A.R. in all spheres was also discussed.

10

Statement by the East German Foreign Minister Winzer on the Middle East.⁴

Berlin, January 15, 1968

A particularly complicated situation arose in the Middle East in 1967. Israel's aggression inspired and supported by US and West German imperialists was designed to bring the progressive Governments in the UAR and SAR to fall and restore unrestricted imperialist rule in that strategically and economically prominent area.

Thanks to the brilliant policy pursued by the Soviet Union supported by the other socialist countries, this plan failed though Israel achieved a temporary military success.

The GDR actively supported the Arab peoples from the first day of Israeli aggression both politically and materially.

At the conferences in Moscow and Budapest, we discussed and agreed with the other socialist states on steps to be taken to overcome the effects of that aggression.

As for the new year, the meeting of Foreign Ministers of the European socialist states held in Warsaw from December 19th to 21st 1967⁵ will certainly prove to have been an important event. The communiqué issued after that meeting is evidence of the common struggle of the socialist states for the withdrawal of Israel's armed forces from occupied Arab territory, against imperialist intervention and for a lasting peace settlement in the Middle East.

GDR denouncement of Israel's aggression

¹ U.N. docs. A/RES/2253-2254 (ES-V) of 4 and 14 July 1967, Texts in *International Documents on Palestine*, 1967, pp. 256, 260.

² See footnotes—and—to doc. 259, *post*.

³ U.A.R. *Arab Political Encyclopedia: Documents and Notes*, January-June 1968, p. 153.

⁴ G.D.R. *Foreign Affairs Bulletin*, 15/1/1968, pp. 12-13. The statement was made in the course of an interview with the East German news agency (ADN).

⁵ For the Communiqué, see *International Documents on Palestine*, 1967, pp. 199-201.

and our statement in favour of the Arab peoples are ample proof of this country pursuing the right political course towards the non-aligned countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. This socialist foreign policy pursued by the GDR will be continued in 1968 and also bear fruit. This appears likely because the GDR has won, to a large extent, the non-aligned countries' esteem and confidence in the course of last year.

11

Statement by the U.S. Department of State on the Status of Jerusalem.¹

Washington, January 15, 1968

We have repeatedly made it clear that we do not recognize any unilateral actions affecting the status of Jerusalem. This remains our policy.

Furthermore, we believe the status of Jerusalem must necessarily be considered in the context of a settlement of all problems arising out of the recent conflict.

12

Joint Communiqué on the Yugoslav President Tito's Visit to Pakistan.² [Excerpts]

Rawalpindi, January 17, 1968

At the invitation of the President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Field Marshal Muhammad Ayub Khan, the President of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito and Madame Broz paid a State visit to Pakistan from January 10 to 17, 1968.

The two Presidents agreed on the importance of strengthening the role and effectiveness of the United Nations for the promotion of international

cooperation and the maintenance of world peace. For this purpose, they affirmed the necessity of faithful application of the principles of the UN Charter and the honoring of international agreements.

The two sides considered the grave situation in the Middle East which had developed as a result of Israeli aggression against the Arab States. Condemning the aggressive actions of Israel, they considered that the immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces from all occupied Arab territories was essential for the establishment of peace and stability in the Middle East.

13

U.S. President Johnson's Address on the State of the Union to Congress.³ [Excerpt]

Washington, January 17, 1968

During the Arab-Israeli war last June, the hot line between Washington and Moscow was used for the first time in our history. A ceasefire was achieved without a major-power confrontation.

Now the nations of the Middle East have the opportunity to cooperate with Ambassador Jarring's U.N. mission and they have the responsibility to find the terms of living together in stable peace and dignity, and we shall do all in our power to help them achieve this result.

14

News Conference Remarks by the U.N. Secretary-General U Thant.⁴ [Excerpts]

New York, January 18, 1968

Question: Sir, I wish to refer to another topic which, unfortunately, is still very lively. On May

¹ *American Embassy Release*, Beirut. According to press reports, Israel expropriated 535.2 hectares (838 acres) of old Jerusalem during the first week of January 1968.

² *Pakistan Documents Series*, No. 2, January 1968. The series are issued by the Pakistani Embassy in Washington, D.C., U.S.A.

³ *U.S. Department of State Bulletin*, 5/2/1968, p. 161.

⁴ *U.N. Monthly Chronicle*, February 1968, pp. 51-54.

25th, the President of Egypt confessed in so many words that the purpose of the closure of Aqaba was to force Israel to fight. There are still responsible diplomats in this building and all over the world who speak of an aggression by Israel. Now, the newspapers that I represent, which are independent of both sides, are at a loss to explain to their readers this—to speak respectfully—contradiction, and are looking to the United Nations for help. Could your Excellency explain this mental phenomenon?

The Secretary-General: I am afraid I am not in a position to enlighten you on this subject. The matter has been exhaustively discussed and debated both in the General Assembly and in the Security Council. The General Assembly has adopted two resolutions on the question. The Security Council has adopted several resolutions, all unanimously. On the basis of the latest Security Council resolution, I have appointed Ambassador Gunnar Jarring as my Special Representative for the Middle East. He is now very much involved in finding a peaceful solution to the problem, as called for by the Security Council resolutions. Beyond that, I am afraid that I cannot make any further assessment.

Question: Mr. Secretary-General, the Canadian Government early this week, on the occasion of Prime Minister Eshkol's visit expressed the view that the Middle East situation, like other world problems, is linked in some way to the situation in Viet-Nam, that the problem in the Middle East cannot be solved until the problem of Viet-Nam is solved. Would you care to comment? Do you hold a similar view, Mr. Secretary-General?

The Secretary-General: I would not go that far. I would not go so far as to say that the Middle Eastern crisis cannot be solved unless and until the crisis in Viet-Nam is solved. But I agree with the assessment that the Viet-Nam war poisoned the atmosphere and caused a very serious setback in East-West détente. It was even reflected in the General Assembly and the Security Council, as you are aware. So the Viet-Nam war has definite and direct impacts on any crisis situations anywhere. But I would not go so far as to say that the solution of the Middle Eastern problem

rests or is predicated upon the settlement of the Viet-Nam war.

15

Interview Granted by the Israeli Defence Minister Dayan to the Israeli Daily "Haaretz,"¹

Tel Aviv, January 19, 1968

Q. What developments do you regard as possible in our relations with the Arab countries? Is a fourth war liable to break out, and if so, when? Or shall we continue to live in a state of neither war nor peace?

A. There are two possible estimates, the first a very short-term one, and the second a long-term one. In the short term, the possibility of a fourth war, or at least a serious clash, must be taken into account. In the long term, there may be permanent peace settlements. Any one who ignores the short term problems can paint an ideal picture, but its veracity is refuted by the facts. From another point of view, if we do not decide what is our long term objective, our treatment of important and pressing problems will not be properly directed.

My first assumption is that the Arab countries, headed by Egypt, will not accept the present cease-fire line as a frontier line, and that it will be a long time before they become sufficiently accustomed to this situation to consent to it. The advantages we see in remaining on the Suez Canal, because it gives us strategic depth and all that that involves, are not likely to appeal to Egypt. We must assume that Egypt will try to secure our withdrawal from the Canal. At first, of course, she will prefer political methods, but if these do not succeed, she will seek other methods. Certainly she will never become accustomed to the Israel Defence Army being stationed on the Canal, with its guns pointed at Egyptian refineries; they will never become accustomed to that. Naturally this also applies, to a great extent, to other countries, but it applies to Egypt first and foremost. Why Egypt? Because she is under greater pressure than other countries, and without

¹ *Haaretz Supplement* (Tel Aviv), 19/1/1968, pp. 6-7.

her it is impossible for the war to be resumed.

The second country that is unwilling to accept the present situation is the Soviet Union. For if we do not withdraw, if Israel does not withdraw after all the Russians have said and promised to the Arabs, it will be a devastating political failure for the Russians, which they will not easily submit to. The Soviet Union is more closely linked to Egypt than to any other Arab country, and we must not disregard the possibility of their joint policy taking the form of an attempt to drive back the Israeli forces and force them to withdraw.

I fear that it is not possible to assume that our power to endure and the passage of time will lead to the settlement of the matter. On the contrary, we must assume that our continued presence on the Canal will mean a struggle, and, perhaps, another round in the war, even though neither of them would welcome another military round—neither the Soviet Union nor Egypt. If political struggle is sufficient, they will prefer it. But if they do not secure our withdrawal by political efforts, Egypt is liable to adopt military methods. From the military point of view, I do not estimate that Egypt is now prepared for military action, even on a local scale. But when Abdel Nasser has finished rebuilding his army, his air force and his armour, the situation may well change.

If a fourth round starts, we must assume that the Arab countries will work in coordination—not abortive coordination, like last year, but real coordination. They will wage war together, on two fronts—the North-Eastern Front (Iraq, Jordan and Syria) and the Southern Front (Egypt).

The Syrians and Egyptians have been replacing the equipment they lost in the recent war, to the extent that their air and armoured strength can now bear comparison with what it was in May 1967. But the basic difference between the possible future war and the war of June 1967 will not lie in the fact that they have more and better arms. The two essential differences will be:

1) Coordination of offensive: In June 1967, when we fought a total war with Egypt and Syria, Jordan and Iraq, they attacked with artillery, and to some extent, with planes (Iraq bombed Nantanya). But there was no serious attempt on the

part of Iraq, Jordan and Syria, to occupy Israel; all that happened was that a commando battalion was sent, which did not get anywhere, and there were local Syrian attacks. It is possible that in the future round they may do what they did not do in 1967. It is possible that these four countries may launch an attack on us on two fronts, with a coordinated plan. For we are treading on their toes—on the Canal, about 120 kilometres from Cairo, on the West Bank, and in the Golan Heights about 60 kilometres from Damascus. This is a very good reason for the Syrians to coordinate their efforts with Egypt. When the Egyptians told them in 1967 that we were attacking Sinai, the Syrians did not hurry. This time they have an excellent reason for hurrying, and the same applies to Jordan, if war breaks out, not because King Hussein wants to be on the winning side, but because now he will regard himself as obliged to “liberate” the West Bank.

Q. Why?

A. Because the lines we now hold, in Egypt, Syria and Jordan, are a reason for the Arab countries desiring war. It is not now a question of their wanting to destroy Israel, but because they regard war as absolutely essential if they are to survive.

2) The new role the Russians are playing. This is the second basic difference. I want to say at once, very definitely, that the next round will only come if the Russians decide there is to be a second round. It will not be like May last year, when the Russians told Egypt that there were Israeli divisions on the Syrian frontiers, after which the Egyptians claimed that they had entered the war on the basis of Russian information. The present situation is different. If the Russians do not come to a very clear decision and tell the Arabs to fight a war, the Arabs will not fight a war, not in the coming year, at least. After their recent defeat they will not undertake such a responsibility. But if the Russians decide that there must be war, the Arabs will fight.

Q. What form might Russian participation in the war take?

A. In my estimate the Russians are now at operational standard. They are now playing their part in the disposition of arms, in anti-aircraft defence and in the artillery network.

I estimate also that they are playing their part in operational planning, in deciding the kind of action to be taken, in the determining of local points, etc. But reports appear in the press from time to time to the effect that the Russian presence in Egypt is liable to be intensified, as happened in the case of the American advisers in the South Vietnamese army, with the result that a Vietnamese battalion commander could make no move without consulting his American adviser. I do not believe that this will happen, but it is possible that the Russians may join in drawing up a plan for starting war. What is certain is that it will be the Russians who decide whether or no a war is to start.

Q. Will Russian objectives be limited?

A. That is a matter of speculation.

The restricted objective in the Golan Heights is withdrawal 20 kilometres to the line of the River Jordan; they also want to get us out of the Suez Canal and Sharm al-Shaikh. It is possible that the objectives may also be limited as regards air and sea. But all these are only theoretical possibilities.

Q. In the case of another round against a united Arab enemy, acting at Russian prompting and with Russian aid, shall we be defeated or win?

A. I believe that we can win the next round too if it comes. If hostilities are renewed, we shall have superiority.

Q. Shall we be successful in defending the civilian rear?

A. I cannot say that there will be no casualties in the civilian rear. I cannot say that it will be exactly the "de luxe" war that it was for the civilian sector in 1967.

Q. Do you mean that they will not achieve even their limited objectives?

A. I say that we shall win this war. I cannot say where we shall gain 50 kilometres and where we shall lose 50 kilometres, where we shall go and where we shall withdraw to.

Q. Shall we fight a defensive or an offensive war?

A. We have not spoken of operational plans. But I say that if there is another round we shall win it. I cannot say exactly what kind of a war it will be, but we shall win it.

Q. Should we not then seek a settlement with Hussein to ease the situation in the South?

A. If we said that we were going to make peace with Hussein today, what difference would that make? In my opinion, the only front today is the Egyptian front at Suez. This is the crisis, the conflict, this is the front, not any other frontier. If war starts there, it may possibly involve other countries. But Jordan will not start a war.

On the Egyptian front, along the Suez Canal, the most important fact is that the Egyptians, as I said before, will never become accustomed to the present situation.

If we made peace with Hussein tomorrow and he got what he wanted, that would not relieve tension on the Egyptian front. On the contrary; if we made concessions to Hussein on his front, the Russians would say: "This is an Israeli concession to the Americans! You have made concessions to the Americans, but not to us." The Egyptians would say that it was a conspiracy between Israel and Jordan.

Q. Some people say that if one Arab country made peace with us, this would start the thaw, and the rest of the Arab countries would be prepared to make peace. Do you believe this?

A. I have heard this theory—that no Arab country wants to be the first. But what I say is that if we make concessions to Hussein, if we withdraw from the River Jordan, Abdel Nasser will be all the more intent on making us withdraw from the Suez Canal. We say that we shall not withdraw without direct negotiations, without peace within secure frontiers. But if we withdraw from one front without obtaining secure frontiers there, there will be greater pressure on us on the other front. If we withdrew from the Jordanian front and made peace with Hussein, Abdel Nasser would not follow Hussein in making peace with us. He would say: "You have withdrawn from there, why do you not withdraw from Sinai too?" The pressure would grow stronger and stronger. But if, on the contrary, we stand firm on all fronts, against Hussein, and against Abdel Nasser too, the pressure will not decrease. I said that the conflict is unavoidable—but it will be easier for us to carry on in the present situation—from the point of view of Arab psychology, at any rate.

It is possible that Abdel Nasser may be

prepared to reach a settlement with us, without reference to Hussein, on condition that we withdraw to the 4 June lines, and then it is possible that Abdel Nasser might be prepared to announce that the state of war was terminated, to grant freedom of navigation in the Straits of Tiran, and even to make some promise as regards the Suez Canal. If we were prepared to withdraw to the pre-1967 lines, we should be able to solve the Egyptian problem to a very great extent.

Q. You are not in favour of it?

A. No, I am utterly opposed to it.

Q. Why? You said that Abdel Nasser will not consent to our being stationed on the Suez canal, that the Russians support him in this, and that his failure to consent will inevitably lead to another round, a military round, apparently. If there is a possibility of reaching a settlement with Egypt, of "solving the Egyptian problem", as you put it, why should we not withdraw?

A. The old frontiers, that Abdel Nasser wants us to return to, are not, from our point of view, secure frontiers. This is proved by the fact that we have been obliged to fight two wars since 1956. The Straits of Tiran are vital to us and we cannot leave them in Egyptian hands or depend on United Nations forces to protect them.

I want a settlement with Abdel Nasser, a settlement based on secure frontiers, which will ensure us freedom of navigation to Eilat. As regards a settlement on freedom of navigation for Israel in the Suez Canal, we are there and we can say: "If you want us to withdraw, let our ships pass through the Canal".

Q. If the Egyptians do not agree now, would you prefer that we should stay where we are?

A. Yes, without such a settlement, we must not withdraw.

Q. Does it not strike you that the Americans would prefer the Canal to remain closed rather than that it should become a Russian waterway?

A. Possibly, I don't know. In any case, the diplomatic steps that must be taken now are not directly connected with this question. From our point of view I think that it is essential that we should, as far as possible, reach agreement with the Americans.

I support the view that it should be our

policy to support U.S. influence in the Middle East. We shall reap no benefits if the U.S. loses its influence in Jordan. Instead of American planes and an American military mission, Jordan would have Russian planes and a Russian military mission. This may be of no great importance to America, but, as far as we are concerned it is an extremely important question whether there are to be Americans or Russians in Jordan. I think that there is reason for such a fear.

I think that as long as there are links with foreign countries, it must be of the greatest concern to us to ensure that the Soviet Union does not inherit American influence in the Middle East, unless the United States allows it.

Q. If Hussein, who is under Western influence, wanted to reach a settlement with us, would you not be in favour of that?

A. Certainly I should. But we must do two things. The first thing we must do now is to reach an understanding with the United States as far as possible, and help it to stay in the Middle East.

Q. Does that depend on us?

A. No, it does not depend on us, but it is what we want. The second thing we intend to do is to think seriously of the relations between us and the West Bank, and Jordan. This is a complicated problem. First and foremost, I do not think that a final settlement is offered to us at present. I think that it is unrealistic at present to ask what should be the guidelines of our final policy. Peace is not offered to us. We must therefore decide on an intermediate policy, rather than a final one.

Q. What should the intermediate policy be?

A. It has two aspects.

1) We must not become engaged with the inhabitants of the areas we are occupying except when necessary.

2) We must hold a secure frontier.

I am not in favour of the army being in Nablus. I think that the Israel Defence Army should be stationed on the range of hills outside Nablus. We must not become engaged with the Arabs of Nablus, with the town of Nablus, but establish ourselves in the mountains to prevent tanks from Iraq and Jordan passing to the West Bank. This is what we should do there. Not

control of the population, but topographical control, to protect Israel—both in the short and the long run.

Q. Is a military presence possible without "engagement", and without controlling the population?

A. What do you mean? Of course it is possible. I can see it with my own eyes. I can see that it is possible. When we established the lines under the 1948 armistice agreement, we wanted to set a barrier between Israel and Jordan, so that they would not be able to cross over from one side to the other. I said that this time we should do the opposite—not closed frontiers, but frontiers that would make contacts possible between the three sectors—the West Bank, Israel and Jordan. As long as it is not prejudicial to our security, we shall try to treat Jordan as a neighbouring country is treated in peace time. What will be the result? As far as we are concerned, the West Bank is, to a certain extent, an intermediary in our relations with the Arab world—a very important intermediary at times. The population of the West Bank can be an important element in preventing operations by *Fateh*. They are imploring Hussein to find ways of making peace with Israel, not war. Not that they have anything to say in our favour. They say that we are oppressive rulers, and they would be delighted if the earth were to swallow us up. They infer that if the Arab armies came to liberate them not a single person would remain alive in their villages. The Jews, they say, would destroy Nablus, the Jews would destroy everything! So, "Thank you very much; please don't come to rescue us! You don't know these Jews. What they really want is that war should break out so that they can expel us." The inhabitants of the West Bank are sending delegations to Hussein, to tell him that the Jews are encouraging *Fateh*. During a certain period, they tell Hussein, *Fateh* did kill a small number of Jews, but during the same period the Israelis demolished houses with the object of making the Arabs flee and they—the Israelis—are demolishing our huts in the Jordan Valley—"and you are providing them with the excuse." This is the pattern—perhaps its is not a very pleasant one, but its implications are important—the pattern of the relationship between Jordan and the West Bank, and how they are to persuade Hussein to stop *Fateh* activities. Now they want to go to the

Arab Summit Conference at Rabat to implore the Arab politicians to seek ways of making peace, not war, with Israel.

There is also a second pattern, which provides a tangible illustration of the present function of the West Bank in the economic field. Jordan declares that any one who brings Israeli goods into the country will be punished, but it allows goods from the West Bank to be brought in. Eventually, thanks to constant contact between the West Bank and Jordan, there will be peaceful life in the West Bank.

I am afraid of what may happen to us and to them, if we are obliged to fight a war against the liberation movement—it will be this system of relationships between us and the West Bank that will be the victim.

I attach great importance to the sound development of this system of relationships. I believe that we can change a large group of Arabs into Israelis. The principal complaint they have against us is that: "You want to separate us from the Arab world." This must not be; this is not the course we must follow if we want to live in the Middle East, and they do not accept it. We can employ force, if we want to control large numbers of Arabs, but I am in favour of the formula which maintains that to create an Arab ghetto in the state of Israel would be to plant a time bomb in the heart of Israel. I doubt if we should be acting wisely if we tried to separate a million Palestinian Arabs from the Arab world. The basic question, therefore, is: can we create a framework, a political-organisational solution, that will ensure that a million Arabs are not separated from the Arab world—whether they are Israelis, Palestinians or Jordanians—they should not be separated from the Arab world through our agency. I am seeking for means of preventing such a separation, and of ensuring that the links between them and the Arab world are as close as possible under present circumstances, so that we can say to the Arabs of Nablus: "All we want of you is that you should not endanger our security; we do not want to control your way of life." We must say to the Arabs: "Whatever the final settlement, you can live without us separating you from the Arab world." Henceforward we must seek to stress that such a solution is possible for countries that are at peace

with each other. The River Jordan, which I regard as Israel's secure frontier, must not separate the Arabs of the West Bank from the Arab world and confine them in a Jewish ghetto. In fact, we have never prevented the Arabs of Israel from listening to broadcasts from the Arab countries. I think they should be allowed to publish their own newspapers, and that we should even subsidise these papers, and that they should be authorised to publish a paper, under military censorship. The Arab people can manage their own personal and collective affairs as they please. We must let them live as they like.

Q. Under what circumstances would a final settlement be possible?

A. First and foremost, Israel's eastern frontier must ensure her security. Secondly, we must have peaceful relations with our partner—whoever that may be—Hussein, or the Arabs of Palestine. The peace treaty must include the following elements: Firstly, the settlement of the refugees—this is an essential condition for peace—and, secondly, there must be religious freedom and both peoples must have right of access to the places with which they have historic links, as is at present the case, for example, in Hebron—even without the establishment of a settlement in Hebron, the Jews can visit the Cave of Machpelah (the Sanctuary of Abraham). This link implies the right to visit, not the possession of title deeds. The peace treaty must stipulate that the historical links of both Jews and Arabs with the places they regard as holy are expressed in their right to visit them and pray to them, rather than to own them. We must not have to buy the Cave of Machpelah again and the Wailing Wall which was built by Herod; I cannot agree that it is Waqf property.

Q. Should the Arabs of the West Bank be encouraged to form their own organisations, apart from the municipalities?

A. Certainly not at present. At present I am talking about a temporary situation.

Q. Is it possible that the temporary situation may last a long time?

A. It is possible. In any case, we must be ready for it to last a long time, for years. In the meantime they are going to and from Jordan, and working wherever they like. They have

Jordanian passports; they send their students to Beirut; they are part of the Arab world. Today the majority of them regard King Hussein as their king.

Q. This being so, should Antun Atallah have been expelled?

A. We did not expel him; we said he would not be allowed to return. This is an important point. There is a difference between the present situation and our admitting that the West Bank is a province of Jordan. That must never be permitted. I cannot accept that it should be understood from the way we behave in a transitional situation that the West Bank is a Palestinian State, or part of Jordan. This is why I cannot agree to the formation of institutions apart from the municipalities. I cannot accept that when an Arab resident of Jerusalem goes to Jordan and takes the oath as a member of the Senate he should continue to be a citizen of Jerusalem. If this Arab had come and spoken to me first, I should have said to him: "Don't do it." And I say to the others: "Wait; the problems will not remain unsolved. Do not put yourself in an impossible political situation. If we have annexed Jerusalem, and you go to Jordan to swear allegiance to Hussein, you will be representing Jerusalem in the Jordanian Senate."

A situation must not be created in which we are understood to recognise Hussein's right to the West Bank. All the same, we must let them live their lives as Arabs—though not as Jordanians—as individuals, as an Arab population, with their own towns, villages, religious courts and Arab system of education (within the framework of our Ministry of Education). In the last twenty years I have learned that this is the key point. Even if we allow them to pray as they wish, and give them work, even so, they will continue to ask "What are you doing to a part of the Arab people? We are part of the Arab world."

Q. Is there anything obscure in this situation you have reviewed?

A. Most things are obscure. For example, one of the things I do not know, although I am optimistic about it, is the extent of the difficulty and the pressure to which Abdel Nasser will be exposed. He may perhaps be in a more difficult situation than we think. I hope that he urgently

needs a settlement, because that would mean that he is in a difficult situation. Russian protection, with the Russians managing his affairs for him—I doubt if it is doing him much good. He has problems at home, his situation is not good. Perhaps he is saying: "Let us reach a settlement with Israel, if only to get out of this situation we have been forced into."

16

Joint Communiqué on the Yugoslav President Tito's Visit to Cambodia.¹ [Excerpt]
Phnom Penh, January 21, 1968

In regard to the situation in the Middle East, the Yugoslav President and the Cambodian Head of State affirmed their resolute support to the Arab peoples in their struggle to safeguard their independence and territorial integrity; they condemned the aggression of June 5, 1967 against the Arab states, demanding the immediate withdrawal of the occupation troops from territories seized by force.

17

Speech by the Indian President Husain at a Banquet in Honour of the Yugoslav President Tito.² [Excerpt]
New Delhi, January 22, 1968

In our common quest for world peace, we have faced some very grave dangers recently. Armed conflict in any part of the world is a threat to peace everywhere. The conflict which overtook West Asia and burst into a war last June has not entirely subsided in spite of the cease-fire. We have welcomed the efforts of the United Nations

to bring peace with justice to the area.

While we adhere strictly to the principle of vacation of aggression we also adhere to the principle that every state has the right to live in peace and security with its neighbours. Your earnest efforts, Mr. President, to bring about an equitable and honourable settlement of the West Asian Crisis, with which we are happy to have combined our own, were an important contribution to the safeguarding of international peace in a troubled world.

18

Speech by the Yugoslav President Tito in Reply to the Indian President Husain.³ [Excerpt]
New Delhi, January 22, 1968

The crisis in the Middle East, brought about by the aggression of Israel against independent Arab countries, is still continuing. Our two countries condemned this aggression at the very outset and have been exerting utmost efforts in order to eliminate its consequences and to find a peaceful solution. This time again, India has made a valuable contribution, particularly by its activity in the United Nations, whereby it has enhanced its prestige among all the peace-loving countries and, especially, among the peoples and governments of the Arab countries which were the victims of Israeli aggression.

We cannot, of course, be satisfied with what has been achieved in the United Nations so far in the search for a solution of the crisis in the Middle East. However, we believe that there do exist conditions for further constructive action aimed at finding a lasting solution.

The Arab countries have shown their readiness to search for a political solution, but Israel, unfortunately, persists in believing that—through the occupation of foreign territories—it will be able to impose solutions which, we are deeply convinced, are not and cannot be accepted by

¹ *Socialist Thought and Practice*, No. 29, January-March 1968, p. 115.

² *Indian Foreign Affairs Record*, January 1968, p. 18.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

one who has at heart the cause of peace and stability in that part of the world and which, in consequence, cannot be in the interest of Israel either.

Therefore, we wish to hope that the Government of Israel will abandon its policy of threat or use of force and that—by evacuating the occupied Arab territories—it will make it possible to solve the existing problems on a lasting basis. It is obvious that all those who are sincerely in favour of peace must continue to exert undiminished efforts in that direction.

19

Replies in Parliament by the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Brown to Questions on Middle East.¹ [Excerpt]

London, January 22, 1968

21. *Dr. David Owen* asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs what steps he now envisages to ensure the full implementation of the United Kingdom Resolution on the Middle East carried unanimously in the Security Council.

Mr. George Brown: It is not for Her Majesty's Government to decide on the manner of its implementation. The Resolution of the United Nations explicitly recognised this in appointing a Special Representative of the Secretary-General to go to the area to begin discussions with the parties concerned. While his mission is in progress I do not think it would be appropriate for me to comment further. But as the House knows Her Majesty's Government are keeping in close touch with all concerned.

Dr. Owen: I congratulate my right hon. Friend on his great contribution to getting this Resolution passed, but does he not agree that it is rather disappointing that so far little action seems to have followed the passing of the Resolution?

Mr. Brown: I am obliged to my hon. Friend for the first part of his supplementary question. I ask him not to be too anxious or gloomy about the second part. I believe that the mission is proceeding very well at the moment, and I have great hopes that we will succeed in getting the beginnings of a settlement there.

Mr. Wood: Can the right hon. Gentleman say anything about the reactions to this Resolution by Israel and the Arab countries?

Mr. Brown: The great thing about it was that when we brought through this Resolution—it was the first time for a long period that a British resolution had got unanimous assent—we also got the acquiescence of both the Arab countries and the Israelis to it, and Dr. Jarring is now operating in the area with both. I think that the best thing we can do at the moment is to wish him very well. I am in touch with both the Arab countries and the Israelis, and have great hopes that he will be able to begin the process of solving this very difficult problem.

Mr. Will Griffiths: Is my right hon. Friend aware that I would like to add my voice to those who wish to congratulate him and the Government in securing this remarkable unanimity in the Security Council last November? But it is now two months since the United Nations Security Council Resolution was passed, and I understand that the Resolution placed no time limit on Dr. Jarring's mission. The Security Council would doubtless wish that it should not be unduly prolonged, because there is real danger of new hostilities breaking out.

Mr. Brown: I thank my hon. Friend for what he said. I entirely agree with him about the mission. My view is that time is not on the side of a solution, and the longer we take over this the more difficult things will get. On the other hand, remaining as I do in close touch, I think that for the moment patience is probably the right virtue to preserve.

32. *Mr. Arnold Shaw* asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether, in pursuance of their policy of seeking to secure peace in the Middle East, the British Government will seek to bring about direct talks between Israel and her Arab neighbours.

¹ Great Britain, House of Commons, *Hansard's Parliamentary Debates*, 22/1/1968, cols. 17-20. (The source is hereafter cited as *Hansard*).

31. *Mr. Henig* asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs what is the policy of Her Majesty's Government with regard to support for direct peace talks between Israel and the Arab States.

Mr. George Brown: While direct talks between Israel and her Arab neighbours are certainly not to be excluded, Her Majesty's Government have always taken the view that it would be unrealistic and therefore unconstructive, to wait upon them before seeking to make progress towards a settlement.

Mr. Shaw: Would my right hon. Friend agree that the only possibility of a lasting peace is direct talks between the two parties and that, therefore, it would help if Her Majesty's Government made their position clear in this and did their best to get the two parties together?

Mr. Brown: This, of course, is one of the most difficult questions that we will ever have to cope with. I have discussed it with Arab statesmen and Arab friends. I discussed it with Mr. Eshkol when he was here last week. It remains my view that the best thing we can do at the moment is to encourage Mr. Jarring in his mission and let the question of direct talks emerge from that. I have no doubt that, in the end, this will have to emerge, but I am pretty sure that if we tried to force that at the beginning, we may very well spoil any chances of a settlement.

Sir B. Janner: May I ask my right hon. Friend to be realistic? Is it not a fact that on practically all occasions previously two contending parties have come together with a view to settling their differences? Does he not think that by some remarks of his he might encourage a settlement in that way—perhaps under the auspices of the United Nations?

Mr. Brown: I think that I am being realistic. I believe that the Israeli authorities understand that I am and I am sure that some of the Arab authorities understand that I am. I am sure that at this moment the right thing to do is to encourage the United Nations mission to go on with this work. Let us move step by step.

Statement by the U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Eugene Rostow on American Policy in the Middle East.¹

Washington, January 23, 1968

Thank you for this opportunity to testify before your subcommittee on the foreign policy implications of S. 975 and H.R. 10915, bills which would permanently bar imports of extra long staple cotton from the Sudan and the United Arab Republic.

We believe that the passage of either of these bills at this time would be contrary to the national interest. Their enactment could harm our foreign trade and investment and could conflict with our international commitments under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Most importantly, such a step on our part, at this delicate and promising moment, would seriously hinder us in our efforts to assist in creating conditions of peace in the Middle East.

Our historic position has been that the absence of diplomatic relations is not in and of itself sufficient justification for severing trade relations. Each case is different and should be examined on its own merits.

In the particular case at hand, the United Arab Republic and the Sudan are the only states in the Middle East which export long staple cotton to the United States. These Governments, along with several others in the area, chose to break diplomatic relations with us on the basis of unfounded allegations that the United States assisted Israel with aircraft and by other means during the latest Arab-Israeli conflict last June. These accusations have no foundation in fact. They are known to be false. In a dignified and statesmanlike speech, King Hussein of Jordan expressly repudiated these charges as based on misinformation. We hope that other governments will see fit to associate themselves with his statement in the near future.

We have serious national interests in the Middle East. We and the nations of Europe have

¹ U.S. *Department of State Bulletin*, 12/2/1968, pp. 217-219. The statement was made before the Subcommittee on Agricultural Production, Marketing and Stabilization of Prices of the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry.

had close and friendly relations with the peoples and governments of the area for generations. We have taken a sympathetic interest in the development of Israel as a progressive and democratic community, and, like most other governments of the world, have insisted on its right to live in peace and security. The Middle East links three continents. Its airspace and waterways are of fundamental importance to the commerce and strategic balance of the world. Its oil resources are a major factor in the life of the world economy. The power to deny access to the Middle East and its resources would be a matter of grave concern to the United States and its allies in Europe and elsewhere.

Our Middle Eastern policy has consistently expressed this strong national interest. For the last 20 years we have attempted to assist the states in the area in creating political and economic conditions which would lead to peace and stability. We take the view that peace in the Middle East should rest on five principles: (1) respect for the territorial integrity and political independence of all the states in the area; (2) justice for the Arab refugees; (3) a status for Jerusalem which recognizes both its international character and its historic identification with three great world religions; (4) the assurance of international maritime rights; and (5) an end to the arms race.

As you know, it has not been easy to achieve these goals. The Soviet Union has shipped huge volumes of arms to certain states in the area and thus far has refused to consider plans for regional arms limitation. Efforts have been made to exploit the tensions of the region at the expense of the constructive and forward-looking governments which have been working closely with us in their plans for economic and social development.

We did everything within our power to prevent the latest flareup of the Arab-Israeli dispute. When the explosion occurred, we did our best to obtain a cease-fire and to move the parties toward peace. Our diplomacy has been working around the clock, under Ambassador Goldberg [U.S. Representative to the United Nations Arthur J. Goldberg] in New York, and in all the capitals of the region, to obtain a fair and evenhanded political settlement of the conflict so that the region could develop in a condition of security and peace.

After months of debate, the United Nations Security Council last November passed a British resolution, which was accepted by the parties to the dispute as a workable basis for negotiation. Under the mandate of this resolution, the distinguished Swedish diplomat, Ambassador Gunnar Jarring, is now in the Middle East meeting with the governments concerned and trying to assist them in establishing conditions for a just and durable peace. We believe Ambassador Jarring is making progress, and we are doing all we can to support him in his difficult and important task.

We regret the fact that many countries in the area chose to break diplomatic relations with us last June. Diplomatic relations are especially important in times of strain. We wish to do nothing which would make the restoration of these relations more difficult when the governments concerned are ready for that step.

Against this background, we believe it would be a mistake at this point, with definite improvement in the political atmosphere taking place, to abolish the long staple cotton quotas which the United Arab Republic and Sudan have long been allowed to compete for in our market. Such an act would impose a new impediment to the restoration of diplomatic relations, and of friendly relations, between the United States and the states of the region. It would be resented by all the Arab states, including those which have worked with us in this tense and difficult period.

We believe the peoples and governments of the area should know that the door to friendly and peaceful relations with the United States is always open. We have no intention of abandoning either our friends or our interests in this part of the world. The elimination of these quotas would not advance any interest of the United States. Such a step would play into the hands of those who are actively seeking to widen the breach between the United States and the Arab world and, indeed, to take positions of control in the internal affairs of the United Arab Republic, Syria, Algeria, and the Yemen.

Enactment of these measures would also damage our economic interests. Their initial impact would be a reduction in our imports of extra long staple cotton. However, their potential adverse effect on our exports and foreign invest-

ments should not be overlooked. A country can hardly be expected to maintain purchases from us if we refuse to buy from it. This is a fact we must keep carefully in mind at a time when we are making a serious effort to reduce our balance-of-payments deficit.

Trade with the United Arab Republic continues to run heavily in our favor. During the first 11 months of 1967, January through November, our exports to the U.A.R. totaled \$ 63.2 million, while imports from the U.A.R. were only \$13.9 million, a net export balance of \$ 49.3 million. This was, of course, purely commercial trade. This pattern corresponds to the record of recent years. Egypt has consistently bought more from us than she sold.

Since the break in relations, our export trade with the U.A.R. has held up better than our import trade. Exports for the period July to November, inclusive, totaled \$13.6 million, against imports of \$2.8 million, an export balance of \$10.8 million in 5 months.

If the committee so desires, Mr. Chairman, I can explain exactly how H.R. 10915 and S. 1975, if enacted into law, could conflict with international commitments of the United States under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. I went into this subject in some detail last July in my appearance before the House committee,¹ and I shall not take up our time now with this problem unless you wish me to do so. Suffice it to say that a conflict could exist and that such a step on our part could be regarded as a breach of our international obligations.

Let me recapitulate, Mr. Chairman. The enactment of H.R. 10915 or of S. 1975:

Would diminish the prospects for peace in the Middle East;

Would worsen our balance of payments; and

Could conflict with our international commitments.

Moreover, it would reduce the flow of commerce through the great port of Charleston and would further reduce the already restricted right of the textile mills in this country to choose the raw material best suited to their needs.

This would be the cost of legislation applying to less than 1 percent of the cotton produced in this country.

If the Congress decides that our national policy now requires additional inducements to assist domestic producers of extra long staple cotton, I submit that the Hayden bill, H.R. 10864, which has been passed by the Senate, would accomplish this legitimate goal without doing violence to our country's foreign policy objectives.

21

Joint Communiqué on the British Prime Minister Wilson's Visit to the U.S.S.R.² [Excerpts]

Moscow, January 24, 1968

At the invitation of the Soviet Government the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, the Rt. Hon. Harold Wilson, paid an official visit to the Soviet Union from 22 to 24 January, 1968.

The two sides had a detailed discussion of the development of the situation in the Middle East and exchanged views on ways to achieve a political settlement of the problems of the region.

They emphasised the need for the earliest possible implementation of the Security Council resolution of 22 November, 1967; and in this connection they declared their support for the efforts of the United Nations secretary-general's special representative, Ambassador Jarring, aimed at bringing about the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the conflict in June, 1967, and the realisation of the other provisions of that resolution.

¹ See *International Documents on Palestine, 1967*, pp. 140-141.

² *Soviet News* (London), 30/1/1968, p. 58.

22

Joint Communiqué on the Yugoslav President Tito's Visit to India.¹ [Excerpt]

New Delhi, January 27, 1968

President Tito and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi also observed with concern that little had been done towards a settlement of the Middle East crisis. They upheld efforts to implement the resolution of the United Nations Security Council, and the endeavours of all peace-minded countries to secure withdrawal of troops from territories occupied through resort to force and to achieve a settlement on the basis of the recognition of the integrity, independence and right to existence of all states in that area, thereby ensuring an enduring peace.

23

Joint Communiqué on the Turkish President Sunay's Visit to Saudi Arabia.² [Excerpts]

Jiddah, January 27, 1968

H.E. President Cevdet Sunay of the Republic of Turkey paid an official visit to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia from 22nd to 27th January 1968 at the invitation of his brother H.M. King Faisal ibn Abd al-Aziz Al Sa'ud of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia...

During the talks, which covered all fields and were held in an atmosphere of sincerity and complete mutual understanding, the two Heads of State reviewed relations between their countries and exchanged views on international problems with particular stress on the Middle East. H.M. King Faisal explained the latest developments in the occupation of Arab territory and the Palestine tragedy. His Majesty emphasised that Saudi Arabia and the Arab world adhered to all Arab rights. His Majesty reiterated the Arab people's

¹ *Socialist Thought and Practice*, No. 29, January-March 1968, p. 115.

² *Jiddah* home Service in Arabic, 11.40 GMT, 27/1/1968. B.B.C., ME/2682/E/1.

profound gratitude for Turkey's continuous and sincere support of the just Arab cause during the Middle East crisis.

His Excellency the Turkish President reaffirmed Turkey's love and profound friendship for the Arab countries. With regard to the Middle East problem, the Turkish President stressed Turkey's opposition to the use in international relations of force and military occupation as means for securing political benefits and territorial gains. He stressed the need to safeguard Arab interests and legitimate rights. He expressed his hope for the success of the current efforts to resolve the problems of the region on the basis of right and justice.

The two Heads of State particularly expressed their profound anxiety about steps taken concerning Jerusalem. They reiterated their opposition to these measures.

24

Joint Communiqué on the East German Vice-Premier Weiss's Visit to Syria, 16-27 January.³ [Excerpt]

Damascus, January 27, 1968

The GDR delegation expressed their Government's appreciation of the social progress made in the Syrian Arab Republic stressing that the GDR was willing to support the struggle waged by that country against imperialism, Zionism, colonialism and neocolonialism.

The German Democratic Republic again condemns the aggression committed by Israel against the Arab countries and affirms its unwavering support for the immediate and complete elimination of the consequences arisen therefrom.

Both parties expressed their indignation at the assistance rendered Israeli aggression by the Government of the German Federal Republic.

The Syrian Arab Republic expressed its appreciation of the help rendered by the German

³ G.D.R. *Foreign Affairs Bulletin*, 15/2/1968, p. 35.

Democratic Republic and this country's solidarity with the Arab peoples' struggle.

25

Radio Interview With the Israeli Foreign Ministry Director-General Rafael.¹

Jerusalem, January 30, 1968

Q. Cairo radio has reported that Gen. Odd Bull has received from the Egyptian Foreign Minister a timetable for the salvage work. How should we treat such a timetable if it is brought by Gen. Bull?

A. Only the subject of freeing the ships trapped in the Canal and Bitter Lake has been discussed with us. When the Egyptians want to discuss the freedom of shipping in the Canal with Israel, including the freedom of shipping for Israel, they will find a way. When they inform Ambassador Jarring of their readiness to accept the U.N. resolutions of 1st September 1951² and 22nd November 1967, we shall be happy to talk to them and to hear from them that they are taking steps to provide freedom of shipping for all nations. The Canal is closed not only because of physical obstacles, but also because of political ones. Egypt uses its state of war with Israel to justify its ban on Israeli shipping. The Egyptians should respond to the U.N. resolutions and remove the political obstacles also.

Q. The agreement provides for the freeing of the ships from the southern end of the Canal. Is an agreement in principle possible on freeing the ships from the northern end?

A. If it becomes apparent that it is impossible to free the ships from the Southern end—although this is technically feasible—then a new situation will be created which will require new discussions.

Q. Mr. Rafael, does the agreement only concern the freeing of the ships and no other operation in the Canal?

A. Yes, the agreement only concerns the

freeing of the ships. The agreement was reached on the initiative of Ambassador Jarring on behalf of the countries whose ships are trapped in the Canal. We thought it proper on our part to assist them in freeing their ships. Israel agreed that the ships should be freed from the southern end of the Canal as proposed.

26

Seventh Annual Report of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.³ [Excerpts]

Washington, January 30, 1968

Regional arms races

The 1967 war in the Middle East drew the world's attention back to one of the most troubling elements in this perennially flammable region—the role of the big powers as arms suppliers. In the United States, it added to a growing sense of national unease about the responsibilities of the larger states in supplying military equipment on a global scale to the developing nations. It led to a proposal by President Johnson that UN member nations report "all shipments of all military arms" into the Middle East and that a record of those shipments be kept on file "for all the peoples of the world to observe."⁴ This move was followed by intensive diplomatic activity aimed at restraint on the major arms suppliers to the region, particularly the Soviet Union.

The 12-years of tension in the Middle East, culminating in the Arab-Israeli war, dramatized the difficult question of whether, how, and when the United States should supply arms abroad. Since the end of World War II, the United States has done so, through military assistance programs or sales, for two general categories of countries—our allies in mutual defense arrangements, and less developed nations. In the latter case, arms have been supplied as a shield against expansionist neighbors or internal subversion

¹ Israel home service in Hebrew 18.40 GMT, 30/1/1968. B.B.C., ME/2684/A/4.

² Resolution 95 of 1 September 1951, U.N. doc. S/2322.

³ U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *Documents on Disarmament*, 1967, pp. 754-758.

⁴ See *International Documents on Palestine*, 1967, pp. 116-118.

behind which economic and political growth could go forward.

Prior to the 1967 Middle East crisis, the Agency produced a series of in-house studies on arms shipments to that area, existing weapons inventories, missile proliferation problems, and arms control possibilities. In addition, selected regional background material was provided by ACDA contractors. This combination of reports backed up overall U.S. considerations of ways of limiting the Middle East arms race, including arms publication and registration possibilities.

During the crisis, as well as in its aftermath, ACDA participated in the preparation of material for top-level interagency groups, including the Special Committee of the National Security Council set up by the President. Contributions were made to the question of restraints on arms shipments into the area, to development of the President's registration proposal, to an examination of the problems of missile proliferation, and to development of the diplomatic effort to hold down a renewed arms build-up.

In such periods of intensive activity, the reservoir of talent and knowledge built up over the years by ACDA's internal and external research program pays off. The Center for International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, which in the past has provided a valuable body of information directly related to the problems of arms transfer and conflict control, was asked on a crash basis to provide material on the Middle East; its first input was delivered to ACDA when the conflict was two days old.

27

Joint Communiqué on the Turkish President Sunay's Visit to Libya.¹ [Excerpts]

Tripoli, January 31, 1968

The Honourable President Cevdet Sunay of

¹ Ankara home Service in Turkish 11.00 GMT, 31/1/1968. B.B.C., ME/2685/E/1.

Turkey paid an official visit to Libya between 27th and 31st January 1968 at the invitation of his brother King Sayyid Muhammad Idris...

During these sincere and productive talks, international problems in general and the situation in the Middle East in particular were discussed. At the same time, topics concerning bilateral relations and ways of developing these relations were studied. H.M. the King gave an extensive explanation of developments in the Middle East and the stage the tragedy of the Palestine problem had reached. He expressed the profound gratitude of the Libyan people and Government for the sincere and valuable support given by Turkey to the Arab countries throughout the crisis in the region.

The Honourable President reiterated Turkey's friendship and profound affection for the Arab countries. The Honourable President confirmed Turkey's opposition to political and territorial gains through the use of force and the use of such gains for the imposition of unilateral settlements. The Honourable President stated that in efforts aimed at the settlement of the crisis the lawful rights of Arab countries must be taken into account.

28

Joint Communiqué on the U.S.S.R. Premier Kosygin's Official Visit to India, 25-31 January.² [Excerpt]

New Delhi, January 31, 1968

Both sides made a comprehensive review of the situation in West Asia. In this connection, once again they emphasized the necessity for the implementation of the resolution of the Security Council of the 22nd November, 1967, and the withdrawal without delay of the Israeli forces to the lines which they occupied prior to June 5, 1967.

² Indian Foreign Affairs Record, January 1968, p. 15.

29

Joint Communiqué on the Chad Foreign Minister Baroum's Visit to the U.S.S.R.¹
[Excerpts]

Moscow, January 31, 1968

At the invitation of the Soviet government, Jacques Baroum, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Chad, was in the Soviet Union on an official visit from Jan. 24 to Jan. 31, 1968.

The sides also exchanged opinions on the situation in the Near East. Noting the dangerous deterioration of the situation in that region, they urged the speediest fulfillment of the Security Council resolution of Nov. 22, 1967, which stipulates the immediate withdrawal of Israeli troops from occupied Arab territories.

30

Joint Communiqué on the Jordanian King Hussein's Visit to Pakistan.² [Excerpts]

Rawalpindi, February 1, 1968

At the invitation of the President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Field Marshall Muhammad Ayub Khan, His Majesty King Hussein of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan paid a state visit to Pakistan from January 26 to February 1...

His Majesty King Hussein and President Muhammad Ayub Khan reviewed the present situation in the Middle East. The King apprised the President of the current development in this region and stressed the urgency of a just solution to the crisis. He reaffirmed His resolve to abide by decisions of the Khartum Summit Conference.

The President expressed His deep concern about the extremely dangerous situation in the

Middle East and the continuance of threats to peace and stability in the area. He recalled that Pakistan had consistently supported the Arabs in their just demand for restoration of their rights to their homeland. He expressed the deep sympathy of the people and Government of Pakistan for the people of Jordan and admiration for their courageous heroism. He stressed special responsibility of the international community for providing humanitarian assistance to refugees and for ensuring their speedy return to their homes.

President Muhammad Ayub Khan and His Majesty King Hussein declared that the acquisition of territory by use of force is contrary to provisions of the United Nations' Charter. They re-affirmed that immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces from all occupied Arab territories, including Jerusalem, is essential for prompt compliance with all resolutions adopted by the special emergency session of the General Assembly and Security Council concerning the Middle East crisis.

Both sides agreed that the real problem facing the world today was the maintenance and consolidation of international peace and stability. They expressed conviction that lasting peace could be attained only by strict adherence to principles of the United Nations Charter and implementation of its resolutions, the exercise of the right of self-determination by all people and the honoring of international agreements. They emphasized the importance of strengthening the effectiveness of the United Nations as an agency for peace keeping and for settlement of international disputes.

31

Letter From the British Prime Minister Wilson on the Soviet Attitude Towards Russian Jewry.³

London, February 3, 1968

Dear Barney,

Thank you for your letter of February 1.

¹ *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 21/2/1968, pp. 19-20. From *Pravda*.

² *Pakistan Documents Series*, No. 3, February 1968.

³ *Jewish Chronicle* (London), 9/2/1968, p. 18. The letter was addressed to Sir Barnett Janner, M.P., after Mr. Wilson's visit to the U.S.S.R. in January, 1968.

I was able to discuss this matter with Mr. Kosygin and other Soviet leaders on my recent visit.

First, with regard to the points you made about the treatment of Jews in the Soviet Union, and the provision of Jewish meat and passover bread, and printing facilities for Jewish material, I have, as you say, raised these questions on previous visits.

I did so again, but there was no change in the Soviet position, which is to regard Soviet Jews exactly like other races or nationalities, as in every sense Soviet citizens.

The leading position of a number of Soviet Jews in positions of high authority was, of course, instanced by the Russian leaders.

With regard to restrictions on emigration from the Soviet Union to Israel, I explained to you that this would be a difficult subject to press, in the present tense situation in the Middle East.

It became clear from my discussions with the Soviet leaders that the fears I expressed to you were justified, and that there will be little hope of reconsideration at this time of this question.

With regards to restrictions involving reunion of families, as you said on previous occasions, both before and since coming into office, I have taken up lists supplied to me by Jewish organisations in this country, and a considerable number of Soviet citizens have been allowed to join their families.

I arranged that this matter would continue to be dealt with through normal diplomatic channels, i.e., through our Ambassador, discussing each individual case with the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Thank you again for the very helpful discussions you have had with me on this subject. As we agreed, I am releasing these letters to the press.

Yours sincerely,
Harold Wilson.

32

Joint Communiqué on the Yugoslav President Tito's Visit to Ethiopia.¹ [Excerpt]

Addis Ababa, February 4, 1968

The Emperor of Ethiopia and the President of Yugoslavia devoted special attention to the present situation in the Middle East. Bearing in mind the need to respect the principles embodied in the United Nations Charter, they support the efforts made by peace-minded countries, within the United Nations in particular, to achieve a settlement on the basis of respect for the territorial integrity and right to independent existence of all states in that area. They consider that withdrawal of troops from occupied territories would constitute a vital step towards the securing of lasting peace and stability in that area.

33

News Conference Remarks by the Yugoslav President Tito During His Visit to the U.A.R.² [Excerpt]

Cairo, February 7, 1968

In the course of our journey we have observed a strong tendency in the countries that there should be greater activity on the part of the non-aligned countries, and not only of the non-aligned countries, but of all countries that reject the use of force in the solution of problems.

The object of our visit here to Cairo was to learn the present situation and to hear President Abdel Nasser's views. The communiqués issued about our journey will show you what subjects we studied and our attitude to the subjects and problems we discussed.

Now I am ready to answer questions.

Al-Ahram : Does President Tito intend to make

¹ *Socialist Thought and Practice*, No. 29, January-March 1968, p. 115.

² *Al-Ahram* (Cairo), 8/2/1968.

new diplomatic efforts after his visit to Cairo, and has he a plan to facilitate the finding of a solution of the Middle East crisis, as he did last August?

President Tito: I think that the situation is approaching a deadlock, and that the Security Council's resolution and the choice of Jarring to implement the resolution has not led to the expected results as regards a solution of the crisis. It is natural that condemnation should be directed against one side—Israel—as the United Arab Republic has adopted a positive attitude as regards the solution of the crisis and shown its good intentions as regards the finding of a solution for certain secondary problems, such as the removal of the ships from the Suez Canal—and you can see where this attitude has led to.

Consequently, the situation once more provides cause for alarm. Israel is determined to get her own way, and is still insisting on direct negotiations.

The West German News Agency: What do you consider is the proper solution of the Middle East crisis?

President Tito: It is possible to find the solution through the United Nations. The majority of the member states are in agreement, but Israel opposes this resolution and refuses to implement it. The situation is now in the hands of the United States, for it is difficult to imagine that Israel would refuse to implement Security Council resolutions without United States support.

American National Television: Do you see any connection between the problem of Vietnam and that of the Middle East? Is it possible to find a solution for both problems?

President Tito: (laughing) Yes, I do indeed see a connection between the Middle East and Far East crises, they are directly linked. The peaceful solution of both problems depends on a single principle—the stopping of air raids on North Vietnam and the withdrawal of the Israeli forces, after which talks can begin on the implementation of previous resolutions, including the termination of the state of war and freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba, which is a question linked with the solution of the refugee problem. There is a connection, and it is quite clear: in our opinion the United States is responsible for both these crisis.

The Algerian News Agency: This being your attitude, do you consider it essential to call a new conference of the non-aligned states in view of the present crisis in both the Middle and Far East?

President Tito: In our talks here we agreed that such a conference is essential. Careful preparations must be made for it. I think that this conference should include all the forces working for peace, and that it should be attended by all the countries that oppose the use of force. These countries must take vigorous action and I should like to emphasise that this conference must not be as restricted as the first and second non-alignment conferences; it must have a wider and more comprehensive base.

Al-Ahram: Your Excellency has described the situation as having reached a deadlock. Do you think that Jarring's mission has failed and that a meeting of the Security Council should be called?

President Tito: I said before that Jarring's mission has had meagre results, or perhaps no results at all. To confront this crisis the situation must be reviewed at the Security Council, which should start where it left off and hold Israel responsible for she has prevented any results being achieved.

American Television: Can you say what countries will attend the new conference?

President Tito: No, I cannot. But the invitation to the conference will be more widely based than was the case with the previous conference. There are certain countries which are to some extent in economic subjection but which, nevertheless, believe in the policy of the Cairo and Belgrade conferences. I therefore think that the invitation to the new conference should be broader and freer.

The Yugoslav Daily "Borba": Did you discuss bilateral relations between the two countries?

President Tito: We discussed bilateral relations between the two countries in all fields and how they could be extended. We also exchanged views on the present situation and the presence of Israeli forces on the other bank of the Canal.

The West German News Agency: You discussed political solutions. Do you believe in a military solution

of the Middle East problem as an alternative to a political solution if it becomes clear that the latter is impossible?

President Tito: The situation is as follows: Here in Cairo we discussed a political solution, not a military solution. But every people, in my opinion, is entitled one day to solve its problems in other ways. We have made tremendous efforts to find a political solution because the United Arab Republic has taken a stand in support of this trend.

But no one can foretell what will happen if pressure on the Arab countries is continued after they have taken a positive stand.

I am now repeating what I said to the *Washington Post* during the aggression. I said then: "I believe that every attempt by Israel to impose a solution will end in disaster for her."

34

Toast by the French President de Gaulle at a Dinner in Honour of the Iraqi President Abd al-Rahman Aref.¹ [Excerpts]

Paris, February 7, 1968

... To the Arab and the French peoples..., absorption by either of the two world blocs centred on the two super-powers is unacceptable. Not, of course that they, or peoples anywhere else that resemble them in this respect, should refrain from such foreign relations as are advantageous to them. But their self-respect, their knowledge of what is required if the world balance of power is to be maintained prompt them to reject any form of subservience, whether ideological, political, economic or military. Hence their fundamental solidarity which they have every reason to put into practice and to reinforce.

This, after all is one of the reasons why France deplores the war that broke out eight months ago in the East, and its consequences which, especially as far as the peoples of the area are concerned, can only be described as shocking:

a state of war and consequences that can only be ended by an international settlement establishing a genuine peace that remedies all injury done to the Arabs.

We have already stated, and we now repeat in your presence, that such a settlement should, in our opinion, include the following: the evacuation by both military and civilian personnel of all territories occupied by the use of armed force since June 1967, the assumption by the United Nations of the task of demarcating frontiers and ensuring their security, the establishing of peaceful and normal relations between the new state of Israel and her neighbours, the repatriation of those refugees who, if such a settlement were reached, would be able to return to their native land, and the ensuring of a dignified status to those who could not return, and to the minorities. Finally, recognition of the right of freedom of navigation for everyone everywhere.

We have already stated and we now repeat in your presence, that France is prepared to participate, on the spot, in the implementation of an agreement drawn up on such a basis. In any case, it seems advisable that our governments should keep in close contact throughout this crisis.

35

Reply in Parliament by the British Prime Minister Wilson to a Question on the Middle East.² [Excerpt]

London, February 7, 1968

Mr. Raymond Fletcher asked the Prime Minister whether, in the light of his recent discussions with the Prime Minister of Israel and the Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, he intends to discuss with the President of the United States changes in the British Government's policy towards the Middle East situation.

The Prime Minister [Harold Wilson]: No. The

¹ *Politique Etrangère de la France*, 1er Sem., 1968, pp. 62-63.

Hansard, 7/2/1968, col. 180.

policy of Her Majesty's Government remains to do all in their power to help forward a political settlement of the problems of the Middle East. As I made clear both to the Prime Minister of Israel during his visit here, and to Mr. Kosygin in Moscow, this requires acceptance of the principle of the withdrawal of Israeli Armed Forces from occupied territories, and the termination of the state of belligerency, and acknowledgement of the right of every state in the area to security and recognised boundaries, as provided *inter alia* by the Security Council Resolution of 22nd November, 1967. Her Majesty's Government sponsored this Resolution and remains fully committed to it.

36

Joint Communiqué on the Iraqi President Abd al-Rahman Aref's State Visit to France, 7-10 February.¹ [Excerpt]

Paris, February 10, 1968

The two Heads of State discussed in a spirit of understanding the international political situation and current problems, especially as regards the Middle East. They also discussed relations between Iraq and France.

Naturally, the talks centred in the first place on the situation arising from the Arab-Israeli dispute and the stands taken by each of the two Governments towards it. The two sides recalled the resolution passed on this subject by the Security Council on November 22 and agreed that there can be no chance of arriving at a solution without prior withdrawal from territories occupied since the outbreak of the war. The two sides expressed the hope that all should coordinate their endeavours, especially within the framework of the United Nations, for arriving at a just and fair solution capable of achieving durable peace in the region.

37

Address by the Indian President Husain Before Parliament.² [Excerpt]

New Delhi, February 12, 1968

The crisis in West Asia remains unsolved. The longer a just solution is delayed, the more difficult would be the problem. As a member of the Security Council, we have consistently supported all the efforts made to find an early and equitable settlement so that no State is allowed to retain the fruits of aggression and that every State in the area is able to live in peace and security with its neighbours.

38

Statement by the Israeli Defence Minister Dayan in the Knesset on the Situation Along the Jordanian Frontier.³ [Excerpts]

Jerusalem, February 13, 1968

The statement I want to make is based on facts relative to what is happening on the Israeli-Jordanian frontier. I want to say first of all that the situation on this frontier is tense; recently most of the incidents have taken place there—more than have taken place on any other frontier—far more than on the Syrian frontier, the Syrian cease-fire line, which is almost completely quiet. More, too, than on the Egyptian front—and of course there can be no comparison with the Lebanese front. Lebanon did not really take part in the war, but from time to time acts of sabotage do take place on that frontier too.

In addition to the tension resulting from the increasing number of incidents on the Jordanian frontier, we must also take a serious view of the fact that the situation inside Jordan, from the political and security point of view, can be described as disintegrating, as abnormal. For, in addi-

¹ *Politique Etrangère de la France*, 1er Sem., 1968, p. 65.

² *Indian Foreign Affairs Record*, February 1968, p. 41.

³ *Knesset Records* (in Hebrew), 13/2/1968, pp. 1029-1031.

tion to the policy of the Jordanian government, whatever this policy may be, Jordan regards herself as closely linked to the Egyptian political-military framework, and is acting on this basis. At the same time there are large Iraqi forces stationed in Jordan.

Thus, in addition to this policy of the Jordanian government, which I shall go into thoroughly, the fact that Jordan is closely linked with the Egyptian military command, and the fact that there are Iraqi troops in Jordan, create in advance an extremely unbalanced situation in the military field there.

Jordan, thanks both to her geographical position and to her government's policy, is being used as the main base for sabotage and terrorist activities against Israel, not only by those who operate from Jordan—the Palestinians who live there or the bases of the *Fateh* guerrillas in Jordan—but also by other units—a Palestinian group in the Iraqi army, and commando units recruited, trained and paid by the Egyptian army, which have recently concentrated in Port Said—Jordan is the base for their operations, too.

The same applies to Syria. In spite of the fact that the Syrian government is the most extremist, certainly in the way it talks, and also in the way it organises and sends sabotage and terrorist units belonging to *Fateh*—these units operate, from the physical and practical point of view, from Jordanian territory. Here also Jordan acts as patron, and takes these units under her wing, and places her bases, both physically and politically, at the disposal of other terrorist units. These, too, are organisationally affiliated to the Iraqi, Syrian and Egyptian armies.

Furthermore, it is not too much to say that not only is tension created as a result of the incidents, and not only that it is objectionable that they should be affiliated to the various armies, and not only that the country is being used as a base for sabotage and terrorist units, but also that there is something manifestly absurd in the attitude of Jordan to the relations established between her and Israel by the cease-fire agreement. Jordan talks about us behind our backs and to our faces as if it was we who started the war against her, as if it was we who were the aggressors, and sometimes her conduct on the frontier is such as to suggest that it was we who lost the

war. This double attitude—treating Israel as if it was we who were the aggressors, and employing units and allowing them to behave as if it was we who lost the war—I can only describe as absurd...

As I said, the most serious feature on the Jordanian frontier is terrorist and sabotage activity. In addition to the other units I have mentioned, the Palestinian-Iraqi battalion, the Egyptian commando battalion, the Palestinian-Syrian battalion, and the trained, armed and organised *Fateh* units whose members receive their salaries from Syria, are afterwards sent to bases in Jordan, and there are also among the population of Jordan itself units and individuals that join these other units. The main bases of these units are situated along the River Jordan, in the Karama refugee camp and in the northern Shuna area. I say this to make it plain that, from clear knowledge of the consequences of this affair, we know that they choose populated areas as the bases for their activities—refugee camps or inhabited villages, and especially near the frontier on the Jordan—so that they can leave these bases, cross the river, carry out sabotage operations, either laying mines, firing or penetrating into villages in the Beth Shan valley and the Jordan Valley, then go back across the river and return to their base the same night or in the morning of the next day.

From this it will be understood that the frontier incidents that have taken place recently between us and Jordan, all of which are the result of Jordanian initiative, derive from two things—the first being firing by Jordanian military units across the frontier, and the second sabotage activities undertaken by members of the *Fateh* units and other terrorist and sabotage organisations. For Jordan provides them with the opportunity, and sometimes also provides them with effective aid in the form of bases, transport and even covering fire from Jordanian units. It also provides them with information about places from where the Jordanian army knows it is possible to cross the River Jordan without coming into collision with our units. This, then, is the second kind, which depends on Jordanian bases, aid and information. This is the source of the incidents, the sabotage, and the shooting of our men, civi-

lians and soldiers alike, by men coming across the cease-fire line.

I want to say a few words more about two subjects. The first is a civilian one; as regards the second one, I want to make two comprehensive observations when I conclude this statement. As regards the civilian subject, I want to say that civilian activity, as opposed to the Jordanian military sabotage activity I have mentioned, has been increasing throughout the period since the end of the war on the cease-fire line, the frontier line between Israel and Jordan. In this activity we have treated Jordan as a neighbouring country, with the cease-fire line as the frontier between us and them. From the economic and social-human points of view there have been many positive reasons to continue this civilian activity. As regards economic activity, exports of agricultural produce, in particular olive oil and citrus fruits, have been as great as during the corresponding period of last year, before the war. This means that in spite of the war, which always saps the whole basis of an economy, in spite of the departure of hundreds of thousands of people from the area, and in spite of the sapping of the sources of raw materials for the markets, we have succeeded in organising marketing, and enabled the Arabs of the [West] Bank to market their produce this year in markets capable of absorbing these agricultural products, and sometimes industrial products too. This is especially the case as regards olive oil products, and other things for which there is no market here in Israel or in the European countries. Thus we have succeeded in maintaining the export level in the area throughout this period, and the volume of exports is no less than it was before.

Finally, I want to make two observations. The first has to do with civilian activity. The mere fact that we are prepared to expand and facilitate such varied civilian activity does not at all mean—and I emphasise this—that we are in any way allowing Jordan to interfere in what is going on in the West Bank. Relations between us and Jordan are based on the cease-fire agreement, which stipulates that the frontier runs along the River Jordan. Jordan has no say in what goes on in the West Bank, in the civilian

field or any other field. I say this so that our approval may not be misinterpreted and because of the attempts of the Jordanian government to pay money and to remain in control and to finance anti-Israeli activities, to pay salaries to teachers not to teach, judges not to judge and ordinary citizens not to work. Jordan's attempts to interfere in, control and influence what is going on in the West Bank are absolutely unacceptable to us, whether these efforts are made directly or indirectly. Relations between us and Jordan in the civilian field are established on the basis of normal relations between one country and another.

My second observation concerns the physical and, if I may use the expression, the moral military base which Jordan is now providing for the sabotage and terrorist activities carried out both by other Arab countries and by Jordan's own population. I want to say that this is a matter of very grave import. There is no possibility, even in the Arabs' view, of sabotage and terrorist activities achieving effective military victories, and as for the incidents, the dangers, and if I may say so, the disasters, sabotage and terrorist activities are less serious than any other form of warlike activity.

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Reply by the Israeli Defence Minister Dayan in the Knesset Following the Discussion on His Statement on the Situation Along the Jordanian Frontier.¹ [Excerpts]

Jerusalem, February 13, 1968

Firstly, as regards the subject of this statement, I made it clear at the start what its subject was going to be, when I said that I was going to make a factual statement on the government's behalf on the state of affairs along the Jordanian frontier, not on the future of the occupied areas, nor on whether or no there should be settlement. There are, Heaven knows, many problems, but I have made a statement, on the government's

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 1048-1050.

behalf, on a specific subject, and it was no accident that it did not deal with other subjects.

This is not to say that I deny the connection between the subject we have discussed and other subjects. Here I want to say to all who have dealt with this subject and tried to link the question of the conflict and the frontier incidents with the problems of the overall solution of the conflict—Member of the Knesset Avneri, Member of the Knesset Tamir, Member of the Knesset Vilner, and other members of the Knesset whose names I will not mention—that Israel will say what she wants and what she thinks will be the best settlement for Israel, without making it conditional on pressure or on checking the threat of frontier incidents and terrorism. These are two different questions. These last eight months have done nothing to confirm either of the two conflicting views on this subject. Nothing has happened to confirm either the view of Member of the Knesset Shmuel Tamir who says “If we do not settle... etc”, terrorism and war will continue and will swallow us up, or of those who maintain the opposite, that if we do settle, terrorism will force us out. In my opinion, these last eight months, so far at any rate, have proved that it is possible to distinguish between things, and I suggest that any one who has ideas on the overall solution of the conflict should base such ideas on his view of what is best, what is essential for the state of Israel, taking all factors into account, not only the question of how many members *Fateh* has, or whether or no there has been firing on the Jordanian frontier.

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I support those members of the Knesset who suggested to member of the Knesset Unna and others, that we are being over-elaborate in our explanation of what is happening in Jordan, and so to speak, pleading Hussein's cause. Member of the Knesset Unna said that the Iraqis are there, suggesting that they are not letting Hussein do what he wants. But in fact, the Iraqis are there because Hussein wants them. The command of the Jordanian army is in the hands of the Egyptians because Hussein wants it so. It is no good saying only half the sentence—that the army in Jordan is in the hands of the Egyptians and that the Iraqis are stationed there, so that Jordan is

no longer in control. We must complete the sentence and add that Hussein wants to be closely linked to Egypt and to do what she says. He wants the Iraqi army to stay in Jordan, he wants them and asks them to stay. Some of us may have other theories, but these are the facts.

Therefore we are not interested in seeing things in another way, and even if we were, it would not be right for us to do so. It is essential that we see things as they really are.

Member of the Knesset Lorincz said that I was moderate. I do not know if this was meant as praise. In any case, I do not believe that our arms were given us to wave about when we talk. What must be done must be done. When we talk we should not wave our arms about. Arms that are waved about when their owner is talking are not performing their proper function.

The whole system of our relations with Jordan is based on the frontiers; this is the basis on which we must deal with the situation and formulate our policy.

I should like to ask Member of the Knesset Vilner a question, a rhetorical question naturally, and I hope he will not be called on to speak again. He proposes that we should return to the 4 June frontiers. Does he not understand that to do that would mean that we should be returning not only to 4 June, but to 23 May when Abdul Nasser closed the Tiran Straits? He, and all the others who propose that we return to 4 June, should tell us here whether they really knew what the situation was on 4 June when the Strait of Eilat had been closed. The Straits were closed on 23 May, and it was no coincidence that I said in this House that commando units had been sent from Egypt to Jordan before 5 June. Everyone remembers, of course, how artillery in East Jerusalem fired on West Jerusalem, on Lydda airport, and the whole sector. Any one who proposes that we return to that frontier is proposing that we return to the days when the Straits of Eilat were closed, when the University on Mount Scopus was in Jordanian hands, when artillery in Latrun was firing at Lydda airport, and that we make that situation the basis of permanent secure settlements.

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As regards the Soviet Union's traditional friendship for Israel, I should like to say that this war started, to a great extent, as a result of the fact that the Soviet Union gave false information to Syria, and later to Egypt, to the effect that Israel was preparing to attack Syria and was concentrating forces on the Syrian frontier. And when we suggested that the Soviet ambassador Tchouvakhine or any one he chose to send, or if he liked, the United Nations observers, should go to the place and see for themselves that absolutely nothing of the kind was happening, the answer was as follows: "I don't want to go and I don't want to see; it does not interest me to do so". The Soviet Union's "traditional friendship",—in inverted commas—to a great extent, led to the war. When Egypt closed the Straits of Eilat on 23 May the "traditional friendship" proposed that the state of Israel should agree that Egypt was in the right, that the Straits were Egyptian territorial waters, and that we should agree to and accept the situation. Could we or could we not accept such a policy? As for calling this "friendship", it is a slight exaggeration! What expression of friendship was there in all these actions on the eve of the war, after Egypt had closed the Straits? What sign was there of the friendship that we should have enjoyed?

I want to make certain observations about us and about the Palestinians, the Arabs of the West Bank and the Arabs of the Gaza Strip. Member of the Knesset Hausner has said that the reuniting of families is a humane action on our part. But why should we do this if it involves loss of life to our troops near the bridge? However, this is not the point. The point I want to insist on is that we do not regard the reuniting of Arab families here, or any other problem connected with the Arabs of the West Bank or the Gaza strip, as being problems that concern Jordan. This is what I want to say clearly and most emphatically. Today we are the government responsible for the destiny and the life of the Arabs of Gaza and the West Bank, and for their way of life. When they want to rejoin their families, they refer to us and we, without reference to Jordan, either give or withhold our approval, in accordance with criteria based on the closeness of family relationship, and in accordance with government decisions for the reuniting of families, and it is up to them, and to the families, to return to their

villages. I mean those cases in which approval is granted. We do not refer to Jordan; we either reunite families or we do not reunite them, quite regardless of whether Jordan makes the situation worse or not. We have no intention of regarding Jordan as party to a problem which concerns us and families in Hebron or Nablus alone. The problem is between us and these families. We must take care not to lose troops in doing this. But it is not a question of give and take between us and Jordan; it has nothing to do with our relations with Jordan, which are based on the fact that the River Jordan is the cease-fire line, and that they are on one side and we are on the other.

The last thing I want to talk about is the conclusions that can be drawn from the situation, and also, perhaps, from this debate.

In my opinion, we can say to ourselves and to others who are prepared to listen to us, firstly, that frontier incidents will not influence us in any way. What is more, the Arabs have no right to boast about frontier incidents, or rather they may be something to boast about, but they cannot be anything to be proud of. Egypt, too, which is bigger than Jordan, has started frontier incidents, so as to have something to boast about. This was a reason for the attack on the destroyer *Eilat*.¹ I should like to say to Member of the Knesset David Hachohen that I am not ready to accept any formula stipulating that civilians shall suffer no harm at a time when we are defending ourselves or engaging in activities along the cease-fire line. Ismailia, Qantara and Suez—civilian cities—are almost entirely empty, because the Egyptians have not observed the cease-fire there, in those cities which were on the cease-fire line. When the Egyptians decided to fight there, civilian life became impossible. I can safely say that we agreed to the cease-fire and that every one, every citizen, could have lived his normal daily life, if the Egyptians had not turned this line into a fighting line. But if they do turn this line—cities with populations of a quarter of a million or a hundred thousand—into a fighting line, and position their guns in them and fire on us, then of course they can bring journalists and television correspondents and show them women and children who have been killed. This is true, because if you fire

¹ The Israeli destroyer "Eilat" was sunk near Port Said by the U.A.R. Navy on October 21, 1967. [Ed.]

from inside a city, you will bring return fire on to it. The Egyptian guns were positioned around hospitals deliberately; Egyptian batteries were stationed around the hospitals, and they can evacuate the hospitals and the batteries, but they must not fire, because this is the cease-fire line. If they turn it into a firing line, it is impossible to live civilian life.

This line was the Egyptian frontier, and as regards the Jordanian frontier, Jordan too will understand sooner or later that it must keep this line as a cease-fire line and not make it a front line. If it is turned into a front line, there is a possibility of the inhabitants suffering all the consequences of living on a front line. We are doing all in our power to prevent this, but we cannot go any further.

I now come to my second conclusion; the first, as I said, was that, if the Arabs have any thing to boast about as regards the present situation on the frontier it will not be the frontier incidents, either on the Suez frontier, the Jordanian frontier or the Syrian frontier, and by firing they will not realise their interests as they wish.

As regards terrorism inside Israel too, terrorist and sabotage units, belonging to *Fateh* and other organisations, we can say that not only have they not deterred us, but now, after eight months, I dare to say that they will never succeed in doing so.

I do not say that we can liquidate them, but I can say with much greater confidence than I could some months ago, that terrorist activities will not prove to be successful as a military measure or as a military campaign.

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Speech by the Soviet Premier Kosygin at the 16th Minsk Province Party Conference.¹ [Excerpts]

Minsk, February 15, 1968

The situation in the Near East remains

complicated. The consequences of the Israeli aggression against the U.A.R., Syria and Jordan have not been liquidated. Israel stubbornly refuses to withdraw its troops from the seized Arab territories and is trying in every way to dig in there.

The Soviet Union supported the Arab states in their difficult hour and played a decisive role in bringing the Israeli offensive to a stop. We have also taken extensive measures to restore the military potential of the United Arab Republic and Syria and to strengthen their defense.

At the same time the Soviet Union is firmly pursuing the line of liquidating the consequences of Israeli aggression with the aid of political and not military means. We are not advocates of a new war in the Middle East; on the contrary, we stand for a lasting peace in that area. The line of political solution of the problem of liquidating the consequences of the Israeli aggression is supported by the United Arab Republic and the other Arab states.

We believe that every political effort must be made to achieve the withdrawal of the Israeli troops to the positions they held prior to June 5, 1967. In maintaining this, the Soviet Union does not advocate the liquidation of Israel; we stand for Israel's continued existence as a state.

The basis for a political settlement in the Near East exists—the Security Council resolution adopted last November. As a first step toward peace in the Near East it envisages the withdrawal of the Israeli troops from the territories they have occupied. However, nearly three months have passed, and the Security Council resolution has not been carried out. Such a policy on the part of Israel inevitably creates a dangerous hotbed of tension.

On our part, needless to say, everything necessary with continue to be done to support the just demands of the Arab states for liquidation of the consequences of Israeli aggression.

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¹ *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 6/3/1968, p. 16. From *Sovetskaya Belorussia*.

Resolution on the Middle East Adopted by the Council of Ministers of the OAU.¹

Addis Ababa, February 24, 1968

The Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity, meeting in its Tenth Ordinary Session, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from 20 to 24 February 1968.

Having heard the statement by the Minister of National Guidance of the United Arab Republic on the situation in the Middle East in general, and in the U.A.R. in particular,

Recalling the principles of the Charters of the O.A.U. and the United Nations,

Recalling the declaration voted at Kinshasa by the Fourth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, pledging the Solidarity of Africa with the United Arab Republic, the victim of Zionist aggression, part of whose national territory, which constitutes an integral part of the African Continent, is still under military occupation,

1. *Takes note* of the integral statement by the Minister of National Guidance of the United Arab Republic;

2. *Reaffirms* its active solidarity with the United Arab Republic and all the Arab countries that are occupied;

3. *Calls* for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of foreign troops from all the occupied Arab territories;

4. *Calls upon* all the Member States to extend their active support, political, moral and material, to the just cause of the United Arab Republic and the other countries of the Middle East that have been victims of the same aggression.

Statement by the Israeli Foreign Minister Eban in the Knesset During the Debate on the Ministry's Budget for 1968/69.² [Excerpts]
Jerusalem, February 26, 1968

Mr. President. The government has, from time to time, made a point of acquainting the Knesset with all the stages of the political battle that started after the preparation and implementation of the campaign of aggression against Israel. Our struggle is still going on, and its end is not in sight. It is possible that, just in the last few days, it has entered on a new and critical stage. When I come to analyse this struggle and its future prospects, I am struck by the fact that it did not start from scratch—behind us stretches a road so long and so encumbered that its effects are apparent both in the political facts that can be seen today and those that may be expected to appear tomorrow.

The fact of the matter is that we are now passing through the fourth period of the battle. Its first and most difficult stage started in the days of tension and preparation that preceded the fighting, at the time when our skies were clouded over, and the thunders of war could be heard close by. It is the duty of a people advancing towards a struggle for its very existence to gather and store political resources, to gather and store every available shred of military strength. We have experience. We have already witnessed how rapidly political isolation can become a threat to military victory, so we had to plan our political struggle in advance, on the basis of our self-defence proving victorious, for there was no other basis on which we could plan it. The world should not forget that, had the war ended in accordance with the wishes of those who planned it, there would have been no discussion of the future of territories and their populations, of the demarcation of frontiers, of the opening of international waterways, or of the peace mission of the envoy of the United Nations. Nor should we have seen the victim of aggression offering to those who desired its death peace treaties based on the demarcation of agreed and secured frontiers

¹ OAU Secretariat, *Resolutions Adopted by the 10th Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers*, CM/Res. 134(X).

² *Knesset Records* (in Hebrew), 26/2/1968, pp. 1187-1190.

and the creation of conditions in which all the countries of the area could live a life of peace, sovereignty and respect.

All we could do then, was to have faith in our victory in the battle, should it be imposed on us, although we knew that this would not necessarily ensure us of success in the political battle. We were obliged, to the extent of our ability, to ensure in advance that our need to defend ourselves should be known to the world, and that certain governments should remember the obligations they had entered into and recognise our right to defend ourselves against renewed aggression and blockade. Above all, we had to ensure that after the battle we should not stand isolated and weakened in the face of an international front united in its opposition to our rights. Our political action in this first stage was not in vain. Sometimes I am appalled when I think of the political situation which would have confronted us immediately after the war had it not been for the political efforts made on the eve of the fighting.

The second battle was one of self defence. Israel was subjected to immense pressure from a group of countries, headed by the Soviet Union, and including the Arab bloc and its many faithful allies. There is no doubt that our enemies hoped that the same historical experience would be repeated, that they expected, and even believed, that we should be swept from our positions by international pressure based on an extensive propaganda campaign aimed at pillorying Israel before the world, and there were many in Israel and in the world who agreed with this cruel forecast.

This huge campaign was stemmed. During its debates at the end of July, the Knesset had reason to note with satisfaction the complete failure of this hostile political campaign. All proposals that Israel should be condemned for defending herself, and that her defending herself should be described as aggression, all proposals for a return to the conditions that had led to war, were rejected. An important result of this stage in our struggle was an unparalleled awakening of public opinion in our favour. The struggle of a small country for its existence, against those who wanted to annihilate it, of a small people against huge numerical odds, made a strong appeal to

the imagination and the conscience of enlightened humanity. It is difficult to recall another moment in the history of this generation when world public opinion has so strongly expressed so much anxiety and fear. The tumultuous and dramatic debates of the summer confirmed that this time Israel was not alone in the family of nations. International policy began to crystallise on the basis of a refusal to accept that the Middle East should return to the hostility, fighting and tension to which it had been exposed for twenty long years. It is no exaggeration to say that, in the summer debates, sympathy for Israel reached its highest peak. But Israel's achievements in the debates of the General Assembly must be appraised in the light of the known huge numerical superiority of her enemies in that particular arena.

In the third stage, for which the Security Council was the theatre, the centre of gravity moved from violent controversy to an international effort to define the principles on which peace could be established. This stage ended with the adoption of the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967. This resolution explicitly states four principles: it calls for the establishment of peace, not for a return to the previous system of relations which collapsed under the burden of the years and the violence of hostility; it calls for agreed and secure frontiers, not for a return to "frontier lines" which established a stranglehold on Israel and made her vulnerable in the face of her enemies; it calls for the abrogation of all manifestations of hostility and war, especially the blockade and discrimination in international waterways and, above all, it refers to the necessity of striving to establish peace—through agreement, mutual agreement. There is no reference to the possibility of settlements imposed by external pressure.

In the course of the debate, and as soon as it ended, those who initiated and supported this resolution provided an explanation of two points of great significance as regards the coming stages of the conflict. In his speech on 15 November the United States representative explained that the expression "recognised and secure frontiers" meant something different and distinct from the previous armistice lines. In his opinion, final peace frontiers should be fixed within the framework of an agreement between the countries of

the area, in the process of establishing peace. At the same time the British government explained that the resolution for the drafting of which it had been responsible, did not call for forces to be moved from the ceasefire line before Israel's security was assured in conformity with a balanced interpretation of the above-mentioned clauses of the resolution, that is, the clauses that stipulate the establishment of peace, the abrogation of a state of war, explicit recognition of the sovereignty and independence of the countries of the area, freedom of navigation in international waterways and the demarcation of agreed and secure frontiers within which it would be possible to live in peace.

Of course, neither Israel, nor the countries that made war against her, belong to the body that adopted this resolution. They were asked to regard it as a guideline for their own independent efforts to achieve agreement on the establishment of peace. The government of Israel has not ignored the positive significance of some of the basic causes of this international consultation of opinion. On 1 December the Prime Minister described the aim of this resolution as follows: "A few days ago the Security Council adopted a resolution, the basic aim of which is the establishment of peace, a just and firmly established peace; based on the safeguarding of every country's right to live within recognised and secure frontiers, to enjoy the respect of all the countries of the area for its sovereignty and independence, and to exercise its right to freedom of navigation in the international waterways in the area...". The Prime Minister added: "The representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations is coming to this area to invite us to sit down round a table for joint talks."

On 5 December he repeated these words in this House in a statement which was approved by a large majority of the Knesset. On 8 January, after a friendly meeting characterised by mutual confidence, the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Israel issued a joint communiqué¹ in which they reaffirmed their adherence to the principle that a just and lasting peace should be established in the Middle East in conformity with the spirit of the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967. They

also stated that the "principles declared by President Johnson on 19 June had established a reasonable basis for such an agreement." The President and the Prime Minister recalled that, in conformity with this resolution, the Secretary General of the United Nations had appointed Ambassador Jarring as his personal representative. They also recalled with satisfaction that Ambassador Jarring had started talks with the governments concerned, and affirmed their full support for his mission.

Members of the Knesset. It is clear from what I have described, and from their implications, that the government of Israel appreciates the importance of the international authority which is represented by the envoy of the United Nations, and the importance of the fact that the Security Council has stated that his task is to seek agreement for the establishment of peace. Peace-loving public opinion throughout the world is following his mission with sympathy and hope, and all countries and blocs have reposed their confidence in him. Israel's attitude to this mission will, therefore, have important repercussions on her international standing and her reputation in the eyes of public opinion.

I have had the opportunity of a basic and comprehensive talk with Ambassador Jarring on what Israel regards as the best ways and means of establishing peace, and I shall continue consultations with him in Jerusalem tomorrow morning. I have no doubt that Israel's views will be conveyed with complete accuracy to the two Arab governments that have agreed to talk with him. It was my good fortune to hear from him his impressions of the psychological trends and political lines he encountered in Cairo and Amman. I handed to him the government's proposal for a list of subjects on which, in our opinion, it is important that agreement should be reached within the framework of the conclusion of peace treaties.

I am not authorised to disclose all the ideas and opinions raised during these talks; they involve vigorous efforts to get to grips with the problem of peace and security, which is more important than any other problem that faces Israel. But at this stage of Ambassador Jarring's mission I believe that I should acquaint the Knesset and the neighbouring governments with

¹ See *ante*, doc. 5.

Israel's basic ideas on peace and on the way peace may be secured.

Israel's basic attitude was defined in the motion approved by the Knesset on 1 August 1967, which is as follows:

"The Knesset approves the stand of the government in favour of steps leading to direct talks between Israel and the Arab countries on the signing of peace agreements, and reaffirms that so long as peace is not attained Israel will continue to maintain unaltered the situation created by the cease-fire arrangements following the Israel Defence Forces' successful repulsion of enemy aggression."

This attitude, which was reaffirmed word for word on 1 January 1968, may not go very far, but as far as it goes it is good, and it contains definitions of profound significance. It places at the head of Israel's aspirations an objective that has not yet been realised—the conclusion of treaties as the result of negotiations. The maintenance of the situation which came into existence after the cease-fire is described in the Knesset motion as a transitional objective which is only valid as long as peace has not been achieved. In other words, it is our policy not to consider a return to the previous situation, but to be more than ready to consider a new situation, a situation of agreed peace, the attaining of which has been declared to be the highest aim of our policy. From this it is to be understood that the government of Israel, which is legally obliged to abide by the Knesset's decisions, is neither entitled, nor desires, to regard the cease-fire situation as a final stage or an ultimate aim. On the contrary, it will be impelled both by its sense of its legal and legitimate duties and by its political will, to make effective, continuous and painstaking efforts to achieve a political and security situation that is different from, and more stable than, any situation we have hitherto known. It is therefore engaged in exploratory activity, probing the reactions of the Arab world through Ambassador Jarring and in other ways.

In all discussion of, or thinking about, problems of peace we encounter certain concepts which, it seems to me, urgently require explanation. I mean the problem of negotiations, the problem of agreement, the problem of frontiers and the problem of peace.

I will begin with the problem of negotiations and what it means.

Nineteen years have passed since the General Assembly of the United Nations invited the Arab countries and Israel "to seek agreement through negotiations on reaching a final settlement of all problems in suspense between them." Since then five more recommendations have been made by the General Assembly and the Security Council in which the countries of this area have been asked to sincerely seek lasting peace through agreement reached by negotiations. I mention this in view of the fact that not only representatives of Arab governments—this was to be expected—but also the heads of certain states that are well known in the world, in their statements, evade all use of the basic expressions—negotiations, agreement, peace—as if they were purely Israeli slogans, and not agreed international principles for which there is no alternative. Things have come to such a pass that when the conference of the heads of Arab states, held in Khartoum, issued an instruction to the effect that there must be "no negotiations, no agreement, no peace", there was no immediate world reaction that by this statement the United Nations Charter has been torn to shreds and the principles of international law thrown on to the rubbish heap.

Negotiations are not a matter of mere procedure. They are the basis of the problem of peace; they are indispensable; they are the epitome of international coexistence. We may study the whole of political history without finding a single case of agreement ever being reached anywhere without countries being ready to meet each other face to face. To reject negotiation is to reject peaceful coexistence. And, in addition to its theoretical side, the problem also has its practical side. Is it reasonable to expect that Israel should enter into undertakings prejudicial to her most vital problems without the possibility of hearing from her neighbours how they regard their mutual obligations, and without putting to the test of direct talks the interpretations that are accorded, in both theory and practice, to every agreement that is reached?

Therefore, to facilitate peace moves, and to ensure that the parties should enjoy equal status, I told Ambassador Jarring, with the authority of the whole government, that Israel is ready for

negotiations and for meetings between her representatives and representatives from Arab countries in such place as the United Nations envoy may consider suitable to the parties. Moreover, it is obvious that a sovereign state cannot be asked to agree to a procedure that involves its being boycotted, and ignored, and having its sovereignty denied. By agreeing to a form of negotiations that both the Arab countries and Israel needed in the past, and which is in full conformity with precedents, we have contributed greatly to the progress of the United Nations peace mission. But it is an axiom that negotiations should take place between the accredited representatives of states meeting face to face, and any one who has a request to make of us must be so kind as to submit it to us directly in our hearing, as the tradition of relations between sovereign states requires. We regard the readiness of the Arab governments to sit down face to face with us as the acid test of the genuineness of their desire to make peace, for refusal to meet face to face can only mean one thing—refusal to make peace.

In view of the fact that the way to peace starts with negotiations, it must, similarly, end in signed agreements stipulating the responsibility of sovereign states to respect each other's sovereignty. The "implementation" of political principles without "agreement" on them has never occurred and can never occur. I am here referring to a strange idea mooted by President Tito and others, to the effect that it is possible to obtain binding "settlements" without negotiations and without peace treaties. But just as the Yugoslav President did not consider the Trieste problem as solved without a written and signed treaty, so Israel, which is just as much a sovereign state as Yugoslavia, is entitled to insist that any settlement based on a treaty should be written by both sides. There is an important moral lesson to be learned from the fate of the settlements imposed in 1957. In view of the fact that those settlements did not take shape during the course of negotiations and were not formulated in a binding agreement, Egypt has considered herself entitled to evade them whenever it has suited her. In a single night the world saw a whole international situation collapse, and this area, and the world along with it, were plunged into appalling dangers. Just as a house built contrary to accepted architec-

tural rules is bound to collapse, so an international settlement that ignores the fundamental laws of negotiation and treaties can only be stable for a while. Our concern for the fate of peace and for the vital affairs of our country warns us against individual and restricted measures and settlements, against compromise situations and against trivial and obscure settlements which are on a completely different plane from accepted international custom.

Now for the frontier problem. The problem of "recognised and secure frontiers" is the real key to peace. The representative of the United States was right when he affirmed at the Security Council that there had never been recognised political frontiers in this area, and that the time had come for them to be finally settled on the initiative of the countries concerned, by their making peace. Israel's proposals as regards this puzzle will be concerned with security, and at the negotiations table Israel will submit serious and reasonable proposals that will, in my opinion, be in conformity with the interests and the national honour of all parties concerned. So vital and crucial is this matter that it requires such precise and calculated work as can only be carried on in the context of close and continuous negotiations. Only the demarcation of recognised and secure frontiers can put an end to the impasse of the ceasefire. For this reason, in all our proposals for peace talks, we have given priority to this over all other problems which will be the subject of negotiation and agreement.

The other important matter is the problem of peace. Peace and the termination of a state of war are the same thing. The problem of peace has a rich and positive purport with a variety of meanings. I am not now referring to peace as a spiritual and emotional concept. Peace is an expression of harmony with a meaning too profound for definition. It may be that a certain transitional period will be necessary for the wounds of hostility to heal, those wounds that have remained open for a whole generation. But peace as a political-legal concept can be defined very precisely. It means a state of relations between countries based on mutual respect for rights and duties, and abstinence from all deliberate injury. Without declared acceptance of the concept of peace, it is impossible to say that any country

respects the United Nations Charter, or even the Security Council resolution, in which the word "peace" appears constantly as the principal motif. Let us put an end to unreal situations—wavering between peace and war—a state of armistice, of ceasefire, of abrogation of a state of war. After twenty years of bloodshed and suffering the peoples of this area are entitled to live in security within a framework of firm and stable relations. As long as the Arab governments refuse to utter the words "peace", "negotiations" and "agreement", we can never be confident that the desired change in our situation, that is prescribed by the United Nations Charter and the Security Council resolution, will take place.

Members of the Knesset. Henceforward the fate of the Middle East will, first and foremost, be in the hands of sovereign states. There is no indication that elements from outside will risk an international confrontation in the Middle East. Israel learned her lesson last summer, when no foreign element came to rescue her from impending danger; in the same way the Arab peoples must realise that no foreign element can solve for them the complicated problems resulting from the policy of hostility to Israel they have adopted.

Obviously the Middle East is gradually losing its traditional strategic character. With the liquidation of imperialism it no longer lies on the crossroads between Europe and her colonies, for the colonies no longer exist. It has been proved that the economy of the world does not collapse because the Suez Canal is closed, in spite of the fact that Israel wanted the Canal opened to all countries of the world, and especially Israel, on a basis of complete equality, and of Israel's assurances that she would play her part in achieving this aim, when peace was established or before. It is clear that oil continues to flow from its owners to its purchasers under all circumstances without there being any need for the physical domination of its sources. For this and other reasons, the foreign presence is diminishing. The days are gone when the fate of this area was decided regardless of its wishes. Henceforward the countries of this area will look less and less to the traditional elements that used to mould the destiny of the Middle East and more and more to

each other for the supplying of their requirements and needs. The Middle East is no longer an area under international protection; for the first time in history it is emerging as a field in which sovereign states are taking the control of the area into their own hands.

43

Statement by the West German Foreign Minister Brandt on the Middle East.¹ [Excerpt]

Bonn, February 1968

The Federal Republic has repeatedly declared that it is pursuing a policy of non-intervention. Irrespective of this, it is trying to the best of its abilities to cooperate in helping overcome the crisis. Our views about the solution of the Near East conflict are largely in accord with the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967.

"I regard the following as the two essential elements of this decision:

"1) The necessity of working toward a lasting and just peace enabling every country to live in safety and without fear of threats or acts of force, and

"2) The principle that war in our days must not result in unilateral territorial changes.

"The Federal Government has honestly tried to restore the traditionally good and friendly relations with all Arab States. Although these efforts suffered a setback because of last June's war in the Near East, I believe that prospects have again improved during the past few months. From the progress of contacts I have gained the impression that the readiness of the Arab countries to normalize relations with us has increased."

¹ *Arab News and Views* (New York), February 1968, p. 2. The statement was made in the course of an interview with the West German news agency (DPA).

44

Joint Communiqué on the Tanzanian President Nyerere's Visit to the U.A.R.¹ [Excerpts]**Cairo, March 6, 1968**

Upon an invitation from the President of the United Arab Republic, President Gamal Abdel Nasser, the President of the United Republic of Tanzania, Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, paid an official visit to the United Arab Republic from 4th to 6th March, 1968.

The two Presidents oriented a considerable part of their talks to the situation in the Middle East, resulting from the aggression committed by Israel against Arab countries on 5th June 1967, Israel's continued occupation of Arab territories and its expansionist policy which constitutes a serious menace to peace in the area. Both Presidents agreed on the imperativeness of complete withdrawal of the aggressive Israeli forces from the territories they have occupied.

President Gamal Abdel Nasser expressed the appreciation of the United Arab Republic of the firm stand taken by the Government and the People of Tanzania towards the Israeli aggression.

45

Chinese Commentary on the Middle East in "Renmin Ribao".²**Peking, March 14, 1968**

At the end of February, Israel, tool of U.S. imperialist aggression, promulgated a "regulation" flagrantly describing the Arab territories it has forcibly occupied since June last year as "military occupied territories." This is a grave step taken by Israel in an attempt to "legalize"

its occupation of Arab territories. It is a new provocation by U.S. imperialism and its lackey, Israel, against the Arab countries.

This illegal decision made by Israel at the instigation of U.S. imperialism has aroused the vehement opposition of the Arab people. Leaders of Syria, Iraq, the Sudan, Southern Yemen and the United Arab Republic have, in statements or speeches, strongly condemned this Israeli scheme of aggression. The Chinese people resolutely support the just struggle of the Arab people against U.S. imperialism and its lackeys—the Israeli aggressors. The Israeli aggressors must get out of the Arab territories they have forcibly occupied!

Since the Arab countries accepted the so-called "ceasefire" hatched by the United States and the Soviet Union, Israel, lackey of U.S. imperialism, has in fact never stopped its provocations and aggressive activities against them. It has refused to withdraw from the Arab territories which it has taken by force; it has constantly engaged in military provocations, frenzied sabre-rattling and shameless threats and blackmail against the neighbouring Arab countries. It is clearly the purpose of the Israeli aggressors to annex step by step the Arab territories now occupied by them and to be ready at any time to launch new military ventures with the support of U.S. imperialism.

Obviously, no running dog would bite so brazenly without its master's leave. Last October, soon after an Israeli warship was sunk while engaged in a provocation against the United Arab Republic, the U.S. State Department announced that it would resume sending war supplies to Israel and forthwith gave it 60 military aircraft. In January this year, after the secret talks between Johnson and Israeli Premier Eshkol, U.S. imperialism handed over to Israel a number of jet fighters. Meanwhile, in an attempt to force the Arab countries to submit to the aggressors, the United Nations' "special representative" Gunnar Jarring, under the direction of U.S. imperialism, went to the Middle East to peddle the Security Council's draft resolution on the Middle East question. In a word, U.S. imperialism is trying by both military and non-military means and through its aggressive tool, Israel, and other accomplices to further its neo-colonialist expansion

¹ U.A.R. *Arab Political Encyclopedia: Documents and Notes*, January-June 1968, p. 148.

² *Peking Review*, 23/3/1968, pp. 32-33. The Commentary is entitled "New U.S.-Israeli Plot of Aggression Against Arab Countries."

against the Arab countries so as to control and enslave the Arab people.

In the Arab people's fierce struggle against U.S. imperialism and its lackey, Israel, the Soviet revisionist ruling clique has constantly played the double-faced counter-revolutionary game of sham support and real betrayal. While hypocritically "condemning" Israel for its aggression and "supporting" the Arab people in words, in actual fact it has been working actively with U.S. and British imperialism to promote neo-colonialism against the Arab countries. There is irrefutable evidence of this in the joint communique issued in Moscow not long ago by the chieftain of Soviet revisionism Kosygin and British Prime Minister Wilson openly proclaiming their support for the sinister activities of the U.N. "special representative" Jarring in the Middle East. The Soviet revisionist ruling clique is up to the hilt the No. 1 accomplice of U.S. imperialism in its aggression against the Arab countries; it is the chief culprit betraying the cause of Arab national liberation.

Our great leader Chairman Mao says: "People of the world, be courageous, dare to fight, defy difficulties and advance wave upon wave. Then the whole world will belong to the people. Monsters of all kinds shall be destroyed." So long as the Arab people are united, dare to fight and persevere in their struggle, it is certain that they will finally defeat U.S. imperialism and its running dog Israel and win complete victory in their struggle for national liberation, no matter what difficulties and twists and turns they may encounter in the struggle; and no matter how protracted that struggle may be.

46

Joint Communiqué on the Talks Held in Belgrade Between the Yugoslav State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Nikezit, and the Dutch Minister for Foreign Affairs Dr. Luns.¹ [Excerpts]

Belgrade, March 17, 1968

Both parties expressed their particular con-

cern over the situation created by the war in Vietnam and the Middle East crisis.

Explaining their respective attitudes towards the crisis in the Middle East, both parties expressed the view that it is imperative that the Resolution of the Security Council be applied, if peace, independence and the territorial integrity of all states in that part of the world are to be assured.

47

Joint Communiqué on the U.A.R. Foreign Minister Riyad's Visit to Turkey.² [Excerpts]

Cairo, March 17, 1968

Upon the invitation of Mr. Ihsan Sabri Caglayangil, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, Mr. Mahmud Riyad, U.A.R. Minister of Foreign Affairs, paid an official visit to Turkey in the period from March 14 to 17, 1968.

In an atmosphere of cordiality and frankness which characterised the visit, the two Ministers of Foreign Affairs held comprehensive talks which bore principally on the present Middle East situation. In this connection, the two Ministers agreed upon the necessity of abiding by the U.N. Charter, the principles of international law and the requisitions of justice.

Mr. Mahmud Riyad exposed in detail the latest developments in the Middle East situation. Mr. Ihsan Sabri Caglayangil stressed the sentiments of friendship and sympathy existing between Turkey and the Arab States. He also stressed that Turkey is opposed to the use of force as a means of getting political or territorial gains. The two parties also expressed their conviction as to the necessity of withdrawal of the Israeli forces from the lands they occupied after June 4, 1967 in

¹ *Review of International Affairs*, 20/3/1968, p. 15.

² *U.A.R. Arab Political Encyclopedia: Documents and Notes*, January-June 1968, p. 155.

accordance with the Security Council resolution issued on November 22, 1967 in order to create normal conditions in the area.

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48

Statement by the U.S. Department of State Spokesman Following the Israeli Attack on Karameh, Jordan.¹

Washington, March 21, 1968

Further violence cannot bring a durable and stable peace to the Middle East. The Israeli military actions today against the territory of Jordan in response to terrorist attacks are damaging to hopes for a settlement of the real issues involved. Furthermore all of the parties know that peaceful channels are available.

We recognize the problems created by terrorism. We also recognize the disruptive effects of military action. Neither kind of action is in the true interests of the people of the area. Our main objective is to achieve a lasting peace. Israel and the Arab states should be adhering scrupulously to the cease-fire resolutions of the Security Council and working with the special representative of the United Nations Secretary-General in accordance with the Security Council's resolution of last November. Any action that delays his work is most regrettable.

We have made our position known repeatedly and as recently as one day ago; that is that Arab-Israeli differences should be settled through the efforts of the United Nations and not through the use of force.

49

Statement by the East German Foreign Ministry Spokesman Following the Israeli Attack on Karameh, Jordan.² [Excerpt]

Berlin, March 21, 1968

Jordan territory east of the Jordan river having been air-raided repeatedly in recent weeks, Israeli armed forces, on March 21st 1968, left their posts on the western banks of that river crossing it to invade east Jordan territory. This renewed abominable infringement of the armistice in the Middle East proves that despite professions to the contrary, Israel does not wish to restore peace in the Middle East. The manner in which this perfidious invasion was carried out by Israel shows its premeditated character.

Israel's provocative invasion of Jordan and aggressive acts against other Arab states considerably aggravate the situation in the Near and Middle East already strained enough. It moreover spreads aggression and increases the danger of new major military conflicts in that area.

The flagrant breach of the armistice provides evidence of the continued aggressive policy pursued by Israel against the Arab states as were the administrative steps to incorporate the territories occupied in June 1967; they constitute efforts on the part of Israel to establish facts in the Arab region. An imperialist peace is to be thrust on the Arab states designed to compel them to abandon their just demands for unconditional withdrawal of the Israeli forces of aggression endorsed by the UN Security Council on November 22nd 1967.

From the very first, the GDR has condemned the Israeli aggression against its Arab neighbour states and backed the Arab peoples. It supports all efforts for a political settlement of the conflict and considers the above-mentioned resolution of the Security Council calling particularly for the unconditional withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from the occupied territories a suitable means of bringing this about.

The GDR strongly condemns and protests against the Israeli invasion of Jordan territory.

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¹ U.S. *Department of State Bulletin*, 15/4/68, p. 509.

² G.D.R. *Foreign Affairs Bulletin*, 5/4/1968, p. 76.

50

Statement by the Soviet Government Following the Israeli Attack on Karameh, Jordan.¹

Moscow, March 22, 1968

The situation in the Middle East continues to attract the close attention of the peoples. The tension of the crisis brought about last summer by Israel's adventurist policy is not subsiding. Israel, an imperialist state, is continuing the aggression against neighbouring Arab states, increasing the scale of the crisis and its dangerous international consequences.

Again and again the government of Israel organises military provocations against Arab states. This is confirmed by the reports that in violation of the decision of the Security Council on the cessation of military actions, Israeli troops on March 21 carried out a new bandit attack on Jordan in which large ground and air forces were used.

In the occupied territories the Israeli military are committing arbitrary acts and crimes and are carrying out large-scale punitive operations against the local population.

Definite steps are being taken with the aim of securing the integration in the Israeli state of the indigenous Arab territories seized as a result of the aggression. Israel's Ministry of Internal Affairs officially announced on February 29 this year that the Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza area, the territory to the west of the River Jordan captured from Jordan, and the Golan Heights in Syria from now on "will not be regarded as enemy territory." By this unlawful act Israel is attempting to turn the cease-fire lines into its state frontiers.

Even earlier, the Israeli authorities had begun to grant numerous groups of Israeli settlers permission to settle in occupied Arab lands, including the west bank of the River Jordan. Military settlements of so-called "farmer soldiers" are being set up. The native Arab population is being driven away from the lands taken over by Israeli settlers and its property is being seized or destroyed.

The number of Arab refugees is growing daily. Israel is intentionally promoting this policy of driving the Arab population away from

Israeli-occupied territories in order to prepare conditions for their annexation and for the colonisation of those lands.

Contrary to the unanimous decisions of the United Nations General Assembly, Israel is continuing her acts of conquest against the Arab part of Jerusalem.

The aim of the present actions by Israel, who has the support of the United States government and of international Zionism, is to delay a political settlement in the Middle East as long as possible, to impose her imperialist terms on the Arabs and to force the Arabs to surrender and renounce the territories belonging to them.

In this the Israeli leaders are making use of the fact that their patron, the United States, is itself appearing in the role of aggressor in Vietnam, in the role of a state that is blatantly flouting the principles of the United Nations Charter and international agreements. What we have, both in the Middle East and in Vietnam, is an attempt by aggressive imperialist forces to strike a blow at the national liberation movement and its advanced detachments.

The colonialist policy of Israel and the forces of world reaction that are backing her is a serious source of the present dangerous international tensions. As a result of this policy, the Suez Canal, that major international waterway, has now been inactive for more than nine months, with the result that considerable economic harm is being done to states whose ships use this canal and to international trade in general.

Displaying goodwill, the government of the United Arab Republic expressed readiness to bring out of the Canal Zone the ships that were trapped there as a result of Israel's aggression and to start preparatory work for clearing the Suez Canal so as to make it usable for shipping as soon as possible. The Israeli authorities, however, prevented this by resorting to armed provocations.

Israel's continuing aggressive line cannot remain without consequences. The Security Council, in adopting on November 22, 1967, its resolution on the Middle East, set the states a clear task—to achieve the withdrawal of Israeli troops from all the captured Arab territories and to take other measures necessary for achieving the speediest political settlement of the problems

¹ *Soviet News* (London), 26/3/1968, pp. 158, 167.

of that area. The principle of the "inadmissibility of territories being acquired by means of war" and the demand for the "withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from the territories occupied during the recent conflict" are given prominence in the resolution and are the main and imperative condition for the restoration of peace in the Middle East. It is only on this basis that secure and recognised frontiers can be ensured for the states in that area.

The Security Council's resolution on the Middle East is not a recommendation or an opinion that governments are free to follow or to ignore. On joining the United Nations, each state undertook to carry out unswervingly the decisions of the Security Council adopted in accordance with the United Nations Charter. Failing to fulfil those obligations means opposing the United Nations and challenging that organisation, whose purpose is to preserve international peace.

The United Nations has been officially informed of the readiness of the Arab states that have suffered most from Israeli aggression to carry out this resolution of the Security Council dated November 22, 1967, and to co-operate with the envoy of the secretary-general in the Middle East who is empowered to facilitate the implementation of this resolution.

Israel, on the contrary, has from the start pursued, and is continuing to pursue a policy of obstructing the decisions of the Security Council and the General Assembly on the Middle East. In her adventurism Israel is going so far as to ignore the appeals from United Nations member-states asking that the organisation's principles and the decision of the Security Council be respected, and she is going so far as to present arrogant territorial claims to Arab states, threatening them with new acts of aggression and resorting to the use of armed force.

The Israeli government has hindered in every way, and is continuing to hinder the activities of the United Nations secretary-general's special envoy in the Middle East, Dr. Jarring, whose task it is to find the shortest ways to a political settlement of the conflict on the basis of the decisions of the Security Council and the United Nations General Assembly and of the United Nations Charter. Israel would like to use

Dr. Jarring's mission in order to distort the meaning of the Security Council's resolution. Failing to say one single word about her being ready to withdraw her troops from all the Arab territories occupied during the recent conflict, i.e., to withdraw them behind the line as it was prior to June 5, 1967, Israel and those backing her are trying to force on the Arab countries talks under conditions incompatible with their legitimate national interests and with their sovereignty, and are trying to deceive public opinion throughout the world.

Israel is following in the footsteps of the Hitlerite criminals. Fascist Germany, as is well known, also seized foreign territories and then tried to dictate her own terms for a "settlement" to the victim of aggression. Such actions, however, were branded by the peoples as banditry, while those who tried to apply them were condemned as international criminals following the rout of Hitler's Reich.

Those who today covet the lands of others and who like to interfere in the domestic affairs of states would do well to remember that.

The Soviet Union proclaims with all firmness its determination to press, together with other peaceloving states, for the ending of the Israeli aggression and the removal of all its consequences, for the return to their lawful owners of the territories seized from Arab states as a result of the aggression of 1967 and for the achieving of the necessary political settlement in the Middle East on the basis of respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in that area.

The government of Israel must unswervingly implement the Security Council's resolution of November 22, 1967, and in the first place must withdraw its troops from all the occupied Arab territories. It should know that its challenge to the interests of world peace and security by its attempts to wreck a political settlement in the Middle East cannot go unpunished.

As long as Israel's leaders, who have support from outside, take their stand on positions of annexing Arab territories, the U.S.S.R. and other countries—friends of the Arab states and champions of a lasting peace in the Middle East—will help the victims of aggression, because they are thereby doing their duty in accordance with the

United Nations Charter and the interests of maintaining peace. This must be clear to everyone.

51

Message From the British Prime Minister Wilson to the Annual Conference of Poale Zion.¹

London, March 22, 1968

On behalf of her Majesty's Government I send greetings to Poale Zion on the occasion of your 62nd Annual Conference, together with thanks for your support during this difficult year. With your continued support we are confident that, provided the right measures are taken and are carried through, we can move forward to a firmly-based solution of the problems with which the nation has for so long been contending. I know that the past year has had its special significance and importance for Poale Zion, and here too the Government is ready and determined to do whatever is possible to help bring about an equitable and peaceful solution to the problems of the Middle East. I wish your movement every success during the coming year, assured that you will continue to play your valued part in the work of the Labour Party.

52

Joint Communiqué on the Austrian Foreign Minister Waldheim's Visit to the U.S.S.R.² [Excerpts]

Moscow, March 23, 1968

At the invitation of A.A. Gromyko, U.S.S.R. Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Kurt Waldheim, Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic

¹ *Jewish Observer and Middle East Review*, 22/3/1968, p. 23. Poale Zion is a constituent of the World Labour Zionist Movement; it was affiliated to the British Labour Party in 1920. [Ed.]

² *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 10/4/1968, pp. 18-19. From *Pravda*.

of Austria, paid an official visit to the Soviet Union from March 18 to 23, 1968.

The two Foreign Ministers discussed the situation in the Near East, which also presents a threat to peace the world over. They spoke in favor of the implementation of the U.N. Security Council resolution of Nov. 22, 1967, i.e., in favor of the withdrawal of armed forces from the territories occupied during the June 1967 conflict and the fulfillment of the other clauses of this resolution, which are intended to ensure peace and security for all states of the Near East.

53

Statement by the Israeli Premier Eshkol in the Knesset Following the Discussion on His Statement on the Military Operation in Karameh, Jordan.³ [Excerpt]

Jerusalem, March 25, 1968

We have now reached a new stage of our struggle for security and peace, and I will try to describe the situation, as it appears to the government, and the decisions and actions it has taken in response to the acts of terrorism that have been perpetrated in the past month. I know that I shall be repeating what has been said before, but I believe it to be my duty to provide, here in this House, a comprehensive and condensed account covering the whole subject, and I may perhaps make a few additions to what has already been said.

Following a wave of acts of terrorism and sabotage, the Israeli Defence Army went into action on 15 February; and the next day the King of Jordan announced his intention of suppressing acts of terrorism and sabotage against Israel. We had great hopes—I, at any rate, looked forward to some relief. But the promise was not

³ *Knesset Records* (in Hebrew), 25/3/1968, pp. 1610-1613. Eshkol's statement on the military operation in Karameh was made in the Knesset on March 21, 1968.

kept, as you know, and perhaps you also know, as I do, why the promise was not kept. There is no point in broadcasting secrets, not even the secrets of kings and governments. I am not concerned to diminish the prestige or dignity of any president or king. We do not interfere in the affairs of the various regimes; we do not wish, nor are we able, to interfere in the regimes of other countries. I am not interested in diminishing the King's prestige. I know that other people think rather differently. There are admirable proverbs to be found in Yiddish popular literature, such as: "Do not seek another king or tyrant, for you never know who will come in the place of the present one." This alone is enough to make us adopt this attitude.

Shmuel Tamir (Free Centre): He is not our tyrant.

Prime Minister L. Eshkol:

But he is our neighbour's tyrant; this concerns the people living there.

Since then the situation has been deteriorating. I cannot say all I know. Every one of you knows something, and keeps it to himself. He has a good reason for this; he has been allowed to speak for ten minutes or so, but he keeps some of the things he knows under his hat. Therefore I cannot speak openly. The situation has deteriorated; we have received reliable information to the effect that members of the terrorist organisations are preparing for a new wave of terrorist activities in Israeli territory. When I say this in the hearing of Member of the Knesset Tubi I do not expect him to reply to me. But we want an explanation of the resolution concerning recognised and agreed frontiers; that is why Dr. Jarring is here. In the meantime the Khartum conference has been held, where the three or four "Nos" were enunciated.¹

There are equally serious reports to the effect that these preparations are not being made in secret, but quite openly. Members of *Fateh* and the other organisations have openly declared that they are being made. They have been going round freely in the towns and villages of Jordan, wearing their uniforms and carrying their arms, telling every one of their preparations and plans. They have turned away those they considered

it necessary to turn away, but they have invited foreign journalists and boasted to them of what they have done and what they intend to do. They have told them of their training programmes and of the many facilities they enjoy, and all this at a time when the Jordanian authorities pretend that they do not know where the saboteurs are.

This pretence was as clear as daylight in Karameh. I do not want to say that I am confident that there are no other places in Jordan where the same situation exists. It may well be that there are other places, but Karameh is so near that it is possible to leave it and return to it in an evening—I should not be telling them this. It is possible to approach the frontier, cross the frontier and return to the same place. The terrorist organisations have gained control of this town and made it their principal base in the Jordan valley. We may discover that they have another principal base, but certainly Karameh has been both a training and an operational base.

We have taken very serious note of the fact that the Jordanian authorities are taking no steps to suppress this activity, which is in flagrant opposition to the obligations imposed by the cease-fire, to which the Jordanian government agreed on 8 June 1967. The fact that no action is being taken also conflicts with statements the Jordanian government has made and obligations it has entered into on several occasions.

What is more, we have learned that many units of the Jordanian army and the other armies stationed in Jordanian territory are cooperating with the saboteurs, providing them with equipment and information about the positions of the Israel Defence Army, and helping them by firing when the saboteurs meet with Israel Defence Army forces after crossing the cease-fire line, to assist them in carrying out their killing operations and to cover their withdrawal back over the Jordan. Members of the Knesset may well be right when they say: "What sort of a king is this without an army?" This is why I said that I was not ready to be killed for this; or to enter into a long discussion. I do not want to become involved in this.

Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that during the month from 16 February to 20 March, dozens of killing and sabotage operations should have been carried out by the terrorists,

¹ See *International Documents on Palestine, 1967*, pp. 655-657.

with more than 50 military and civilian casualties, including six killed. The security forces of the Israel Defence Army have succeeded in frustrating certain assassination operations, with the result that saboteurs have been killed. This is no consolation to me, and I am sure that it is no consolation to any one. The young man who was killed there also had a father and mother, and it is true that the saboteur that was killed will have had a wife and children. All this is true.

But what the Israeli government is interested in is to ensure quiet, order and security to all who live in the areas under its control. I wonder how the Knesset would reply if there was a period of months during which there were killings in shops with one killed today, two tomorrow—I imagine that even the Member of the Knesset who sits near me in the same row—Member of the Knesset Avnery—that even he would not refrain from asking: “What sort of a government is this?” He would try to give advice, bogus advice, misleading and fallacious, and if there was any one who tried to submit a proposal, if such a person were to be found, I do not know what he would say.

We have employed political methods in the suppression of acts of sabotage and killing, but all the contacts we have made have not led to the desired results. Acts of terrorism have continued, and the Jordanian government has done nothing to prevent them. The only road open to us is that of defending ourselves by suppressing terrorism with all our strength.

We have not gone to war; we are not interested in doing so, and we do not wish to do so—this is no secret—indeed, we even want it not to be a secret. For this reason we declared and announced at the top of our voice: “We are going to a place where the killers live, the killers whose task it will be tomorrow, or the day after tomorrow, tonight or some other night, to attack us.” And I think I know some of the places where they have planned to attack.

We have gone forth to suppress acts of sabotage by paralysing and disorganising the terrorist bases. I imagine that some of you may scoff at the expression “disorganising them.” We must not underestimate the matter; there is no single miraculous treatment that can be achieved in one day, one night, or two days.

I do not intend to discuss the question of what will happen when we get there or to a second, third or fourth place. I was not very happy when one of you said that we could reach this capital or that—this is true. Someone picked on this matter and thought: “This is Israel’s strategy.” But it is not, nor is it your strategy.

We decided this after the explosion of the mine near Beir Ora. The matter was talked about; I do not need to repeat the details—they are known to all of us.

Available statistics show that Karameh and Safi are centres of terrorist activity, in which hundreds of terrorists are concentrated, and it is now clear that they were more than we supposed. But before you go there—this is exactly like the proposals you are making—if you do not get your figures right but just give us advice, and here it is just the same too—before you make a careful investigation, you cannot know. We told the Israel Defence Army to attack these bases, seize the saboteurs, disarm them and paralyse their bases. And when I say: “We told the Israel Defence Army”, with all respect to the government, I wish you to understand that the orders were not imposed on the Army without its being consulted. Thank God, we have the army, the organisation, and we have consultations lasting whole days and nights on the plan and all its details, and of course we shall not go out to fight before the plan is completed, as long as this is possible. In the battle itself, of course all sorts of things may happen in one way or another.

We have imposed on ourselves certain military restrictions. This is sound and I have explained why we have done it. It arises from the situation we are in—which you have said you do not underestimate—which demands that we should not hurt people—innocent women and children. At least we can define this according to age. For a simple reason: imagine what would happen and how certain sections of the press, not in this country, would comment, if a bus full of children drove over a mine. They would say: “The government is not explaining.”

This is no justification, no excuse, but those who wanted to would come, take photographs and write what they pleased.

We have refrained from an organised attack on the territory of Jordan and its army, and we

have said so, for it is clear that if we went forth with this end in view we should need a completely different attitude.

The operation began on Thursday before dawn, and the last soldier returned at 21.00. Every possible vehicle was got out though here, too, I have heard people saying: "Oh, so you wanted to get the vehicles out; that is why the men were killed." This is nonsense. Three or four tanks were blown up, burnt and one stuck in the mud. I myself heard instructions being given: "To hell, leave it; the men are more important." We took much spoil from the enemy.

When the terrorists were interrogated it was confirmed that the information we had was accurate. There was a *Fateh* command in Karameh, and its leader, who has two names, had been there until he fled.

He was the first to flee from the place at the beginning of the operation. There were nearly one thousand members of the sabotage organisations in the area. There were in the area ten saboteur centres, including the commands of *Fateh* and the National Front for the Liberation of Palestine, a training camp, four bases for the units, including saboteurs of the Egyptian brigade "141", an equipment centre and residential camps. Also found were large quantities of arms, thousands of pieces of a large number of types including mortars, machine guns, bazookas, rifles and machine guns, ammunition, and tons of explosives and mines of all kinds. For obvious reasons I will not mention what other types there were. There are things I do not wish to tell either in Gath or Ascalon, not even in Jerusalem, for it would not be in our interest to do so. Underground trenches were found, fitted up for fighting purposes. The area was under the full control of the saboteurs—they even had a prison in which men who had refused to join them were confined, and the few people who remained in the villages had to pay taxes to *Fateh*. We really have some right to boast—it was a very considerable force, and we went in and destroyed their hideouts.

A similar picture was revealed in the southern area of activity, which is much smaller. There too members of *Fateh* fought against our forces; arms were found and dozens were killed. If I am not mistaken not one of our men was killed. This means that the planning was sound, but

accidents will happen.

As I said before, we now know that operations had been planned for an attack on civilians, an indiscriminate attack, in population centres, communications arteries and public places. Again, I will not give the details which are now known to us of the localities which were to have been attacked. It was intended in this operation to use the majority of the sabotage organisations, especially the units which have joined them in the last few months, whose numbers and names I have already given.

This picture of the activities of the terrorist organisations clearly explains why we took action against Karameh and Safi. As far as possible we have also supplied this information to the Security Council and to any one else we saw reason to supply it to. All the same, I want the affair to be told in this House and to be recorded in the history of the Jewish people. The Jordanian government has completely ignored its obligations. We do not think that this operation has solved the problem of terrorism, and King Hussein's first reaction bears witness to this, although he has manifested extremely varying reactions in a single week, as some members of the Knesset have mentioned. But what is certain is that a severe blow has been dealt to a large and important *Fateh* centre.

King Hussein said in his speech that he was not prepared to guarantee Israel's security in areas held by the Israel Defence Army, and we have never asked him to do this. The Israel Defence Army is capable of doing that itself. All the King was asked to do was to meet the obligations he entered into when he agreed to the cease-fire.

The government of Israel does not expect the Jordanian army to lay down the red carpet for it. All the Jordanian government is expected to do is to stop all aid, whether direct or indirect, to the terrorist organisations. If it is ready to accept that operations should continue from its territory, and especially if it continues to aid the terrorist organisations in implementing their aggressive policy, it will be taking a great responsibility on itself. I am anxious to choose the quietest words possible, but kings, diplomats and politicians must understand this.

May this operation be a warning to the

saboteurs and those who do not prevent them from performing their mission of killing, and a proof to the Arab rulers that no military operation against Israel will succeed. Events of the last few months have proved that the only way to ensure stability in the area and peace for its inhabitants is the way of peace.

You may like to know, and I can tell you in this House, because it has already appeared in the press, that during the talks I had this morning with Ambassador Jarring, discussion was restricted to one subject only—his continued efforts for peace. As a result of the first talk I had the honour to have with Gunnar Jarring, the exchange of prisoners was also carried out, and the problem of the ships was solved. This later became complicated, but he admits that this was not our fault.

We are ready to support all constructive efforts towards this end, but we are aware that only the total abandonment of a policy of continued war, and all that this involves, will bring real peace, and one would hardly deduce that this is likely from what happened at the Khartoum conference and afterwards. To arrive at peace we shall continue to maintain security. The people must know this, and they do know it, and I hope that both our friends and our enemies will realise it too.

We regret that the situation leaves no other course open to us than that of armed action accompanied by bloodshed. I am prepared to say that the situation up to this moment is the following: in spite of all this, it is possible that a ray of hope may appear unexpectedly, a wise and constructive idea which will result in a practical course being found. It was not we who began to war. It was not we who started firing across the cease-fire line. We are not saboteurs, we do not lay mines. It is not we who want the fighting to continue.

Members of the Knesset. Yesterday the Security Council resolved to criticise the military operation undertaken by Israel and to express its regret at all violent incidents in violation of the cease-fire. Although we know the composition of the Security Council, which includes five countries which do not even have diplomatic relations with us (it can hardly be expected that the Security Council, five of whose members always support the Arabs and vote on a basis of their hostility

to Israel—should vote otherwise) yet we have been greatly disappointed that the Security Council has never tried to show a full understanding of the situation created by our enemies.

There has been a certain equilibrium in the Security Council resolutions—as one of you has said in this House, this was a good thing—because certain countries have refused to associate themselves with a biased and unilateral condemnation, whereas for years whenever our problems have reached this international tribunal we have been the victims of flagrant injustice.

Members of the Knesset; we still remember the killing of peaceable farmers in the Kurzim area four years ago. Why am I recalling this in particular? Because it took place at the beginning of my term of office as Prime Minister, and I said at the time: "Let us try appealing to the Security Council." Some people may perhaps object to this, but in the end all of us are Jews, and every one of us feels in the bottom of his heart that it is really possible that a new epoch may start eventually. Naturally I believed in this, and had hopes of it. We submitted our complaint to the Security Council, but the Soviet veto prevented any decision being taken. Since then we have appealed to the Security Council many times, but we have not asked for meetings to be held. We have called the attention of the Council to what is going on here.

Yesterday's Security Council resolution includes an attempt to distinguish between a sabotage operation, as being "unofficial", and military operations carried out with government approval. We have now all of us seen how unofficial they were, and to what extent the government and the regime there is ignoring things. This unjustifiable distinction has been made in every debate in the Council on the situation on the Israel-Arab frontier for years. What does the Assembly want? That Israel should behave in the same way as her neighbour?

It is the duty of the state in a democratic society to defend the lives of its citizens and to assume responsibility for its actions. If we sign a cease-fire agreement we are responsible for seeing that this agreement is not infringed. But to prevent infringement, is there really any need for such "justification." There was once a man, so they say, who when he was slapped on one cheek

turned the other cheek.

Natan Bilid (Mapam):

Since that time his followers have been slapping a lot of cheeks.

Prime Minister L. Eshkol:

That is true. Would the governments, and the members of the Security Council, have been silent about the aggression against peaceable civilians, including small children? The United Nations Charter does not exclude self-defence from what is acceptable under international law and custom; on the contrary, it recognises it as completely valid.

I regret very much that when the history of the Middle East during the last hundred years comes to be written, the writer will be obliged to express disappointment at the incapacity shown by the highest tribunal to keep the peace. He will have to describe how that tribunal, whose forces, after keeping peace in the area, were withdrawn at the instructions or orders of the President of Egypt, did not even meet to express its opposition, or even its disapproval of their withdrawal.

Once more I repeat that we insist on our right to fight and to defend ourselves. It is no accident that I do not say "war", though it is possible that it may come to that. I do not know. I use the word "fight" deliberately, for of course there will be conflicts of this kind, and others.

We are building our future and our sovereignty, and defending them with courage and resolution. If we have no choice we shall make war and strike the enemy. Nevertheless, we shall not cease from efforts for peace, real and permanent peace.

Finally, Madam Chairman, as long as the Security Council is incapable of definitely affirming that the duty of making peace must be performed by all the parties; as long as it tends to establish a situation in which one party is free to continue fighting, while the other side is expected to accept the violation of the Charter and resolutions of the United Nations, its resolutions will not be capable of contributing effectively to the establishment of peace in the area.

Reply in Parliament by the British Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Roberts to a Question on the Middle East.¹ [Excerpt]

London, March 26, 1968

Mr. Fletcher: The last point is that I believe that the Government should emphasise that, whatever the outlines for the settlement, there must be a face to face negotiation between Israel and the Arab States. I ask the Government to use all their considerable powers and influence to bring this about.

The Minister of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Gordonwy Roberts): Like other hon. Members, I always listen with great interest and respect to my hon. Friend the Member for Ilkeston (Mr. Raymond Fletcher). Today he has spoken frankly as a partisan, but I am sure that he is equally capable of approaching this very difficult and dangerous problem with impartiality and objective analysis.

I think that on reflection my hon. Friend will agree that it would not be productive to delve into the complex past history of the Arab-Israel problem to try to establish where the blame for the present situation principally lies. For the last 20 years the peoples of the Middle East have lived through a succession of crises, including three full-scale Arab-Israeli wars, which have brought untold harm and suffering to all the peoples concerned, and have in addition posed a threat to the peace of the whole world. It follows from this that the central aim of the Government in the present situation is to help to achieve a lasting peace in the area in which all the peoples of the region may be able to develop the full potentialities of their countries to the benefit of all, and in which our own considerable commercial and economic interests can flourish.

I hope my hon. Friend will agree that in a situation such as this, where passions are bitterly inflamed, and where each side is convinced, not without some justice, that right is on its side, no other outside country will be able to help very much towards resolving the present conflict if it is considered to be the partisan of one side or the

¹ *Hansard*, 26/3/1968, cols. 1479-1482.

other. To be a partisan would in any case mean ignoring facets of the truth, since in this dispute we are faced with a conflict of two rights, for both of which there is much to be said. In these circumstances I hope the House will agree that a policy of impartiality, of not taking sides, is the only possible course for a responsible Government truly concerned to secure lasting peace in the area.

I turn, now, to the more immediate situation as it has existed since the six-day war in June, 1967. Her Majesty's Government have maintained a balanced policy covering both the necessity for Israel to withdraw from occupied territories, and for the Arab countries to end the state of war with Israel and to acknowledge the right of Israel to live in peace within secure and recognised boundaries. This was set out by my right hon. Friend the former Foreign Secretary in his speeches of 21st June and 26th September at the United Nations, and also in statements to the House. It is in this way, I suggest, that we have been able to make a substantial contribution to the search for a peaceful settlement.

We of course recognise that our ability to influence the situation acting on our own is necessarily limited, and that if an end is to be found to this destructive enmity which has bedevilled the area for the last 20 years it can only be achieved by the international community acting together in the interests of peace, and here I join my hon. Friend who emphasised the role of the United Nations in this matter. It is for this reason that the Government have, since the six-day war, laid so much stress on working through the United Nations.

There may be those who question the efficacy of the United Nations in achieving constructive results, and I listened to what my hon. Friend said about Israeli doubts on this, based on what they consider to be their experience of the past. There have often been grounds for disappointment, not only in this matter, but in others. This could be inimical, but all the encouraging initiatives and all the hopes for progress towards an Arab-Israeli settlement have arisen out of the activity of the United Nations, and in that activity this country and this Government have played an honourable and effective part.

In the immediate aftermath of the six-

day war our efforts through the United Nations were necessarily concentrated on the achievement of a cease-fire and in trying to make it effective. There have, regrettably, been many breaches, on both sides, of the cease-fire, but it did at least confine the dangers of full-scale open war, with all the risks that this involved of escalation and extension. Later it was the policy of Her Majesty's Government to work through the United Nations for a Resolution dealing more directly with the substance of the Arab-Israeli situation and providing for the appointment of a representative of the Secretary General to go to the Middle East to discuss with the parties concerned and to try to bring them to accept a settlement based on the principles set out in the Resolution.

The unanimous adoption by the Security Council of the British draft Resolution of 22nd November set the scene for the conciliatory Mission of the distinguished ambassador, Mr. Jarring, who is continuing, despite last week's clashes. My hon. Friend asked me to confirm that it is our policy fully to support the Jarring Mission. Of course, having been one of the principals concerned in making the Mission possible, we are indeed 100 per cent. in support of the Mission and deeply anxious that it should continue to full success.

The Government believe that in this situation it is even more important that Mr. Jarring's Mission should be kept in being not only by all countries but by all countries in the Middle East. We hope that the unanimous Resolution adopted on 24th March by the Security Council condemning the Israeli incursion into the east bank of the Jordan on 21st March and deploring other violent incidents in violation of the cease fire, will have contributed to bringing home to both Arabs and Israelis the folly of allowing fresh escalation of violence.

We all deplore all violence, whether by raid or reprisal in this highly dangerous situation, and our Permanent Representative at the United Nations made our attitude clear in the Session on 21st March. Obviously, if Mr. Jarring is to have any prospect of success, concessions will be required by both Israelis and Arabs, which will mean their abandoning or modifying attitudes and positions to some of which they are deeply attached, but we are convinced that this is the only way

to prevent the situation from getting worse.

If there is no progress towards a settlement, passions will be further inflamed, there will be no slackening of the armed tensions of the past 20 years, and this cannot but be to the detriment of all the peoples of the Middle East and a constant threat to world peace. I am grateful for what my hon. Friend has said in support of the Government's firm policy of working through the United Nations and his appreciative references to our initiatives, and I hope that he will write and speak in future in support of those principles.

55

Joint Communiqué on the Hungarian Prime Minister Fock's Official Visit to France, 25-30 March.¹ [Excerpt]

Paris, March 29, 1968

The talks also dealt with the Middle East crisis. The two parties noted with profound regret that no progress had been made towards reaching a solution of the problem. They emphasised the dangers arising from the continuation of the state of affairs created by the war, and the consequent necessity of arriving at a settlement based on the full and immediate implementation of the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967. They regarded the United Nations as being fully qualified to play a prominent part in facilitating the implementation of that resolution.

56

New Zealand's Position on Middle East Problems.² [Excerpt]

Wellington, March 31, 1968

Although there are few specific New Zealand interests in the Middle East, as a United Nations member New Zealand accepts a general responsibility of lending its weight to efforts to secure peace and security in the area. Speaking in the General Assembly's debate on 28 June 1967, the New Zealand delegate, Mr F.H. Corner, stated New Zealand's deep regret at the outbreak of war and hope that through a process of accommodation a lasting settlement might be produced. New Zealand believed that the United Nations could assist in the difficult task of bringing the two sides into substantial negotiations.

57

Joint Communiqué on the Talks Held Between Spiljak, the President of Yugoslavia's Federal Executive Council, and Demirel, the President of the Ministerial Council of Turkey.³ [Excerpt]

Ankara, April 2, 1968

As far as the Middle East is concerned, the two prime ministers, expressing their regret at the continuation of the state of affairs caused by the armed conflict, confirmed their opposition to the use of force as a means for gaining territory and other political benefits, and their point of view that the policy of fait accompli was impermissible. They expressed the hope that the efforts being made to solve this dangerous conflict without delay and in keeping with the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967, would lead to the establishment of lasting peace in this region commensurate with the principles of justice and equitability.

¹ *Politique Etrangère de la France*, 1er Sem., 1968, p. 93.

² *Annual Report of the Department of External Affairs, 1 April 1967-31 March 1968* (Wellington, 1968), p. 16.

³ *Review of International Affairs*, 20/4/68, p. 16.

58

Toast of the French President de Gaulle to the Libyan Premier al-Bakkush.¹ [Excerpt]

Paris, April 5, 1968

France intends to-day, as she has so often done recently, to help countries everywhere to progress, and to support their right to self-determination. For example, France is, as much as ever, the friend of the Arabs, especially now, when their territories have been invaded.

59

Joint Communiqué on the Libyan Prime Minister Al-Bakkush's Official Visit to France, 2-5 April.² [Excerpt]

Paris, April 5, 1968

There was an extensive exchange of views on the relations between the two countries and on the main problems of international politics, in particular the serious situation prevailing in the Near East, which may lead to further developments.

The two parties recalled the terms of the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967. They reaffirmed that nothing could be settled by unilateral action and that any eventual solution would depend on the evacuation of the territories occupied since the incidents of June 1967. Both sides expressed the hope that every effort would be made, particularly at the United Nations, to reach a just settlement of the question as soon as possible.

60

Joint Communiqué on the Soviet Premier Kosygin's Visit to Iran.³ [Excerpt]

Teheran, April 7, 1968

A.N. Kosygin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, was in Iran from April 2 to 7, 1968, on an official visit at the invitation of Amir Abbas Hoveida, Prime Minister of the Imperial Government of Iran...

Bearing in mind the dangerous exacerbation of the situation in the Near East, the two sides placed special emphasis on the necessity that all states in this region have an opportunity to develop freely and independently, without any pressure or interference from outside forces that would like to maintain the colonial system and their influence here.

The two sides expressed their firm intention of seeking, together with other peace-loving states, the implementation of the Nov. 22, 1967, U.N. Security Council resolution, which called for the guaranteeing of peace and security to all states in the Near East on the basis of respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of each state in this region. The main task is the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the occupied Arab territories.

61

Resolution of the Plenary Session of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee on Foreign Policy.⁴ [Excerpt]

Moscow, April 10, 1968

In noting the continuing seriousness of the situation in the Near East as a result of the aggressive actions of Israel's ruling circles, which are

¹ *Le Monde*, (Paris), 6/4/1968.

² *Politique Etrangère de la France*, 1er sem., 1968, p. 104.

³ *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 24/4/1968, pp. 26-27. From *Pravda*.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 1/5/1968, p. 4. From *Pravda* and *Izvestia*.

backed by U.S. imperialism, the plenary session fully approves the measures of the Politburo and the Soviet government aimed at elimination of the consequences of Israeli aggression and liberation of the occupied Arab territories, as well as at comprehensive support for the progressive forces in the Arab countries.

62

Resolution Adopted by the Conference of Progressive and Anti-Imperialist Forces of the Mediterranean Countries.¹ [Excerpts]

Rome, April 11, 1968

"The Conference of Progressive and Anti-Imperialist Forces of the Mediterranean was held in Rome from April 9 to 11, 1968, with the following parties and movements participating: National Liberation Front (Algeria), Progressive Party of the Working People of Cyprus, Communist Party of France and United Socialist Party (France), Democratic Union of the Left—EDA (Greece), Communist Party of Greece, Communist Party of Italy, Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Yugoslavia, Communist Party of Morocco, National Union of People's Forces (Morocco), Patriotic Front of National Liberation (Portugal), Arab Socialist Union (UAR), Arab Socialist Party BAAS (Syria), Communist Party of Spain and Frente Organization (Spain), Turkish Workers' Party, and, as observers, the World Council for Peace and the Permanent Secretariat of Solidarity of Afro-Asian Peoples.

The participants gave consideration to the political situation in the Mediterranean region, its international context and the immediate and future forms of joint struggle and cooperation.

Today, the Mediterranean, together with Southeast Asia, is one of the outposts of aggressive US policy and its global strategy of domination.

The tension in the Middle East, provoked by the Israeli aggression and occupation of Arab

territories, is aimed at overthrowing progressive Arab regimes; in this manner, it strives to establish a political system which would guarantee the political and economic interests of the imperialists.

In this sense, the expansionist policy of the Zionist Government of Israel serves imperialist aims and dovetails with American deployment the purpose of which is to secure conditions making it possible for that country to dominate the Mediterranean. The pursuit of this policy is facilitated by the existence of NATO and American military presence in the Mediterranean.

The Conference condemns the Israeli aggression of June 5, 1967, against the Arab countries, as the consequence of a ceaselessly expansionistic policy at the expense of the Arab peoples and of assaults on the progressive regimes of the Middle East; this aggression and this policy have found support and encouragement in American imperialism.

It roundly condemns the armed intervention by Israel, its explicitly stressed desire to annex Arab territory, its repressive measures in occupied territories and, particularly, collective reprisals. The Conference demands the urgent and unconditional withdrawal of the Israeli armed forces to the positions of June 5, in line with the principle that it is impermissible to annex territory by war; it expresses its solidarity with the legitimate resistance of the Palestinian people, and demands that the tragedy into which it has been drawn be solved in keeping with its national rights and its right to self-determination.

63

News Conference Remark by the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Hajek on the Middle East.² [Excerpt]

Prague, April 13, 1968

By our vote for the Security Council resolu-

¹ *Review of International Affairs*, 20/5/68, p. 21.

² *Jerusalem Post*, 14/4/1968.

tion last year, we emphasized that we are for a political solution to the Middle East crisis and for the withdrawal of Israel forces from occupied territories.

64

Letter From the Soviet Communist Party Leader Brezhnev to the Algerian President Boumedienne.¹ [Excerpt]

Moscow, April 14, 1968

The vital interests of the great revolutionary forces in our age rest in ensuring the final triumph for the cause of the national and social progress of peoples. The cohesion and unity of these forces has become more necessary than ever due to the gravity of the international situation in our day, which is witnessing the escalation of the aggressive war being waged by American imperialism in Vietnam, the continuation of the criminal Israeli aggression against the Arabs and the increasing manoeuvres of the imperialist and reactionary forces in the Arab Maghrib and especially in the African Continent. The Soviet Union, as you are aware, is giving essential aid to the heroic people of Vietnam and firmly and resolutely opposing the manoeuvres of imperialism and reaction. We are also determined to fulfil the commitment to grant aid in various forms to the U.A.R., Syria and other Arab countries and to support them in their just struggle to eliminate the effects of the Israeli-imperialist aggression.

Together with other peace-loving States we are seeking to achieve before anything else the withdrawal of the forces of aggression from all the occupied Arab territories. Towards this end an important role is expected to be played by the alliance of struggle of the socialist countries and all the anti-imperialist forces.

¹ *Algiers*' home service in Arabic, 20.00 GMT, 24/4/1968. B.B.C., ME/2754/ A/1.

65

Interview Granted by the Israeli Foreign Minister Eban to the Israeli Daily Davar.² [Excerpts]

Tel Aviv, April 18, 1968

Q. Reports have been published of the ministers' views on conditions for peace, especially as regards the frontiers. In the light of these conflicting views, do you think that this government can take a decisive and explicit decision when the time comes for peace negotiations?

A. I do not entirely believe all that has been published on this subject. I have not considered myself obliged to define my views on final frontiers to any foreign element, because the proper time for such discussion is during negotiations with the Arab governments. But I have followed with the closest attention the views expressed by the ministers during our discussions. As regards the Labour Party ministers, there is no substantial difference of principle between their views. I know their views, and I know what is going on in their minds. All their views are restricted to a single objective—to obtain frontiers that will ensure security, to prevent a repetition of that vulnerability which was ours before 4 June, and to maintain the character of our state as a state whose course and destiny are decided by the Jewish people. There are various expressions of this trend, but there will be no difficulty in reaching a consensus in our party when the time comes. In my opinion, it will not be difficult to arrive at a decisive and explicit attitude that will be adopted by the whole government. But, as I said, there is no need for a declaration of such a consensus as long as there is no prospect of negotiations. At the moment (the evening of 17 April) I see no possibility of negotiations with any Arab country in the near future.

Q. The change that has taken place in the war in Vietnam is the result of President Johnson's statement on stopping the bombing. Do you think that the time has come when Israel's foreign policy should no longer consist of nothing but waiting until the other side is ready for negotiations, and that steps should be taken to

² *Davar*, (Tel Aviv), 18/4/1968.

induce the enemy to respond in the diplomatic field? Do you think that we should take the initiative as President Johnson has done?

A. It is not true to say that there have been no Israeli initiatives. We are living at present in the political vortex created by an Israeli initiative which consisted of a statement in the Knesset of our readiness to meet the Arab countries, under Jarring's auspices, to undertake face to face negotiations on all matters mentioned in the Security Council resolution. Only a few weeks ago we tried to resolve the impasse by proposing a formula for negotiations that would help the Arabs to overcome their complexes: we proposed a procedure that would ensure that the parties should have equal status in the negotiations. We were even prepared to allow the presence of some foreign element to maintain the balance of the negotiations and to ensure that we were not in a position to dictate their course through our "victor's arrogance", as the Arabs call it. That is to say, we proposed a fair game on a neutral pitch with a referee to ensure that the rules of fair negotiation were observed.

This initiative had to be taken, and it has not failed. From the tactical point of view it has achieved its aims. It has put the Arab governments, in the eyes of the world, in a situation from which they have not yet succeeded in extricating themselves. They have been in no hurry to call for a meeting of either the General Assembly or the Security Council, for it is not easy for them to explain why they have not agreed to undertake negotiations within a reasonable international framework. Through their own obstinacy they have made great difficulties for themselves, and so far there is nothing to justify their renewing the international struggle in any of the essential fields. This is because they know that it is not easy for them to let the whole world see them refusing to respond to a reasonable initiative.

But our proposal was not fundamentally a tactical one. I really think that it is possible to advance towards peace treaties at a "peace conference" like that proposed by Jarring. I think that it is still too early to consider that this initiative has exhausted itself. In any case, we are now in the fourth week of this initiative, and I am not prepared to say that all the fuel has been consumed. You may ask: Is there no possibility of another

initiative? But the question is: What would it consist of? Is there another approach that might bring us to negotiations? I am open to proposals, and I have some ideas, but they are all within the framework of the policy adopted by the government and the Knesset. I am convinced of one thing: No advance is possible without direct negotiations. The basic problem is that of ensuring agreed, secure and recognised frontiers. This question can only be explored in the course of face to face negotiations. In this context I should like to say that the Security Council resolution does not propose that we should "implement" anything before agreement has been reached on establishing peace; where agreement is reached, of course, we shall implement what we have agreed on. In view of the fact that we support this attitude, I do not think that we should do any good if we renounced this fundamental attitude by starting a discussion of frontiers with any quarter except the Arab governments.

Some people say that the Arabs have agreed to negotiations if they had had a general impression that encouraged them to suppose that through negotiations they would be able to arrive at an "honourable" result, that is to say, that they would not be expected to append their signature to terms dictated to them by us. Negotiations are, in our view, a serious process, not a foregone conclusion, and we have been working on this assumption. We have shown that the question of demarcating frontiers is a question open to negotiation, and that we do not consider the problem as finally decided by the existence of the cease-fire lines.

What more we can do I do not know. If it is asked whether it is not possible to provide a detailed explanation of what we mean by agreed secure frontiers and to provide a map of them, I think that this would not be a sound procedure, because the Arabs would then be able to reply to our proposals without negotiations, whereas in negotiations we could either insist that they made counter-proposals or explained their rejection of our proposals. I know of no precedent for territorial verification between governments which have not previously clearly stated that they have decided to make peace and conduct negotiations.

Even the international elements with which we are in contact do not advise us to inform the

Arabs of the details of our proposals if there is no prospect of negotiations. This is why I cannot see at the moment what is the use of asking about "other initiatives". It may be that the Arabs have been confused by public discussion here in Israel. I have the impression that they attribute an exaggerated importance to the views of the minority that maintains that peace is a vain hope, and that the question of defining frontiers by negotiations should not be made a precondition. It is possible that this school is confusing them, because they do not distinguish between its views and the views of the majority in this country that believes that we should stand fast by certain possibilities that actually exist. From this my conclusion is that the views of the majority should be more courageously reflected by public opinion and that no school of thought should give expression to the minority view only. If this was not a minority view, how would it be possible to affirm that the government's formula enjoys the approval of the Knesset and the sympathy of the people? All official decisions have given expression to the view that the door should be kept open to all sorts of possibilities.

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Q. If we ever had a honeymoon with Hussein it came to an end after the Six Day War, at the moment when the guns of the Jordanian army started shelling Jerusalem, and now the indirect dialogue has ended, and patience is exhausted. Some people, too, believe that it would be better if some foreign element controlled Jordan, giving as an example the period of quiet ten days ago when Nabulsi was Prime Minister. Do you think it will be easier for us to come to an understanding with the extremist elements that will be controlling Jordanian policy, including even those who will be under the influence of Fateh?

Again, the question is always being asked, which is better for us—with or without Hussein?

A. I cannot recall the period of "our honeymoon with Hussein." Israeli governments have always shown a desire to make peace with the neighbouring Arab country. I remember the efforts made by Ben Gurion to explore the possibilities of peace with King Abdullah—Egypt and Syria were two "foreign" countries that entered the conflict from 1948 onwards. Jordan and Israel belong to a single geographical and political

environment. Our basic problem is: how to arrive at coexistence with the Arabs on both sides of the river. We do not specify what sort of regime there should be in any Arab country. It is not a question of a "honeymoon with Hussein", but of the relations we want with the Kingdom of Jordan and the people living in it.

What we want in Jordan is a government which will observe the cease-fire and move towards peace. We do not want a neighbour who allows his territory to be used for the exertion of pressure by a great power hostile to Israel. If, for example, there was to be a government in Jordan similar to that in Syria, then, in spite of the quiet situation on the cease-fire lines in the north, I should not feel at all happy. Nor is it to be expected that the Jordanian government will keep the peace on this frontier on its own, for it is different from the northern frontier, because of the Palestinians and refugees, none of whom live in the north. Would that increase Israel's security? If there were to be such regimes on three sides, should we not feel that we were being strangled? I can see no advantage to Israel in such a situation. If such a regime makes its appearance on the Jordan, we shall fight against it. But I hope that this will not happen. The enthusiasm shown by certain correspondents and commentators for the replacement of the regime in Jordan by another seems to me an extreme form of masochism.

We are faced with a country whose military strength is not as great as ours, and whose basic links are with international elements that want Israel to survive, rather than with those suspected of wanting to damage the existence of Israel. I do not agree that we have nothing to lose in the present situation. Every bad situation may get worse: it is possible that the situation on our frontier with Jordan may get worse, and it would be strange indeed if we ourselves were to encourage this. I am quite sure that if the "prophecy" that the dozen American planes will be replaced by 100 Migs comes true, there is not one of us who will be happy about Israel's security situation. There is no impression in Jordan that this is a likely trend in international politics. The fact is that she has had an opportunity of accepting Soviet protection, but she does not need it. We know that Hussein has received generous offers

from Moscow, but that is not what either the Kingdom of Jordan or the leaders of the Arabs of the Land of Israel are thinking of.

Q. In the past you came out against a Palestinian state. What is your attitude now?

A. Even if this was desirable, we should have to discover if it is possible. The idea is to establish a Palestinian state bounded by the West Bank of the river. We have made extensive contacts with the Arab [Palestinian] people, (and I am personally more familiar with their thoughts than I was before) but I have not found a single Arab here who is in favour of the separation of the Arabs who live among us from those who live in Jordan. The Arabs in Nablus and Jordan who demand "independence" will have to decide what is to be their link with the other side of the Jordan.

And it is quite possible that in so doing they may choose links with the Arab rather than the Israeli side. Here there is some confusion that arises from the fact that the word "Hussein" is often used as meaning "Jordan". The question is not what is the attitude of the Arabs of Israel to Hussein himself, but whether they want continued links and contacts with Jordan. The majority of them want links, whether or no they formerly supported the Hashemite king. What I say is that if, through a peaceful settlement, they could attain "independence" in part of the West Bank, it is not to be supposed that they would want to remain independent by themselves. They would want to join whatever there was on the other side—today it is the Hashemite Kingdom, tomorrow it may be some other Arab government.

Even with Hussein in power it is not impossible that the Kingdom should come under a Palestinian regime. Hussein's need for a Palestinian regime is increasing. I have not encountered Arab elements here that regard their future as linked to Israel more than to the Arab world. Their aspiration is for continued contacts,—through Jordan—with the Arab world as a whole.

I believe that any solution will have to take into account this aspiration, which has become of considerable importance. It has been the policy of the (military) government to maintain constant and unimpeded contact across the river, and I think that this policy is a sound one. But one of its results is that it is difficult to separate a

settlement with the Arabs of the Land of Israel from one with the Arabs of Jordan.

Q. Do you not think that a statement by the government of Israel that it recognises the national rights of the Palestinian people would have been more likely to bring a solution than the tendency to approach Amman through Nablus, and that such a statement might also have shown world public opinion that we have no desire for occupation?

A. To make such a statement is less important than to draft a peace plan that will decide for good and all the allegiance of all parties. If it was possible to obtain a solution that safeguards our security by ensuring self-determination to some hundreds of thousands of Arabs, this would solve the majority of our information problems. There are various ways by which this might be achieved, but I will not discuss them as the government has not reached a decision concerning them.

I know the inclinations of all the members of the government, and I know that most of them are trying to find a way to reconcile their opposing views. They want more territory and greater security but, if possible, without depriving some hundreds of thousands of Arabs of the right to self-determination. A measure of embarrassment is felt. As to how reconciliation can be achieved between two things: on the one hand more territory and more security, so that we may never again be in the situation in which the Arab armies were pressing us towards the sea, and when they had superiority from the hills and heights, and, on the other hand, self-determination for hundreds of thousands of Arabs. This embarrassment is much to be respected, though it has not yet reached an agreed solution. Even those who work in the security sector are deeply concerned to find a solution of this problem. There are many people, whose feelings for security I respect, as does the whole of Israel, and the majority of them do not claim that the cease-fire is the only situation capable of ensuring our security. I think that Itshak Rabin has very wise views on the subject.

Q. In the last few days there has been an increasing

impression that the Soviet Union is encouraging Arab obstinacy in the area, and that this is liable to lead to the sabotaging of Jarring's mission and to the raising of the subject of the Middle East once more for debate in the United Nations. Is this a correct appraisal, and if so, what can Israel expect at the United Nations?

A. I do not think that this impression has been increasing recently. There is no indication that the Soviet Union is sabotaging Jarring's mission, although it is clearly not helping it, and is, at the same time, circulating a false and unreliable interpretation of the Security Council resolution.

If there is to be a new stage of the struggle at the United Nations, we shall make every effort, as we have done in the past, to oppose hostile proposals. I hope that we shall succeed, as we have succeeded in the past, in preventing the crystallisation of an international policy hostile to us. I am not prepared to guarantee success; all I am prepared to guarantee is that the greatest possible efforts will be made. The fact is that after ten months there is no approved international policy that demands that the prevailing situation should be changed without peace being established and without frontiers which we accept and approve of being demarcated.

66

Press Conference Remark by the Soviet Premier Kosygin on the Middle East During His Visit to Pakistan.¹ [Excerpt]

Rawalpindi, April 18, 1968

Our position is that the aggressor, Israel, must evacuate all the Arab territories it has seized and return to the line existing before the start of the aggression. There is no other way of solving the Middle East problem.

We must say that the Israeli aggressors are mistaken in believing that they have a superiority in military strength. We are convinced that they

¹ *Soviet News* (London), 23/4/1968, p. 41.

will make the biggest mistake in the history of their state if they do not now evacuate the territories they have seized.

And I think that the Israeli people will not forgive their government for this mistake if the opportunity is missed.

67

Resolution Adopted by the Interparliamentary Union (Spring Session) on the Middle East.² [Excerpt]

Dakar, April 20, 1968

For a just and lasting peace to be established in the Middle East, the two following principles must be enforced:

1) The withdrawal of the Israeli armed forces from the territories occupied during the recent conflict;

2) The cessation of any assertion or state of belligerency, respect for and recognition of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area, and of its right to live in peace within secure and recognised frontiers safe from all threats and acts of violence.

68

Joint Communiqué on the Soviet Premier Kosygin's Visit to Pakistan.³ [Excerpts]

Islamabad, April 21, 1968

At the invitation of the President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Field Marshal Muhammed Ayub Khan, Alexei Kosygin, Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, paid an official visit to Pakistan from April 17 to April 21, 1968.

The two sides condemned the continued acts

² *Le Monde* (Paris), 21-22/4/1968.

³ *Soviet News*, (London), 23/4/1968, p. 43.

of aggression by Israel against the Arab states. They stressed their conviction that peace in this area will be restored only if Israel pulls its troops out from the occupied territories and respects the territorial integrity and independence of the Arab states. They stressed the urgent need for the immediate implementation of the resolution of the Security Council of November 22, 1967.

69

Statement by Aspirant to the Republican Candidature for the U.S. Presidency, Richard M. Nixon, on the Middle East.¹ [Excerpt]

Washington, April 22, 1968

The Middle East today stands closer to the threshold of armed conflict than at any period since the June war. Outside of the cauldron of the Middle East itself, this new danger to regional and global peace can be traced directly to Soviet policy in the area—and indirectly to the absence of an effective American counter-policy.

There is no question but that the Soviets were the losers in the six-day conflict itself. The belligerent Arab states to which they were allied suffered a stunning defeat; a Soviet-trained and -equipped army was humiliated on the field of battle and a multi-billion dollar investment in arms and equipment had to be written off.

But if the Soviets were the losers in the six-day conflict, they are the principal beneficiaries of the uneasy post-war truce; and United States interests have suffered to the same extensive degree that Soviet interests have advanced.

Their naval manpower in the Mediterranean has been augmented five-fold since the war. Their client states have been rearmed and equipped with some of the most modern of weaponry in the Soviet inventory. Their influence has grown in the entire Arab and Near Eastern world—from Morocco to Iran—as they have stiffened

the spine of the militants with encouragement and arms, established naval bases on the south shore of the Mediterranean, and assumed the leadership of the anti-Israel league in the United Nations. For the first time in history they are in the Mediterranean in power, and solidly entrenched on the World Bridge.

Confronted with this diplomatic and military policy of expansionism and adventurism on the part of the Soviets, the American response has been halting and lame and ineffectual. Indeed, there seems to be no American policy at all in a region of the world where a single chance spark could ignite a local conflict that could bring the great powers hurtling together in a major confrontation.

What should American policy be in the area, now that we have paid so dearly for the absence of an effective past policy?

The first urgency is for America not to allow the balance of power to shift in favor of the militant Arab states bent on a new war. To this end, the United States must see to it that Israel's military strength is never at a level vis-à-vis the Arab militants that will invite a war of revenge, the consequence of which we could not possibly foresee and which at all costs we must avoid.

Second, the United States must deal directly with the Soviets and impress upon them both the urgency of keeping their client states in check, and the dangers inherent to the peace in any renewal of the kind of wholesale Soviet irresponsibility evident just prior to the recent conflict.

Third, the United States must take the diplomatic lead in forging an acceptable settlement. Included in the terms of that settlement should be solid guarantees that the currently occupied territories will never again be used as bases of aggression or sanctuaries for terrorism. Access for the ships of all nations through the re-opened Suez Canal and the Straits of Tiran should be guaranteed. It should include recognition of Israeli sovereignty, its right to exist in peace, and an end to the state of belligerency.

With regard to the occupied territories, it is not realistic to expect Israel to surrender these vital bargaining counters in the absence of a genuine peace and effective guarantee. However, it is also my view that for Israel to take formal and final possession of these occupied areas would

¹ *Near East Report*, (Washington - Special Survey), May 1968, p. 6. Mr Nixon made this statement available to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee.

be a grave mistake.

It is my belief from my own visits to Israel and my own talks with her leaders that the one thing that Israel values more highly than the peace she desperately seeks is her freedom and national independence.

If the United States is to help secure this for the future, then we must strengthen our ties with America's friends in the Arab world. The channels of communication that have broken down must be repaired and the United States must re-establish its position on the side of all of those, Arab and Jew, who are appalled at the prospect of wasting their precious resources on another war.

To find a just peace in an area of the world that has known only armed truces and three major and bitter wars in a generation is not an easy task. But the United States is not without diplomatic and economic resources, and its private and public men are not without cogent ideas to get directly at the underlying problems of refugees and water. And I think that we cannot wait longer to make the effort.

70

Press Release on the Meeting of the Nordic Foreign Ministers, 25-26 April.¹ [Excerpt]

Oslo, April 26, 1968

In discussing the conflict in the Middle East, the Ministers underlined how imperative it was for the parties concerned to do what they could to enable Mr. Jarring's mission to lead to a constructive outcome. If once again it is shown that the presence of United Nations troops in the area is desirable, the Nordic countries, in the view of the Foreign Ministers, should be prepared to participate.

¹ *Documents on Swedish Foreign Policy, 1968*, p. 65. The Foreign Ministers of the following countries attended the meeting: Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden.

71

Joint Communiqué on the Yugoslav President Tito's Visit to Iran.² [Excerpt]

Teheran, April 28, 1968

In view of the serious situation in the Middle East, both sides agreed that the withdrawal of Israeli forces from occupied Arab territory constituted the most important matter and emphasized that it would be imperative to guarantee the free development and independence of all the states in that area, without pressure or interference on the part of any foreign power. They consider that, with a view to helping to normalize the situation in the Middle East, all the interested countries should adhere to the principles laid down in the UN Charter and put in effect the resolutions of the United Nations, notably the resolution passed by the Security Council on November 22, 1967.

72

Speech by the Indian President Husain at a Dinner in Honour of the Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie.³ [Excerpt]

New Delhi, April 28, 1968

Another danger spot is West Asia. Though the cease-fire remains on the whole effective, so long as Israel continues to hold on to the Arab territories occupied by force, the danger of renewed warfare cannot be ruled out. Therefore, the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the occupied Arab territories is essential for a permanent settlement of the problem.

India considers territorial aggrandisement by force as unacceptable. At the same time we believe that every State has the right to live in peace and security within its own borders. Both India and Ethiopia support the UN efforts to

² *Review of International Affairs*, 20/5/1968, p. 23.

³ *Indian Foreign Affairs Record*, April 1968, p. 79.

bring about peace with justice in the area and we will continue to work together to bring about a just settlement of the West Asian crisis.

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73

Message of Greetings from the U.S. President Johnson to the President of Israel Shazar.¹

Washington, April 29, 1968

Dear Mr. President.

I am pleased to extend to you and to the people of Israel my congratulations and those of the people of the U.S. on the Twentieth Anniversary of your independence.

During this brief period of time, the State of Israel has made great strides, socially, economically, and politically. It has set an outstanding example of how people of widely disparate backgrounds can become a thriving, democratic nation.

But three times during these 20 years war has broken out. The Middle East remains beset by violence and hatred. These are trying times—times in which patience and cool judgement must prevail. My warm wishes to your people on this milestone of statehood are therefore accompanied by my confidence that your Government will devote all its energy to the effort to reach a secure, just, and lasting peace—acceptable and beneficial both to Israel and to her neighbours.

Sincerely,
Lyndon B. Johnson.

74

Statement by Aspirant to the Democratic Candidature for the U.S. Presidency, Robert F. Kennedy, on the Middle East.²

Washington, April 29, 1968

First of all, let me state unequivocally and incontrovertibly that I believe Israel has the right to exist and the right to protect herself. Our country must make our policy clear. We have in the past and must continue to insist that Israel's existence is secure, that she will not die, that she will not be conquered, that the United States will take whatever steps are necessary to preserve her existence. We believe without question or qualification in Israel's right to live; and we must support that belief.

I have fervently urged meaningful and fruitful negotiations directly between Arabs and Israelis. The antagonists in the war-torn Middle East must personally meet and agree to a practical and peaceful relationship. As we have all painfully learned, war serves no nation. The hatred in the wake of armed conflict poisons the air between neighbors. Thus will I continue to urge direct peace negotiations for Israel and her neighbors. Hopefully, the Arab nations will soon agree, as has Israel, to this more humane means of settling disputes. Those negotiations could be the occasion for any accommodations that might be made in the borders between the various countries.

Meanwhile, those who again would embroil the Middle East in war must not be encouraged. If Israel's most antagonistic neighbors are rearmed by others who would stir further hatred in that troubled part of the world, then Israel should have equivalent military strength. A balance of forces is necessary to dissuade those who promote armed aggression. To that end, the United States should stand ready to sell Israel jet aircraft and the other arms she needs effectively to defend herself from attack, and thereby lower its probability.

But there will never be a permanent peace in the Middle East while the neighboring nations

¹ *Jerusalem Post*, 30/4/1968.

² *Near East Report* (Washington - Special Survey), May 1968, p. 4. Mr. Kennedy made this statement available to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee.

there are fearful of one another. There cannot be harmony in that area while the people there hate each other, while one nation envies the other, while proud Arabs suffer in unspeakable poverty beside a flourishing neighbor about whom they hear only derogatory propaganda. Arabs and Israelis must meet, and mix, and trade with each other. They must begin to understand and appreciate each other's ways.

The United States should encourage and support such friendly relations. Fortunately, hatreds do melt. Countries, like people, are flexible. Often it is not the entire people of a land who so hate the other. Rather, some hostile Arab leaders have turned their backs on peace for their own private and personal gain. Other Arab leaders however have begun to face the realities of the Middle East and have hinted a willingness to seek peace. Therefore this nation should not be rigid or dogmatic with even the most recalcitrant Arab nations. For they too can be encouraged to seek a peaceful co-existence with their Arab neighbors and with Israel.

We should press then for a policy of open arms, an optimism in even the darkest hour. We must aid and encourage those Arab leaders who turn away from war, and lend our finest minds and efforts to the elimination of poverty, hunger and despair in the Arab lands.

In my judgment, these are the paths toward peace in the Middle East. The United States will always guarantee the existence and security of Israel. But without mutual understanding and friendship between Arabs and Israelis, it can be no more than a tenuous peace, always threatening to erupt again into bloodshed and tragedy. But if those nations sharing the same part of the world can find the way to grow together while enriching each other's cultures, then there could be a lasting and fulfilling peace.

75

Joint Communiqué on the Yugoslav President Tito's Visit to the U.S.S.R.¹ [Excerpt]

Moscow, April 30, 1968

...The two parties stressed the urgent necessity of eliminating all consequences of the Israeli aggression against the Arab countries and of finding a political solution for the Near East crisis.

76

Joint Communiqué on the Yugoslav Foreign Minister Nikezic's Visit to East Germany.² [Excerpt]

Berlin, April 1968

As for the situation in the Middle East, both parties agreed that the refusal by Israel to implement the U.N. Security Council resolution of November 22nd 1967, to withdraw its armed forces from occupied Arab territories and its continued acts of aggression against the Arab states increased tension and the danger of new military clashes obstructing any political solution.

Both Ministers again stressed the solidarity and support of their Governments for the friendly Arab states in the struggle for sovereign rights and overcoming the results of Israeli aggression.

¹ *Review of International Affairs*, 20/5/1968, p. 22.

² *G.D.R. Foreign Affairs Bulletin*, 15/5/1968, p. 107.

77

Joint Communiqué on the Ethiopian Emperor Haile Sellassie's Visit to India, 28 April - 1 May.¹ [Excerpt]**New Delhi, May 1, 1968**

His Imperial Majesty and the Prime Minister [of India] re-affirmed their support to the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967, on the West Asian situation. They agreed that among the pre-requisites to a lasting settlement was the vacation of territories occupied by force. They expressed their full support to the efforts of the United Nations to bring about a lasting settlement in the region.

78

Joint Communiqué on the Turkish President Sunay's Visit to Iraq.² [Excerpts]**Baghdad, May 1, 1968**

His Excellency Cevdet Sunay, president of the Republic of Turkey, paid a state visit to Iraq, between 27 April and May 1st, 1968, at the invitation of His Excellency Lieutenant General Abd-al-Rahman Muhammad Aref, President of the Republic of Iraq.

His Excellency the Iraqi President gave a detailed account of the developments in the Middle East and the extent which the tragedy of the Palestine problem has reached and stressing the adherence by Iraq and the Arab world to all Arab rights and expressed the gratitude of Iraq for the valuable support extended by Turkey to the Arab countries throughout the crisis in the area.

His Excellency the President of the Turkish Republic reaffirmed the sentiments of friendship and sympathy of Turkey towards the Arab coun-

tries. He reaffirmed Turkey's opposition to the use of force as a means for securing political advantages and territorial gains and the use of such gains to impose unilateral solutions. He also stressed the necessity of safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of the Arab countries and expressed the wish that efforts designed to find a solution based on justice and equity in the region would be successful.

In this connection the two Presidents expressed their belief in the necessity of the withdrawal of all Israeli forces from all occupied Arab territories.

79

Message of Greetings From the Kenyan President Kenyatta to President Shazar of Israel.³**Nairobi, May 2, 1968**

I convey to you, your Government and the people of Israel on my own behalf and on behalf of the Government and people of Kenya, our warmest wishes for your continued success and prosperity.

We have been following closely the recent events in the Middle East and I wish to reiterate my call that all States concerned will settle their disputes by peaceful means and negotiations. May the coming years see the fulfilment of our mutual desire for peace and security throughout the world.

¹ Indian *Foreign Affairs Record*, May 1968, p. 84.

² Turkish *Foreign Ministry Release*, Ankara, 1/5/1968.

³ *Jerusalem Post*, 3/5/1968.

80

Speech by the Australian Prime Minister Gorton at a Meeting Celebrating Israel's National Day.¹ [Excerpts]

Sydney, May 1968

I hope that the Middle East will reach a settlement that accepts the rights of all States in the area to live in peace with each other. This is not yet, but I believe this will come. This desire for peace...will be pursued by my Government.

This path will be easier if face to face negotiations [between Israel and the Arabs] could take place. One can only urge that it should happen.

81

Joint Communiqué on the French Prime Minister Pompidou's Official Visit to Afghanistan.² [Excerpt]

Kabul, May 11, 1968

As regards the situation in the Middle East, the Afghan Premier expressed his profound appreciation of the attitude adopted by the French Government.

82

Joint Communiqué on the Tunisian President Bourguiba's Visit to Canada.³ [Excerpts]

Ottawa, May 12, 1968

At the invitation of the Canadian Government, the President of the Republic of Tunisia,

His Excellency Habib Bourguiba, paid a state visit to Canada, May 8-12.

The President explained the Tunisian viewpoint on the question of the Middle East, and they underlined the importance of finding a solution which would be consistent with justice and a lasting peace in the region. For that purpose, they expressed their support for the efforts the United Nations is making to find a solution, particularly with respect to the mission of Ambassador Jarring.

83

Replies by the Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko to Questions on Soviet Policy in the Middle East.⁴ [Excerpts]

Rome, May 12, 1968

Q. What, in your opinion, is the reason for Israel's decision to ignore all General Assembly and Security Council resolutions on the Middle East? What initiatives should be taken to secure the withdrawal of Israeli forces from all occupied Arab territories, and to find a political solution of the Middle East conflict?

A. As everyone knows, Israel enjoys the most extensive support for her aggressive policies from imperialistic forces, first and foremost the U.S.A. Israel's expansionist policy in the Middle East is closely connected with the aggressive policy pursued at world level by the U.S.A., as witnessed by what is happening in South-East Asia, Latin America and other parts of the world.

In the Middle East Israel, with her policy aimed at the liquidation of the national liberation movements and the progressive regimes that have arisen in a number of Arab countries, is playing the role of gendarme which has been allotted to her, and this is why Tel Aviv is being so obstructionist in its refusal to accept any political solution

¹ *Jewish Chronicle* (London), 10/5/1968, p. 11.

² *Politique Etrangère de la France*, 1er Sem., 1968, p. 127.

³ *Canadian External Affairs*, June 1968, pp. 260-261.

⁴ *L'Unità* (Rome), 12/5/1968. The replies were made in the course of an interview with the Italian Communist daily *L'Unità*.

of the conflict. Our sympathies are with the Arab States which are struggling to liberate the territories occupied by Israel, and we are in favour of a political settlement based on the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967.

In the hope of securing an international détente and a stable peace in the Middle East, the Soviet Union is taking all measures in its power, with due regard for the necessity of respecting the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of all the states of this part of the world, to eliminate the consequences of the Israeli aggression. In its statement on 22 March the Soviet Government confirmed its decision to join with other peace-loving states in eliminating the consequences of the Israeli aggression and in ensuring the return of the Arab refugees to the occupied territories.

The Israeli Government is under the obligation to respect the Security Council resolution of 22 November, 1967, which stipulates, first and foremost, the withdrawal of troops from all Arab territories occupied by the aggressors. If this does not take place, Israel will, sooner or later have to answer for her policy. The Soviet government is acting on the assumption that concern for the Security Council imposes on Israel respect for the decisions it takes.

The Soviet Union will also grant aid in the future to the friendly Arab States in their just struggle for the elimination, of the consequences of the Israeli aggression. In this way the U.S.S.R. will perform her duties in conformity with the United Nations Charter and with the interests of maintaining peace in the Middle East.

Q. What is the significance, in the new situation that has been created in the Mediterranean, of the Soviet presence in this part of the world?

A. Since the second World War great changes have taken place in some of the Mediterranean countries. This has been the case particularly as regards the development of the historical process of the national and social liberation of the people.

With the object of hampering and obstructing the further development of this process, the reactionary and imperialist forces are trying to interfere in the internal affairs of these countries so as to deprive the peoples of their inalienable

right to decide their own destiny.

Since the period immediately following the war there have been many examples of this. In the recent past imperialistic forces have many times engaged in military adventures against the Arab peoples and countries. Last summer Israel engaged in a new treacherous aggression against the United Arab Republic, Syria and Jordan.

The facts that reveal the special role played by the American Sixth Fleet in the policy of imperialist interference are known to all.

The Sixth Fleet is used to exert continuous pressure on the countries that lie on the shores of the Mediterranean, and in attempts to check the national liberation movements in the Middle East and North Africa. This is a why, in many Mediterranean countries, there is a growing tendency to demand the withdrawal of the American Sixth Fleet which is in the service of the policy of aggression.

As a Black Sea country, and, consequently, a Mediterranean country too, the Soviet Union is naturally interested in peace and security in an area which is near to its southern frontiers. We have always intervened to ensure that the Mediterranean should become a peaceful sea and a nuclear-free area.

The presence of the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean is therefore a factor contributing to the consolidation of the security of the whole Mediterranean.

84

Remarks by the U.S. President Johnson at the Ceremony Welcoming President Bourguiba of Tunisia to the United States.¹
[Excerpt]

Washington, May 15, 1968

The United States neither has nor desires political dominion in North Africa and the Middle East. What we seek is what the war-weary people

¹ U.S. *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, 20/5/1968, pp. 796-797.

of the Middle East most desire themselves, that is: the hope of a better life and justice and peace.

Last June¹ I reconfirmed our commitment to these goals in the Middle East. I committed us to pursue a peace based on five principles:

- First, the recognized right of national life;
- Second, justice for the refugees;
- Third, innocent maritime passage;
- Fourth, limits on the wasteful and destructive arms race; and
- Fifth, political independence and territorial integrity for all.

I restate these principles today. Many debates and many discussions have taken place since last June 19th. The United Nations Security Council passed its important resolution on November 22nd. Our commitment to these principles—and to that resolution—has not changed. It will not change.

85

Joint Statement on Talks Between the U.S. President Johnson and the Tunisian President Bourguiba.² [Excerpts]

Washington, May 16, 1968

On May 15, 1968, President Johnson welcomed President Bourguiba of Tunisia as his guest for a State Visit to the United States...

President Bourguiba stressed the urgency of a just settlement of the Middle East problem. President Johnson expressed his agreement, and in that connection reiterated his firm belief that justice for all was to be found in the five principles he had enunciated on June 19, 1967. The two Presidents reaffirmed their strong support for the Security Council resolution of November 22, as offering the surest road to peace, and called on all governments to cooperate fully with the Jarring Mission toward this end.

¹ See *International Documents on Palestine, 1967*, pp. 116-118.

² U.S. Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 20/5/1968, p. 807.

86

Address by the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Battle on U.S. Policy in the Near East.³ [Excerpts]

Miami (Florida), May 16, 1968

A year has passed since the June war. Following that war many countries, including our own, determined to seek this time a lasting peace. The world cannot risk these periodic upheavals, with all the increasing dangers of broader conflict. As I speak today one year later, our hope for peace is still strong. Our determination to pursue it is unwavering. But the optimism in the immediate aftermath of the war has been tempered by certain hard realities.

The problems which for 20 years have divided Israel and its neighbors are still with us. Many have increased in complexity. The conditions which led to the June war are still present and have been sharpened by intense bitterness and distrust. For some time following the war, there was great debate in the halls of diplomacy, as well as the public press, as to whose side time served. It seems clear now that time is working for no one.

I would like on this occasion, first, to speak generally of the search for peace and then to deal specifically and frankly with some of the problems and conditions that must be dealt with if that quest for peace is to succeed.

President Johnson in a notable speech on June 19 [1967] set forth the policy of the United States with respect to the Near East. Read today with all the incidents and events and debate over past months, the speech in my judgment shines through as a beacon of wisdom, anticipating as it did the trend of thought which evolved throughout this troubled year. Its basic five principles are undoubtedly well known to you, but they cannot be restated too often, and I recall them here:

³ U.S. *Department of State Bulletin*, 3/6/1968, pp. 711-714. The address, entitled "Objectives and Directions of U.S. Policy in the Near East," was made by the U.S. Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Mr. Lucius D. Battle before the American Jewish Congress at Miami.

First, the recognized right of national life.

Second, justice for the refugees.

Third, innocent maritime passage.

Fourth, limits on the wasteful and destructive arms race.

And lastly, political independence and territorial integrity for all.

May I now turn to some of the specific problems.

The first and the most immediate threat to peace in the area is the two-sided problem of terrorism and acts of reprisal. In recent months the old terrorism has begun to assume new dimensions and new dangers and to create a new kind of threat. The number of terrorist bands has increased. There is a stronger appeal and more support for these so-called resistance groups among better educated, more competent, and more seriously dedicated elements in Arab societies. The nationals of more countries appear to be drawn into this activity.

Official Jordanian policy has been one of opposition to terrorism. Enforcement of this policy has proved difficult indeed. The best efforts of the Jordanian Government are often frustrated by the unsettled conditions in Jordan and the strong feeling of segments of the population that the occupied territories must be regained by any means.

Terrorism breeds reprisal raids which breed more terrorism which breeds more reprisal raids. The cycle can be unending.

The United States has attempted to interject reason into this cycle and to urge both sides to end it. After one cycle culminated in a heavy raid by Israeli forces into Jordan on March 21, we joined in a Security Council resolution deploring all incidents of violence, including terrorism and Israeli response.¹

Over recent weeks the Israeli defense forces appear to be policing the Jordan line more successfully. The Jordanians are also seeking to exercise more effective controls. For the sake of all, may this problem be eliminated by progress toward peace.

At the same time, cease-fire violations along the Israeli-Jordan line are an almost daily oc-

currence. There is no effective way of arranging for a cessation of firing. And as the violations continue, so does the constant threat that cease-fire violations might escalate to dangerous levels. To help prevent such violations and to establish machinery for controlling those that occur, we have called upon the Government of Jordan and the Government of Israel to permit the stationing of United Nations military observers along the cease-fire line. For different reasons, neither side has responded positively to this idea.

The tragic problem of the Arab refugees has become more complicated since the June war. As a consequence of that war, over 300,000 persons have fled their homes in the occupied territories. Many of these people are living in conditions of near desperation in East Jordan. Over 30,000 indigenous villagers have recently been uprooted by fighting along the Jordan River. Together, these displaced persons and the 1948 refugees total over half the East Jordan population. They offer prime recruiting targets for terrorist groups. In our opinion there are compelling political and humanitarian reasons for the Government of Israel to permit, with necessary security safeguards, the return of the displaced persons to their normal lives in the occupied territories.

A third problem I would like to discuss is the difficult and highly emotional issue of Jerusalem, a city holy to three world religions and hundreds of millions of people. The ties of the Jewish people to Jerusalem are deeply felt. The world recognized the surge of emotion experienced by the Jewish people everywhere when Jews could once again worship at the Western Wall, or Wailing Wall.

At the same time, Moslem religious and historical associations with Jerusalem are no less binding and no less emotional than those of the Jewish people. For Christians also, Jerusalem is a shrine of special importance.

For 20 years the United States has stressed the international character of this holy city. We have not recognized claims of national sovereignty over Jerusalem. We have not accepted the view that either Israel or Jordan has a superior claim to the city. The interests of both these countries, as well as the interests of the international community, must be taken into account and properly protected.

¹ *Post*, doc. 228.

We continue to think it fundamental to any solution for Jerusalem that communicants of all faiths must have unrestricted access to their holy places in the city. We believe also that the interests of the three world religions and of the countries most directly concerned must be protected by fair and effective arrangements if Jerusalem is to be truly a city of peace and not a center of strife.

Since last summer the United States has consistently maintained that if there is to be a satisfactory solution for Jerusalem, the problem must be dealt with as one of the elements in a general peace settlement. It is obviously impossible to have a satisfactory solution for Jerusalem without peace in the area, and it is just as evident that there will be no real peace unless the parties can agree to a solution for Jerusalem. As Ambassador Goldberg stated before the United Nations Security Council last week, the United States does not recognize unilateral actions as prejudging "the final and permanent status of Jerusalem."

A basic problem of the area lies in the attitudes that have developed during the course of the Arab-Israel struggle. If there is to be any chance for peace in the Near East, it is essential that the illusions and myths of the past 20 years be abandoned and that the Arab people and their leaders face squarely the realities of the choices which confront them. The first and greatest principle for peace in the area is that every nation has a fundamental right to live and to have that right respected by its neighbors.

Another of the difficult realities confronting us in the Near East has been the problem of getting talks started toward a peace settlement. The United Nations Security Council last November 22 unanimously adopted a resolution which set forth certain principles for a peace settlement. Briefly these include:

1. Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from occupied territories.
2. Termination of all claims of belligerency and respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence and secure and recognized boundaries.
3. Freedom of navigation.
4. A just settlement of the refugee problem.
5. Guarantees for the territorial inviolability

and political independence of every state in the area, through measures including demilitarized zones.

These principles are consistent with the statement of policy made by President Johnson on June 19 of last year.

The resolution also called for a special representative of the U.N. Secretary-General to go to the area to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the resolution. Ambassador Gunnar Jarring of Sweden, the United Nations Special Representative, has been traveling between the capitals of Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, and the U.A.R. since the middle of December. Ambassador Jarring is a world-renowned diplomat who enjoys the respect of both sides. It was clear from the outset that his mission would require extraordinary patience and the exercise of great skill.

Ambassador Jarring's work has been complicated by strongly held positions on both sides toward his mission. On the one hand, Israeli spokesmen call for direct negotiations and a formal peace treaty with the Arabs. On the other hand, some Arab leaders insist there must be "no negotiations, no recognition, and no peace treaty" with Israel. The gap between these positions is very wide indeed, but we continue to hope that with good will and quiet diplomacy it can be bridged. Some progress in this direction has been achieved.

You have also read in the press of the demand by the Arabs that Israel "accept" and agree to "implement" the Security Council resolution. I will not test your patience with the juggling of semantics this sterile argument has produced. Whatever its merits, the debate has impeded progress toward substantive talks for months. Quiet diplomacy, more flexibility, and fewer tendentious public statements might help the parties to bridge their differences.

Too often, both sides seem to lose sight of the overriding goal of a permanent peace settlement in order to give expression to their temporary frustrations.

Finally, I must discuss another problem which is of most serious concern to all of us as Americans. This is the question of Soviet influence in the Near East since the June war.

An enlarged Soviet fleet now sails the waters of the Mediterranean between Alexandria, Egypt, and Latakia in Syria. Soviet military technicians have gone to certain Arab countries in increasing numbers, while shipments of Soviet military equipment to the area have brought the level of armaments in Arab countries close to the inventories of a year ago. Our efforts to arrive at an effective limitation of arms shipments to the area have so far met with no success. Accordingly, the United States has authorized the shipment of selective military equipment to Israel and to moderate Arab states whose friendship and ability to defend themselves are important to the United States. I am aware of your interest in guaranteeing Israel's security, and I can give unqualified assurance that the United States Government is very much alive to Israel's needs. I can best summarize our view of this matter by referring to the joint statement¹ issued at the conclusion of Prime Minister Eshkol's visit to Texas last January:

The President agreed to keep Israel's military defense capability under active and sympathetic examination and review in the light of all relevant factors, including the shipment of military equipment by others to the area.

I have spoken at length on the problems confronting the United States and the nations of the Near East. I would like to deal with two conflicting but equally incorrect interpretations of the United States role in the Near East. First, there is the view that the United States has taken a conscious decision to stand aside, to disengage from the problems of the Near East—the view that we are more or less resigned to accept whatever fate brings us in the area. On the other hand, we sometimes hear the contrasting opinion that the United States is planning with the Soviet Union to work out some sort of “deal” in the Near East in exchange for an equivalent “deal” in Southeast Asia. Those who hold this opinion believe such a Near Eastern deal would be made by us at Israel's expense.

To understand the error that says we are unconcerned about the Near East, one must appreciate the nature and delicacy of the mission undertaken by Ambassador Jarring. His contacts are with the parties to the conflict, not with outsiders. We believe that the parties to the conflict

must have a chance to settle their differences in their own way under his auspices. But in this situation we must not be unmindful of our interests in the area. These interests are economic, geographic, and strategic, and they call for the maintenance of strong, independent states in the area friendly to the United States. These specific interests must not suffer at the hands of any power within the area or outside of it.

The possibility of a U.S.-Soviet deal in the Near East is equally unrelated to the factual situation in the area and to the logic of U.S. foreign policy. This rumor was current at the time of Glassboro. A year's time should have proved it false. The problems of the Near East have long histories, going back more than 20 years. The Soviets have historic ambitions in the Near East which are unlikely to be altered by events in Asia. For the United States, suffice it to say, we do not trade on the interests of our friends for our benefit. That's simply not the way we do business.

Putting aside these misconceptions of U.S. policy, what are the actual objectives and the direction of our policy in the Near East? The answer is a simple one. We seek an effective and lasting peace in accordance with the principles set down by President Johnson last June 19. Only with the attainment of a real peace can we protect our long-term interests in Israel and in the Arab world. But no matter how important peace is to us, we have not been prepared to write the terms of a peace settlement or to impose our own ideas of peace on the area.

The role that the United States can play is an important one, however. We and other nations of the world must help to create the environment which can lead to a peaceful settlement. President Johnson's speech of June 19 spelled out the kind of environment which would be necessary for peace. He urged the parties to be flexible in their approach, to adopt no rigid view on procedures. He urged them to deal with the area's problems in a comprehensive way, and he promised them our material and diplomatic assistance in resolving their difficulties. Following these guidelines, we have sought to promote the necessary conditions for peace. To this end Ambassador Goldberg worked skillfully at the United Nations last fall to help produce a

¹ See *ante*, doc. 5.

resolution acceptable to all parties. During the past months of the Jarring mission, we have been active in Washington, in our embassies abroad, and through Ambassador Goldberg's mission in New York to urge the parties to cooperate effectively with Ambassador Jarring's mission.

We shall continue in our efforts to support the mission of Ambassador Jarring. It is our earnest hope that his mission will be successful, but as I have tried to point out to you without illusion, the obstacles facing Ambassador Jarring are considerable. It is in the interest of the parties that the Jarring mission succeed. It is in their interest to show the responsible flexibility that can make his mission a success. Moreover, the world demands that the Jarring peace mission succeed. The world cannot tolerate a prolonged period of tension which constantly threatens the outbreak of broader hostilities. The "hot line" was used last June. We do not want a situation to arise in which it must be used again. The nations of the Near East have an obligation to the nations of the world to work for peace in their area. The world is committed to help them. You may be assured that the United States will do everything in its power to prevent the area from again turning toward open conflict. We will use all of our influence to move forward from the present dangers of instability and growing tensions. We will do everything we can, but the major burden and the final responsibility fall on the nations of the area. It is to them that we must look for the good will, the wisdom, and the determination to reach a true peace settlement.

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Remarks by the Yugoslav President Tito on the Middle East.¹ [Excerpt]

Belgrade, May 17, 1968

As you know, I visited three Arab countries in August last year. We had long talks at that time, and I spoke of the necessity to seek a political

¹ *New York Times*, 22/5/1968. The remarks were made in the course of an interview with the *New York Times* correspondent C.L. Sulzberger.

solution of the crisis.

The United Arab Republic and Jordan agreed to this. Nor were the others opposed, but they were a little skeptical about this possibility. In a certain sense they have been proven right, as Israel is stubbornly adhering to its concept of conquest. However there have been signs more recently that the other side, too, might accept the resolution of the Security Council.

Otherwise, I know that the Arab countries, the U.A.R. in the first place, are ready to seek a political solution. The leaders of the U.A.R. must also bear in mind the feelings in other Arab countries.

It does not suit the representatives of the Arab countries to find themselves face to face with the representatives of Israel. It would be better if the great powers, the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union would help to find a solution. And particularly the U.S.A. should exert great influence on Israel, because it can do so, so that the Israelis may finally realize that such a situation is untenable and that they must withdraw within their borders.

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88

Joint Communiqué on the French President de Gaulle's Official Visit to Rumania, 14-18 May.² [Excerpt]

Bucharest, May 18, 1968

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The two Presidents studied developments in the Middle East situation. They expressed their profound anxiety as regards the dangers involved in the continuation of the existing situation and stressed the urgency of implementing the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967 with a view to reaching a peaceful and lasting settlement of the problems of that part of the world.

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² *Politique Etrangère de la France*, 1er Sem., 1968, p. 138.

89

Statement by the Israeli Minister Galili on Direct Negotiations and Peace.¹ [Excerpt]

Ghosh Etzion, May 20, 1968

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The government's policy is clear—it is that the frontiers of 4 June are null and void and will be replaced by agreed and secure frontiers. We must seek a lasting peace obtained through direct negotiations only and conclude a peace treaty, not through the good offices of an intermediary in indirect negotiations. We must continue to assist the United Nations envoy as long as he is trying to call the parties to peace negotiations. As long as the Arabs continue to refuse to meet us for negotiations, and as long as no peace treaty is concluded, we shall continue to maintain the situation established by the cease-fire agreements completely unchanged, and whenever we are attacked we shall exercise our right to defend ourselves.

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Joint Communiqué on the Indian Prime Minister Gandhi's Visit to Singapore, 19-20 May.² [Excerpt]

Singapore, May 20, 1968

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The two sides exchanged views on the current situation in West Asia. The Prime Minister of India explained the stand which the Indian Government had taken in the United Nations and elsewhere in this matter. Both sides expressed the hope that a stable peace in the area would be restored soon.

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¹ *Haaretz* (Tel Aviv), 21/5/1968.

² *Indian Foreign Affairs Record*, May 1968, p. 127.

91

Address by the U.S. Representative to the United Nations Goldberg to the National Press Club.³ [Excerpt]

Washington, May 24, 1968

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Next I come to the Middle East, a region in which *détente* between the Soviet Union and ourselves is equally essential. Instability in that area presents a potential threat to international peace and security which we have tended to forget because of our preoccupation with Viet-Nam—but which was suddenly brought home to us in six dramatic days last June.

Fortunately for the world, a direct confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States was avoided on that occasion. But no one should suppose that we and they are pursuing parallel policies in that area. It would be a major contribution to peace in the Middle East if both powers could agree on one basic principle, confirmed by 20 years of tragic experience including three wars; namely, that a just and lasting peace in the Middle East cannot be imposed on the parties but can only be arrived at and secured by agreement among the parties, in the making of which the parties themselves will have been engaged.

As an earnest of their will to encourage such an accepted and agreed settlement, both powers should agree upon and implement steps to limit the arms race in the area, as President Johnson suggested in his speech last June.⁴ The United States has been striving both inside and outside the United Nations for such arms limitations. We cannot do it alone, and we must therefore persist in our efforts to persuade the Soviet Union that its national interest also lies in this direction.

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³ *U.S. Department of State Bulletin*, 1/7/1968, p. 27.

⁴ See *International Documents on Palestine, 1967*, pp. 116-118.

Interview Granted by the Israeli Defence Minister Dayan to the Army Magazine "Bamahane" and the Army Radio "Galei Zahal."¹ [Excerpts]

Jerusalem, May 28, 1968

Q. A year has passed since the (Six Day) War broke out. Looking back, are there any things you now see in a different light from that in which you saw them after the war?

A. Yes. I must confess that, immediately after the war, it was my estimate that the total defeat suffered by the Arabs would lead them—if not Syria, then at least Jordan and perhaps Egypt—to some readiness to come to terms and achieve peace with us. In actual fact, however, no such readiness has been shown by them.

Q. From the present standpoint, what do you consider to have been our greatest gains from the war? At the same time, looking back, would you say that there is anything that should have been done differently in the war?

A. Our first achievement consists in having defeated the Arab forces. On the eve of the war, the Arabs did not believe that the Israel Defence Forces could rout their armies. I feel certain that today, one year after the end of the Six Day War, they will be very careful about going into action against us again, even though their armies have been re-equipped—and this owing to the outcome of the military struggle.

However, it would seem to me that our main achievement lies in the fact that, once again, the question has been raised: what is the map of our country, both in the physical and in the political sense. Whatever the claims and the counter-claims, the question on the agenda is what territorial settlements—be they called borders or peace settlements—will result from this war. In fact, not only the map, but also the relations between ourselves and the neighbouring states are up for discussions. In other words, a question is once again being asked which would never in actual fact have been raised had it not been for this war.

Before, we were fettered by armistice agreements calling for U.N. Observers and troops stationed along part of the border. This screen between ourselves and the Arabs is no longer there. We have not achieved a solution, but in fact the following question has been tabled: what is Eretz Israel geographically—in other words territorially and what is the nature of the relations between ourselves and the Arabs? This is the main political achievement perhaps the most historic one—from the Zionist point of view—of this war: today this is the question at issue.

As for things that might have been done differently, the only thing I can say is that hindsight is always best—as the proverb goes.

Q. According to the latest estimates of the situation, Jordan might be ready to negotiate with us. Shall we be ready to sign a peace treaty with Jordan without there being any peace treaty with Egypt?

A. We have always said that we are ready to sign peace agreements with any of the Arab States separately or with all of them jointly. We shall not tell Jordan, if she is really ready to sign a peace treaty with us (a peace treaty that we, too, shall be ready to sign), that we are not prepared to sign because Egypt is not willing to do so.

Q. To date, the Government has not adopted a stand on the future of the occupied areas. Do you believe that the time has now come for the Government to do so?

A. I do not think the Government has not taken up any stand at all on any of the territories. First of all, there is Jerusalem. To a great extent this is a serious point in dispute at present—as may even be judged from the amount of time devoted to the subject by the Security Council—much more time than to the Golan Heights.

And it is not only Jerusalem that comes to mind here. I would not say that Israel's Government is altogether passive or apathetic as regards the Golan Heights or the Etzion Bloc.² I would therefore not accept the statement that the Government of Israel has not taken a stand as regards

¹ *Jerusalem Post*, 28/5/1968.

² An area between Bethlehem and Hebron. [Ed.]

the future of the occupied areas in their totality, or in a general sense. Furthermore, to the extent to which time passes and additional questions come up, Israel will certainly have to adopt—and definitely will adopt—a more detailed and specific stand concerning the various places.

Q. Are you ready to tell us, at least generally, how we can make sure of peace and security at the same time? Can signed agreements ensure our safety? Will geographic facts be determined? Will it be necessary to combine the two?

A. Peace agreements are far more than pieces of paper. However, without detracting from the value or importance of such agreements, if you are speaking of peace, of real peace, and if you ask me—and I mean me myself—I believe that peace will be assured by the places where the soldiers of our army will be standing. In other words, such substitutes as demilitarization, guarantees or U.N. forces will, in my opinion, not grant the State of Israel its security. Israel's security will be determined by where the Israel Defence Forces are going to stand.

Q. To what extent, in your personal opinion, should the historical and geographical attachments that we feel be decisive factors in determining the question of our borders?

A. I consider this to be not only one of the factors but a basic element. From the emotional point of view, from the aspect of spiritual attachment, my attitude to Al-Arish will be totally different from that to Hebron—not to mention Jerusalem and the Western Wall. Naturally this is not just one of the elements, but the most fundamental of them all, for it is one of our three basic ideals—the Jewish nation, the Bible—which is the book of the Jewish nation, and the Land—the land of the Jews.

Q. For about a year now, various means have been used to counteract terrorist activity. Can you give us an interim estimate of the extent to which these measures have proved successful?

A. It is not a question of measures: this is a war. My estimate is that, to date, the terrorist actions have proved an utter failure. Actually, this is a fact, not an estimate. To count their successes, the terrorists would be able to make do

with the fingers of one hand—and, indeed, it is questionable whether even these can be called successes. In other words, to date the Israel Defence Forces have simply routed the terrorist organizations.

However, I must say that this war is also taking its toll in blood. There has been almost no clash without casualties in our side, and no mechanical means can prevent this absolutely. After practically every clash—we read in the paper that one of our soldiers was killed, that two were wounded—and then you see those who were wounded, and one was hit in the back, the other in the hand or leg, and you realise how serious this war is. *Fateh* can chalk up no wins—but every casualty is a costly loss to us and therefore I cannot only see the failures of the saboteurs.

Q. Is the encouragement given by the Arab governments to the terrorist actions not likely to support them and worsen the situation so far as we are concerned?

A. It is not unlikely that they will really carry out what they have been saying. This means that they will not only be assisting the terrorist activities with money, equipment and political aid, but also with men and perhaps even with new territories in Lebanon, Syria and Egypt.

However, even if this does prove true, and the terrorist organizations should be able to dispose of thousands of men, this can anyway not be worse than the total war waged against us in the past: the strength of the terrorist organizations cannot exceed that of the combined Arab armies, and we shall defeat them decisively. I do not say that we shall do so without shedding any of our blood, or within one day—but whatever the Arab states can do within the framework of terrorist activities cannot be worse or more dangerous to us than the ordinary total war they have already waged against us. In this fight, I have not the slightest shadow of a doubt that we shall not only defeat them, but we shall smite them hip and thigh, both jointly and separately—every single country that will wage a war of terror against us!

Q. Has the system of open passage to the Arab states proved itself?

A. I am all for it! I believe that, within the framework of relations in the life of one nation with another, the arrangements we are following today are the right ones—and I am not speaking of the present situation, but rather in the long run.

It is my view that we should not create a situation in which the Arabs under our rule should be cut off from the Arab world. We are linked to the Jewish world. I consider myself closely connected with the Jews of Philadelphia and of New York—far more closely than with any Arab of Umm-el-Fahm. We may both be citizens of the same state, while the Jews of New York and myself are citizens of different states—but we are one people. This is something that should not and cannot be obviated from the Arabs. They are part and parcel of the Arab World, and should be afforded free contacts and links with the Arab world—except, of course, in whatever may adversely affect our security. People coming and going out must be checked to see if they are leaving in order to organize activities against us, or if they come here in order to bring weapons for the terrorists. These things we shall not permit. But if there is contact between them and the Arab people—I believe this should not be prevented.

Q. What is your attitude to the suggestions that we should begin taking practical steps towards the settlement of the refugees?

A. We cannot solve the problem of the refugees by ourselves, even from the practical point. It is a matter that can only be dealt with in co-operation with the Arab states—or with at least one of them, Jordan—and only within the framework of an international settlement. Which means with money from international—certainly American—funds. From the political aspect, too, it is one of the weightiest problems awaiting solution—and a solution is possible only within the framework of a peace settlement between ourselves and the Arab states—at least between ourselves and Jordan.

Q. Would it not be important—at least so that justice might be seen to be done—to start doing something in the matter?

A. In my opinion, since we cannot solve the

problem, what good will it do for someone to set up a model village? Such things have already been seen under the sun. It is obvious that we can set up a village; it is just as obvious that the Arabs know how to live in a village.

The whole question is political rather than exemplary. The question is a basic one—can we or can't we solve the refugee problem by ourselves? It is my opinion that we can't, and that indeed we shouldn't even try to make a start. It can be and should be part of a peace settlement first and foremost between ourselves and Jordan—if and when that should come about.

Q. What contribution can Jordan make to the solution of this problem?

A. She can absorb most of the refugees. It is my humble opinion that Jordan not only can do so but is interested in doing so. She has a meagre population, and should be interested in increasing it. Moreover, Jordan is not faced with the problem that we have: this is not a different nation. Jordan is today perhaps more Palestinian than Jordanian. Numerically and ethnically, Jordan can and should be interested in absorbing the refugees, I believe.

In Jordan there are also as yet unexploited water resources—the Mukhaiba reservoir, which has not yet been set up, as well as other sources. Refugees cannot be settled without establishing development projects, and a considerable portion of the water potential and the empty lands needed for this purpose are to be found in Jordan.

Q. Has the outcome of the latest war, over and above the outcome of the two previous wars, not been conducive to creating an attitude of contempt of the Arabs, which is likely to lead to our living in a fools' paradise?

A. I hope not in the Israel Defence Forces at any rate. Here nothing is taken lightly. At all levels, the possibility of a resumption of military hostilities is being taken seriously into account at all levels, and is being prepared for in addition to the operations against terrorist activities, which are also no small matter.

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Joint Communiqué on the Indian Prime Minister Gandhi's Visit to New Zealand, 27-29 May.¹ [Excerpt]

Wellington, May 28, 1968

The two sides exchanged views on the current situation in West Asia (Middle East) and expressed the hope that a stable peace in the area would be restored soon on the basis of U.N. resolutions.

94

Reply by the Israeli Foreign Minister Eban in the Knesset to a Question on a Statement made by the Israeli Representative to the U.N.²

Jerusalem, May 29, 1968

On 1 May 1968 Ambassador Yosef Tekoah made the following authorised statement on Israeli policy:

"In declarations and statements made publicly and to Dr. Jarring my government has indicated its acceptance of the Security Council resolution by the promotion of agreement on the establishment of a just and durable peace.

I am authorised to reaffirm that we are willing to reach agreement with each Arab state on all the matters included in that resolution.

More recently we have accepted the proposal of Ambassador Jarring to bring about a meeting between Israel and each of her neighbours under his auspices and in fulfilment of his mandate for the purpose of reaching a peaceful settlement.

So far no Arab state has accepted that proposal. The Arab Governments continue to assert that they are bound to the resolution of the Khartum Conference that says: 'No negotiations with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no peace

with Israel'. Their policy is in flagrant contradiction of the spirit and terms of the resolution which they pretend to accept definitely. Will any Arab representative declare that his government is prepared to establish a just and lasting peace with Israel, to promote agreement with Israel on the acceptance of peaceful settlement, to recognise Israel's sovereignty, independence and right to live within secure and recognised frontiers to be worked out as part of the peace-making process, and to meet with Israel's representatives under Dr. Jarring's auspices?"

This was the statement made by Ambassador Tekoah at the Security Council.

The significance of this statement is to be understood in conformity with the principles and purposes enunciated by the government of Israel regarding the establishment of peace in the Middle East. Our policy is embodied in resolutions adopted by the Knesset on 1 August and later, and remains fully valid.

In the second half of March, in April and at the beginning of May, I submitted to Ambassador Jarring a proposal on the method of implementing the Security Council resolution, in accordance with which he is carrying out his mission. This proposal was discussed by the cabinet on 21 May and constituted the basic point of the report which the government endorsed at that meeting.

The proposed method of implementing the November 1967 resolution for establishing lasting peace consists of four phases:

A. Negotiations

Face to face negotiations between Israel and each Arab state, on the basis of declared agreement that the aim of the negotiations is the establishment of peace. We are ready to accept that the representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations should convene the parties for these negotiations, as the Prime Minister stated on 1 December 1967, and as I stated to the Knesset on 5 March 1968.

B. Agreements

When the parties meet for negotiations, they must work towards agreements on all matters mentioned in the Security Council resolution. As early as 1 February 1968 Dr. Jarring was informed of the government's view that Israel

¹ *Indian Foreign Affairs Record*, May 1968, p. 121.

² *Knesset Records* (in Hebrew), 29/3/1968, p. 2074.

is ready to conduct negotiations on each of the subjects mentioned in the Security Council resolution which the other party desires to raise, and reserves the right to raise any point which she regards as important. In this context the parties to the talks could reach agreement on the secure and recognised frontiers which would be effective as from the signing of peace treaties. The definition of the agreed borders and agreed security arrangements would obviously determine the deployment of armed forces in conditions of peace. Also to be decided would be agreements on the abrogation of the state of war and the form of the declaration required from the governments of the area regarding their explicit recognition of the independence, sovereignty and integrity of each state and its right to live in peace, free from fear of attack, within recognised and secure frontiers to be determined with the establishment of peace. Agreements would be concluded on the form of guarantees to be given concerning immediate freedom of navigation for Israel in international waterways. And agreements would also be formulated on the principles and bases for a solution of the refugee problem.

C. Conclusion of Treaty

All the above-mentioned agreements will be incorporated in peace treaties on the signing of which the state of war will be terminated and a state of peace will prevail.

D. Implementation

The parties will agree to work out arrangements for the implementation of the agreements after they have been signed within the framework of peace treaties. In other words, the process of establishing peace, which is the aim of the Security Council resolution, will be carried out in four phases: the phase of negotiations, the phase of agreement, the phase of the treaty and the phase of implementation.

This proposal is entirely compatible with international law and precedents. It comprises an effective implementation of the Security Council resolution for the establishment of peace within secure and recognised frontiers and is based on decisions of the government and the Knesset regarding the establishment of peace.

Henceforward every Arab country will know that Israel is ready to participate in a

serious effort to establish peace in conformity with these rules and procedures. We shall await the response of the Arab governments to these proposals, as their responses will put to the test the seriousness of their recent statements on their readiness to reach an agreed peace in conformity with the Security Council resolution which aims at establishing the relations between the countries of the area on a basis of officially proclaimed and stable peace.

I hope that the Arab governments will declare their readiness to implement this proposal for the establishment of a just and stable peace and will, for this purpose, meet with Israeli representatives to conduct direct negotiations. I must point out that this is the only conflict in the world at present in which any state refuses to start talks with another state. This fact suffices to illustrate the roots of the impasse which now prevails in the Middle East.

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Statement by the West German Foreign Office State Secretary Duckwitz on Arms Supply Policy.¹ [Excerpts]

Bonn, May 30, 1968

[The Federal Republic of Germany] wishes to avoid even the appearance that it is no longer holding to its fundamental decision of February 1965 to deliver no weapons or military material to areas of tension, or to permit such deliveries.

It is true that in November 1967 Israel inquired of a German firm regarding the supply of transport aircraft of the type Transall. But the Federal Government refused to grant the required export permit. The Transall is not in fact a military aircraft and it is unarmed...

Concerning a supposed order for 50 helicopters, the Federal Government knows nothing of this. In any event, no such request for permission has been directed to us up to now.

Let me repeat, however, that helicopters, like any military aircraft, in accordance with the Federal Government's known principles, are not

¹ F.R.G. *The Bulletin*, 4/6/1968.

delivered to areas of tension.

The absurdity of all these false reports becomes especially evident in the example of the medium-range missiles: We neither possess medium-range missiles nor do we make them. For this reason if no other, a sale of such weapons is impossible.

No M-48 tanks have been supplied either directly or indirectly to the Near East. There is, as you know, a law controlling weapons of war. Among other things, it stipulates that the export of weapons, ammunition and all military material is subject to permission.

And the Federal Government does not grant such permission when areas of tension are involved.

In order to make sure that weapons or other military material do not reach areas of tension through devious routes, the Federal Government takes the appropriate precautions. These precautions make shipment for re-sale to areas of tension impossible.

The principle of delivering no arms to areas of tension is not directed against one particular state, but only serves the purpose of preventing any aggravation of an existing tension.

Therefore we abide by this principle in the Near East in regard to both Israel and its Arab neighbours.

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Interview Granted by the Israeli Ambassador to the U.S. Rabin to the Israeli Daily "Davar".¹ [Excerpts]

Tel Aviv, May 31, 1968

Q. What is the present estimate in the United States of the extent of Soviet intervention in the Middle East?

A. The basic assumption is that the lack of stability and the existence of a state of war in the years preceding the Six Days War provided favourable conditions for the Soviets to enter the

Middle East. They followed a clear line: absolute support of Arab demands against Israel in the political field, and unrestricted supplies of conventional weapons or, if there was any restriction, it was only such as was imposed by the rate at which the Arab armies could absorb such weapons. Then in the middle of last year a situation arose which would have led to Soviet domination in the Middle East, had it not been for the Six Day War. The consequences of the war curbed, or even stopped the trend that might have led to this domination. But three months after the war the Soviet position in the Middle East underwent a revival, and the Soviet Union is also exploiting the present situation to once more strengthen its position in the countries it previously dominated. The Soviets are stepping up penetration, and there is nothing to prevent them increasing their influence, for one of the basic objectives—because of its potential, rather than its actual importance—is Jordan. This is why the West, and America in particular, is so sensitive as regards the destiny of Hussein. For Hussein, even though his position may be unstable, is still an obstacle to Soviet penetration, and the United States believes that his fall would open the door to Soviet penetration in Jordan too.

Q. Is that why the United States is pressing for an Israeli settlement with Jordan?

I see no reason to talk about pressure. The problem is, essentially, the following: the United States is anxious to bring about a peaceful settlement between Israel on the one hand, and Egypt and Jordan on the other, for these are the two countries that accept the Security Council resolution and are in constant touch with Gunnar Jarring.

Q. Do you regard that as a curb to Soviet penetration?

A. A peaceful settlement will remove one of the conditions that make deeper Soviet penetration easier. This is the generally accepted hypothesis.

Q. Is the United States afraid for the survival of Jordan under present circumstances?

A. I assume so.

Q. Is there any immediate prospect on the political

¹ *Davar*, (Tel Aviv), 31/5/1968.

horizon of a resumption of relations between the United States and Egypt?

A. The United States would like it, but under certain conditions, such as payment of compensation for damage done to American property in Egypt during the anti-American disturbances, and an admission that the people were misled by the accusation of American participation in the June War. The delay in the resumption of relations comes from Egypt. Either Cairo needs more time to prepare Egyptian public opinion for a political volte face, or it wants first to be sure of a change in the fundamental American attitude to the desired solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Q. How would you define that attitude at present?

A. United States policy is based on the speech of President Johnson on 19 June of last year, in which he supported a peaceful settlement between the parties to the conflict—Israel and each of the Arab countries—a settlement in the form of a treaty.

Q. Does the United States believe that such a settlement is possible?

A. Washington is trying to do all it can on a basis of this policy. It still sees Dr. Jarring's mission as the essential instrument for the achievement of that end.

Q. But, even according to the President's speech, the United States—as opposed to Israel—does not regard direct negotiations as being essential.

A. That is so. But what I say is that, even according to the American attitude, which is based on a settlement through a treaty, a meeting between the parties is essential. It is, however, possible that, in view of their attitude, the talks would not have to be direct and open at the initial stage.

Q. Then there are differences of opinion on what is a matter of principle to us?

A. There are differences of opinion on this matter—the way to peace. There are also differences of opinion as to what sort of peace is desired. But there is a conformity of interests in many and varied fields, the most important being that of efforts for peace in the area.

Q. Is there still any American understanding of Israel's security requirements?

A. Yes. The statement issued at the end of the Prime Minister's visit to President Johnson¹ established a basis for understanding of and response to our security requirements.

Q. Does this include the supplying of Phantoms?

A. We have great hopes of this, but there is no explicit obligation.

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Q. Is the atmosphere of the negotiations to end the war in Vietnam influencing the attitude of the United States to Middle East affairs too?

A. The President's statement which brings the "Vietnam Struggle" on the lines of an attempt to reach a peaceful settlement forms part and parcel of an overall American attempt to reach an understanding with the Soviet Union. The effect of the war in Vietnam on the American masses is much greater than can be imagined from a distance. There is a trend in public opinion favourable to reaching an understanding with the Soviet Union, and Moscow is the first to encourage this trend. (There is, for example, the consular agreement that had been put off until now, and the negotiations on the opening of air services) Moscow is showing a smiling face without taking practical steps to achieve such an understanding. American efforts to achieve an understanding cover all fields, but I do not believe in the possibility of a genuine understanding between them.

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¹ See *ante*, doc. 5.

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Joint Communiqué on the Indian Prime Minister Gandhi's Visit to Malaysia, 29 May-1 June.¹ [Excerpt]

Kuala Lumpur, June 1, 1968

The two sides exchanged views on the current situation in West Asia. Both sides expressed the hope that a stable peace would be restored soon in the area on the basis of the Security Council Resolution.

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Joint Communiqué on the Rumanian Premier Ceausescu's Visit to Yugoslavia.² [Excerpt]

Belgrade, June 1, 1968

The two sides observed with concern that the situation in the Middle East continued to pose a threat to world peace and emphasized again the need to find a political solution to the crisis. They feel that if the matter is to be settled peaceably, it would be indispensable for the Israeli troops to withdraw from all occupied Arab territories, and that a secure and lasting peace in this area requires recognition of the right of all states in the region to existence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as just regulation of all other controversial issues. They also expressed their conviction that it was urgently necessary for all parties concerned to implement the Security Council Resolution of November 22, 1967.

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Statement by an East German Foreign Ministry Spokesman on the Middle East.³

Berlin, June 4, 1968

On June 5th 1968, a year will have passed since Israel's imperialist aggression against the United Arab Republic, the Syrian Arab Republic and Jordan. The situation in the Middle East is still most tense with Israel calling up reservists under the same pretext of having to protect the country against a possible invasion by the Arab states as it did a year ago.

The latent danger of armed conflicts is being increased by such a step. The Israeli Government continues to ignore resolutions of the U.N. Security Council, e.g. it obstinately refuses to comply with that adopted on November 22nd 1967 which provided for so elementary a step as the withdrawal of Israel's armed forces from the occupied Arab territories. The Israeli Government is thus pursuing a policy designed to hold those territories permanently obstructing every step likely to settle the conflict peaceably.

The ruling groups in Israel are able to pursue such a policy primarily because they have the full approval and undivided support of the imperialist states, above all of the United States but also of West Germany. The West German Government not only considers Israeli aggression to be a test case for its own aggressive plans against the G.D.R. and the other socialist states but also gives Israel every political, moral and material support. Direct connections exist between the aggressive intentions of the Kiesinger-Strauss Government in Europe and Israel's aggression in the Middle East.

On behalf of the West German Government, Herr Schütz, President of the Bundesrat, will come to Tel Aviv on the very day Israel's invasion of the Arab countries started a year ago. He will meet the Israeli Foreign Minister, Mr. Eban, on June 5th with a view to increasing the strategic priority goods to be supplied to Israel by West Germany. Herr Schütz' visit to Jerusalem is a demonstration of West German support for Israel's policy of annexation. It should be added that, on the other hand, Israel is supporting Bonn's

¹ Indian *Foreign Affairs Record*, June 1968, p. 136.

² *Review of International Affairs*, 5/6/1968, pp. 17-18.

³ G.D.R. *Foreign Affairs Bulletin*, 14/6/1968, pp. 137-138.

illegal claims to West Berlin.

The G.D.R. therefore strongly protests against imperialist scheming in the Middle East and against the active participation of West German ruling groups therein.

We are pleased to find that the anti-imperialist alliance and the friendship between us and the Arab peoples is consolidating and that co-operation in many fields is increasingly characterized by our common anti-imperialist struggle. The G.D.R. will continue to stand by the Arab peoples in their struggle against oppression and for progress.

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Address by the U.S. President Johnson at Glassboro State College.¹ [Excerpt]

Glassboro, N.J., June 4, 1968

Today in two areas of danger and conflict—the Middle East and Viet Nam—events drive home the difficulty of making peace.

In the Middle East, it has been almost a year since the six-day war—a year in which millions have been denied peace and progress.

The people of that region deserve a peace based upon a true and lasting settlement: a settlement which respects the integrity of every nation; which frees every nation from the threat of attack; a settlement which the nations of the region themselves should reach. So far, progress has not been satisfying. But we must continue to try.

The United States has been working every day, in world capitals and in the United Nations, to promote a fair and stable peace.

Ambassador Jarring, acting with the authority of the Security Council, is in contact with the parties. We strongly support the Security Council Resolution of November 22, 1967, and Ambassador Jarring's peacemaking efforts. And we are urging that neither side pass up any reasonable path to negotiations.

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Joint Communiqué on the Malawi President Banda's Visit to Israel, 26 May-5 June.² [Excerpts]

Jerusalem, June 5, 1968

[The Malawi and Israeli Presidents expressed] their strong belief that a just and lasting peace in the Middle East can only be brought about by direct negotiations between Israel and the Arab states and a settlement of the refugee problem must be based on mutual and regional agreements.

The two Heads of State expressed their hope that the present endeavours of the special representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Ambassador Gunnar Jarring, will advance the establishment of peace in the region.

The two Presidents noted the existing co-operation between African states and Israel in many fields of activity. They hoped that these ties of co-operation will not only be strengthened but that they will also result in increased economic, technical, cultural and scientific relations.

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Joint Communiqué on the Dutch Foreign Minister Lun's Visit to the U.A.R.³ [Excerpt]

Cairo, June 5, 1968

Dr. Joseph Luns, the Foreign Minister of the Netherlands, paid an official visit to the U.A.R. during the period June 2-5, 1968 at the invitation of Mr. Mahmud Riyad, the U.A.R. Foreign Minister.

During his stay in the U.A.R., the Dutch Minister was received by President Gamal Abdel Nasser.

² *Jerusalem Post*, 6/6/1968.

³ U.A.R. *Arab Political Encyclopedia: Documents and Notes*, January-June 1968, p. 156.

¹ U.S. *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, 10/6/1968, p. 904.

Talks were held between Dr. Luns and Mr. Mahmud Riyad during which they exchanged views on the Middle East situation and the bilateral relations between the U.A.R. and the Netherlands with particular stress on economic and cultural relations. The talks were conducted in an atmosphere of friendship and sincerity.

With regard to the Middle East situation, the two Ministers stressed their interest in the implementation of the Security Council resolution issued on November 22, 1967.

They agreed on giving full support to Ambassador Gunnar Jarring in his efforts to implement the resolution.

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Address by the President of the World Zionist Organization Goldmann Before the 27th Zionist Congress, Jerusalem, 9-19 June, 1968.¹

Jerusalem, June 9, 1968

Mr. Chairman, Delegates, my Friends, Ladies and Gentlemen.

Discussion of absorption has become very popular in the last few weeks. I do not now intend to join in the controversy as to whether the state or the Agency should be responsible for absorption. What concerns me is to get some idea of your capacity for absorption and for listening to another speech! I do not know how to explain the applause, but I am quite ready to postpone the speech to tomorrow morning. However, as is my custom, let us make a compromise, I will try to say what I want to say, and leave certain subjects for another occasion.

Gentlemen, this Congress and this opening session are the occasion of three jubilees, celebrating three great events in Jewish history; this year is the seventieth since the first Zionist Congress, the fiftieth since the Balfour Declaration and the twentieth since the establishment of the state.

I think that it may be said, with all humility, that these events were not only important dates in our history, but also important to the whole of humanity. The great interest shown by all the peoples of the world in all subjects connected with the state of Israel does much to preserve the quantitative value of the state, and proves that it is permissible for us to attribute to these events a general significance for all the peoples of the world.

It is therefore appropriate that the opening session should be dedicated to the celebration of these historic events.

Gentlemen, what distinguishes a people from others more than anything else is the way in which it celebrates its feasts. We are a people who celebrate our feasts very seriously. Let us take one example: All other peoples of the world celebrate the New Year with noise, cheap rejoicings, dancing and so on. But for us the New Year is an extremely serious feast, a feast of self-examination, of ethics and obligations. It is an extremely serious and moral feast. I therefore think that it is more appropriate to the character of our nation that we should not, this evening, celebrate the events I have mentioned with emotional words, with self-praise or self-criticism. We should take advantage of this occasion in our history to ask ourselves what we have achieved so far. Let us draw up a balance sheet—what stage have we reached on the long road? We started on the road of Zionism seventy years ago, and our final goal, of course, is well known. A great pro-Jewish German poet called Lessing once said that the road to truth is much more important and more creative than truth itself. This applies to everything ideal—the way to its achievement is more creative than the ideal itself, for it is impossible for a people or a movement to achieve the whole of it.

I want to speak simply and unemotionally about what we have achieved. I sometimes quote the wonderful words of Theodor Herzl: "Zionism is a great thing; we must talk about it in very simple words." If I ask myself what are our achievements, I can count three things: a) We have succeeded in implanting in the mind of the Jewish people dispersed throughout the world the realisation that we are a single people that can, if it only wants to, become once more

¹ *Twenty Seventh Zionist Congress, Jerusalem, June 9-19, 1968, Stenographic Report (Jerusalem: Executive of the Zionist Organisation, 1968), pp. 11-18.*

the master of its future and its destiny; b) We have taught the Jewish people not to have confidence in its friends and not to rely on them more than necessary to save it; we have also taught the Jewish people not to be afraid of its enemies who can destroy it. We have educated the people to believe that the final decision as regards its future and its destiny lies in its own hands; c) On the basis of this achievement we have succeeded in establishing effective means to safeguard the existence of the people and of the Jewish state. We have succeeded—and this, perhaps, is our greatest achievement—in establishing this state in the Land of Israel, from which the people was separated thousands of years ago, but which it has dreamed and prayed it might return to. This is perhaps the greatest of our successes. If we look at these successes and these achievements from the point of view of world history, we cannot but think, gentlemen, that we are alone in achieving such a success, although there have been many peoples, especially in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, that have succeeded in achieving their national unity, in liberating their territory or in establishing their states.

But there is one aspect of the Jewish people of which Zionist thinking and the Zionist movement are the expressions. This aspect of the Zionist idea is, in my opinion, unique of its kind. I know of no other movement, of no other people, that displays such a phenomenon. What I mean is the fact, so vital to our destiny, that the source of the Zionist idea was not a reality, but a dream. Every nationalist movement in the world, every revolutionary movement in the world, has its origin and its foundation in a known reality; it then develops beyond the social-political situation. If the gap between true reality and the elements of the social-political synthesis is very great, it will lead to revolution. The source of revolution, then, is reality. When, seventy years ago, Herzl left the Zionist Conference with the slogan of the Zionist state, the only reality that lay behind it was a few tens of thousands of Jews living in the Land of Israel. The whole source was the dream, the aspiration, the prayer, Jewish idealism, and the hope that the return to Zion might sometime be achieved.

I emphasise this unique character of the Zionist movement, which is what also distinguishes

the Jewish people. I have no time now to embark on a historical discussion on the beginnings of the history of our people, which goes back to the covenant God made with our father Abraham. It is not important whether this is true or not, it is the source of our history. I therefore stress this aspect, because it is what will decide the future of the Zionist movement, the future of the state of Israel and the future of our people.

If there are any laws in history, there is certainly a law which says that the source from which a people derives its history, its point of departure, decides that people's destiny. We are a people obliged to live on a basis of dreams and hopes, religion and social ideals, and the details are not important now. But the moment we lose this foundation, when we live in a state like other states, where there is no idea or dream to strengthen the Zionist movement, or the state of Israel, which is the beginning of the realisation of the idea of Zionism, we shall be lost and we shall lose our future. We are obliged to continue our history on the basis of that source, which is a dream, an ideal, and an aspiration to the future.

May I now pass on to the second part of the observations I wish to make. Now that I have described very briefly what I think we have achieved, let us ask ourselves what we have not yet achieved. The Zionist movement, if I may express myself in very simple words, is a movement for the return of the Jewish people to its homeland, to the Land of Israel. If the project is seen from this point of view, we are still very far from having achieved it; we are still at the beginning of its achievement. By this I mean the Zionist idea in both its aspects—the aspect of the land we want to return to, and the aspect of the people that wants to return to that land. Today we are here in this country, but, from the point of view of the land, we are still far from full achievement, as long as this area, which is called the Middle East, and which we are obliged to live in, is not ready to accept us. It is the tragic and heroic destiny of Zionism that we were obliged to begin the history of the state with war, which was imposed on us by our neighbours, and we were later obliged to defend ourselves in two more wars. The fact of our victory in these wars—and what a magnificent victory—is, of course, a more dramatic achievement than all the other

achievements of the state of Israel—and I do not intend to speak about it further. But in spite of all these victories, we have not yet succeeded in being accepted in the family of the peoples of this area, in which we are obliged to live.

This aspect of the Zionist idea—return once more to the land called the Land of Israel, whatever its frontiers—is still far from being fully achieved. Its achievement lies in Israel's hands, it is Israel's task. I hope that the present generation in the state of Israel will succeed in achieving this task so that we may live in peace and that, as the Chairman said, we may become an important and decisive factor in this area which has so glorious a history, for we have contributed greatly to human civilisation in the past and we are resolved to commence a great task in the history of the human race. We hope and believe that we shall achieve this, that we shall become one of the principal creative and constructive factors in this area, so that, in our time, a great chapter of its history may open.

But, as I said, this is the task of the state of Israel, and it is not for the Zionist movement to tell the state how to perform its task of making peace. What we can do, we of the Zionist movement, which represents the whole Jewish people in a specific sense, is to give the state a helping hand. But the task itself must be performed by the sovereign state of Israel; it is for the state to take decisions.

There is another aspect of the Zionist idea: the people. I do not want this evening to embark on an endless discussion of the significance and meaning of the exile—of whether it is an organic part of Jewish history, or a merely fortuitous and abnormal episode in that history. This is an extremely wearisome and complicated subject. But however we regard the so-called exile in the context of Jewish history, we live in the third exile. Whatever our view of the philosophy of Jewish history, I am confident that we all accept that present relations between the centre and the Diaspora, between the state and the exile, are intolerable. Twenty per cent only live in the state—the Chairman has also mentioned this figure. However the exile is regarded, negatively or quite positively—it is impossible to regard this proportional relation as normal.

I thus come to the problem which, I am

confident, will form one of the principal subjects of discussion at this conference—the problem of immigration.

It is the Zionist movement's capacity to deal with this problem that will finally decide the future of the Zionist movement, not in some remote hypothetical future, but in this generation.

Gentlemen, we have experienced in this generation a great miracle and, paradoxically, so it would seem, a terrible tragedy. What happened to us was that, after winning the land we lost the people. I am exaggerating, admittedly; a part of the people survived; it was not all destroyed. But it is no exaggeration—and I am confident that you will agree with me—to say that the destruction of six million Jews in Eastern and Central Europe destroyed that part of the people who were the natural and normal candidates for the great immigration to an Israeli state; it destroyed that part of the people with whom no argument would have been necessary, upon whom it would have been necessary to exert no influence. No efforts would have been necessary to convince a large part, if not the majority, of these six million, who were the repository of Jewish tradition and civilisation, and with whom was destroyed the citadel of the essence of the Jewish people as far as religious and social concepts were concerned. After the extermination of these six million, the whole problem of the return to Zion assumed, from the practical point of view, a completely different aspect and framework.

I do not wish to speak of the practical problems connected with the Zionist movement's principal object of concern at the present time. My friend and colleague Mr. Pincus, the head of the Executive, will talk about those problems tomorrow, after which there will be discussions both by the Congress as a whole and by the committees. But I do want to make some observations on the problem of immigration from a wider viewpoint—not from the organisational viewpoint—who is to be responsible for absorption, for immigration, how it will be organised, what will be the relations between the state and the Zionist Organization and the Agency and so on. I do not underestimate the importance of these problems, but this official opening session is not the occasion to discuss them. I intend to deal with only one or two aspects of the problem of immigration.

After the great sources of compulsory immigration—the poor countries and the Nazi camps—dried up, the problem arose of voluntary immigration—the immigration of Jews from Western countries.

I hope that what I am about to say will not be misunderstood—this also applies to immigration from Soviet Russia. I say this because I am confident that the day will come when there will be a great immigration from Soviet Russia to the state of Israel. I am not a young man, but in spite of that I am confident, as confident as it is possible to be, that I shall live to see this immigration. But, Gentlemen, immigration from Russia, judging from the little experience we have acquired in dealing with it, will pose problems not very different from those posed by immigration from the Western countries. All the problems we are faced with as regards immigration from Western Europe and the American continent apply, with certain differences, naturally, to Jews coming from the communist regimes including immigration of Jews from the Soviet Union. We shall deal with, we must deal with this difficult problem and there is no one who does not now understand how difficult it is.

Gentlemen, I am not a historian, but I am not completely ignorant of history. My interest in this problem has been from a historical point of view.

I cannot recall any really large-scale voluntary immigration, that did not take place for religious considerations. In my historical studies so far I have not come across any ideal that induces people to emigrate and to change their way of life of their own free will, as opposed to coercion arising from persecution. Such an ideal does exist, but only when there are religious considerations. But we are not a religious movement. The movement as a whole, at any rate, is not a religious one, and it is our duty to perform a task that has never yet been performed before—to induce people to change their way of life voluntarily, not for religious considerations. We must increase the power of attraction of the Zionist dream and Zionist ideology, for only religious movements have so great an influence. We must live in a world of imagination, and we shall not achieve our aim by adopting resolutions and making speeches, because we are concerned with

a psychological process. We must turn to the new generation. I am not talking now of the mature generation which can more easily be induced to immigrate—tens and thousands and hundreds of thousands of whom I hope it may be possible to bring to the state of Israel. The problems as far as they are concerned are not ideological and psychological so much as economic, organisational and so on. But if we look at it from a historical point of view, it will not be sufficient if we bring twenty or thirty thousand immigrants in the next few years. We shall doubtless be delighted if we succeed even in that, but we are looking to the future to bring hundreds of thousands of Jews from the Western countries to the state of Israel. Therefore, Gentlemen, it is our duty first and foremost to interest ourselves in the new generation.

We live in a revolutionary age that transcends history, and so far there has never been a period when revolution has had so great an effect on the world and on humanity. At the time of the French Revolution, did anyone know of it in China? When there were revolutionary movements in Japan, did anyone hear of them in Europe? The world today is a single unit. There is television, and every movement in the world has an immediate effect in other countries. We live in an age when hundreds of millions of human beings have begun to demand their rights, and are no longer content with the discrimination to which they have been subjected for hundreds of years. Every day we read in the press of the revolutionary movement, and this is an epoch in the life of the peoples of the world when the old values are vanishing. There is a rising generation with great aspirations to new ways and new ideals, but these aspirations are vague and have not yet become sufficiently clear. I have no time today to relate anecdotes, but there is a famous saying of a great socialist leader, Victor Adler of Austria. When he was violently attacked by the leftist opposition, he said: "The members on the left who are attacking me do not know what they want, but they want it with great enthusiasm."

This applies to some extent to all youth and student movements. I do not say this to criticise; I think that this attitude has great value, involving as it does a capacity for development, progress and

revolution. But this demands persistent effort. Young Jews are joining these movements, and they do not live in small countries or ghettos; they are liberated; and not only are they sharing in the revolution, they are playing a decisive part in it. It is no accident that the three leaders of the revolutionary movement in France are Jews. We must become accustomed to the fact that these young people are ideologically inspired; they are not only interested in becoming rich and playing golf, they are ready to live their lives on an ideological basis. The problem is that their ideas are not our ideas.

Gentlemen, the problem of immigration, which is our problem, is the most difficult problem. If we want henceforward to succeed, we must find a new language that is understood by this youth. When I say a new language, I do not mean that we should translate German words, for example into English, or that a substitute should be found for Yiddish or even for Hebrew—I mean a new mentality. Zionism, as I said, was based on a synthesis of Jewish ideas—a return to Zion based on contemporary forms and concepts—a contemporary state, a contemporary political movement. The concepts that influenced Theodor Herzl, Max Nordau and even Ahad Ha'am were, in form, nineteenth century concepts, and we today are living in the second half of the twentieth century. And one cannot help feeling that there is a gap of hundreds of years, not only sixty or seventy years, between these two eras. The historical problem of the Zionist movement as a movement that wants to live, and to be prepared for, and capable of, dealing with the vital problem of the immigration of large numbers of the rising generation, is the problem of expressing the Zionist idea in concepts and expressions that are comprehensible to this generation. The nationalist idea means nothing to the revolutionary part of this generation. Two weeks ago an incident took place in France that was stranger than the strangest dreams. Thousands of students in Paris, the proudest and most nationalist capital in Europe (rather like the ancient Greeks) went round announcing: "We are all German Jews"—because of the attacks on the German Jew Cohn-Bendit. This may not apply to the majority, but it does apply to a small number, to the minority, and we must not forget that it is minorities that make history—we were a minority, and we

have made contemporary history. It is revolutionary minorities that always make history, and the majority is nothing more than the new reality created by the triumphant minority.

Only by giving the nationalist idea a profoundly human significance shall we be able to attract the new generation. This is why I say that, if we look at things from a historical point of view, we shall realise that, in spite of the importance of organisational problems, including the distribution of tasks, problems which must be dealt with if the immigration movement is to start, we must find another language and a new basis for our ideology. We must follow this course so that the rising generation may understand us, and so that Zionist ideology may be able to compete with all the ideologies that prevail today.

If we go to young Jews of the kind we are talking of, and say to them: "You must immigrate to the state of Israel, because only there can you live a full Jewish life", they will answer: "Why should I live a full Jewish life? Don't I hold the same beliefs as hundreds of billions of human beings—the Chinese and the Indians, the underprivileged and the negroes? What have I to do with such nationalist ideas?" Part of this generation is ready to betray their country. Thousands of young people have fled from America so as to avoid going to war. This is something that has never happened before in all history. There have been criminals who fled their countries, but this time those who flee have beliefs, and they have preferred to go to prison rather than fight for their people. I therefore ask: "What will the Jewish nationalist idea mean to such a generation as this?" Only if we give the nationalist idea a profoundly human significance, only if we succeed in persuading this generation that we here are not only building a state for the Jewish people, but building a civilisation, a new society, with a profound significance and an immense value for the whole of humanity—only then will there be any prospect of attracting this generation. We know very well that the pioneers from Poland, too, were not satisfied with the nationalist idea alone, and wanted to add to it a social idea, an aspect greater than nationalism. This is not easy. Gentlemen, the point of what I am saying is this: it is up to the state to realise the idea. The contemporary Zionist movement can be no more than

its agent, telling of the new situation that is to be found in Israel. I hope you will allow me to make one final observation; and I hope that you will not think that this is weakness. This fact and these ideas are regarded as irrational in Israel, and this is one of the difficulties of dealing with immigration from the point of view I have been speaking about.

Gentlemen, the Zionist movement has started to develop in two contradictory trends—to use a familiar expression, it is suffering from split personality. The first trend is towards securing a normal life for the Jewish people—a people with a state, a language, a civilisation and an economy of their own, in one word a people, like other peoples. The other trend is towards preserving the peculiarity of the Jewish people. What I want to say—and I hope you will not misunderstand me—is that the first trend consists in turning the Jewish people into a normal people, while the second consists in keeping them an abnormal people. These two contradictory trends are nothing new in Zionism. Many of you are familiar with Hebrew literature, and know the slogans with which writers fought each other, how some said that the people of Israel are not like other peoples, while others said that we should become like other peoples.

In the history of the Zionist movement there have been two classic exponents of these two trends. The first was Herzl, who came from the assimilation and therefore did not understand the peculiarity of the Jewish people, of Jewish religion and civilisation. All he saw was the difficulties and sufferings of the Jews, at the time of Dreyfus, and so adopted the line: “Let us be like other nations—a people, a civilisation and a sovereign state.” He was opposed by Ahad Ha’am who said that the basis must not be the state, but a spiritual centre which would protect and safeguard the special character of the Jewish people. We have never decided between these two trends; we have never reached a final decision. I think that the time has come to settle this problem. I fancy that, twenty years after the establishment of the state, and especially under the pressure of the chronic problem of immigration and its difficulties, and of its value and importance to the state of Israel, we must decide what course we are to follow. In my opinion, the solution should be a mixture

of the two trends—a state that is a spiritual centre not only for Jews who remain outside it (although I hope that the day will come when the overwhelming majority of the Jewish people will be ingathered into the state of Israel—a desire which is also expressed in the New Jerusalem project) but also for the people who live in Zion. For them, too, the state should be more than a mere ordinary state; it should be what may be called a spiritual centre. Whether or no the expression is a suitable one does not matter; it is the idea that is important. This state should not be content merely to be like other states; it should be a state that is the embodiment of a new reality, the embodiment of the peculiarities, as regards civilisation, religion and social structure, of what we call Jewish history and civilisation.

Gentlemen, if we look at the tasks of the Zionist movement from a historical point of view, it should not be necessary to stress that the Zionist movement is essential and inevitable. I also hope that the Congress will deal with this problem in the manner of “To be or not to be”. But there is another problem which is far from having been settled: Can the Zionist movement perform its tasks? I do not hesitate to express all these doubts even at the inaugural session, but this evening, at any rate, I will avoid discussions and problems involving differences of opinion—the time for them will come later.

Gentlemen, it is the task of this Conference to answer to itself, to the state and to the Jewish people the question: Is the Zionist movement ready to undertake the new tasks—though they are not new in the historical sense—involved in a kind of immigration that is entirely different in its structure and its ideology, in its difficulties and complications? If the movement is ready to undertake these tasks, it must make very sure that it is capable of coping with them. I have my own view, which I shall submit at the general debate. If I did not believe that there was any prospect of success, I should not be standing here—I should have abandoned my post in the Zionist movement long ago. I am sure that we are at the last stage, and that we must now make our decisions and answer the questions: Are we capable of undertaking these tasks? Are we capable of waging a new ideological offensive against the Jewish people? Are we once more to become a militant

minority movement? We shall achieve constructive action in the country with non-Zionists, in the form of a united group. I do not intend to go into details now, but we should understand that it is our duty to make this attempt, this effort, by directing a campaign against the Jews of Western Europe, and, more particularly, to Russian Jewish youth, when the time comes, as I hope it will, when we can talk to them.

It is up to the Congress to give this answer. The answer will not be given by decisions taken at the Congress. What the Congress is capable of giving, and what the committees are capable of achieving, we shall see in a year or two—we shall see whether all the decisions and good intentions have been realised. But between this Congress and the next, it is up to the Zionist movement to give the answer to this question, which the state must inevitably ask. There should be no dependence on the Covenant. I was one of the leaders of those who fought for the Covenant but I said at the time that when the state was fully convinced that the Zionist movement was incapable of playing its role, it should change the Covenant. The hand that is offered can also be withdrawn. I do not advise the state to do that; I think that we are entitled to ask to be given a last chance. If, at this Congress, the movement reaches an understanding of the main trends in its discussion of immigration, which has nothing to do with rhetoric, and if it undertakes to perform the task, we are entitled to ask that the state should give it the opportunity of proving its capacity.

If we can do this—and I want to end my speech with an expression of the hope that we shall be able to do it—then we shall start on a new era in the history of Zionism. And if we achieve a part of the great historical task, the task of securing mass immigration from the Western countries, and even from Soviet Russia, we shall be able to start on a second era of the history of Zionism which will be worthy—this is my hope—of the glorious first era which we are celebrating this evening.

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Joint Communiqué on the Indian President Husain's Official Visit to Hungary, 6-10 June.¹ [Excerpt]

Budapest, June 10, 1968

[The two Presidents] stressed the urgency of implementing the Security Council Resolution of November 22, 1967 and the immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces to the lines existing prior to June 5, 1967 in the interest of settling the West Asia situation.

105

Address by Pope Paul VI on the Middle East on Receiving the Lebanese Foreign Minister Butros in Official Audience.² [Excerpt]

Vatican City, June 11, 1968

The Holy See hopes that conditions of peace may be brought about as soon as possible, putting an end to the state of insecurity which continues to prevail in the Near East and which is keeping a large part of the populations of that area in a humanly and materially precarious situation.

We feel that the measures approved last fall by the U.N. Security Council represent a positive step toward the solution of the serious and urgent problems which remain open. And we like to think that the mission of the special envoy of the U.N. Secretary-General will find, on the part of all responsible leaders...the support and understanding it deserves.

¹ *Indian Foreign Affairs Record*, June 1968, p. 131.

² *Jerusalem Post*, 12/6/1968.

106

Press Release Issued by the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission on Nuclear Energy Centres for the Middle East.¹

Washington, June 11, 1968

The potential of nuclear-powered "energy centers" in the Middle East is being studied by the Atomic Energy Commission through its Oak Ridge National Laboratory.

The study will explore the technical and economic feasibility of using nuclear power-desalting plants to provide large amounts of fresh water and electricity in agro-industrial production complexes (energy centers) for development in arid regions of the Middle East.

The study is to serve, in part, as a response to Senate Resolution 155, adopted last year, calling on the Administration to consider the application of large scale nuclear desalting plants as a means of supporting a stable and durable peace in the Middle East.

An initial study of the basic nuclear powered agro-industrial concept was also conducted by the AEC at its Oak Ridge National Laboratory last summer. The purpose of the study was to appraise the possibilities of using the most advanced nuclear power, agricultural and industrial techniques on a large scale to provide badly needed energy, water and industrial products, especially fertilizer, in developing countries. Power from a nuclear plant would be used to desalt water to irrigate arid land in which the complex would be located. The electricity would be used in industrial plants such as chemical factories and metal refineries, and in fertilizer production. (A report on this study will be available this summer).

Based on the preliminary results and in collaboration with Oak Ridge National Laboratory, the Government of India has recently initiated a similar study of the agro-industrial complex as it might apply to conditions in India. Such a complex might be expected to be heavily related to those products, such as fertilizer, which could

assist in increasing food production in that country.

The new study is applying the information developed in the initial investigations to the specific conditions of the Middle East and is expected to be completed in about one year. The AEC will collaborate with the Interior Department on the nuclear desalting aspects of the study in accordance with established relationships.

Other agencies of the U.S. Government will carry out related studies which will be coordinated with the study of the Atomic Energy Commission. Policy guidance will be provided by an interagency panel chaired by the Director of the Office of Water for Peace of the Department of State.

The study group, including experts from Government, industry, foundations and universities, will estimate the power and water requirements of the Middle East; survey the sources and availability of raw materials for industrial products; survey the domestic and export markets including price and demand relationships for the products from such a complex; identify specific locations where the soil, climate and other conditions are suitable for agricultural development using desalted water for irrigation; design and estimate costs for agri-industrial complexes at specific locations; and define the need for experimental or pilot projects to assure the success of larger projects. Specific attention will be devoted to planning for new jobs in industrial plants and on farms in the region.

The concept of nuclear-powered agro-industrial complexes has grown out of studies by the A.E.C. and the Office of Saline Water, Department of the Interior, of the use of nuclear energy to supply heat for desalting sea water and the generation of electricity. These studies have shown that the increase in size of nuclear power-desalting facilities results in the reduction of power and water costs.

¹ U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Non-Proliferation Treaty, Hearings*, 20th Cong., 2nd sess., 10, 11, 12 and 17 July 1968, p. 290.

107

Joint Statement on Talks Between the U.S. President Johnson and the Iranian Shah Reza Pahlawi.¹ [Excerpts]

Washington, June 12, 1968

The Shahanshah and the President met on June 12 and discussed topics of mutual interest to their two countries...

They discussed the situation in the Middle East and agreed that the peaceful development of the area could be accomplished only through respect for the sovereignty of Middle Eastern States and cooperation among the states of the region for their security and independence. Both leaders expressed their intention of continuing to support efforts made through the United Nations to reduce tensions in the area, reaffirming their support for a just and lasting peace based on the resolution adopted by the Security Council of the United Nations on November 22, 1967.

108

Press Release on Talks Between the U.A.R. Foreign Minister Riyad, and the East German Foreign Minister Winzer.² [Excerpt]

Berlin, June 13, 1968

In the talks special attention was devoted to the situation in the Middle East. Both Ministers underlined the need for putting an end to the occupation of Arab territories and the brutal terrorist rule there which has been going on since the Israeli imperialist aggression of June 5th 1967. They agreed that Israel's refusal to carry out the U.N. Security Council resolution of November 22nd 1967 and withdraw her troops from the occupied Arab territories represents the

main obstacle on the road to a political settlement.

Minister Winzer declared again that the German Democratic Republic will also in the future give every possible assistance to the United Arab Republic and the other Arab states affected by the imperialist Israeli aggression in their efforts for a political settlement of the Middle East conflict, the restoration of their sovereign rights and the speedy elimination of the aftermath of the aggression.

Minister Riyad paid tribute to the consistently anti-imperialist attitude adopted by the Government of the German Democratic Republic and to its support and solidarity for the U.A.R. in its struggle for a peaceful settlement of the Middle East conflict.

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Article on the Middle East in the Chinese Official Weekly "Peking Review."³

Peking, June 14, 1968

Working hand in glove, U.S. imperialism and the Soviet revisionist renegade clique have been busy pushing through a so-called "political settlement" of the Middle East question in an attempt to force the Arab countries to an all-round capitulation to the U.S.-Israeli aggressors. They have stepped up their plotting ever since June last year when U.S. imperialism and its tool of aggression Israel launched a large-scale war of aggression against the Arab countries and seized large tracts of Arab territories. This is a big conspiracy jointly concocted by the U.S. imperialists and Soviet revisionists to suppress the national-liberation movement of the Arab people.

During the past year, U.S. imperialism has continued to rush arms to Israel and has instigated Israel to repeatedly make war cries and even carry out continuous large-scale military provocations

¹ U.S. *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, 17/6/1968, p. 953.

² G.D.R. *Foreign Affairs Bulletin*, 25/6/1968, p. 146.

³ *Peking Review*, 14/6/1968, pp. 25, 29. The article is entitled "U.S.-Soviet Conspiracy to Strangle Arab People's Anti-Imperialist Struggle."

against the Arab countries, exerting military pressure on them. At the same time, U.S. imperialism has trotted out a set of proposals which, in the guise of a "political settlement," were in essence aimed at forcing the Arab countries to capitulate to the U.S.-Israeli aggressors. The main content of these proposals was embodied in the "five principles" put forward by the chieftain of U.S. imperialism Lyndon Johnson on June 19 last year.¹ All this is a big fraud, pure and simple.

Dancing to Washington's tune, the Soviet revisionist renegade clique has been collaborating with the U.S. imperialists to cook up the proposals for the so-called "political settlement." Kosygin, chief of the Soviet revisionist clique, went to the United States in June last year and held "talks" with Johnson at Glassboro.² They reached a secret agreement on the so-called "political settlement" of the Middle East issue on the basis of Johnson's "five principles." This has been followed by a lot of dirty political deals made as a result of a constant exchange of letters and cables between Moscow and Washington, continual diplomatic contacts, and direct conversations over the "hot line" between Kosygin and Johnson. They have been laying special stress on using the United Nations to put across their "political settlement" hoax. At the behest of U.S. imperialism, the "special envoy" of the United Nations Jarring scurried back and forth between Tel Aviv, Cairo, Amman and Beirut dozens of times. High-ranking delegations of the Soviet revisionist clique and Tito, Indira Gandhi and other U.S.-Soviet lackeys have all gone to the Middle East to do their utmost to help sell this fraud.

What kind of merchandise is peddled by this U.S.-Soviet "political settlement" fraud? Against whom is it directed? Who will benefit from it? The answer can easily be obtained after analysing briefly the contents of the series of "resolutions" which Washington and Moscow have dished up in the United Nations Security Council since June last year.

These "resolutions" include the three successive "ceasefire resolutions" adopted by the Security

Council in June 1967,³ the Security Council "resolution" of November 22, 1967,⁴ and another Security Council "resolution" of April 25, 1968.⁵ These "resolutions" have several features in common:

1) They are directed primarily against the Arab national-liberation movement. Again and again they "deplore all violent incidents," demand "termination of all claims of belligerency" and the prevention of "all violent incidents." It must be pointed out that, by their counter-revolutionary violence, Zionists have occupied Arab lands and rendered over one million Palestinian refugees homeless and destitute for 20 years. Last year Israel again launched aggressive war against the Arab countries, seizing large tracts of land and gaining control over strategic areas. Yet after all this the United Nations waves the policeman's baton, clamouring for the prevention of "all violent incidents." Obviously it is exerting pressure upon the Arabs, especially the Palestinians, in a vain attempt to force the Palestinian people to lay down their arms and end their just armed struggle to recover the occupied territories.

2) These "resolutions" are intended to provide legal cover for the *fait accompli* resulting from the Israeli aggression. They call fervently for the two sides to "cease fire." In fact they are coercing the Arab countries into unilaterally accepting a "cease-fire", thus binding the hands of the 100 million Arab people in their just struggle against aggression. At the same time, these "resolutions" try in every possible way to protect Israel and connive at its aggression. As revealed by an official of the Tito renegade clique, the secret agreement reached by Johnson and Kosygin envisages "frontier adjustments" between Israel and the Arab countries. Evidently this will allow Israel to occupy more Arab lands. All this is designed to ratify the result of the Israeli aggression as a *fait accompli* and make it possible for Israel, a U.S. imperialist tool of aggression, to occupy a better position strategically so as to further intimidate the Arab countries and launch new aggression against them.

3) The November 1967 Security Council

³ U.N. docs. S/RES/233-234-235, of 6, 7 and 9 June 1967, respectively, texts *ibid.*, pp. 250-251.

⁴ Text *ibid.*, pp. 258-269.

⁵ *Post*, doc. 235.

¹ See *International Documents on Palestine, 1967*, pp. 116-118.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 121-122.

"resolution" stressed the necessity for "guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every state in the area." In appearance it looks fair and impartial, but in essence it means that the U.S. imperialists and the Soviet revisionists have ganged up with Israel to put pressure on the Arab countries. It totally disregards their sovereignty and is another vicious trick to force them to submit to Israel and its rabid military aggression.

4) In order to help the United States and Israel realize the objectives which they have not been able to achieve completely through their war of aggression, the U.N. "resolutions" also advocate guaranteeing "freedom of navigation through international waterways" in the area and contain other clauses in favour of Israel.

It can be seen clearly from these facts that the so-called "political settlement" cooked up jointly by the U.S. imperialists and the Soviet revisionists is a political snare to lure and force the Arab nations into surrender. It proves once again that U.S. imperialism is the most ferocious enemy of the Arab people and that the Soviet revisionist renegade clique is the No. 1 accomplice of U.S. imperialism.

In recent years, U.S. imperialism has been plagued with difficulties at home and abroad and is finding the going tougher every day. It is being badly mauled on the Vietnam battlefield. The Afro-American struggle against violent repression is spreading far and wide. Its financial crisis is deepening daily. Under these circumstances, U.S. imperialism urgently needs to strengthen its strategic position in the Middle East and maintain its huge oil interests there. However, following the ever wider dissemination of Mao Tse-tung's thought, the Arab people are awakening with each passing day and the national-liberation movement in the Arab region is developing in depth. In particular the flames of the Palestinian people's armed struggle are raging ever more fiercely. All these have dealt deadly blows to the U.S. neo-colonialist policies in the Middle East. Hence the situation in which U.S. imperialism more than ever needs its accomplices the Soviet revisionists to benumb the fighting will of the Arab countries in their struggle against imperialism and to stamp out the flames of the national-liberation movement and armed struggle

in the region.

The Soviet revisionist renegade clique has all along been pursuing in the Middle East its counter-revolutionary revisionist general line in foreign policy—"peaceful coexistence" between the aggressor and the victim of aggression. So as to put into effect the so-called "Tashkent spirit",¹ it has urged the Arab people to "coexist peacefully" with their deadly enemies U.S. imperialism and Israel. It mortally fears and bitterly hates the national-liberation movement, especially the people's armed struggle; it is afraid that the Arab people's anti-imperialist revolutionary storm might disrupt the Soviet revisionist and U.S. imperialist control and plunder of the Middle East and shatter its fond dream of "U.S.-Soviet collaboration for world domination." Through its foreign policy of capitulation and betrayal, the clique aims at complete co-ordination with U.S. imperialism to suppress the Arab national-liberation movement; it is indeed playing a role that U.S. imperialism cannot play.

Our great leader Chairman Mao has said, "The oppressed peoples and nations must not pin their hopes for liberation on the 'sensibleness' of imperialism and its lackeys. They will only triumph by strengthening their unity and persevering in their struggle."

The daily awakening Arab people will not be intimidated, nor will they be deceived. At recent anti-U.S. rallies, Arab masses have shouted such resounding slogans as: "What has been taken away by force must be recovered by force!" *Fateh* (the Palestinian liberation movement) solemnly pointed out in a recent statement in Beirut: "We reject all resolutions passed by the United Nations on Palestine." The statement said that *Fateh* rejects the "political settlement" fraud peddled by the U.N. "special envoy" Jarring. "We reject every formula which limits the freedom of the Palestinian people in their struggle to liberate their homeland," it said. A leading member of *Fateh* declared unequivocally that *Fateh* knows of only one formula, that is, "to wage armed struggle for the final liberation

¹ The Tashkent meeting between President Ayub Khan of Pakistan and Premier Shastri of India, from 4 to 10 January 1966, ended with a declaration, thanks to the Soviet Premier Kosygin's mediatory efforts, under which the two countries agreed to renounce the use of force in the settlement of their dispute. [Ed.]

of Palestine." Another leading member said, "No matter how many difficulties we may face, we are determined to fight till final victory." Since the beginning of this year, the Palestinian guerrillas have launched more than 200 attacks in the Israeli-occupied areas, badly battering the aggressors. This serves as a powerful rebuff to the "political settlement" swindle.

The contradictions between the Arab people on the one hand and U.S. imperialism and its accomplices on the other are irreconcilable. It is entirely wishful thinking for the U.S. imperialists and the Soviet revisionists to imagine they can stamp out, through their "political settlement" scheme, the raging flames of the Arab people's struggle against imperialism. Today the national-liberation movement in the Arab region is further developing in depth. The 700 million Chinese people armed with Mao Tse-tung's thought resolutely support the just struggle of the Arab people. So long as the 100 million Arab people closely unite and persevere in a protracted struggle they will surmount all difficulties, defeat all enemies and achieve final victory in their struggle against imperialism.

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Joint Communiqué on the Indian President Husain's Official Visit to Yugoslavia, 10-14 June.¹ [Excerpt]

Belgrade, June 14, 1968

Re-affirming the stands expressed in the joint communiqué issued at the end of the visit of the President of Yugoslavia to India last January,² the two Presidents exchanged views on the world situation and on important international issues including the war in Viet Nam and the Middle East crisis. The two Presidents devoted special attention to the necessity of further strengthening the activity of non-aligned and other countries with a view to consolidating independence, safeguarding peace and accelerating the develop-

ment of the developing countries and creating more favourable conditions for the positive solution of international problems.

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Address by the Israeli Foreign Minister Eban Before the 27th Zionist Congress, Jerusalem, 9-19 June, 1968.³ [Excerpts]

Jerusalem, June 15, 1968

Delegates to the Congress. Throughout history this last year of the second decade of our independence will be studied and described, will provoke heart-searching and self-examination. Our people have not experienced many years of this kind. I have seen reports in the press of the lessons the Zionist Congress is to learn from the events of last year. The balance sheet is very complicated; there has certainly been great rejoicing, but we have also suffered some disappointments—our neighbours are refusing to make peace, and there are others who have not granted us their full sympathy. There is also one disappointment of local manufacture that is extremely disquieting. Who could have foretold that the revolutionary challenges of this year would not result in a great wave of emigration and recruiting in the countries of the Jewish Diaspora, to confront the new prospects and the new dangers. Who could have foretold that this would happen? There was, indeed a sudden rush to volunteer, which kindled our enthusiasm and increased our hopes; but it only lasted a short time. Why did the embers fade almost as soon as they were kindled?

The Zionist movement should be aware of and feel responsible for this problem, and others of the same kind. It is impossible to bring back the past, nor can the impossible be achieved. Were there four, or even three million Jews here now, how different would be our capacity to

¹ Indian Foreign Affairs Record, June 1968, p. 138.

² See *ante*, doc. 22.

³ Twenty Seventh Zionist Congress, Jerusalem, 9-19 June, 1968, Stenographic Report (Jerusalem: Executive of the Zionist Organisation, 1968), pp. 216-220, 222-227.

form our Jewish destiny in the hour of victory.

... It is the duty of all of us, and especially of us representatives of Israel in the capitals of the world, to make matters of immigration and absorption our first concern. But though matters of immigration and absorption must take first place, we are not free to disregard other problems...

... Had the war ended as those who started it hoped and planned, there would have been no question today of discussing problems connected with the occupied areas, population, contacts, agreements, the territories we hold, or settlements on the frontiers. Instead of this there would have been a terrifying quiet, which would have left nothing for discussion, it would have been the final end, after which nothing is left, no hope of consolation.

Delegates to the Twenty Seventh Congress. I am not reviving these memories just to excite your emotions or to arouse your pride. I am reviving them because they are the heart, the very king-pin of Israeli foreign policy, and because without understanding our memories you cannot understand our policy. This policy can be described in one word—Never—our absolute insistence that we shall never, never, never, return to the danger and the exposure to attack that we have been delivered from. We shall never return to that political chaos and lack of territorial security from which we have been delivered with so much difficulty. Never again shall Syrian guns threaten our villages in Upper Galilee and the Jordan Valley; never again shall the Egyptian forces, which were only a few kilometres away from our principal towns, have their hands at our throats. Never again shall hostile forces press hard on us in a narrow coastal plain. Never again shall international waterways be open to all other peoples, and closed to Israel alone.

Above all, never again shall the Eternal City be divided and its sanctity be desecrated. If we have any memories at all it is Jerusalem that we remember.

To sum up, history demands that we should not go backward, but forward. Not backward to frontier lines where everything was provisional, impermanent, unstable and indefinite, but forward

to agreed and secure regional frontiers. Not backward to boycott and blockade, but forward to an area open to the free flow of persons, merchandise, and even ideas.

We shall not rebuild the rubble of the old building which was demolished by war and destroyed by hatred. This time we shall be content with nothing less than the new edifice of a peace that is stable, firm, serious and secure. The task before the leadership is not to rebuild the old but to create the new.

We are asked what is our policy. Its goals are to replace the cease-fire by a peace obtained through free negotiations and the signing of peace treaties, the demarcation of agreed and secure frontiers for the Middle East countries, the stopping of hostile activities and the ushering in of a new era of cooperation in the area. Until such a settlement is obtained we shall continue to hold on to positions on the cease-fire line that are vital to our security. This is a cautious and reasonable attitude, which conforms with normal international principles. We are behaving as any other state that had been the victim of aggression would behave. The idea that the state of Israel should return to the brink of the abyss, and abandon its positions without peace, without an agreement, without negotiations, is so unreasonable and so unprecedented, that it is incredible that any one should so much as suggest it.

It is not for moral or legal reasons that the state of Israel is defending itself. What is the choice open to it? That we should return to the dangers, to the political and territorial situation which led us to war? That we shall never do. There is no international obligation to commit national suicide. We are therefore all agreed in our absolute refusal to return to the nightmare situation that prevailed on 4 June.

Delegates to the Zionist Congress. Our political battle is entering its second year. We have passed through certain stages in this battle, but the end is not yet in sight. This political battle began before the fighting began, at that time of anxious expectation at the end of May. We all know how the consequences of a military victory can be annulled by political pressure—we had experience of that in 1956. When the sky started to cloud over we were obliged to ask ourselves certain questions regarding our destiny: should

we be able, in the hour of trial, to free ourselves from pressure and interference by a hostile great power? Would those who, ten years ago, assumed the responsibility for our safety and for freedom of navigation remember their obligations? Would they at least respect and support our efforts for a stable peace if we ourselves took steps to safeguard our existence?

Our political activity in May 1967 ensured that these questions should be answered in the positive, and our aims were realised. 1967 was not like 1956. The state of Israel, through its magnificent, painstaking and energetic preparations, ensured that, if victory was won it should not be lost. I am appalled when I think what would have been our political and physical situation after the fighting was over had it not been for the vital political efforts we made on the eve of the war.

In the two weeks prior to the war, the Israeli leadership showed itself realistic in its policy; it adopted a decisive attitude and displayed cool political courage in the face both of the danger that threatened from outside, and of indications of a loss of nerve at home. These efforts ensured that the clash should be restricted to this area, and that there should be no great power interference; they ensured clear prospects of political support after the war, a growing trend in our favour in the field of world public opinion, and unequivocal support, which is so vital, for our military strength.

The second stage, as you all remember, was reached last summer. During this stage we were engaged in a political battle between the Soviet and Arab influence that dominates a large part of the voters at the United Nations. The minority defeated the majority. All efforts to secure the condemnation of our war of liberation failed. All proposals to stigmatise us as aggressors for refusing to allow ourselves to be annihilated were rejected, and all efforts to bring about a return to the situation and the map that were in force on 4 June failed completely.

This stage of the battle lasted through last summer, and it was fought in the field of world public opinion. The drama unfolded in the sight and hearing of millions of witnesses. The Jews have experienced throughout history the situation in which they have had to defend themselves, in isolation, against campaigns of defamation. But

no judgement was given by any such important tribunal on matters of decisive importance.

The third stage of the political battle in the Security Council consisted of a search for a series of principles that would assist us in our efforts towards final peace. This search ended with the acceptance of a doctrine based on peace, not on armistice, on recognised secure frontiers, not on the old armistice lines, on a comprehensive peace settlement in which all matters would be agreed on.

The fourth stage, which we are coping with now, consists of a search for contacts and negotiations through various channels, including the special representative of the United Nations. We have accepted the invitation to establish peace through agreement on secure and agreed frontiers, and through complete and explicit recognition of our sovereignty and our political identity.

When Ambassador Jarring proposed a meeting between Israel and her neighbours with himself in the chair, it was Israel, and Israel alone, that accepted his proposal. Cairo and Amman are now confronted with a fateful choice. I say Cairo and Amman because the revolutionary regime in Syria is beyond reasonable alternative. But Cairo and Amman are faced with a fateful choice: they must either be prepared to study the possibility of an honourable settlement we are offering them, or continue in a state of tension, with all the sorrow and danger that this involves for the peoples of the area.

Thus at the end of the year we find ourselves where we were at its beginning. We are firmly established on the cease-fire line, insisting on the principles and attitudes we proclaimed at the end of the fighting. No serious international pressure is being exerted on us to make us change this situation without the establishment of peace. Many complicated perils confront us, but the doctrine of withdrawal without peace has been defeated, and if we hold out even the neighbouring countries will recognise that this doctrine no longer exists.

Our endurance through the past year has been a political gain out of proportion to our geopolitical force. The Western world, nearly all

the communist world, and a great part of the Islamic world has demanded that we be pushed back to the dangerous point from which we started. In doing this they have taken their stand on an extremely old attitude, the attitude that opposes all territorial change, on the precedent of the withdrawal that was imposed on us in 1956, on patterns derived from other conflicts that have no connection with the present case, conflicts in which the previous situation was automatically restored. But the analogy is false, for those situations, unlike ours, were normal ones, not situations liable to explode at any moment.

You should also remember that the obstacles that have been placed in our diplomatic path are much more formidable than those which confronted us on the field of battle. On the field of battle our numbers were small—sometimes three enemy tanks or planes to one of ours. But in the political field the odds are four to one, and in this field it is not only, or even mainly, the Arabs who are our enemies. We must remember that one major military episode in June 1967 has not changed everything. It has left the Arab world unchanged, with all its resources, its vast area, its huge population, its great mineral wealth, its strategic importance, its sovereignty, its absolute confidence in its identity and its national entity, its allies in the international field, and even its violent and blazing hatred.

This is an age of non-interference, not an age of increasing interference. France and Britain have withdrawn. The United States and the Soviet Union want to put an end to the present focuses of hostility, not to create new ones. Moreover, their points of view on the Middle East are completely contradictory. The Middle East today is not what it was. It is no longer a crossroads, it is no longer the road to anywhere. There is no longer an eastern empire. Oil is no longer a weapon, and those who produce oil are dependent on such as may decide to buy it. There are no military bases, there is no need to establish bases to protect empires. The extraordinary thing is that it is clear, and has been established, that the world's economy can continue to survive without the Suez Canal, if its owners insist on keeping it closed. It is never wise to put fancies to the

test of reality.

It is no less important to state what we shall do. We shall officially conclude peace with each Arab country on the basis of a treaty that satisfies the requirements of all concerned as regards their security, sovereignty and national honour. Instead of hostility we propose good neighbourly relations. Instead of blockade and boycott we propose free trade and the exchange of ideas. Instead of cease-fire lines, armistice lines, we propose agreed and permanent territorial frontiers.

It is inconceivable that we should return to the situation that prevailed in the past, when our frontiers were tightly closed. In conformity with twentieth century developments, frontiers in Western and Northern Europe are open; it is possible to cross them in full security for purposes of trade and pilgrimage; there is a free interplay of ideas. The Arabs and Jews mix with each other in this country even now, when it is living in a state of cease-fire and repeated wars; would it not be preferable to replace this situation by a peace agreement?

When peace comes, international solutions will be found for the population and refugee problems caused by constant war resulting from a state of hostility, solutions to which Israel will contribute effectively and creatively.

To sum up, I propose to the Arab governments that they join us in establishing a group of sovereign states in the Middle East, in which each state will be secure within peaceful frontiers and will cooperate with the others over open frontiers and in a spirit of regional and international solidarity.

Delegates to the Congress. The absence of international action is the second basic factor, after Arab aggression in the 1967 war. All we ask for today is support for accepted international principles—this is what all countries expect in the settlement of disputes. What are these principles? Firstly, negotiations. This is not merely a matter of procedure, it is also a matter of principle. Let us say to the Arabs: "We met each other face to face in the war. You must now meet us face to face for peace."

International experience has proved the importance of this principle. Today the whole of humanity is breathing a sigh of relief because preliminary peace talks have started on the Vietnam war. In every international conflict refusal to hold talks means refusal to make peace. In every international conflict readiness for negotiations is the touchstone of the desire for peace.

The turning point in the Middle East will only come when there is a prospect of negotiations, and this does not rule out the possibility of cooperation with international elements working to improve the atmosphere and the conditions which will enable the conflicting parties to come closer to each other.

After negotiations, agreement. We cannot risk our vital principles, or genuine peace for the sake of a peace agreement that is ill-defined, and not binding. There must not only be free negotiations for an agreement; a treaty must be signed. War is the result of inconsistencies in unsigned agreements. If we neglect to hold on to the basic principle of international settlement in a search for rapid, superficial and partial success, there will be war again. I know that diplomacy is not an exact science but, as is the case with every organised human activity, it is possible to engage in it either with or without experience, with or without precision, with or without explicit obligation. If a house is built without due regard for the principles of architecture, it will fall down. If I raise a structure of international relations without due regard for the accepted principles of negotiation—agreement and a peace treaty—this structure will fall down too, and the lives of many people will be lost in its fall.

It is sometimes proposed to us that we should be content with a trivial measure, and replace what is valuable and practical by what is imaginary. We have no need of such advice, because we have a single sacred duty to perform—to ensure that the last war was really the last war, and to protect the state of Israel from dangers in the future.

Statements and guarantees by the great powers are no substitute for an Arab-Israeli agreement; the most they can do is to support signed agreements. If an Arab-Israeli agreement is violated, it can be imposed through mutual

sanctions, and if they violate it, it is not binding on us either. The statement or guarantee of a great power, as we saw last year, is accompanied by a fundamental truth—at the hour of trial no one outside the area is ready to take a risk on behalf of peace inside the area.

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These facts make it essential that we should devote great attention not only to the principles of our policy but also to the drafting of our speeches and to our diplomacy. Attempts have been made to get Israel into a situation that I call “anti-cosmetic”. Most countries adopt a “cosmetic” policy which makes their policy look more attractive than it really is. Israel has adopted a policy that is reasonable, just and extremely attractive, but there is a definite desire to conceal its attractiveness by the indiscriminate use of heavy face powder. We must not fall into this error. There is no need to discuss our firm decision not to withdraw without peace. The main problem is the importance we accord to the search for ways to make peace. It would be misleading to claim that it is we alone who desire peace; I am convinced that the firm desire of the people of Israel and the Jewish people is that we should pursue their cause and their ideas beyond the range of the cease-fire in our search for a different and better settlement or relations.

Ever since its foundation the Zionist movement has emphasised that peace is an ideal of supreme value. If we have fallen short of this idea it is only because the prospect of achieving it was doubtful. Many years ago the establishment of the state of Israel seemed more remote than does the making of peace today. But we neglected neither the slogan nor the dream. There are ideals which even to strive for constitutes a human value and a strategic advantage, even though they are not immediately within our grasp. Peace and security were the slogan which inspired our sons in the battle, and it is too early—it will always be too early—to relinquish this aspiration.

Even though peace is remote, the mere fact that we make it our principal aim will have an important and immediate effect. Even though actual negotiations with the Arab governments have not yet taken place, a group of Ministers and of my colleagues in the Foreign Ministry are

preparing alternative projects and schemes for the solution of the problems of peace.

If we did not do so we should be committing an error which would have far-reaching effects on our future. Lively discussion is in progress on such problems as the legal form and the content of the peace, the demarcation and control of secure frontiers when peace comes, what stands are required to guarantee freedom of navigation, what principles and institutions are necessary for a just solution of the refugee problem, and what measures should be taken to ensure the protection of Islamic and Christian interests in all aspects of life in Jerusalem with which the world religions are concerned.

There is full agreement as to what should constitute our peacetime frontiers, which must be established on a basis of security considerations. There is also agreement on what should be the nature of the legal and political relations between the parties. So far there is no single proposal that the government of Israel has accepted as binding, the reason being that there is as yet no framework for negotiations. But serious, rigorous and practical thinking and discussion are in progress, in connection with a large variety of alternative ideas. It is not true that we are paralysed by divisions; we are ready to be put to the test. If any Arab country agrees to explore prospects of peace with us through negotiations, we shall in a very short time submit detailed and acceptable proposals on all matters that they and we wish to raise.

There is another result of the policy which is expressed by the decisions of the government and the Knesset in our search for peace. I am referring to our refusal to hinder prospects of negotiations, our refusal to allow legitimate historical sentiments to obliterate all other feelings. This is why we have rejected slogans and concepts incompatible with prospects of peace through negotiations. Such slogans enjoy no government support whatsoever. Our future may well be tragic if we do not advance beyond the present stage. If peace is not established for many years there will be war, and this possibility is too close for it to be ignored. If this threat is to be our destiny we must recognise it, and we shall only be in a position to adopt a moral attitude to it if we first explore every prospect of sure and

honourable peace, and we are indebted to those who are asked to make efforts beyond their power.

Finally, there is a more sensitive aspect of this problem. I mean the concept of political superiority. We have succeeded in confronting a great political offensive, thanks to our links with a group of countries which have opposed and diverted the pressure exerted on us to make us withdraw. There is not a single country that supports the cease-fire situation, unless it is accompanied by determined, continuous and sincere efforts for an agreed peace treaty. Therefore, all action towards the establishment of peace constitutes a protection against isolation, and maintains the front that we have established with such great efforts—that front which is so firmly led by the United States, and which includes the countries of the American continent, most of the countries of Western and Northern Europe, some parts of Asia and an important part of the developing African countries. If we are to deal with the problem of peace seriously, we must recognise the complicated questions that are connected with it. We must try to reconcile a number of opposing objectives. We must secure a better security map and more extensive territory with less indefensible frontiers, so that this state may live in accordance with the principles of democracy and loyalty to its Jewish objective.

The state of Israel is an ideological state. It does not exist merely to live, but for an idea. It exists to establish and realise this idea—the establishment of a sovereign unit whose ideology, spirit, civilisation, social objectives and intellectual form are determined by the Jewish people.

Furthermore, a peaceful solution will be accepted by the area and will be internationally ratified, in an objective and binding manner. In view of the fact that the problem of peace is extremely complicated and demands that very many elements be taken into account, it requires intellectual attention as well as popular patience and endurance. I could express an opinion on the question as to whether such an atmosphere of popular patience and endurance exists here, but I prefer to leave this to you to decide.

The sovereignty of Israel does not absolve the Zionist movement and world Jewry from expressing their opinion and their attitude as regards the historic choices that lie before us—

these are matters so important that world Jewry cannot be silent about them, for they touch on the very heart of the Jewish destiny. It is our right and our duty to know what sort of Israel you want us to build and how you want us to build it. I am confident that Jews in all parts of the world are at one in their demands of us. They want us to keep what we have gained by our abundant work so that we may translate these gains into a reality of peace and security. They want us to continue our strenuous efforts to arrive at peace. They want us to show the world a Jewish personality, which believes in Jewish values with due regard to world ideas. They want us to look to our neighbours realistically, with respect and, if necessary, with mercy. Although Israel is living in a new situation, they do not want to see her neglecting her fundamental objectives—the development of a Hebrew society, the development of the arts, the discovery of the secrets of nature, the reclamation of the desert, economic progress and social justice, continued concern for her special mission in the developing world, our new administrative activities among a million and a quarter Arabs—this is an urgent necessity, and is our sole or, at any rate, our main preoccupation.

112

News Conference Remarks by the U.N. Secretary-General U Thant on the Middle East.¹ [Excerpt]

New York, June 18, 1968

Q. What can you, or anyone else, do to help Ambassador Jarring get serious negotiations under way for peace in the Middle East? Do you consider that his mission still has a chance of success or would you recommend that it be terminated?

The Secretary-General: Since the arrival in New York of Ambassador Jarring I have been in constant touch with him. According to our latest conversation he expects to submit a report to me before the end of July. Of course, I in turn have

to transmit this to the Security Council for whatever action the Council might deem fit to take. Of course, I have no means of knowing whether Ambassador Jarring's report to me will indicate some progress or lack of progress. But his expectation is to submit a report before the end of July. At that time, of course, it is up to the Security Council members to decide whether to meet or not to meet on the basis of that report.

Q. How long a leave does Ambassador Jarring have from his Government?

The Secretary-General: In the first instance, at my request the Government of Sweden very kindly granted Ambassador Jarring a six-month leave, which expired, of course, at the end of May. At my request again, the Government of Sweden very kindly extended his leave for another three months—June, July and August. Therefore, for the moment his leave will expire at the end of August.

Q. You have given strong endorsement to the concept of direct talks between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities. Do you see any possibility of bringing about similar direct talks between the Arab States and Israel in connexion with the Jarring mission, and do you intend to make such a recommendation? Now that you have had the benefit of discussions with Ambassador Jarring and General Bull, do you still believe that direct negotiations in the Middle East of a kind similar to that which you favour between the parties in Viet-Nam are not possible?

The Secretary-General: I do not want to project myself, for the moment in any case, into such very controversial issues, which is one of the bones of contention, if I may say so, between the parties directly involved in the Middle Eastern crisis. But in my view they are situations which are not identical, and because of their differences in the background, differences in the political and geographical factors, I think we have to assess the situations differently.

I remember having made a similar observation at one of the press conferences in the past. I even brought in the example of somebody projecting an idea of direct talks between President Johnson and Premier Fidel Castro. I do not know whether I said that at a press conference or on another occasion. But my point for the mom-

¹ U.N. Monthly Chronicle, July 1968, pp. 68-69.

ent is this: I do not wish to project myself on this very contentious issue, which is primarily the concern of the Secretary-General's Special Representative, Ambassador Jarring, who has been trying his very best to achieve some progress in the context of the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967.

Q. In the light of the adopted resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly, namely, resolutions 237 (1967) and resolution 2252 (ES-V), respectively, what steps have been taken, after the report of Ambassador Gussing of 2 October 1967, on the refugee question?

The Secretary-General: For many weeks past I have been in consultation with the parties directly involved in the Middle Eastern crisis in connexion with sending a Special Representative of the Secretary-General to look into the humanitarian problems in the area. The consultations are not yet conclusive, but I hope to be able to report to the Security Council on the progress or lack of progress in this field in the very near future perhaps in the next few days.

113

Statement Issued by the Israeli Foreign Ministry on the U.N. Security Council Resolution of November 22, 1967.¹

Jerusalem, June 19, 1968

There is no decision by any international body to the effect that 'Israel must withdraw to the June 4 lines.' The resolution speaks of the establishment of peace within recognized and secure boundaries, and of the necessity to promote agreement toward this end.

Attention is drawn to the statement by the U.S. representative on 15 November 1967, in which he said that agreed and secure boundaries mentioned in the Security Council's resolution are not identical with the 4 June boundaries, and also to similar statements in this spirit by initiators and supporters of that resolution.

¹ *Jerusalem Post*, 20/6/1968.

The Israeli Government's policy in regard to boundaries has been repeatedly described by the Foreign Minister in the Knesset and on other occasions, according to which, 'we shall not return to the June 4 boundaries [1967] and we shall remain on the present cease-fire lines until they are replaced by agreed and secure boundaries which will be established within the framework of a peace treaty.' This is the authorized policy of the Government of Israel and the Knesset.

114

News Conference Remark by the U.S. Secretary of State Rusk on the Middle East.²
[Excerpt]

Washington, June 21, 1968

Q. Mr. Secretary, in the Middle East, the Israelis suggested new plans, as I understand it, the Allon plan for the disposition of the west bank of the Jordan, involving a quasi-independent government and military security. Do you have any comment on that?

A. No, except that the U.S. attitude is based wholly upon President Johnson's five principles of last June³ and the November resolution of the Security Council taken as a whole.

We, therefore, fully support the efforts of Ambassador [Gunnar] Jarring to make some progress in his contacts with the two sides. We shall give him all the support we can, and we do not believe that an answer is going to be reached by unilateral plans put forward by one side or the other, but rather in the course of serious discussion of the possibilities of a permanent peace by those who live in the area and who have to find a way to get along together.

² U.S. *Department of State Bulletin*, 8/7/1968, p. 38.

³ See *International Documents on Palestine, 1967*, pp. 116-118.

115

Reply by the Israeli Premier Eshkol to a Question on the U.N. Security Council Resolution of November 22, 1967.¹ [Excerpt]

Jerusalem, June 22, 1968

The government repeats that it is impossible to return to the situation prevailing before 5 June [1967] when the Jordanian army could attack Jewish population centres at will, and violate the Armistice Agreement times without number.

We distinguish between political frontiers, the cease-fire line and secure frontiers. From our point of view, the River Jordan constitutes Israel's secure frontier. We shall remain on the cease-fire line as long as there are no agreed frontiers.

In the demarcation of the frontiers the people of Israel's historical links with, and rights in, the land of Israel will be taken into account, and naturally it will not be possible to ignore the fact that there are large concentrations of Arab inhabitants in certain areas.

116

Statement Issued by the Israeli Cabinet on the U.N. Security Council Resolution of November 22, 1967.²

Jerusalem, June 23, 1968

The Israeli Cabinet today gave full and emphatic endorsement to the position taken by Foreign Minister Abba Eban on the problem of Israel's future boundaries and on his interpretation of the Security Council's resolution of 22 November 1967. The Government reaffirmed the statements on this subject made to the Security Council and the Knesset by the Foreign Minister and the Israeli delegate to the U.N. between 22 November 1967 and 29 May 1968.

In these statements Mr. Eban had declared that while the situation of 4 June [1967] could

not be restored, Israel was willing to negotiate 'secure and recognized boundaries' with each Arab State as part of the peace-making process. On 15 November the United States representative had explained that the term secure and recognized boundaries, which appears in two drafts, one American and one British, meant an agreed boundary different from the previous armistice line and from the present cease-fire line.

In the Cabinet discussion today it was made clear that personal views expressed by Ministers in a party meeting could not in any way affect the validity of authorized statements by the Prime Minister or Foreign Minister. Yesterday the Prime Minister made a public statement to this effect.

117

Speech by the Iranian Prime Minister Hoveyda at a Banquet in Honour of the Iraqi Prime Minister Yahya.³ [Excerpts]

Teheran, June 24, 1968

Our two peoples greatly need permanent peace, stability and tranquillity to achieve their ideals. For this reason the Imperial Iranian Government is doing its utmost to see that disputes are resolved through the U.N. on the basis of the U.N. Charter and that U.N. resolutions are implemented. As you know, the Shah, Arya Mehr, was the very first world figure to say, during a stop in Turkey at Ankara airport, that the days are over when one country can occupy another country and retain it by force. As in the past, the Imperial Government continues to regard the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the occupied territories as necessary and inevitable. The Imperial Government also strongly supports the restoration of Jerusalem to its previous status on the basis of U.N. resolutions.

The Iranian people sincerely sympathises with the Palestinian refugees and has always supported them. We firmly believe that Muslim

¹ *Maariv* (Tel Aviv), 23/6/1968.

² *The Israel Digest*, 12/7/1968, p. 8.

³ *Teheran* home service in Persian, 03.30 GMT, 25/6/1968. B.B.C., ME/2806/A/1.

countries must draw inspiration from the lofty Islamic principles to achieve their legitimate rights and progress and happiness for Muslim nations...

118

Communiqué on the Semi-Annual Session of the NATO Council of Ministers.¹ [Excerpts]

Reykjavik, June 27, 1968

The North Atlantic Council met in Ministerial Session in Reykjavik on 24th and 25th June, 1968.

8. Ministers examined and approved a report from the Permanent Council which dealt in detail with the situation in the Mediterranean and related defence problems. They directed their Permanent Representatives to consult fully on this situation and to extend their consultations in range and depth as circumstances required. To this end, the Secretary General was requested to co-ordinate the exchange of information among members of the Council and to keep the Council closely advised on the situation in the Mediterranean. It is, of course, understood that member countries, or the Secretary General, may put forward matters to be considered by the Council in accordance with their rights and responsibilities.

9. The Ministers of the countries taking part in the Defence Planning Committee, concerned at the recent expansion of Soviet activity in the Mediterranean, decided that their Permanent Representatives, with the assistance of the NATO Military Authorities, would take under early consideration measures designed to safeguard the security interests of NATO members in the Mediterranean area and to improve the effectiveness of allied forces in that area. The Permanent Representatives will also consider other measures or organisational changes that may be needed to enhance the effectiveness and co-ordination of

allied surveillance activities in the Mediterranean and that may require further authorisation.

10. France did not associate herself with the decisions referred to in paragraph 9 above.

119

Report on Foreign Policy to the Soviet Supreme Soviet by Foreign Minister Gromyko.² [Excerpt]

Moscow, June 27, 1968

To paralyse any manifestation of the policy of aggression in any part of the world—this is the task accepted and in practice achieved by our country along with the other peace-loving states.

This also holds true of Soviet policy in the Middle East, where the consequences of imperialist aggression have not yet been eliminated.

Israel's troops continue to occupy the captured Arab territories. Its armed provocations continue ceaselessly against the neighbouring states. The Suez Canal has been out of service for more than a year now, which does great harm to the interests of international shipping. Tension in the Middle East does not subside.

Who is responsible for this situation, with all its attendant dangers? There can be no two views on this score.

The Arab states have accepted the United Nations Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967, as the basis for a solution of the Middle East crisis, and have declared their agreement to implement it.

They have so informed Dr. Gunnar Jarring, the special envoy of the U.N. Secretary-General who is charged with the task of helping the two sides to implement the Security Council's resolution.

Israel, on the contrary, refuses to carry out this decision, and enjoys U.S. backing in this.

¹ *Survival*, Vol. X, No. 9 (1968), pp. 297-298.

² *Soviet News* (London) 2/7/1968, p. 6.

The Soviet Union is working for a relaxation of tension and the establishment of lasting peace in the Middle East, an area which directly adjoins the southern frontiers of our country.

We are taking every measure we can to do away with the consequences of the Israeli aggression, taking into account in the process the need to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state of this area, whether an Arab state or Israel.

Israel must implement the resolution of the Security Council and withdraw its troops from all the occupied Arab territories. If this is not done, the Israeli government will, sooner or later, have to answer for this policy.

A short while ago the government of the United Arab Republic put forward the proposal for a staged plan to be drawn up for co-ordinating the steps of the two sides to normalise the situation in the Middle East.

This is an important initiative, and the Soviet government is ready to help in putting such a plan to restore peace in the Middle East into effect.

I should like to express the hope that the governments of all countries will realise the need to settle the situation in the Middle East as soon as possible, because it is fraught with a grave danger for peace.

It is not only the countries of that area which will benefit by the normalisation of the situation there; the world as a whole will stand to gain from this.

We urge the governments of all countries to approach this important and acute problem in a reasonable way, and this requires, first and foremost, a solution of the main question—the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the occupied Arab territories.

120

Joint Communiqué on the Libyan Prime Minister El-Bakkush's Visit to Spain.¹
[Excerpts]

Madrid, June 28, 1968

Joint Spanish-Libyan Communiqué.

The Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Libya, H.E. Abdul Hamid el-Bakkush paid an official visit to Spain from 26 to 28 of this month, at the invitation of the Spanish Government.

The Libyan Prime Minister gave detailed information on the serious situation in the Near East. Both sides recalled the terms of the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967 and expressed their agreement on the necessity of an immediate withdrawal from the territories occupied since June 1967.

121

Joint Communiqué on the Iraqi Prime Minister Yahya's Official Visit to Iran, 24-29 June.² [Excerpt]

Teheran, June 29, 1968

The two Prime Ministers studied the Middle East situation and especially discussed the Palestine issue which is of interest to all Islamic countries, and demanded the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the occupied territories and the return of Jerusalem to its previous status according to the U.N. resolutions.³ The Prime Ministers declared their support for the people of Palestine in their efforts to regain their legitimate demands in accordance with the U.N. resolutions...⁴

¹ *Revista de Política Internacional*, No. 98, July-August 1968.

² *Echo of Iran* (Teheran), 1/7/1968.

³ U.N. docs. A/RES/2253-2254 (ES-V) of 4 and 14 July 1967, respectively, texts in *International Documents on Palestine, 1967*, pp. 256, 260.

⁴ See footnotes to doc. 259, *post*.

122

Statement by the Turkish Ambassador to Jordan on the Occasion of the Signing of the Turkish-Jordanian Transport and Transit Agreement.¹ [Excerpt]

Amman, June 30, 1968

Your Excellency;

The armed clash that took place in the Middle East last year greatly increased the instability of the Middle East area, and all the countries of the area are concerned that peace should be established there.

As we have made clear on numerous occasions, we are against the use of force in international relations and in the realisation of political advantages and territorial gains. The aim of the Turkish government is to strengthen its links with the countries of the Arab world, especially in view of the critical situation through which the area is passing.

It is of the greatest importance to find a just and final solution for the Middle East problem by peaceful means, and this is the task, first and foremost, of the countries of this area and of the United Nations.

We profoundly hope that the efforts that are being made to this end will produce acceptable results, and we are confident that, under the wise leadership of His Majesty King Hussein, the courageous Jordanian people will be able to surmount their difficulties and recover their legitimate rights.

123

Soviet Memorandum on Disarmament.² [Excerpts]

Moscow, July 1, 1968

The interests of safeguarding peace call for

further steps aimed at restricting the arms race and at disarmament. This is all the more important since the intensification of the activities of the aggressive forces has resulted in a worsening of international relations, while the United States' war of aggression is expanding in Vietnam, and Israel is continuing to occupy territories forcibly seized from a number of Arab states.

Following the conclusion of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the Soviet government proposed that an understanding be reached on the implementation, in the near future, of the following urgent measures for an end to the arms race and for disarmament:

7. Dismantling of foreign military bases.

Military bases on foreign territories create a serious threat to peace. Such bases serve as a source of the outbreak of military conflicts and threaten the freedom and independence of the peoples. This is convincingly borne out by the United States' continuing war of aggression in Vietnam and by the tension and conflicts in other parts of the world where foreign bases are situated.

The Soviet government proposes that, in accordance with instructions of the 21st session of the United Nations General Assembly, the 18-nation Disarmament Committee should urgently examine the question of dismantling foreign military bases.

8. Measures for regional disarmament.

The Soviet government supports the establishment of nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world. In so doing, it proceeds on the basis of the assumption that the formation of such zones would effectively limit the sphere of deployment of nuclear weapons and fully accord with the task of preventing the direct or indirect proliferation of such weapons.

The Soviet government believes that not only groups of states, embracing whole continents or major geographical regions, but also more limited groups of states, or even individual countries, may assume commitments for the establishment of nuclear-free zones.

The Soviet government also supports proposals concerning the implementation of measures for regional disarmament and for the reduction of

¹ *Al-Dustur* (Amman), 1/7/1968.

² *Soviet News* (London), 2/7/1968, pp. 294-296.

armaments in various regions of the world, including the Middle East.

Of course, the question of such measures for slowing down the arms race in the Middle East could be considered only in conditions in which the consequences of the Israeli aggression against the Arab countries were eliminated and, above all, the Israeli forces were completely evacuated from the territories of Arab countries occupied by them.

124

Speech by the Soviet Communist Party Leader Brezhnev at a Kremlin Rally in Honour of the Hungarian Communist Party Leader Kadar.¹ [Excerpt]

Moscow, July 3, 1968

The tension in the Near East also continues. The responsibility for this lies with the Israeli extremists, who enjoy the support of imperialists in the U.S.A. and other capitalist countries. Tel Aviv simply refuses to realize that an adventurist course, provocations against the national-liberation movement and the annexation of Arab lands constitute a dangerous policy that might result in serious new complications and turn against Israel itself.

Our Arab friends may be sure that we shall continue to give them all necessary aid and support. Truth is on the side of the Arab peoples, and the just cause will triumph.

125

Statement by the East German State Council Chairman Ulbricht on the Middle East.² [Excerpt]

Berlin, July 4, 1968

The Governments of the Federal Republic and Israel are the main allies of the U.S. Government in Europe and the Middle East. They fulfil the role of aggressive outposts for implementing the objectives of the U.S. global strategy. Their alliance is founded on their common opposition to social progress of the peoples, on their expansionist endeavours against their neighbouring states, their desire for a revision of the frontiers and the annexation of foreign territories and their efforts to obtain control over nuclear weapons.

The G.D.R. has on various occasions unambiguously set forth its viewpoint that the question of Palestine should be settled on the basis of the U.N. resolutions.

In view of Israel's continued aggression, the occupation by Israeli troops of important areas of the United Arab Republic, the Syrian Arab Republic and Jordan, and the preparations made by the Israeli government to annex these territories, the U.N. Security Council resolution of November 22nd 1967 is at present of particularly topical interest. I hold that it can serve as a basis for a political settlement of the conflict.

The main question in this connection remains the withdrawal of the Israeli troops of aggression from the occupied Arab territories. The destructive attitude of Israel on the Security Council resolution of November 22nd 1967 has helped to unmask the true intentions of the aggressor and its imperialist backers and to force them on the defensive. The events of the recent months have shown that the aggressive policy has increasingly put the ruling circles of Israel into foreign-political isolation.

That is a first important result of the anti-imperialist struggle against Israel's imperialist aggression, which is led by the Arab peoples

¹ *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 24/7/1968, p. 6. From *Pravda*.

² G.D.R. *Foreign Affairs Bulletin*, 25/7/1968, p. 173. The statement was made in the course of an interview with the editor of the Cairo daily *Al-Jumhuriyah* and published on July 4, 1968.

and in which they are supported by the socialist states and all peace-loving people of the world.

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126

Speech by the Soviet Communist Party Leader Brezhnev at a Luncheon in Honour of the U.A.R. President Nasser.¹ [Excerpt]

Moscow, July 5, 1968

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In face of the aggressive intrigues of the enemies of peace and progress, the Soviet Union has always rendered, and is continuing to render, all-round assistance and support to the United Arab Republic and other Arab states.

This policy will be steadfastly implemented for the sake of the triumph of the cause of peace and justice in the Middle East.

There must not be the slightest doubt about this. The Soviet Union will always side with the Arab nations in the struggle for the removal of the consequences of aggression and the withdrawal of Israeli troops without delay from all the Arab lands occupied as a result of the June aggression.

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127

Joint Communiqué on the Pakistani Foreign Minister Husain's Visit to Turkey.² [Excerpts]

Ankara, July 7, 1968

At the invitation of His Excellency Mr. Ihsan Sabri Caglayangil, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, His Excellency Mr. M. Arshad Husain, Foreign Minister of Pakistan, paid an official visit to Turkey from July 2 to 7, 1968.

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¹ *Soviet News* (London), 9/7/1968, p. 18.

Pakistan Documents Series, No. 7, August 1968.

With regard to the Middle East, the two Ministers reiterated their opposition to the use of force as a means of securing territorial gains and political advantages in international relations and expressed the hope that the present efforts designed to bring about a solution in the region in conformity with the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967, will be successful. In this context, the two Ministers voiced again their Governments' conviction that any solution should safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of the Arab countries concerned.

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128

Joint Communiqué on the Tunisian President Bourghiba's Visit to Bulgaria.³ [Excerpts]

Sofia, July 8, 1968

At the invitation of the Minister of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, H.E. Theodor Zhivkov, and the Chairman of the High Committee of the National Assembly, H.E. Gorgiou Traikov, the President of Tunisia, H.E. Al-Habib Bourghiba paid an official visit to the People's Republic of Bulgaria from 3 to 9 July 1968.

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In the course of their discussion of the international situation, both sides gave expression to the misgivings they feel as a result of Israeli aggression in the Middle East and of the danger it constitutes to world peace. They expressed their condemnation of the Israeli aggression against the United Arab Republic, Jordan and Syria and of Israel's continued military provocations against these countries.

Both sides vigorously affirmed their support for the just demands for the evacuation of Israeli forces from the occupied territories and for the implementation of the 22 November 1967 Security Council resolution, which is based on the principle of the condemnation of the occupation of territories by force, and on the affirmation of the right

³ *Al-Amal* (Tunis), 10/7/1968.

of countries to independence and territorial integrity.

The two sides expressed the opinion that a solution must be found for the Palestine Problem in conformity with United Nations resolutions so that a just and permanent peace may be established in the area.

129

Joint Communiqué on the U.A.R. President Nasser's Visit to the U.S.S.R.¹ [Excerpts]

Moscow, July 10, 1968

During the talks, which proceeded in a friendly and cordial atmosphere and in a spirit of complete mutual understanding, frank exchanges of opinions took place on a wide range of questions of the further development of comprehensive cooperation between the U.S.S.R. and the U.A.R., the situation in the Near East, ways of liquidating the consequences of the Israeli imperialist aggression and other international problems of mutual interest.

1.—Special attention during the talks was devoted to the situation in the Near East in view of the aggression of Israel against the Arab states.

The Soviet Union and the United Arab Republic believe that the aggression of Israel was another dangerous link in the overall chain of the policy of imperialism, which is trying to undermine the progress of the Arab states and to halt the liberation struggle of the Arab peoples...

Through its predatory policy the state of Israel, enjoying the support of the imperialist forces, first of all the U.S.A., hurls a challenge to the entire world. The Soviet Union and the United Arab Republic declare that the territorial claims advanced by the state of Israel are illegitimate and therefore must be decisively condemned and rejected by all peace-loving states...

The two sides once more declared the neces-

sity of settling the Near East problem on the basis of the Security Council resolution of Nov. 22, 1967. The U.A.R. government, displaying concern for the restoration of peace, has stated its readiness to fulfill this resolution in the near future and has taken important practical steps toward this goal. The Soviet government has given a proper appraisal to the initiative of the U.A.R. on this question and supports it.

The withdrawal of Israeli troops from Arab territory to the positions they held before June 5, 1967, and the fulfillment of the other stipulations of the resolution cited above are necessary conditions for the establishment of peace in the Near East...

The U.S.S.R. and the U.A.R. express their support for the efforts of Jarring, the special representative of the U.N. Secretary General in the Near East, and call on all interested parties to facilitate the success of his mission, the goal of which is to promote the fulfillment of the Nov. 22, 1967, Security Council resolution.

Gamal Abdel Nasser, the President of the U.A.R. and Chairman of the Arab Socialist Union, expressed profound gratitude to the C.P.S.U. Central Committee, the Soviet government and the Soviet people for the political support and extensive practical assistance the Soviet Union has given to the United Arab Republic for strengthening its economy and defensive capacity in the struggle against the aggressors and in liquidating the damage caused by the aggression. The U.A.R. government highly appreciates the foreign-policy steps the Soviet government has taken on the path of liquidating the consequences of the Israeli aggression, in defense of the legitimate rights and independence of the Arab peoples and for the purpose of ensuring peace and security in the Near East.

In the complicated situation that has been created in the Near East as a result of the Israeli aggression, the creation of a broad anti-imperialist front of Arab states and peoples in the struggle against the neocolonialists and their agents assumes special importance for liquidating the consequences of this aggression.

The Soviet side highly appreciates the efforts of the U.A.R. government and President Nasser personally in the struggle for unity of the Arab states...

¹ *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 31/7/1968, pp. 22-23. From *Pravda*.

The two sides agreed on further joint steps on questions relating to the situation in the Near East with the aim of restoring peace and security in this area.

130

Joint Communiqué on the Visit of a Cuban Communist Party Delegation to Algeria.¹
[Excerpts]

Algiers, July 10, 1968

On the occasion of the celebration of the sixth anniversary of Algerian independence, a Cuban delegation headed by Mr. Armando Hart Dávalos, member of the Political Bureau of the Cuban Communist Party, and Secretary of the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party, visited Algeria from 3 to 10 July 1968.

As regards the Middle East, both parties condemn in the strongest terms the Israeli aggression which is supported by imperialism, and salute the efforts of the Palestinian people in their determination to recover their freedom and honour.

131

Message of Greetings from the Chinese Committee for Afro-Asian Solidarity to the Palestinian National Council.²

Peking, July 10, 1968

On the occasion of the meeting of the Palestinian National Council, the Chinese Committee for Afro-Asian Solidarity extends warm greetings to the broad masses of the Palestinian people who are heroically fighting against U.S. imperialism and its lackey, the Israeli aggressors, and

wishes the Palestinian people continuous new victories in resisting the U.S.-Israeli aggressors and the meeting of success in its objective of strengthening armed struggle and unity against imperialism.

Guided by Mao Tse-tung's thought, the 700 million Chinese people have consistently given the Palestinian people and the people of other Arab countries firm support in their just struggle against U.S.-Israeli aggression and resolutely supported the Palestinian people's just struggle for returning to their homeland. After a period of arduous quest the heroic Palestinian people have found armed struggle to be the main form of struggle for liberation. This is a most valuable experience. Without armed struggle, the people will have no standing at all, and the struggle against imperialism cannot triumph. At present, U.S. imperialism and its accomplices are carrying out a series of plots in a vain attempt to sabotage the just struggle of the Palestinian people and other Arab people. But their plots will surely meet with ignominious failure.

The Chinese people's great leader Chairman Mao Tse-tung has pointed out: "The world is progressing, the future is bright and no one can change this general trend of history." We firmly believe that so long as the Palestinian people and other Arab people hold high the banner of armed struggle, persevere in making progress, strengthen unity and dare to fight and fear no difficulty, they will certainly win final victory in the struggle against U.S. imperialism and its tool for aggression, Israel.

132

Radio Interview With the Israeli Air Force Commander Hod on the State of Israel's Air Force.³ [Excerpt]

Jerusalem, July 10, 1968

Q. What changes have taken place in the Israeli Air Force since the end of the six-day war?

A. If there are any changes, they are for the

¹ Algerian *Ahdath Wa Watha'iq*, 25/7/1968, pp. 22-23.

² *Peking Review*, 19/7/1968, p. 6.

³ *Israel* home service in Hebrew 18.10 GMT 10/7/1968. B.B.C., ME/2819/A/2-3.

better. What I mean is that the changes are relative and not absolute. In other words, the change is not in size or absolute quantity, but in comparative strength and relative ability between us and the Arab world. This gap is the most important factor in the relation of our forces to their forces. We are concentrating our efforts on this point at present and will do so in the near future.

Q. The main strength of the Air Force as we know it has so far been in fighter and fighter-bomber aircraft. Will this also be the case in the future, in your opinion, or are we entering a new epoch in air combat?

A. Air Force combat equipment is actually determined by a number of criteria. One thing is clear: the field of combat is not changing, the enemy is undergoing little change, and if he changes, then the change will be in his equipment and not in his manner. The aims have also not changed: they remain more or less the same, both in their extent and nature. Therefore, according to my prediction the Israeli Air Force will in the future also [word indistinct] the type of equipment which will be suitable for its tasks. Up to now this has been fighter-bomber equipment. I assume that in the future it will still be fighter-bomber aircraft, although their performance will be much higher than those in our hands today, and as a result the aircraft will have additional (?capabilities) which will enable us to use them for other purposes.

Q. So you assume that the enemy's air forces will not change? Do you think that in five or ten years you will meet the same type of pilots as you met in the six-day war—I mean the enemy pilots—or do you think that their capabilities will be greater?

A. Of course we will not meet the same pilots. Future Egyptian, Syrian, Jordanian and Iraqi pilots will be absolutely better than the pilots met during the six-day war. But we shall meet the same relative difference as regards the Israeli Air Force. In other words, we shall keep the same gap of quality between Israeli Air Force pilots and Arab air forces pilots. This is the most important matter.

Q. Do you share the concern regarding the French embargo?

A. Regarding the Mirage M-5 aircraft, obviously it is very unfortunate that the aircraft

are still not in our hands and are embargoed in France. I still believe that this will pass.

Q. Do you think that the Hawk missiles which we are now receiving will replace the Phantom aircraft which we want?

A. I hope, or I am confident, that this will not be the case. Negotiations regarding the Hawk missiles deal were held for some considerable time. These missiles are part of the equipment needed by the Israeli Defence Forces for defence purposes. Acquisition of these missiles is part of a long-term Air Force plan and has no connection with—I mean it will not ease the pressure for or weaken—the fairness of—our request for the supply of the Phantom aircraft, because they are two different types of equipment covering two completely different fields.

Q. Has the Israeli Air Force a counter-weapon for medium-or long-range missiles, which according to rumours have already been supplied to Egypt or will be supplied to it in the future?

A. The best answer is that we have the possibility to reach and destroy such missiles before they can cause great damage, if anyone (?dares) use them. I think that at this stage Egypt does not yet have ground-to-ground missiles. They have ground-to-air missiles for defence purposes. But the moment Egypt acquires ground-to-ground missiles, then we will definitely have adequate means to tackle them—as we have the means to tackle the other combat equipment in Egyptian hands.

Q. Have the defence operations procedures of the Israeli Air Force changed since the six-day war?

A. They have definitely changed—for the better. Our defence area, since the six-day war, runs from the Suez Canal up to Mount Hermon and from the Jordan river as far west as we want or need. This has great significance, even in the everyday life of the Air Force. It is much more comfortable and much easier for us now to carry out routine operations, which were very limited within the former borders. What is most important, since the six-day war, the Air Force has enjoyed the tremendous advantages which the occupied areas provide.

Q. Will you be concerned if the Egyptians receive the MG-23 aircraft?

A. No. I am concerned neither by the MG-23 nor by the Egyptians. We shall manage the MG-23 as we managed the MG-21.

133

Statement by the U.S. Presidential Candidate Hubert Humphrey Outlining His Position on the Middle East.¹

Washington, July 11, 1968

My position on Israel and the Middle East is clear. Ever since the creation of the State of Israel, which I enthusiastically supported—both on moral and political grounds—I have felt that a stable peace in the Middle East is a *must*.

There are six necessary elements for a permanent peace in the Middle East:

1. The existence of the State of Israel must be accepted by all its neighbors;

2. The fragile, often-violated truce lines must be transformed into agreed and secure boundaries;

3. The State of Israel must have free navigational rights in all international waters, including the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba;

4. The arms race, which breeds insecurity as it feeds on hostility, must be finally terminated;

5. The international community must assist the countries immediately concerned in solving the human tragedy posed by the Arab refugees;

6. The resources of the Middle East countries must be used primarily for human and economic development rather than war and destruction.

These views have been fortified by the experience of the June 1967 war.

I favor active United States diplomatic efforts to convince Israel's neighbors—many of whom have been friends of this country for many years—to pursue now a general settlement. It is in the interest of all the peoples of the Middle East to engage actively in negotiating an agreement among the nations in that region.

The cause of peace will not be served by the pursuit of military preponderance by Arab States through arms deliveries from the Soviet Union.

¹ *Near East Report* (Washington), 23/7/1968, p. 58.

Until permanent peace is achieved and the arms race ended, I believe continued U.S. military assistance, including jet planes, to Israel is justified and desirable. *I favor it*. But the real answer lies in agreed disarmament.

The United States and other developed nations should actively support national and regional economic modernization programs, especially irrigation development and desalinization.

My views are motivated by a sense of justice and concern for all the inhabitants of a region that through the centuries has contributed so much to our own spiritual and philosophical development.

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Comments of the U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defence Nitze on the Soviet Memorandum on Disarmament.² [Excerpts]

Washington, July 11, 1968

The memorandum on disarmament issued by the Soviet Union on July 1, 1968 is being studied with interest by the Department of Defense. Our initial reaction is that, of the nine disarmament items listed in the paper, only two reflect any significant change from previous Soviet positions. We are, of course, encouraged by these two changes, one of which concerns the discussion of limitations of strategic delivery vehicles and the other concerns measures to limit arms in the Near East.

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The memorandum states that the Soviet Government supports the creation of nuclear free zones in various areas of the world. I welcome this statement: I would welcome even more Soviet signature to Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco³ as evidence of their support. The United

² U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Non-Proliferation Treaty, Hearings*, 90th Cong., 2nd sess., July 10, 11, 12 and 17, 1968, pp. 76-77. For the Soviet Memorandum, see *ante*, doc. 123.

³ The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America signed at Tlatelolco, Mexico, in February 1967. [Ed.]

States has signed this Protocol, but the Soviet Union has not yet signed. This eighth item of the Soviet memorandum also states that the Soviet Government supports proposals for the implementation of measures for regional disarmament and the decrease of armaments in the various regions of the world, including the Near East. I would point out that President Johnson made a concrete proposal to the members of the United Nations in June of 1967 for the registration of all arms shipments to the Near East and for other measures to limit the flow of such arms. The United States has acted with the utmost restraint in the supply of armaments to all areas, but most particularly to the Near East, whereas the Soviet Union has shipped vast quantities of arms to this area in the past year.

The United States would welcome any serious Soviet proposal for a limitation of arms in the Middle East. The present Soviet memorandum requires complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from the territories of the Arab countries as a precondition for consideration of this subject. The question of withdrawal cannot be separated from the vast number of other very complex issues.

135

Joint Communiqué on the U.A.R. President Nasser's Visit to Yugoslavia, 10-12 July.¹ [Excerpts]

Brioni, July 12, 1968

Presidents Nasser and Tito had talks in Brioni on international problems, bilateral relations and cooperation between Yugoslavia and the United Arab Republic.

The two Presidents expressed special concern for international problems, with emphasis on the situation in the Middle East which has arisen from the Israeli aggression against the Arab countries.

Israel's refusal to implement the Security

Council resolution and to withdraw her forces from the occupied territories is an unequivocal violation both of peace and of the Charter and resolutions of the United Nations. This attitude not only obstructs a peaceful settlement but also increases tension.

The Yugoslav President affirmed that Yugoslavia would, along with the peace-loving socialist and progressive countries, continue to support the Arab countries which were the victims of Israeli aggression, and all efforts to ensure that the Arab peoples recovered their legitimate rights.

136

News Conference Remark by the Soviet Premier Kosygin on the Middle East During His Visit to Sweden.² [Excerpt]

Stockholm, July 13, 1968

The Soviet Union continues to maintain its stand, which means supporting the Arab countries which are victims of aggression, and striving for an end to the aggression. We want a political solution to be found to the problems of the Middle East.

The withdrawal of Israeli troops from the occupied Arab territories must be the main condition for talks.

For our part, we shall do all we can to ensure that the Security Council's decisions on the ending of the conflict in that area are carried out. We shall do all we can to continue helping the United Arab Republic and other Arab states that are struggling against Israeli aggression.

This stand is understood and supported by all the peace-loving forces.

It is time to demand that Israel should carry out the Security Council's decisions in full and without delay. The longer Israel and those who support her keep from fulfilling the Security Council's decisions, the greater will be the responsibility which will rest with them and the

¹ *Al-Ahram* (Cairo), 13/7/1968.

² *Soviet News* (London), 16/7/1968, p. 36.

more difficult will be the problems they will face in the future.

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Joint Communiqué on the Soviet Premier Kosygin's Official Visit to Sweden, 11-14 July.¹ [Excerpt]

Stockholm, July 13, 1968

The two Governments noted that the situation in the Middle East was still strained and a danger to peace. They emphasised that the precondition for the maintenance and strengthening of peace in this area was that the parties concerned should observe the resolution of the Security Council of 22nd November 1967. That resolution envisages the withdrawal of Israeli forces from territories occupied during the recent conflict and the safeguarding of peace and security for all states in the Middle East on the basis of respect for the sovereignty, the territorial integrity and the political independence of every state in this area. The two Governments, for their part, will continue in the future, too, to assist the special representative of the U.N. Secretary-General, Mr. G. Jarring, in his mission.

138

Joint Communiqué on the Tunisian President Bourghiba's Visit to Rumania.² [Excerpts]

Bucharest, July 15, 1968

At the invitation of the President of the Socialist Republic of Rumania, H.E. Nicolai Ceaucescu, the President of Tunisia, H.E. Al-Habib Bourghiba, paid an official visit to Rumania

from 9 to 15 July, 1968.

As regards the situation in the Middle East. The two Presidents affirmed the necessity for the urgent implementation by both sides concerned of the provisions of the 22 November 1967 Security Council resolution.

139

Statement to the Press by the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Ball During His Visit to Israel.³ [Excerpts]

Jerusalem, July 16, 1968

I feel very gratified by the two days I spent here in the sense that I have been exposed to a great many ideas, a great deal of information. We have had discussions which have been on a basis of great candor and straightforwardness. I feel therefore that I am better informed by far about problems which surround any settlement of this very troublesome issue.

I want to make it quite clear that we did not come here with any plans for a settlement, nor have we in the course of any of the conversations proposed any plan of ours. The U.S. continues to adhere to the position President Johnson took very early after the war in June 1967, that the parties to the conflict should be the parties to peace, that this must be settled by an agreement among the major parties in the dispute—between Israel on the one hand and the Arab States on the other. . .

I am going from here to Amman, where I expect to have conversations with King Hussein, then to Beirut and from there to Jedda, where I expect to see King Faisal. In the course of the very few days I am spending in the Middle East I am trying to gain as complete and objective an understanding of this complicated situation as is possible. I must say I think we learned a great deal in these two days.

¹ *Documents on Swedish Foreign Policy, 1968*, p. 279.

² *Al-Amal* (Tunis), 16/7/1968.

³ *The Israel Digest*, 26/7/1968, p. 5.

140

Joint Communiqué on the Indian President Husain's State Visit to the U.S.S.R., 8-18 July.¹ [Excerpt]**Moscow, July 18, 1968**

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The two sides discussed the situation in West Asia and emphasised the urgent necessity for the full implementation of the Security Council resolution of the 22nd November 1967 and the early withdrawal of Israeli forces to the lines which they occupied prior to June 5, 1967. They consider that the proposals made by the U.A.R. to draw up an agreed plan for the step by step implementation of the Security Council resolution would constitute a good basis for the establishment of durable peace and security in the region.

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141

Joint Communiqué on the Visit of a Cuban Communist Party Delegation to Syria, 12-18 July.² [Excerpt]**Damascus, July 18, 1968**

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The two sides regard the continued Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory as deriving from the schemes of imperialism, and believe that Israel constitutes a base for the implementation of the policy of aggression against the Arab people which aims at occupying their territories, and destroying the Arab revolution. They also believe that Israel is the instrument of the imperialist monopolies in the African continent. The two sides affirm that the liberation movement of the Palestinian Arab people is an inseparable part of the national liberation movement in all parts of the world.

The two sides express their support for the legitimate armed struggle in which the Palestinian Arab people is engaged, regarding it as the

only way of recovering their national rights in their occupied homeland.

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142

Message from the East German Chairman of the Council of State Ulbricht to the U.A.R. President Nasser on the Anniversary of the 1952 Egyptian Revolution.³ [Excerpt]**Berlin, July 23, 1968**

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The Council of State, the Government and the people of the German Democratic Republic again corroborate their determination to do their utmost to give continued support to the people of the United Arab Republic in their just struggle for the political solution of the Middle East conflict on the basis of the U.N. Resolution of November 22nd 1967, for the restoration of their sovereign rights and the speedy overcoming of the aftermath of the aggression. They condemn most resolutely Israel's imperialist policy of aggression and annexation which it is practising with the active support of the U.S.A., Great Britain and West Germany against the United Arab Republic and other Arab states.

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Joint Communiqué on the Pakistani Foreign Minister Husain's Visit to Iran.⁴ [Excerpts]**Islamabad, July 27, 1968**

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At the invitation of His Excellency Mr. Ardeshir Zahedi, the Foreign Minister of Iran, His Excellency Mr. M. Arshad Husain, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, paid an official visit to Iran from July 22 to 26, 1968.

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¹ *India News*, 12/7/1968.² *Al-Ba'th* (Damascus), 19/7/1968.³ G.D.R. *Foreign Affairs Bulletin*, 5/8/1968, pp. 181-182.⁴ *Pakistan Documents Series*, No. 8, August 1968.

Reviewing the Middle East situation the two Ministers expressed an identity of view on the ways and means of resolving the crisis. They felt that the resolution of Nov. 22, 1967, adopted by the Security Council provided a sound basis for settlement. They expressed their deep concern at the continuation of the crisis and reiterated their opposition to the occupation of territory by the use of force. The withdrawal of Israeli forces from occupied Arab territories and the Holy City of Jerusalem in accordance with the United Nations resolutions was considered as an essential step to be initiated.

144

Interview With the West German Ambassador to Israel Pauls at the End of His mission.¹ [Excerpts]

Tel Aviv, July 1968

Q. May I ask Your Excellency to tell us how do you consider your mission, as the first German Ambassador to Israel, was fulfilled?

A. Diplomacy is a work of continuation and in so far a mission never is fulfilled. The particular aspect of German-Israeli relations, of course is of a character that a mission of three years cannot fulfill very much. But I think we have achieved to find the right approach for the buildup of our relations, and I believe that now we should continue the way we have started our cooperation in the past few years.

Q. May I ask Your Excellency how you consider the possibility of further developing not only cultural and human relations between the two countries, but practical ones as well?

A. Well, in the political field, I think one of the main points is the continuation of our efforts to get Israel into better contact with the E.E.C.

This is as well an economic and a political approach, and I do hope that after a certain period of time and after some internal problems of the Community have been cleared, we shall be able to find a way in so far. The first is a preference agreement, and then, even more has to be achieved in the years to come. The problem of better access of Israel to the E.E.C. cannot be regarded as an isolated problem, in a way it is part of a Mediterranean settlement with the E.E.C. And it certainly is not a bilateral problem, because we are only one of the six E.E.C. members. But I am sure that we are going to continue our efforts to be helpful. . . .

Q. Would Your Excellency consider that Germany's trade relations with Israel could develop even more than they are now?

A. That depends very much on the regulations with the Common Market, because, as you know, the 1st of July will be the beginning of the abolition of all internal tariffs inside the E.E.C. and of the common tariffs to the outside countries. So, there is not much room left anymore, if at all, for bilateral trade regulations between one of the member States and a third country, but it has to be done with the Community as a whole. But there is the wide field of increasing the exports from Israel to Germany. First, I see certain possibilities as far as agricultural exports are concerned, citrus fruits—the development during the last few years was rather good—and then products of the agricultural industry of Israel, then textiles, and here I think that particularly the great department stores in Germany are very good customers. I hope that they are going to buy still more than in the last years. I am also thinking of Israeli exports of the chemical and electronic industries. But there is also the possibility of cooperation in the field of production. There I am thinking of the business contacts between Israeli and German firms, already existing, of the efforts of Walter Hesselbach. . . .

Q. . . . of the Bank für Gemeinwirtschaft? . . .

A. . . . Yes, and of the German study group now working here in Israel to find out whether there are opportunities to increase export and cooperation.

Q. This would be an exchange of knowhow and of investment of capital?

¹ The interview was granted to the English-language Tel Aviv monthly *The Mediterranean and Diplomatic Observer* and published in July 1968, pp. 1, 3-4.

A. Yes, both ways, I think.

Q. Is this something sponsored by the Governments as well or is it only private initiative?

A. Well, this is very much private initiative. But, of course, following our philosophy of international cooperation, we are in favour of all efforts to intensify this cooperation.

Q. Would there be some special improvement in cultural relations as well? Are there some plans in this connection?

A. Yes, there are plans and some progress has been achieved and more progress should be achieved in the next few months and in the years to come. We are working there very quietly, because we are well aware of the fact that this is a very neuralgic field of activity, and we do not want to rush, to hurry anything. What we want is to build up in a very constructive way, and our main interest is bringing together young Israelis and young Germans, the one way and the other—Israeli trips to Germany, information trips, scholarships etc., and vice-versa.

Q. Are you fully cooperating in this field with the Israeli authorities and groups?

A. Yes, very much so...

Q. Could you select for us some group here, in this field?

A. We have a very good cooperation in this field with the City of Tel Aviv, with the Union of Local Authorities, and some private groups, and we have, as far as these efforts are concerned, also contacts with Government authorities.

Q. Does Your Excellency feel that there is still another field which is more or less still virgin in the German-Israeli relations?

A. Happily enough there isn't anything virginal left anymore...

Q. May I ask Your Excellency, as a personal opinion, how do you see—after staying three years here, in the middle of the frightful events we lived through—the possibility of peace for this region? Is there one, in your personal opinion, or not, in the near future?

A. I think there is. It will take time and it is asking for negotiations...

Q. What about Dr. Jarring's mission. Do you, as a diplomat seeing another diplomat striving to do something, think there is any chance for success in his mission?

A. I think it is of great value to continue with this mission, and I have the impression that Dr. Jarring has worked with great patience and very wisely, and I hope that in continuing his constructive efforts, he is going to achieve results too.

Q. So, there are, in Your Excellency's views, possibilities that one day peace may come back to this our area?

A. Certainly!

Q. In this case, what would Germany conceive as her role here, the moment a normal way of life, with peace, is restored?

A. Well we have made clear our point that we do not regard ourselves as a Near Eastern power, that is a power with a particular political interest in the Near East. But it is our interest and the common European interest as well to see the the Near East consolidated and in peace. We are willing and prepared to contribute all we can towards this very goal.

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Interview With the Brazilian Ambassador to Cyprus and Israel De Meira Penna.¹ **[Excerpts]**

Tel Aviv, July 1968

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Q. ...How do you see the present position of Israel in the Middle East?

A. We have always studied with interest the situation in the Middle East, as members of the U.N. We have quite obviously a neutral position in this problem, as we have friendly relations with both Israel and the Arab countries. Besides a strong Jewish community, we have in Brazil as well an important Arab community—about

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

600,000 people mainly of Lebanese and Syrian origin. Our position in the U.N. since the June War, consistently was that peace has to be achieved, but we believe the problem is a global one. You cannot examine any special item separately. The whole problem of the Middle East has to be settled as a whole. Therefore, we have not supported certain attempts by other countries to solve one problem, like, for instance, the one of occupied territories, without finding a solution for the others. This has been our consistent policy, both in the General Assembly, and this year in the Security Council, of which Brazil is now a member. We consider that the problem of the Middle East should be solved as a whole. This is why we strongly supported the resolution of the Security Council of last November.

Q. Are you supporting the idea of Dr. Jarring's mission?

A. Yes, very much so. We put great hopes in the success of his mission.

Q. Is Your Excellency's Government kept informed about what Dr. Jarring is doing?

A. The secret of Dr. Jarring's success is his discretion. Therefore we do not expect him to publicize his efforts. We believe that the more these efforts are kept secret, the better chances he will have for success.

Q. How would you see peace coming in this part of the world?...

A. There is very little, of course, that Brazil can do, except offer its good offices within the framework of the United Nations. We have no direct involvement in the area. Precisely because we do not have any such direct involvement in the area, no particular interest of any kind, our intervention can, we think, sometimes, be impartial, without arising suspicions. But of course it is limited, it can be done within the framework of the U.N. We can only show our desire, together with other Latin American countries, for a peaceful settlement of these complicated issues, which of course can endanger world peace if they are not brought under control. We believe that if all big powers would contribute to that ideal, it will also help in the settlement of the situation in the area...

Joint Declaration by the Bratislava Conference of Warsaw Pact Governments.¹ [Excerpts]

Bratislava, August 3, 1968

The Conference of Representatives of the Communist and Workers' Parties of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Hungarian People's Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic took place in Bratislava on August 3, 1968.

We are also concerned over the fact that the situation in the Middle East continues tense as the result of the aggressive policy of Israel's ruling circles. Our parties will do everything in their power to eliminate the consequences of the Israeli aggression on the basis of the resolution of the United Nations Security Council of November 22nd, 1967, and for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the occupied Arab territories.

Text of the Middle East Plank in the U.S. Republican Party Platform for the 1968 Presidential Elections.² [Excerpt]

Miami Beach, August 4, 1968

In the tinderbox of the Middle East we will pursue a stable peace through recognition by all nations of each other's right to assured boundaries, freedom of navigation through international waters, and independent existence free from the threat of aggression. We will seek an end to the arms race through international agreement and the stationing of peace-keeping forces of the

¹ G.D.R. *Foreign Affairs Bulletin*, 15/8/1968, p. 188. This Conference was held to discuss developments in Czechoslovakia in the summer of 1968.

² *Near East Report* (Washington), 3/9/1968, p. 70.

United Nations in areas of severe tension, as we encourage peace-table talks among adversaries.

Nevertheless, the Soviets persist in building an imbalance of military forces in this region. The fact of a growing menace to Israel is undeniable. Her forces must be kept at a commensurate strength both for her protection and to help keep the peace of the area. The United States therefore will provide countervailing help to Israel, such as supersonic fighters, as necessary for these purposes. To replace the ancient rivalries of this region with new hope and opportunity, we vigorously support a well-conceived plan of regional development, including the bold nuclear desalinization and irrigation proposal of former President Eisenhower.

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Joint Communiqué on the Visit of a Soviet Communist Party Delegation to Syria.¹
[Excerpts]

Damascus, August 6, 1968

In fulfilment of their common desire for continued encounters and increased cooperation between the Ba'th Party and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and in response to the invitation of the Ba'th Party, a delegation of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, headed by Comrade G.I. Sizor, Chairman of the Party's Central Auditing Committee, visited the Syrian Arab Republic from 24 July to 4 August 1968.

The two Parties believe that the Zionist-imperialist aggression against the Arab countries and the American imperialist aggression against the people of Vietnam arise from an over-all imperialist plan, and that they constitute a danger to world peace and to the security of all peoples.

The two Parties believe that the aggression of 5 June [1967] against the Arab countries, the main object of which was to overthrow the progressive Arab regimes and to smash the Arab

¹ *Al-Thawra* (Damascus), 7/8/1968.

liberation movement, was carried out in accordance with the plans, and at the instigation of, first and foremost, the United States of America, and also of Federal Germany and Britain, which effected this aggression through their instrument for aggression in the Middle East, Israel.

The delegation of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union announced its condemnation of the Zionist-imperialist aggression and affirmed that it was essential that the aggressors should withdraw from occupied Arab territory. It also announced its resolute support for the Arab people in the Arab countries which have been the victims of aggression, in their legitimate struggle to liberate their territory from Zionist colonialist occupation and all forms of imperialist domination, by the use of all means available to them. The delegation of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union declared that the resistance movement in the occupied territory is a just and legitimate movement inasmuch as it expresses the natural and practical attitude of the Arab people to usurpation and aggression. The delegation of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union also declared its support for the just struggle of the people of Palestine to obtain their legitimate national rights.

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Statement by the Pakistani President Ayub Khan on Jerusalem.²

Amman, August 8, 1968

Q. Your Excellency knows that Israel has defied the Security Council resolution on Jerusalem which was recently proposed by Pakistan and Senegal.³ Israel has also refused to abide by the two resolutions on Jerusalem adopted by the General Assembly last year.⁴ What steps do you think Muslims should take to protect the Holy City against the Zionist peril?

² *Al-Dustur* (Amman), 8/8/1968. The statement was made in reply to a written question by the editor-in-chief of *Al-Dustur*.

³ *Post*, doc. 238.

⁴ U.N. docs. A/RES/2253-2254 (ES-V) of 4 and 14 July 1967, texts in *International Documents on Palestine, 1967*, pp. 256, 260.

A. In view of the special place occupied by the city of Jerusalem in the hearts of Pakistanis, the restoration of its previous status is a question of the profoundest concern to us. It is the duty of the United Nations to take appropriate measures to ensure that Israel abides by its resolutions. The real victim of the present tragedy is the United Nations Charter which Israel violates at will. If the international community permits any country to acquire territorial gains by force, this will create chaos in international relations which in turn will imperil the territorial security and independence of small countries. Pakistan will continue to concentrate its efforts on securing Israel's withdrawal from the Arab territories and from the city of Jerusalem in particular. As a member of the Security Council, Pakistan will play its role to the full in obtaining extensive international support for the Arab cause.

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News Conference Remark by the Yugoslav President Tito on the Middle East.¹ [Excerpt]

Prague, August 10, 1968

I have told Arab leaders that the existence of Israel must be accepted by them as a fact. Israel is a nation which has diplomatic relations with many countries, including some of the world powers. It is true to say that most of the nations of the world sympathise with Israel. This is because she is a small state and there was always the danger that she would be liquidated.

But today there is no such danger. Israel should take a more realistic attitude and withdraw her forces from occupied territory — to positions held before the Six Day War — in return for guarantees of the status quo, and accept the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967.

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Article on Zionism in the Soviet Defence Ministry Daily "Krasnaya Zvezda" (Red Star).²

Moscow, August 17, 1968

Contemporary Zionism cannot be regarded solely as Jewish nationalism. The Zionism of today, as is emphasized by the Israeli Communists, who defend the genuine interests of their people, is the ideology, a system of organizations and practices of the pro-imperialist Jewish bourgeoisie, the main substance of which is anticommunism. This is why the reactionary substance and danger of Zionism can be made clear only in terms of its close connection with the strategy and tactics of imperialism, first and foremost, American imperialism.

How then did Zionism's connection with American global strategy arise? How did it become an instrument of the "psychological warfare" being waged against the socialist countries?

At the end of the past century a mediocre Austrian journalist, Theodor Herzl, wrote a pamphlet, entitled "The Jewish State." It presented the idea of the unification of all Jews on the basis of race and religion and simultaneously launched the idea of the "inadvisability" of Jewish workers' participation in the revolutionary movements of the countries where they live "for the time being."

Such ideas pleased the reactionary governments of that time in Europe and America. With their support the World Zionist Organization (W.Z.O.) was proclaimed at a special congress held in Basel in 1897. It was named in honor of Mt. Zion near Jerusalem, where the main Judaic temple was located in ancient times. The Zionists made the creation of a national Jewish state in Palestine, i.e., on land inhabited by Arabs, their chief programmatic demand.

No, it was not concern for the interests of working Jews that guided the efforts of the W.Z.O. organizers. "Our return to Palestine," Herzl wrote, "corresponds to the vital interests of the powers that are looking for something in Asia."

¹ *Jerusalem Post*, 12/8/1968. The statement was given during an official visit to Czechoslovakia.

Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 4/9/1968, pp. 15-16. The article was written by P. Petlyakov and entitled "Zionism: Its Essence, Aims and Methods."

Thus, from the very beginning the W.Z.O. was regarded by its founders as a political business, an imperialist corporation for the purpose of carrying out dirty deals between the big Jewish bourgeoisie and the monopolies of the U.S.A., Great Britain, France and other powers at the expense of the peoples of the Near East.

As long as Britain held the key positions in that area, the Zionists oriented themselves toward British imperialism. However, after the second world war they chose a more powerful patron, the United States of America.

The state of Israel was created in May, 1948. It was created on the basis of a U.N. resolution that provided for the formation of two states in Palestine—an Arab state and a Jewish state. In supporting this resolution, the Soviet Union presumed that the leaders of Israel would try to establish good-neighbor relations with the surrounding Arab world. But this did not happen. As a result of the activities of ultrareactionary Zionist forces, the Israeli state immediately started seizing territory. The Palestinian war of 1948-1949, participation in the tripartite aggression against Egypt in 1956, and, finally, the treacherous attack on the U.A.R., Syria and Jordan in June, 1967—these are the steps in the “fall” of the Israeli lackeys of imperialism and in Israel’s becoming an imperialist outpost in the Near East.

Israel’s true nature as an imperialist, aggressive state becomes clearer with every passing day. Continuing occupation of captured territories, terror against the Arab population and the provocation of new military conflicts have dispelled the propagandist illusion of the Israeli state as a “peaceful sanctuary” for Jews, who have gathered at Mt. Zion supposedly to make the principles of the Old Treatment a reality.

Sometimes it is asked why such a small state as Israel can wage continuous wars with the Arab countries. Where does it get the forces and the means for these wars, which require colossal expenditures?

To answer that question, it is necessary to take a look at the activities of the World Zionist Organization. At present the W.Z.O. is a powerful international corporation with a unified program and a practically unlimited budget, because its participants and creditors are the

biggest, chiefly American, magnates in the capitalist world. The executive body of the W.Z.O. is the so-called Jewish Agency with branches in New York and Jerusalem.

The imperialist monopolies connected with the Zionist organizations finance Israel generously, especially for its armament. In the 20 years of its existence Israel has received more than \$ 3,500,000,000 from the United States in government “aid” and “contributions” by American Zionists.

The “strange alliance” that has developed between Tel Aviv and Bonn cannot be ignored. In 1952, West Germany agreed to pay Israel 3,450,000,000 marks in reparations. In this way the F.R.G. leaders tried to “pay off” the crimes of their predecessors, the Hitlerites. A secret agreement that gave Israel 320,000,000 marks’ worth of West German arms free of charge was concluded in 1962. Israel’s Zionist leaders accepted this deal, defiling the memory of the 6,000,000 Jews murdered by the fascists. Common imperialist interests proved to be uppermost, tying the Tel-Aviv extremists and the Bonn revanchists together with the same cord.

Thus, the Zionist organization is a reactionary political corporation of the big Jewish bourgeoisie that has merged with international imperialism and in which Israeli businessmen and rulers are junior partners. The W.Z.O. has in various countries up to 60 branches that occupy themselves with the broadest range of questions, from religion right up to espionage. The Zionists are active behind the scenes of international politics and are weaving a net of intrigues around the Arab countries and conducting subversive, anti-communist propaganda.

For example, when the June aggression was being prepared, the Zionist machinery worked at full capacity, influencing public opinion, seeing to military deals in the interests of Israel and collecting money and espionage data for it. The extremely rich banker Baron Rothschild issued a call in those days for every Jew to donate 10% of his profits to Israel. In just five months after the June war Israel was presented with more than \$ 500,000,000 from America and Western Europe. This was a “gift outright” from those who had already gained, or hoped to gain, much more in profits from the aggression.

The Zionists try persistently to make all Jews, irrespective of citizenship and class, accomplices in Israeli aggression and in the dirty actions of the big Jewish bourgeoisie and international imperialism aimed against peace and socialism. For this purpose they preach the false idea of "dual citizenship" for Jews: a "collateral" citizenship in the country of actual residence and another, "the main," citizenship in Israel. The Hitlerites at one time resorted to such tricks in order to form "fifth columns" in various countries.

The imperialist intelligence services and psychological warfare agencies spend hundreds of millions of dollars for subversion of the socialist countries and their fraternal militant commonwealth from within. They work together with Zionist organizations, which are especially persistent in recruiting supporters and like-minded people in the socialist countries. And in this respect the Zionist theory of "dual citizenship" coincides with the notorious "bridge-building" policy, which is an instrument of imperialism's ideological and political sabotage.

The concept of "two homelands" substantially facilitates the work of Israel's intelligence service, which in turn is connected with the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and the West German espionage service. The Organization of World Jewry for Progress, Science, Art and Security was especially set up in Israel to use persons of Jewish origin who live in socialist countries for the benefit of the "true homeland." This organization tries to make contacts primarily with "well-informed people"—eminent scientists, engineers, and public figures in the socialist countries for the purpose of obtaining information of a "ticklish" kind from them. The strength of Israel's intelligence service, the British Sunday Telegraph stated, is the result of its contacts with Zionists and their sympathizers all over the world.

Frequently, the "sympathy" for Israel is simply bought. In this connection it is appropriate to recall the activity of Joint [the Joint Distribution Committee], an international Jewish "philanthropic" organization, which in the guise of "aid" to Jewish schools, clubs and individuals has systematically financed the espionage and subversive work of American-Israeli agents in the socialist countries. For example, in 1966 Joint sent to Poland alone \$163,000 in banknotes and

\$242,000 dollars' worth of goods.

In the June, 1967, days the Babel Jewish youth club, using handouts from Joint funds, held celebrations of Israel's "brilliant victories." "It suddenly turned out," the Polish newspaper *Sztandar Młodych* stated, "that these young men and women regard as their homeland not Poland, which feeds them, but the state of Moshe Dayan, Ben Gurion and Eshkol."

This is what the "dual citizenship" theory means in practice! Western intelligence services found among people with Zionist sentiments the organizers of the antipopular demonstrations and excesses that took place in Poland in March, 1968.

The Polish working class gave the provocateurs a determined rebuff. At the demand of the working people, Party and state agencies and educational institutions were purged of Zionist elements and degenerates. Naturally, Western imperialist propaganda tried to picture the struggle against agents of Zionism in Poland as a manifestation of anti-Semitism. But this slander was refuted by the logic of facts. The Polish comrades showed convincingly that anti-Zionism is not anti-Semitism. They rightly emphasized that the danger of Zionism is primarily that a Polish citizen of Jewish origin who feels that he is a "son of Israel" wittingly or unwittingly serves imperialism.

Experienced personnel and agents of the Israeli intelligence service are active in the Zionist organizations in charge of resettling Jews from the socialist countries in capitalist countries. They elicit all political, economic and military information from the emigrants. "Emigrants who have gone through military service in the socialist countries are obliged to give information about the deployment of military units, their armaments, the officers, etc." *Zolnierz Wolnosci*, the Polish army newspaper, stated.

In the struggle against socialism, international Zionism endeavors to bring to life and heat up nationalist and religious prejudices. For this purpose they shamelessly preach the racial "exclusiveness" of the Jewish people and that they are "God's chosen people." The religious morality of Judaism sets believing Jews apart from other nations and justifies any crimes against "gentiles." It is no accident that in Israel, where Biblical

canons are strictly observed, racial discrimination and religious persecution have become a characteristic feature of internal life. It is noteworthy that not only Arabs are discriminated against, but also persons of Jewish nationality who come from Asian and African countries. Only immigrants from European countries, who have taken into their hands the levers of economic and political power, have a privileged status. Thus, national oppression in Israel is a direct consequence of class and social oppression.

As in any imperialist state, Israel has exploiters and exploited. The sympathies of Soviet people and of the peoples of the socialist countries are with the working people of Israel. There are healthy forces in Israel that are aware of the perniciousness of the extremist policy and participation in the conspiracies of international imperialism. The Communist Party of Israel, headed by Comrades Wilner and Tubi, firmly stands on positions of internationalism.

"Nationalism and chauvinism are alien to us Communists," Comrade Wilner said at a Moscow rally in honor of the 50th anniversary of the October Revolution. "We judge people not by their nationality but by whether they are progressive or reactionary, whether they want peace or war.*** Our approach is a class approach, and we reject chauvinistic evaluations.

"We Israeli Communists have learned and are learning from the Soviet Union, which is a living example of the brotherhood of peoples that has developed and grown strong in the 50 years since the October Revolution."

The ideological exposure of Zionism is of no small importance today to the international workers' movement and to all progressive anti-imperialist forces. Back in 1903 V.I. Lenin emphasized that "the Zionist idea is entirely false and reactionary in its essence." Marxism and Zionism are antipodes. The former defends socialism and proletarian internationalism; the latter puts itself at the service of double-dyed imperialist reaction and preaches "class peace" between Jewish working people and the big Jewish bourgeoisie. That is why, having become Israel's ideological and political banner, Zionism on many levels of its practical activity has joined with the intelligence services and sabotage organizations of the imperialist powers.

Nothing upsets international Zionism so much as close attention to it. Nothing evokes from it such a flood of accusations of "anti-Semitism" as the attempt to deprive Zionists of the privilege, bought long ago, of working behind the scenes and always remaining in the background. But sooner or later the covert becomes overt.

Soviet people are well aware of the perfidious methods of the Zionist imperialist agents. Year after year the New York and Tel Aviv centers of psychological warfare disseminate slander about the alleged persecution of Jews in the Soviet Union. There is no need to refute these fantasies. Suffice it to recall the kind of "reception" accorded Chief Rabbi of Moscow Leib Levin, who visited New York in June, 1968. Zionist bullies tried to break up his public speeches and even threatened him with death, solely because he spoke the truth about the status of Jews in the U.S.S.R. and said that, contrary to the assertions of bourgeois propaganda, there is no place in our country for "fascism and anti-Semitism."

Zionism and anti-Semitism are equally inimical to Soviet society, because they are the product of the class bourgeois system, which is alien to us. We condemn Israel's policy not because Jews live there, but because it is an aggressive imperialist state. We are combating Zionist ideology not because its advocates are Jews, but because this ideology is fundamentally inimical to the working masses, and to Marxism-Leninism, because in present conditions Zionism serves as a tool of American imperialism's global strategy and as an instrument of psychological warfare against the socialist countries.

Faithful to the principles of proletarian internationalism, Soviet people will continue even more persistently to strengthen the friendship of the peoples of the socialist commonwealth and to expose the intrigues of imperialist agents, in whatever guise they may appear.

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Text of the Middle East Plank in the U.S. Democratic Party Platform for the 1968 Presidential Elections.¹ [Excerpt]**Chicago, August 27, 1968**

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The Middle East remains a powder keg. We must do all in our power to prevent a recurrence of war in this area. A large Soviet fleet has been deployed to the Mediterranean. Preferring short-term political advantage to long-range stability and peace, the Soviet Union has rushed arms to certain Arab states to replace those lost in the Arab-Israeli war of 1967. As long as Israel is threatened by hostile and well-armed neighbors, we will assist her with essential military equipment needed for her defense, including the most advanced types of combat aircrafts.

Lasting peace in the Middle East depends upon agreed and secured frontiers, respect for the territorial integrity of all states, the guaranteed right of innocent passage through all international waterways, a humane resettlement of the Arab refugees and the establishment of a non-provocative military balance. To achieve these objectives, we support negotiations among the concerned parties. We strongly support efforts to achieve an agreement among states in the area and those states supplying arms to limit the flow of military equipment to the Middle East. We support efforts to raise the living standards throughout the area, including desalinization and regional irrigation projects which cut across state frontiers.

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Cable Message from the East German Foreign Minister Winzer to the Arab League Secretary-General Hassuna.²**Berlin, September 1, 1968**

The German Democratic Republic observes

with great attention the conference of the Council of the League of Arab States, dealing among others with the question of how to overcome the consequences of the imperialist Israeli aggression against Arab states.³

At the same time, the policy of the Israeli ruling quarters which recently have again made intensified attempts to stir up a panic of war in the Middle East gives rise to grave concern. In doing so, they enjoy now as before the undivided and active support of the Government of the West German Federal Republic.

In this connection I should like to call your attention to the announced visit to Israel of the West German Minister of the Interior Benda, an expert for the suppression of the democratic forces in the Federal Republic. The delegation headed by the West German Foreign Minister Brandt who aims at obstructing the non-proliferation treaty, includes also the member of the Foreign Policy Committee of the West German Bundestag, Dr. Kurt Birrenbach who conducted the negotiations on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Federal Republic and Israel. Here, the nuclear cooperation between the West German Federal Republic and Israel plays an important role. These facts make it clear again how closely the cause of peace and the security of the peoples of Europe and the Middle East are linked with each other.

I may give you and the representatives of the Arab states the renewed assurance that these machinations directed against peace are resolutely condemned in the G.D.R.

At the same time I should like to reassure you and in your person the participants in the Foreign Ministers' conference of the League of Arab States of the full solidarity of the G.D.R. in your anti-imperialist struggle for the rights of the Arab peoples and to wish the conference of the Council of the League of Arab States full success.

¹ *Near East Report* (Washington), 3/9/1968, p. 70.

² G.D.R. *Foreign Affairs Bulletin*, 13/9/1968, p. 211.

³ Held in Cairo on 1-3 September 1968.

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Address by Richard M. Nixon, Republican Candidate for the U.S. Presidency, Before a B'nai B'rith Convention.¹ [Excerpts]

Washington, September 8, 1968

Four fundamental facts of life are evident in the Middle East today.

First, the danger of war increases in direct ratio to the confidence of certain Arab leaders that they could win that war.

Second, the Soviet Union has the definite aggressive goal of extending its sphere of influence to include the Middle East.

Third, the United States has a firm and unwavering commitment to the national existence of Israel, repeated by four Presidents, and after Inauguration Day next year, it will be repeated by another President.

Fourth, the foundations for a permanent peace will be laid when hunger and disease and human misery have begun to disappear from the Arab world, and the breeding ground of bitterness and envy is removed.

America must look hard at those facts of life to determine how we can change the collision course of the Nations of the Middle East, and avert a confrontation of the major powers.

Since the six-day war the Soviet Union has systematically rebuilt the armed forces of the U.A.R. Their goal was not to restore a balance of power; their goal was to further Soviet ambitions.

To a disturbing extent, they have introduced new and more sophisticated weapons. Their Middle Eastern clients are growing more confident that they could win a war of revenge and drive Israel into the sea.

Therefore, the free world must act to maintain a balance of power to remove the confidence of would-be aggressors. Certainly a balance of power is a short-term solution; but when survival is at stake, short-term solutions are necessary.

Israel must possess sufficient military power

to deter an attack. As long as the threat of Arab attack remains direct and imminent "sufficient power" means the balance must be tipped in Israel's favor. An exact balance of power, which in any case is purely theoretical and not realistic, would run the risk that potential aggressors might miscalculate, and would offer them too much of a temptation.

For that reason—to provide Israel a valid self-defense—I support a policy that would give Israel a technological military margin to more than offset her hostile neighbors' numerical superiority. If maintaining that margin should require that the U.S. supply Israel with supersonic Phantom F.4 jets—we should supply those Phantom jets.

In the Middle East and the Mediterranean, along the southern flank of NATO, we have been witnessing the advancement of Russian imperialism. This is no Communist innovation but an age-old Russian geopolitical goal that the Soviet rulers inherited from the Czars.

Consider the pattern:

In June of 1966, the Warsaw pact nations bluntly declared the incorporation of the Middle East into the Communist sphere to be one of their aims.

During the next year, they provided the weapons and unleashed a propaganda campaign that inflamed tensions and led to the six-day war, which they consider only a temporary setback.

Since June of 1967, the Mediterranean complement of Soviet ships has more than quadrupled—from 11 to nearly 50 ships. And for the first time in 60 years, the Soviets have moved a fleet into the Persian Gulf, which extends into the heart of west Asia.

Since the take-over of Czechoslovakia, the Soviets have stepped up their anti-Semitic propaganda, concocting a "Zionist plot" in Prague to win support in the Middle East.

These are the clear-cut moves of a superpower seeking domination. Confronted with this diplomatic and military policy of expansionism on the part of the Soviets, the American response has been uncertain and ineffectual.

We can hardly ignore the fact that during the past five years of active Soviet penetration, the U.S. Government has at times seemed to hide its head in the sands of the Middle East; this Admin-

¹ *New York Times*, 9/10/1968. B'nai B'rith is a Jewish World Organisation established in 1843.

istration has failed to come to diplomatic grips with the scope and seriousness of the Soviet threat.

What must we do now? Short-range, we must counter the military build-up, as I have indicated. We must take the initiative for near-term settlements. Looking ahead, we must deal directly with the Soviets on the subject of the Middle East.

Without belligerence, we have to make it crystal clear that the stake of the free world in the Middle East is great; we must impress upon the Soviets the full extent of our determination, and then, and only then, will we cause them to re-examine their own policy to avoid a collision course.

Some of America's critics abroad say that support for Israel by American political leaders is purely an election-year exercise. They say it is a device to capture Jewish votes at home.

But these critics don't understand the American point of view.

America supports Israel because we believe in the self-determination of nations; America supports Israel because we oppose aggression in every form; American supports Israel because it is threatened by Soviet imperialism; and America supports Israel because its example offers long-range hope to the Middle East.

We can justify our firm support on the basis of principle but there is that human element involved as well.

All those reasons taken together add up to why we are not about to abandon Israel. America's word is good. It has cost us enough to prove that.

We recognize Israel's predicament; its enemies can afford to fight a war and lose, and come back to fight again; Israel cannot afford to lose once. America knows that. And America is determined that Israel is here in the family of nations to stay.

Some Arab leaders equate America's support of Israel as being "against" them. That is simply not true.

The United States should work with every nation of the Middle East willing to live in peace with its neighbors on a far-reaching development program.

The imaginative Eisenhower plan to bring

water—and thus food and employment—to the Middle East is one such proposal. This plan would provide atomic plants for the desalting of sea water—water so desperately needed to irrigate deserts. The first of these plants would produce as much fresh water as the entire Jordan River system does today, opening a new life to hundreds of thousands of Arab refugees. We must explore every avenue to turn the arms race into a race for development.

Right now, the United States must take the lead in forging an acceptable settlement in the Mideast.

Included in the terms of that settlement should be solid guarantees that the currently occupied territories will never again be used as bases of aggression or sanctuaries for terrorism. Access for the ships of all nations through the reopened Suez Canal and the Strait of Tiran should be guaranteed.

It is my view that for Israel to take formal and final possession of the occupied territories would be a grave mistake; at the same time, it is not realistic to expect Israel to surrender vital bargaining counters in the absence of a genuine peace and effective guarantees.

To find a just peace in an area of the world that has known only armed truces and three major and bitter wars in a generation is not an easy task. But the United States is not without diplomatic and economic resources, and its private and public men are not without cogent ideas to get directly at the underlying problems of refugees and water.

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**Address by the U.S. President Johnson
Before the 125th Anniversary Meeting of
B'nai B'rith.¹ [Excerpt]**

Washington, September 10, 1968

Now let me turn to the Middle East. That is an area of deep national interest to the American people—to all of our people—for the safety

¹ U.S. *Department of State Bulletin*, 7/10/1968, pp. 345-349.

and the future of small nations are not the concern of one group of citizens alone.

To you tonight, I assure you they concern all Americans.

Our society is illuminated by the spiritual insights of the Hebrew prophets. America and Israel have a common love of human freedom, and they have a common faith in a democratic way of life.

It is quite natural that American Jews should feel particularly involved with Israel's destiny. That small land in the eastern Mediterranean saw the birth of your faith and your people thousands and thousands of years ago. Down through the centuries, through dispersion and through very grievous trials, your forefathers clung to their Jewish identity and clung to their ties with the land of Israel.

As the prophet Isaiah foretold: "And He shall set up an ensign for the nations, and He shall assemble the outcasts of Israel and gather together the dispersed of Judah from all the four corners of the earth." History knows no more moving example of persistence against the cruelest odds.

But conflict has surrounded the modern State of Israel since its very beginning. It is now more than a year that has passed since the six-day war between Israel and its neighbors—a tragic and an unnecessary war which we tried in every way we could to prevent. That war was the third round of major hostilities in the Middle East since the United Nations established Israel just 21 years ago—the third round—and it just must be the last round.

From the day that war broke out, our policy—the policy of this Government—has been to work in every capital, to labor in the United Nations, to convert the armistice arrangements of 1949 into a stable and agreed regime of peace. The time has come for real peace in the area—a peace of justice and reconciliation, not a cease-fire, not a temporary truce, not a renewal of the fragile armistice. No day has passed since then without our taking active steps to try to achieve this end.

The atmosphere of fear and mutual suspicion has made communication between the two sides extremely difficult. In this setting the plans of reasonable men, both Arabs and Israelis, have

been frustrated. Despite the patient and perceptive efforts of Ambassador [Gunnar] Jarring, little real progress toward peace has been made.

I am convinced that a just and a dignified peace—a peace fair to the rightful interests of both sides—is possible. Without it, the people of the Middle East cannot shape their own destinies, because outsiders are going to exploit their rivalries, and their energies and abilities will be diverted to warfare instead of welfare. That just should not happen.

No nation that has been part of the tragic drama of these past 20 years is totally without blame. Violence and counterviolence have absorbed the energy of all the parties. The process of peacemaking cannot be further delayed without danger and without peril. The United Nations Security Council resolution of last November laid down the principles of a just and lasting peace.

But I would remind the world tonight that that resolution is not self-executing. It created a framework within which men of good will ought to be able to arrive at a reasonable settlement.

For its part, the United States of America has fully supported the efforts of the United Nations representative, Ambassador Jarring, and we shall continue to do so. But it is the parties themselves who must make the major effort to begin seriously this much needed peacemaking process.

One fact is sure: The process of peacemaking will not begin until the leaders of the Middle East begin exchanging views on the hard issues through some agreed procedure which could permit active discussions to be pursued. Otherwise, no progress toward peace will be made.

In recent weeks some progress in this direction, I think, has been achieved. So tonight I appeal and I urge the leaders of the Middle East to try to maintain and to accelerate their dialogue. I urge them to put their views out on the table, to begin talking the substance of peace.

Many channels are open. How the talking is done at the outset is not very important tonight. But we just must not lose whatever momentum exists for peace. And, in the end, those who must live together must, in the words of Isaiah, learn to reason together.

The position of the United States rests on the principles of peace that I outlined on June 19, 1967.¹ That statement remains the foundation of American policy.

First, it remains crucial that each nation's right to live be recognized. Arab governments must convince Israel and the world community that they have abandoned the idea of destroying Israel. But equally, Israel must persuade its Arab neighbors and the world community that Israel has no expansionist designs on their territory.

We are not here to judge whose fears are right or whose are wrong. Right or wrong, fear is the first obstacle to any peacemaking. Each side must do its share to overcome it. A major step in this direction would be for each party to issue promptly a clear, unqualified public assurance that it is now ready to commit itself to recognize the right of each of its neighbors to national life.

Second, the political independence and territorial integrity of all the states in the area must be assured.

We are not the ones to say where other nations should draw lines between them that will assure each the greatest security. It is clear, however, that a return to the situation of June 4, 1967, will not bring peace. There must be secure and there must be recognized borders.

Some such lines must be agreed to by the neighbors involved as part of the transition from armistice to peace.

At the same time, it should be equally clear that boundaries cannot and should not reflect the weight of conquest. Each change must have a reason which each side, in honest negotiation, can accept as a part of a just compromise.

Third, it is more certain than ever that Jerusalem is a critical issue of any peace settlement. No one wishes to see the Holy City again divided by barbed wire and by machine guns. I therefore tonight urge and appeal to the parties to stretch their imaginations so that their interests, and all the world's interest in Jerusalem, can be taken fully into account in any final settlement.

Fourth, the number of refugees is still increasing. The June war added some 200,000

refugees to those already displaced by the 1948 war. They face a bleak prospect as the winter approaches. We share a very deep concern for these refugees. Their plight is a symbol in the minds of the Arab peoples. In their eyes, it is a symbol of a wrong that must be made right before 20 years of war can end. And that fact must be dealt with in reaching a condition of peace.

All nations who are able, including Israel and her Arab neighbors, should participate directly and wholeheartedly in a massive program to assure these people a better and a more stable future.

Fifth, maritime rights must be respected. Their violation led to war in 1967. Respect for those rights is not only a legal consequence of peace. It is a symbolic recognition that all nations in the Middle East enjoy equal treatment before the law.

And no enduring peace settlement is possible until the Suez Canal and the Straits of Tiran are open to the ships of all nations and their right of passage is effectively guaranteed.

Sixth, the arms race continues. We have exercised restraint, while recognizing the legitimate needs of friendly governments. But we have no intention of allowing the balance of forces in the area to ever become an incentive for war.

We continue to hope that our restraint will be matched by the restraint of others, though I must observe that has been lacking since the end of the June war.

We have proposed, and I reiterate again tonight, the urgent need now for an international understanding on arms limitation for this region of the world.

The American interest in the Middle East is definite, is clear. There just must be a just peace in that region and soon. Time is not on the side of peace.

¹ See *International Documents on Palestine, 1967*, pp. 116-118.

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Joint Communiqué on the East German Premier Stoph's Visit to Mongolia, 10-13 September.¹ [Excerpt]

Ulan Bator, September 13, 1968

Both delegations stated that Israel's aggression against Arab countries, which was staged and supported by the circles that rule the United States and West Germany, constitutes a flagrant violation of the fundamental principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of international law. This aggression is part of the imperialists' global strategy which is targeted at heightening international tensions and suppressing the struggle of the peoples who champion national and social liberation, political and economic independence, and the elimination of colonialism and neo-colonialism.

The German Democratic Republic and the Mongolian People's Republic expressly endorse the demand that Israel immediately withdraw her troops from all occupied territories in accordance with the Resolution the U.N. Security Council passed on November 22nd 1967.

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Resolution Adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the O.A.U. on the Middle East.²

Algiers, September 16, 1968

The Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity, meeting in its Fifth Ordinary Session, in Algiers, Algeria, from 13 to 16 September 1968:

Having Heard the statement of the U.A.R. Minister for Foreign Affairs on the situation in the Middle East in general and the U.A.R. in particular,

¹ G.D.R. *Foreign Affairs Bulletin*, 3/10/1968, p. 229.

² OAU Secretariat, *Resolutions Adopted by the Fifth Assembly of Heads of State and Government*, AH6/Res. 53.

1. *Takes note* of the statement made by the U.A.R. Minister for Foreign Affairs;

2. *Reaffirms* in this respect its support for the U.A.R.;

3. *Calls for* the withdrawal of foreign troops from all Arab territories occupied since the 5th of June, 1967; in accordance with the Resolution taken by the Security Council on 22 November 1967, and appeals to all Member States of the OAU to use their influence to ensure a strict implementation of this Resolution.

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News Conference Remarks by the French Foreign Minister Debré on the Middle East.³ [Excerpts]

Paris, September 16, 1968

Q. (Tribune des Nations)—Mr. Minister, you laid particular emphasis on the search for peace, as being your country's principal objective. May we ask you what concrete suggestions France might make in this respect, in two major sectors you have not dealt with in detail to-day—Asia and the Near East?

A. I have not dealt with them, Mr. Ullmann, because they have been thoroughly dealt with on many occasions before, and there is no reason to change what has already been said.

As regards the Middle East, France has also clearly stated her position: we desire the implementation of the Security Council resolution.

In the one case as in the other—I mean in Vietnam as in the Middle East—what strikes me is that I do not clearly see what other possible solution can be contemplated. Just as in Vietnam the only solution that can really be envisaged is a negotiated political one, after the termination or halting of military operations, so, in the Middle East, it is hard to envisage any move towards peace and the mutual recognition by the peoples of each other's right to self-determination in that part of the world, without the implementation

³ *La Politique Etrangère de la France: Textes et Documents*, 2nd Sem., 1968, pp. 68-77.

of the Security Council resolution.

In either case—I mean in the case either of negotiations or of the Security Council being implemented—ways and means could be proposed, time schedules for implementation could be discussed, but here again I have yet to meet someone—and I am sure that person is not at this table—who can tell us what other solutions can be envisaged, if not a military build-up leading to escalation of the conflict.

From the moment there is a real intention to seek peace, it would seem that, apart from procedural details, the only course to follow is to abide by the rules that French policy has established for itself.

Q. (Middle East News Agency, Cairo)—Mr. Minister, when talking just now of the Middle East crisis, you suggested a solution. You spoke of the possibility of seeking a peaceful solution in the Middle East, but you did not speak of the possibility suggested last June of convening a meeting of the four great powers to settle the Middle East crisis. May we know the reason?

A. I believe that when a journalist once writes what he thinks, he does not need to rewrite that same article every month, and that so long as he does not say the opposite, what he has already written holds good. The same applies to governments.

General de Gaulle—and I think my predecessor, the present Prime Minister, too—both clearly indicated, a few months ago, that one of the aspects, perhaps one of the conditions of an acceptable settlement, might be that the four great powers—and we know which they are—should one day shoulder their responsibilities. Yes... But we are not there yet... Before these powers shoulder their responsibilities, the parties concerned must themselves make the first move in conformity with the principles of the Security Council resolution.

Interview Granted by the Israeli Defence Minister Dayan to the Israeli Daily "Ma'ariv"¹
[Excerpt]

Tel Aviv, September 22, 1968

Q. Who would you say that our real enemy is, the Palestinians or the Arab states?

A. In a given context the distinction between Palestinians and Arab states is a false one. Whoever wars against us, whether militarily or diplomatically, is our enemy. If the Palestinians take the field against us in the form of an army, then they're the enemy, just as the Egyptian who chooses not to fight me is not my enemy and can be lived with in peace.

Q. How would you apply what you've just said to the various Arab terrorist organizations?

A. They are fighting a diplomatic war by means of guerrilla methods. The terrorist from Hebron, for example, who joins such an organization is no more our "sworn enemy" at heart than the Arab from Hebron who refrains. But the converse is true too: those who aren't terrorists are perfectly capable of becoming such. It's just that for the time being they're not operating actively against us.

Q. When a terrorist organization, let's say, has its base in Amman, Jordan—are we at war only with it, or with the Government in Amman as well?

A. We're at war with the authorities in Amman too. When Amman allows a terrorist organization to operate against us from its territory, it's perfectly aware that this constitutes a violation of the ceasefire. Moreover, the real issue is not one of firing or ceasing to fire, but of establishing good, neighborly relations.

Q. When I asked you in the course of an interview in 1964 which of the following three positions you considered to be closest to your own—1) accepting the present (that is, the pre-1967) frontiers as final; 2) being ready to exploit any opportunity thrust upon us for ex-

¹ *Midstream* (New York), Vol. XIV, No. 10, December 1968, pp. 47-51. The interview was originally published in the Hebrew daily *Ma'ariv* (Tel Aviv) on September 22, 1968.

panding those frontiers; 3) actually taking the initiative to create such opportunities—in 1964 you answered: “The present frontiers are not where they are because Israel wanted them there, nor do they represent the fulfillment of any particular goal. They are the result of a war. If the Arabs make good their threats to start yet another war against Israel, it’s not inconceivable that such a war will produce new boundaries. If the Arabs win, it will mean the elimination of Israel. If Israel wins—she will be in a position to establish frontiers that are more satisfactory to her than the present ones.” Would you give the same answer today if I were to ask you about the present frontiers—that is, would you say that they do not represent the fulfillment of any goal but are simply the result of a war?

A. The present ceasefire lines are also the result of a war, but this time we had far more say in determining them than in 1948. As a result, naturally, they’re not only more spacious than the previous frontiers, but also more “border-like.”

Q. Do you consider the Jordan to be Israel’s natural geopolitical boundary?

A. Rather than speak in political terms, I would say of the entire cease-fire map that it’s much more “logical,” more “acceptable” (to us, of course), than the 1948 map. But I’ve already expressed my opinion elsewhere that unfortunately, what would be ideal isn’t always a realistic possibility.

Q. During the same interview in 1964 I asked you: “What would you advise a teacher to tell a child who asked whether the Wailing Wall or the city of Hebron were still ours?” You answered me then: “More than Jerusalem and Hebron are ‘ours,’ we are psychologically ‘theirs’... I would advise the teacher,” you continued, “to hang on the walls of her classroom not only a map of Israel as it is at present, but also the maps that are to be found in a historical atlas of the Jewish people, from the kingdoms of David and Solomon to the Yishuv in Palestine before the establishment of the State of Israel. But our people’s future should be determined by its political objectives and not by its heritage from the past.” Permit me to ask you today:

A) Would you hang all the historical maps of the atlas on the classroom wall today too?

B) Do you still believe today, after the Six-Day War, that a distinction can be made between “political goals” and our “heritage from the past”?

A. As far as the maps are concerned, I

would definitely give the same answer as I gave then: I would hang all the historical maps of the atlas on the classroom walls today too. As for political goals and the heritage of the past—what I was trying to say then, and I still believe as much today, was that there are considerations and necessities in the political sphere right now that were not factors in the past, just as there were territories in the past that are no longer attainable today. It’s true that the heritage of the past remains the cornerstone of our Zionist objectives of today and that the dream of the Return to the Land of Israel is still the motivation behind all our political activity; nevertheless, one has to distinguish between the past and the necessities of present reality. It’s neither possible nor desirable to set our policies today by placing a sheet of tracing paper over old maps and copying their borders.

Q. But don’t you think that dreams have their soldiers too?

A. Our people have come this far by virtue of a dream, but no dream and no poem can be translated literally into prosaic reality. I make a distinction between the historical entity of the Land of Israel to which we have returned and the geographic lines on any given map. Within this entity, of course, there are certain geographic centers without which the Land of Israel makes no sense, such as Jerusalem, for example, and not only Jerusalem.

Q. When Jews traditionally concluded the Passover Seder with the prayer “Next Year in Jerusalem,” they referred not only to Jerusalem, but to the Land of Israel as a whole. When you declared at the Wailing Wall, upon returning to it in June 1967, “Jerusalem, we shall never leave you again,” did you also have in mind more than just the city of Jerusalem?

A. Yes. Not just Jerusalem.

Q. You spoke before of the “necessity of reality”—don’t you think there is such a thing as the “necessity of history” too?

A. Certain things can come about but they can also not come about. I’m not such a fatalist that I depend on history to do everything all by itself.

At the same time, I can’t agree with those who view the Six-Day War as having been exclus-

ively a war of survival. It wasn't just a war of survival, but of *national* survival. We didn't fight simply for our own individual lives, but for our lives as a people, that is, for the past and the future too. I don't believe that we fought as we did because we had our backs to the wall, because otherwise we would have been thrown into the sea—on the contrary, we fought because we thought not of the sea at our backs but of the future before us.

*Q. What do you think of the young people who want to settle in Hebron? Do you consider them idealists?*¹

A. Yes, definitely. I haven't met them all, but those whom I have met I would definitely consider idealists. By "idealists" I don't mean angels, but I think they were acting in the belief that they were performing a service to the nation and not from opportunistic motives. That's how I view them.

Q. Suppose I should want to buy a house in Nablus today—would your [military occupation] regime allow it?

A. It's not "my regime," it's "our government." If you want to go to Nablus and buy not a basket of figs but a house—that would be a political rather than simply an economic act, and politics are the jurisdiction of the government. It's up to the cabinet to decide what its policies are in this matter. The question of whether or not to establish Jewish settlements [in the occupied territories], and if so, how many, when and where, is constantly under review. It is the most fundamental question confronting us in our present situation.

Q. Did you by any chance notice that in his Order of the Day of June 5th [1967, the first day of the Six-Day War] the commander of the southern front, General Yeshayahu Gavish, ended his message to his troops with the words: "And may God be with you"?

¹ Last April a group of young Israelis, most of them orthodox, applied for and received permission from the military government to celebrate the Passover in Hebron, formerly part of the Jordanian "West Bank." When the holiday was over they refused to leave, claiming that as Jews they had an inalienable right to settle in the Biblical town. The incident led to a public uproar and a crisis in the cabinet, but in the end the "settlers" were permitted to remain and at last report the government was preparing to build permanent housing for them.

A. No, no I didn't. But I'm happy that he said it, though one might legitimately ask exactly what he had in mind... For myself, fighting in God's name means fighting with a deep personal faith and for the realization of the aspirations of the Jewish people.

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News Conference Remark by the U.N. Secretary-General U Thant on the Middle East.² [Excerpt]

New York, September 23, 1968

Q. The Security Council, on 22 November 1967, adopted the resolution which created the mission of Mr. Jarring. Nearly a year has passed and nothing has happened. Arab States have said that they accept the principles and the resolution. In your opinion, what are the major reasons for this resolution not being implemented, and what is the future of Mr. Jarring's mission?

The Secretary-General: As you know, the Secretary-General's Special Representative, Ambassador Jarring, has been involved in a search for peace within the framework of the Security Council resolution of 22 November of last year, and he is still continuing with his efforts. He is due to arrive in New York tonight and, of course, he will continue with his consultations and discussions with the parties primarily concerned, along with others. One gratifying aspect of his functions or involvement is the fact that all the parties directly involved in the conflict want him to carry on, and even the Security Council last week gave him a big boost with a resolution endorsing his mission. Apart from this, I do not wish to give a reason or reasons for the stalemate. At the appropriate time, of course, Ambassador Jarring will be in a position to report his assessment and findings.

² *U.N. Monthly Chronicle*, October 1968, p. 107.

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Official Statement by the Soviet Foreign Ministry Spokesman Zamyatin on the Middle East.¹

Moscow, September 25, 1968

The developments of recent weeks in the Middle East have again confirmed the gravity of the situation in that region, which is a result of continued Israeli aggression against Arab states.

The ruling circles of Israel, preventing the political settlement in the Middle East envisaged in the decisions of the United Nations, are organising repeated provocations against Jordan and the United Arab Republic. Literally every day, Israeli troops, in violation of the Security Council's decisions on a cease-fire, are directing artillery fire against towns and villages and organising acts of armed sabotage. Israeli troops are terrorising the peaceful Arab population in the temporarily occupied Arab territories.

The outrageous provocation committed by the Israeli armed forces in the region of the Suez Canal on September 8, when Israel used artillery, tanks and even rockets against Suez, Ismailia, and other Egyptian towns, gives evidence of the intentions of the Israeli extremists.

Israel, in addition to increasing the tension and extending the scope of military adventures, is continuing her unrestrained anti-Arab propaganda campaign. Inside Israel, Israeli extremists are doing their best to whip up chauvinist feelings among the population and to maintain an atmosphere of war hysteria in the country. Is this not the purpose of the declarations of the leaders of the state of Israel, who call, as did, for example, Prime Minister Eshkol, for the battle to be carried to the enemy's gates and further?

The most provocative attitude is that of the Israeli military. They are openly calling for the wrecking of the Security Council's decisions. Defence Minister Dayan has recently proclaimed in so many words: Israel should under no conditions accept the Security Council's resolution.

This can only mean a call for a military solution to the problems which have arisen, i.e.,

a call for the continuation and escalation of aggression.

In order to camouflage their policy, the leaders of the state of Israel hypocritically claim that they are only concerned with the security of Israel. In fact, it is not the security of Israel but a policy of blackmail and aggression and a desire to hold on to occupied Arab territories that is the heart of the matter. This is proved in particular by the declaration made by the Israeli government in February of this year, according to which the territories of the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip, the Jordanian territories west of the River Jordan and the Golan Heights in Syria would henceforward not be regarded as enemy territory.

Tel Aviv is trying to carry out its plans to "digest" Arab territories. Military settlements are being established in those territories and natural wealth belonging to Arab countries is being exploited. Israel has even published geographical maps on which the occupied territories of the three Arab states, and also the southern part of Lebanon, are included within the so-called "secure frontiers" of the Israeli state.

The other day a ministerial committee headed by the Prime Minister was set up in Israel "for the administration of the occupied territories." Measures have been taken towards altering the status of Jerusalem. A decision has been pushed through the parliament concerning the extension of Israeli jurisdiction to the Arab sector of the city. All this has been done contrary to the resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council.

In other words, Israel is doing her utmost to secure her positions in the Arab territories which she has occupied and is ignoring the Security Council's resolution of November 22, 1967, the principal point of which is the withdrawal of the Israeli forces from the territories they have seized.

The mission of Dr. Jarring, special representative of the U.N. Secretary-general, and his contacts with the representatives of the Arab states and Israel indicate that Israel is even refusing to declare that she recognises this resolution of the Security Council.

This attitude of the Israeli government to the United Nations' decisions and to the Jarring

¹ *Soviet News* (London), 1/10/1968, p. 3.

mission itself merely confirms that the Israeli ruling circles are basing their policy, not on a political settlement, but on continued aggression, thereby endangering peace in the Middle East.

As is known, the Security Council worked out its decision as a result of lengthy and complicated negotiations, bearing in mind the task of consolidating the security of all the states in the region. Precisely for this reason, the majority of the states of the world rightly regarded this decision as a real basis for a political settlement of the Middle East crisis.

While Israel is preventing the implementation of this resolution and, in fact, does not want to carry out any of its provisions, the Arab states have clearly and in definite terms proclaimed their readiness to implement it and to seek possibilities for a settlement on this basis. This is a manifestation of the statesmanship of the leaders of Arab countries and, in the first place, of the United Arab Republic, and of their understanding of the great role and responsibility of their countries in the establishment of peace in the Middle East.

The government of the United Arab Republic has suggested, for the purposes of the practical implementation of the provisions of the Security Council's resolution, that a time schedule be worked out for a stage-by-stage implementation of this resolution. This suggestion merits every support since it opens up possibilities for setting out without delay on the path of political settlement in the Middle East.

Thus today there exists a programme for settlement approved by the Security Council; there exists the constructive idea of its stage-by-stage implementation; there is consent on the part of the Arab states to carry out the resolution of the Security Council of November 22, 1967, in its entirety. What, then, is hindering the normalisation of the situation in the region?

It is evident that the only obstacle is presented by the attitude of the Israeli government, which is supported by certain circles in the United States of America. Were it not for this support, Israel would not dare to ignore in such an impudent manner the decisions of the United Nations and challenge this international organisation to which, by the way, Israel is obligated for her very existence.

The path on to which Israel and her patrons

would like to push the present developments in the Middle East may lead to very serious consequences for the cause of peace. It is, therefore, the duty of all peace-loving nations to take effective measures to prevent a new and dangerous explosion in the region.

This calls first of all for an end to the aggressive policy of the ruling circles of Israel, who are persisting in their negative and obstructive attitude. It is necessary to give active support to the just cause of the Arab states which are anxious to remove by political means the consequences of Israeli aggression.

In the struggle for freedom and independence waged by the Arab peoples, they will, as they have done in the past, enjoy the support and assistance of the Soviet Union. In adopting this line of policy the Soviet Union proceeds on the basis of our state's attitude of principle in rendering help and assistance to countries and peoples which fall victims to imperialist aggression or are the object of imperialist plots and intrigues.

The Soviet Union considers it necessary to warn the government of Israel most resolutely of the serious responsibility which it bears for the consequences of its dangerous provocations against the United Arab Republic, Jordan and Syria.

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Statement Issued by the Italian Foreign Ministry on the Australian Minister for External Affairs Hasluck's Visit to Italy.¹ [Excerpts]

Rome, September 26, 1968

The Right Honourable Paul Hasluck, Australian Minister for External Affairs, paid an official visit to Rome from September 24 to September 26 at the invitation of the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Senator Giuseppe Medici.

¹ Australian *Current Notes on International Affairs*, September 1968, p. 388.

The two Ministers carefully examined developments in the political situation in the Middle East, and they confirmed their determination to support the work of the United Nations in this sector, with particular regard to Ambassador Jarring's mission. A fair and lasting solution will strengthen the peace and the safety and freedom of all the directly interested countries, and they will therefore be able to concentrate their energies on their development.

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Statement by the French Foreign Minister Debré Before the National Assembly.¹
[Excerpt]

Paris, October 2, 1968

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As far as the Middle East is concerned, a resolution was adopted last year by the Security Council. To implement it, the Secretary-General of the United Nations appointed a special representative who has not yet completed his task. We have advised the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and all the governments concerned, that we fully support the Security Council resolution and the action of the special representative who, we earnestly hope, will continue his mission. Nothing will be possible in the near future if Israel does not evacuate the territories occupied by force. Nothing can be achieved unless both parties are willing to recognise each others' frontiers, each other's right to exist and the fundamental principles of normal international life; this involves, in particular, freedom of navigation. We hope that an agreement may soon be reached on such a basis, and we are prepared to cooperate to the full in all attempts to reach such an agreement.

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¹ *La Politique Etrangère de la France: Textes et Documents*, 2nd Sem., 1968, p. 103.

164

Joint Communiqué on the Yemeni Prime Minister Al-Amri's Visit to the U.S.S.R.²
[Excerpts]

Moscow, October 5, 1968

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The Prime Minister of Yemen, General Hasan Al-Amri, paid an official visit to the U.S.S.R. as head of a Yemeni government delegation from October 1 to 5 at the invitation of the Soviet government.

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The two sides expressed the belief that the Security Council's resolution of November 22, 1967, was the basis for a political settlement in the Middle East.

They stressed that the further strengthening of the anti-imperialist front and the cohesion, unity and concerted actions of Arab states and peoples had assumed special importance in face of Israeli aggression and the unceasing machinations of the imperialist forces in the Middle East.

They emphatically condemn the government of Israel for its obstructionist policy with regard to the United Nations and the Security Council decisions. The two states also condemn the systematic provocations on the cease-fire lines with the United Arab Republic, Syria and Jordan, staged by the Israeli military in order to build up tension and delay a political settlement in the Middle East.

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Speech by the East German Premier Stoph on the Eve of the Anniversary of the Creation of the German Democratic Republic.³
[Excerpt]

Berlin, October 6, 1968

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We confirm in this connection our solidarity

² *Soviet News* (London), 8/10/1968, p. 14.

³ *G.D.R. Foreign Affairs Bulletin*, 25/10/1968, p. 241.

with the just struggle of the Arab peoples to overcome the consequences of the imperialist aggression committed by Israel. We strongly protest against the aggravation of tension in the Middle East promoted by the West German Government's policy encouraging and openly supporting the aggressor. We will continue to support all the nations struggling for liberation from the colonial yoke and imperialist dependence.

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Resolutions of the First Meeting of the International Islamic Organisations.¹ [Excerpt]

Mecca, October 6, 1968

It is the opinion of the Islamic Organisations that the cause of Palestine is not only an Arab cause, but the cause of the whole Islamic world.

It is also their opinion that, in these critical times, it is a duty to concentrate all efforts on this problem which is the foremost and most critical problem facing Islam, and which constitutes a grave threat to the very existence of Muslims and to the destiny of Islam.

In view of the above, the following decisions were taken with a view to their implementation:

A. That a constantly reiterated call be issued for a *jihad* to recover Jerusalem, the Aqsa Mosque and all other Palestinian and Arab territories occupied by the Jews. Such a *jihad* is now a religious obligation on all Muslims.

B. That all member organisations be called on to mobilise all their resources and to exert all the influence they or any of their members may have on various governments and peoples, particularly in those countries where these organisations have branch offices, with the object of ensuring

that such governments and peoples give increased support to the cause of Palestine, Jerusalem and the Aqsa Mosque; provide all facilities necessary thereto and adopt more decisive attitudes at international level and at the United Nations.

C. That no Islamic state shall recognise the so-called state of Israel. Islamic states which have already done so are requested to withdraw their recognition. They are further requested to support the rally which is to be held in Amman shortly to issue a call for the deliverance of Jerusalem and the Aqsa Mosque, and to endeavour to induce the organisations and Muslim personalities presently gathered in Mecca to take part in this rally.

D. That a cable on the subject of Jerusalem and the Aqsa Mosque be sent to the United Nations.

E. That a cable of appeal on the question of Jerusalem be sent to the Kings and Heads of Islamic countries.

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Speech by the U.S. Presidential Candidate George C. Wallace on Foreign Policy.² [Excerpts]

Washington, October 7, 1968

The Middle East is still an area of high potential danger to world peace. We still take the initiative in encouraging mutual cooperation between the adversaries in this area and in seeking the mutual respect of each for the United States.

We will encourage multilateral discussions seeking means of resolving and stabilizing boundaries and providing for the free use of water and land routes throughout this area. Binding non-aggression agreements must be developed.

If Russia persists in its arming of the Arab nations to such an extent as to pose a threat to

¹ *Falastin* (Beirut), No. 92, November 1968, p. 5. The meeting was held in Mecca between 3-6 October 1968; the following organisations took part: the Islamic World Conference (Karachi), the Afro-Asian Organisation (Jakarta), the General Islamic Conference (Amman) and the Islamic World Association (Mecca).

² *New York Times*, 8/10/1968.

their neighbor, this country must assure that Israel is kept at a commensurate level of strength. Under these conditions we will join with the other nations of the free world in providing arms and equipment to Israel to maintain a balance of force in this area.

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Statement by the U.S. President Johnson on the Signing into Law of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1968.¹ [Excerpt]

Washington, October 9, 1968

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I have taken note of section 651 concerning the sale of planes to Israel.

In the light of this expression of the sense of the Congress,² I am asking the Secretary of State to initiate negotiations with the Government of Israel and to report back to me.

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¹ U.S. *Department of State Bulletin*, 28/10/1968, p. 452.

² The text of section 651 as added by section 303 of the act follows:

Sec. 303. Chapter 3 of part III of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, which relates to miscellaneous provisions, is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new section:

"Sec. 651. Sale of Supersonic Planes to Israel.—It is the sense of the Congress that the President should take such steps as may be necessary, as soon as practicable after the date of enactment of this section, to negotiate an agreement with the Government of Israel providing for the sale by the United States of such number of supersonic planes as may be necessary to provide Israel with an adequate deterrent force capable of preventing future Arab aggression by offsetting sophisticated weapons received by the Arab States and to replace losses suffered by Israel in the 1967 conflict."

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Radio Interview with the Israeli Foreign Minister Eban.³ [Excerpt]

New York, October 11, 1968

Q. Does the Israeli nine-point peace proposal indicate a change of policy?

A. I am not very interested in how my speech compares with the previous impressions of our policy. The important thing is that this speech now represents the policy of the Israeli Government and the views of our Government and how that policy should be presented. It was the fruit of many consultations, on the main elements, which I conducted before I drafted the speech, and now I have received a message from the Prime Minister identifying himself and the Government unreservedly with everything that I have said. In other words, this is now the way the Government of Israel thinks its views should be presented in the light of the existing international situation.

Certain results have been achieved. But first of all, the sincerity and the ardour of Israel's desire for peace have been expressed in a way that seems to have convinced many who have been sceptical. Secondly, we have achieved a method of formulating our policy, which has won greater confidence and co-operation from other governments. I have been impressed recently, especially in the light of what I was told before coming here, by the cordiality between the United States and Israel on this subject. There has, I think, been a general improvement in the atmosphere of our dialogue since I began it on 30th September with Secretary of State Rusk and this has various expressions. Thirdly, what we said about the world reaction is of political importance, and there has been a reaction of (?unequalled) repercussion such as we have not known for any exposition of Israel's case since the dramatic days of the emergency session last June. In view of the importance of the public opinion [words indistinct], this in itself is a gain. I would therefore say that the expression of our policy as it was expressed has had tangible and

³ *Israel in English* 11.37 GMT 12/10/1968. B.B.C., ME/2899/A/1-3. The interview was recorded in New York on October 11, 1968.

positive results, and this is much more important than whether or not it is different from the way it was expressed previously.

Q. There is widespread agreement among observers, or analysts, in the U.N. corridors, Mr. Eban, since your speech that Israel will from now on concentrate not so much on having direct talks with the Arabs as on signing binding and permanent peace treaties with the Arab States. Is this correct?

A. The central objective of our policies has always been the achievement of peace—a solid, genuine, binding, contractual peace with the Arab States. That is the meaning of our ambition to secure treaties of peace with the Arab States. As for the negotiating problem, negotiation is a principle and not a procedure. At any rate, the refusal to negotiate is certainly a negative principle. It embodies the concepts of refusal to recognise and refusal to make peace. We have not abandoned that principle. Our friends did not advise us to abandon it. And it is clear to me from discussions with the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, Latin America and African and other delegates, that they do not envisage that we will ever effectively pass from a state of war to a state of peace on the basis of the refusal by one Government to meet another. But many of them have said that we ought not to carry this conviction to the point of passivity. Therefore, I enunciated our views in the following terms: We continue to believe that there must be normal negotiations and that the refusal to meet cannot be condoned. But if in order to reach that position it is necessary to have a preliminary stage in which we exchange views, principles, ideas on certain matters, then we are prepared for that preliminary stage. This also has won support and acquiescence—I would say more: it has allayed certain apprehensions lest our devotion to principle might inadvertently lead to a deadlock. But we have not abandoned our normal principles in favour of negotiations, argument, signature and the establishment of peace.

Q. The idea of a peace treaty, however, was categorically rejected by your Egyptian colleague, if I may say so, Mr. Riyad, who argued in his speech in the General Assembly, and later in a press conference, that such a treaty would be tantamount to capitulation

on Egypt's part, and that in any case, Israel would not honour its signature. He proposed instead a timetable for the implementation of the Security Council resolution of November 1967 to be worked out by Dr. Jarring under the supervision and the guarantees of the council itself. Does this strike you as slamming the door on peace or does it at least leave a crack open?

A. It certainly does not open the door any wider than it was before. If he is not interested in our signature, then we are not interested in his timetable or in any resolution that he thinks—I think, quite hopeless—he might be able to get through a consensus of the Powers. We are convinced that the international community can at most give its support and endorsement to an agreement which is reached between the sovereign States of the Middle East and nothing which is adopted, or guaranteed, or proposed by Powers outside the region can be a substitute for the sovereign agreement of the States within the region.

The timetable idea has no value whatever in this context. How can you have a timetable for something to which you have not agreed? It is only when you have negotiated an agreement and when you have signed peace that you can raise the problem of implementing what was signed and of fixing the time and the sequence of carrying out what has been signed. But to talk about a timetable which concerns a peace which has not been signed and which has not been agreed upon, and which has not been negotiated, this is fundamentally fallacious, and I will explain this, of course, to them through Ambassador Jarring and through the Foreign Ministers and heads of delegations whom I meet.

Q. Would you favour as at least a basis for negotiations the idea—that would seem to have some support, at least in Western capitals—of terminating the 20-year war between Israel and the Arab States not by way of a formal peace treaty but rather through, say, a joint declaration for the termination of belligerency?

A. I have never heard of any such way or anything which has the force of a treaty. I do not see any point in renouncing our nomenclature about the peace treaty in favour of a formula which the other side is not interested in. But they, as I understand, are not in favour of a joint dec-

laration. What is a treaty? A treaty is a joint declaration by parties binding themselves to certain things which are included in the document. I think that we are very far from any normal procedure for passing from the state of war to the state of peace.

Q. The Egyptian Foreign Minister said, again in his speech and press conference that the implementation of the Security Council resolution would amount to a peace settlement, and when I ventured to ask him in the conference what he meant by peaceful settlement, he said that it involved the implementation of the Security Council resolution. Does this make sense to you?

A. No, my knowledge of English may be not sufficient for me to understand what he means. I rather doubt whether he knows what he means himself. There is no such thing as a self-implementing resolution. Those who drafted the resolution and those who supported it have said to him and to me that it is not self-executing. It is a list of principles which can help the parties and guide them in their search for a solution because it lists the claims, the main claims, which both parties make against each other, but it has no life on its own. The best description that I have heard of it was that which Ambassador Ball gave on 11th September. He said it is a skeleton of principles on which the parties can build peace. Perhaps a good description. Now, how can you implement a skeleton? You cannot implement a skeleton. All you can do with a skeleton is put some flesh and some bones [sic] on it as our prophetic ancestor Ezekiel once suggested, but until that has happened, the skeleton has no life, and it has no breath, and it has no movement. That is what the Security Council resolution is. It is simply a collection of words, unless or until the parties have used it in the course of their efforts to reach a peace settlement. I also made it clear in the General Assembly that no single text of that kind can ignore the mutual obligations of Israel and the Arab States towards each other. We are bound by the Charter, by the normal principles of international law and by the human needs of our region, as well as by constructive realism. To say that you can pass from peace to war [sic] simply by the declamation of a resolution is nonsense and there is no question whatever in favour of that view.

Q. Mr. Eban, you have been having discussions

with Dr. Jarring for the past two weeks and you have been in touch with many Foreign Ministers here in the General Assembly. How good do you see the prospects of Dr. Jarring's success now?

A. I think it is too early to predict success, and it is too early to diagnose failure. Therefore the mission should continue in order that its full prospects are revealed. It would be a great mistake to terminate it now. It would create a diplomatic vacuum in which the idea of peace would be lost, and in which a kind of fatalistic move towards war would be expedited. I think that we have won support for the view that another chance should be given to this mission in the circumstances which exist here to prove whether or not it can become an element in bringing the parties together. We shall therefore not say today that it will succeed, but we should not say that it is a failure. And the U.N. would be making a great error in creating this premature vacuum. We saw it happen in May 1967 when a vacuum was created, and now something of the same kind could occur without any reason and without any necessity. I have found among most delegations the disposition to accept the view that the opportunity should be given for a diplomatic probing and that what can be achieved by public rhetoric belongs much more to the stage of world opinion than to the concrete advancement of peace.

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Radio Interview With the Israeli Foreign Minister Eban.¹ [Excerpt]

New York, October 11, 1968

Q. Does Riyad's statement at his press conference regarding Egypt's readiness to accept the principle of freedom of navigation in the Canal and the Straits seem to you an indication of a change in the Egyptian position?

A. No, because the bitter fact is that Egypt never found it difficult to accept this principle

¹ Israel home service in Hebrew 08.00 GMT, 12/10/1968. B.B.C., ME/2899/A/3-4. The interview was recorded in New York on October 11, 1968.

but it never put this principle into practice towards Israel. Egypt has not declared that the Straits of Tiran are an international waterway which should be open to ships of all countries. Egypt has not joined us in such a declaration. I say "us" because Israel has the ability to permit or not to permit passage there. There is a point to which many have not paid attention in many (instances) and even today: we have the ability to permit or not to permit the passage of ships to the Jordanian Port of Aqaba. In all circumstances we have permitted this passage. As regards the Suez [Canal], Egypt has never said that ships flying the Israeli flag will one day be permitted to pass through the Canal like all other ships. It links this subject with another which is not connected with it—the solution of the refugee problem. Thus it is reserving for itself the possibility of dodging the subject of free passage through the Suez Canal until doomsday.

Q. Riyad said at his press review something regarding the refugee problem when he was asked whether he agreed to your proposals. His reply was that the Palestinian people's problem was completely separate from Israel-Egypt relations and that he could not speak on behalf of the Palestinians.

A. If he does not want to speak on their behalf then we shall speak to them. Anyhow we are prepared to discuss this subject. I have the impression that he wants to create an alibi for himself for not achieving a settlement. At the very best, the solution of the refugee problem would need many years, and if he makes any progress regarding peace, navigation or any other subject conditional on the solution of the refugee problem, which was created by Egyptian aggression, then in my eyes this is an easy way to dodge peace [words indistinct].

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Interview Statement by the French Foreign Minister Debré During His Visit to the United States.¹ [Excerpt]

Washington, October 12, 1968

After which, as is natural, the question of the Middle East engaged our attention. Here also, French policy is clear. It has been stated by General de Gaulle on various occasions but, as compared with other problems, American policy on the Middle East is very different from ours. I did not have to offer any explanations. What I had to do was to consider, along with the American authorities, under what conditions the Security Council resolution for which the Government of the United States voted—as we did too—might some day be implemented. This brought us back to consideration of the mission of Mr. Jarring, the special envoy who is now trying to find a solution. As you can realise, the subject of our discussions was a very important one.

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Statement by the Turkish Foreign Ministry Spokesman on the Middle East.²

Ankara, October 15, 1968

It appears that rumours have been published in the foreign press to the effect that our Foreign Minister is to act as mediator in the Middle East dispute, or that he and certain other countries, intend to submit to the United Nations, a proposal concerning the Middle East conflict.

During his stay in New York, our Foreign Minister, Ihsan Sabri Çağlayangil, discussed the Middle East conflict with the Foreign Ministers of many countries, in particular with the envoys of the Arab countries, with whom he exchanged views. This exchange of views was no more than

¹ *La Politique Etrangère de la France: Textes et Documents*, 2nd Sem., 1968, p. 114.

² *Turkish Foreign Ministry Bulletin* (in Turkish), October 1968, p. 19.

routine diplomacy and it should not give rise to the idea that our Foreign Minister has been engaging in mediation. Similarly, the rumours to the effect that the Foreign Minister intends to submit a Turkish peace initiative to the General Assembly of the United Nations are unfounded.

The contacts made by our Foreign Minister indicate how important Turkey regards the establishing of peace and stability in the Middle East, but they should be seen within their proper framework.

Mr. Jarring is continuing his task as mediator, and the Security Council is keenly interested in the subject.

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Joint Communiqué on the Turkish Foreign Minister Caglayangil's Visit to Tunisia.¹
[Excerpts]

Tunis, October 16, 1968

At the invitation of the Tunisian Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Al-Habib Bourghiba, Jr., the Foreign Minister of Turkey, Mr. Ihsan Sabri Caglayangil, paid an official visit to Tunisia from 13 to 16 October 1968.

The two ministers expressed their profound concern at the grave situation in the Middle East and at the consequent threat to peace and security in the area and in the world. They expressed their absolute conviction of the necessity of finding an equitable solution of the Middle East dispute that will ensure just and permanent peace in the area. In this connection the two Ministers expressed their support for the efforts that are being made by the United Nations within the framework of the 22 November Security Council resolution and, in particular, for the mission of Mr. Jarring.

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Radio Interview With the Israeli Foreign Minister Eban.²

Jerusalem, October 20, 1968

Q. What are the subjects which at this stage require consultations between you and the Government?

A. According to my impression, the situation today is different from the situation I found when I arrived at U.N. headquarters about three weeks ago. At that time, it was necessary to work in anticipation of a struggle to overcome several [word indistinct] difficulties. There was talk, mainly in the Israeli press, of a frontal dispute that was expected between us and the U.S. Government.

There was also talk of a certain crisis in public opinion, which was not (?convinced) of Israel's desire for peace. There was further talk of a possibility that the U.N. General Assembly would introduce far-reaching and fundamental changes in the Middle East problem through [words indistinct]. It was also expected that Jarring's mission would come to an end. We were worried about the possibility of preserving the balance of forces, mainly in the air. There was a certain impasse concerning one category of vital military equipment we need.

Developments took place in all these spheres. The discussions I held with the U.S. Secretary of State and his colleagues three weeks ago [words indistinct] to settle the differences. Moreover, there is no doubt that a favourable change occurred in public opinion as a result of the widespread and deep reaction we created through the explanation of Israel's peace plan in the U.N. General Assembly [words indistinct].

I do not believe that we can content ourselves with overcoming obstacles and dangers. We have to maintain an incessant dialogue. It is true that it is still impossible to [word indistinct] negotiations between Israel and any Arab State but, in my opinion, it is not too early to ponder what attitude Israel will adopt if such a prospect should (?be realised) [words indistinct].

¹ *Al-'Amal* (Tunis), 17/10/1968.

² *Israel* home service in Hebrew 18.10 GMT 20/10/1968. B.B.C., ME/2905/A/4-5. The interview was recorded in New York.

Q. You had a rather long meeting this week with Ambassador Farring. It was reported that you explained to him the peace plan you presented in the General Assembly and that you also conveyed through him certain questions to the Egyptian Foreign Minister, Mahmud Riyad. Have you already received any answer or reaction to any of these questions?

A. [Words indistinct] we did not receive any reaction. I have the impression that the Arab Governments understand very well that the growing [word indistinct] among the extremists will place them, the Arab Governments, in a difficult situation regarding world opinion. The Israeli initiative in outlining (?principles) of peace has not yet produced any Arab reply [words indistinct].

Q. The new U.S. representative at the U.N., James Russell Wiggins, said in a television interview this week after a meeting with you that he was very optimistic about prospects for peace in the Middle East. Do you share this view [words indistinct]?

A. I cannot express optimism until I hear of some thaw in the Arab attitude.

Q. The Defence Minister said this week that the issue of peace between Israel and the Arabs was not topical today. Do you consider this attitude compatible with the Government's declared and approved policy as you described it in your speech before the U.N. General Assembly?

A. I do not want to comment on a speech which I did not hear and which I did not read. I only heard of various press articles which claimed to describe this speech. What I shall now say should not be considered as a reaction to any speech.

As to the issue itself, I do not know whether the peace is a real peace, but I am also not certain whether the war is real. Whether the peace is real or not, discussing peace and interest in peace are very real things. That means that Israel is not free to evade the need to explain its aspiration, desire and the principles of its policy to the same world whose aid and support Israel is seeking. In other words, if we do not want complete isolation, then it is our duty to discuss peace problems [words indistinct].

It is vitally important that the Government, and especially the men in charge of security,

should take into account the possibility of war and make preparations for it. But this task, necessary as it may be, does not diminish our political responsibility. We must aim at the prevention of a new war and at the transformation of the achievements of the last war into a new (?policy) of peace and security.

If there should be another war, then we could do nothing but to prepare for the war that would follow, and for the one which would follow that. If this is our fate as a result of Arab hostility, then [words indistinct]. But a responsible and far-sighted policy cannot be founded on this gloomy forecast. [Words indistinct]. Our history has proved that only those who do everything to prevent war will ultimately win the war when it takes place.

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Interview Granted by the U.S. Vice-President and the Presidential Candidate Humphrey to the British Weekly "Jewish Chronicle".¹

October 25, 1968

Q. Mr. Vice-President, what is your policy on the Middle East?

A. First let me say at the outset that the situation in the Middle East constitutes a major threat to world peace. It is, in my opinion, the world's most explosive danger spot. We must work for peace in the area, strengthen moderate constructive regimes and combine our efforts to achieve prosperity in all Middle East countries. The search for peace in the Middle East depends on our ability to convince the Russians to turn their efforts to peaceful economic development.

Recently in Washington I called for the following Strategy of Peace.² I should like here to reaffirm that programme:

1. The existence of the State of Israel must be accepted by its neighbours.

2. The boundaries of all these countries must be transformed into agreed and secure frontiers.

¹ *Jewish Chronicle* (London), 25/10/1968, p. 7.

² See *ante*, doc. 133.

3. The State of Israel must have free navigational rights in all international waters, including the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba.

4. The arms race must be ended.

5. The international community must assist in solving the human tragedy posed by the Arab refugees.

6. The resources of the Middle East must be used for human and economic betterment rather than war and destruction.

In addition I should like your readers to know that I look upon Israel not only as a nation which can strengthen resistance to Soviet and Communist pressure in the region, but as an outpost of democracy which can bolster democratic forces everywhere in the Middle East, Africa and Asia. By her example Israel is teaching the entire region that democracy works best.

*Q. Do you favour the supply of the latest type of combat aircraft to Israel to match the modern equipment supplied by the Soviet Union to the Arabs? (Asked before President Johnson's announcement that he had asked the Secretary of State Mr. Rusk, to enter into negotiations with Israel for the sale of supersonic aircraft.)*¹

A. Yes. We cannot minimise or ignore the flow of Soviet arms into the region, thereby upsetting an already delicate balance. To re-establish that balance—to preserve the security of the region—I believe that we must provide Israel with Phantom aircraft. And we will continue to support Israel with the weapons she needs if there is a further threat to her existence. Israel will not be insecure through any failure on our part.

But in the future, we cannot hope for peace, permanent peace, lasting peace, unless there are comprehensive agreements among the major suppliers in the area—and among the recipient countries themselves.

The Russians say they want an agreement. Let them show their good faith. Let them join with us to end this arms race. Let us conclude an agreement that provides for the security of all these Middle East countries. And let us do it now.

Q. Do you agree with the Israeli view that direct talks with the Arab States are the only way of obtaining a secure and lasting peace?

A. Yes, I favour diplomatic efforts to convince Israel's neighbours to pursue a general settlement. It is in the interests of all parties in the Middle East to engage actively in negotiating agreements among the nations in that region.

Q. In the absence of such talks, what policy will you advise Israel to follow in the Middle East?

A. I hope that Israel will continue to make clear to her Arab neighbours that she wants peace and that she is ready to co-operate with them for peace and economic development.

Q. What active steps are you prepared to take to promote a Middle East settlement?

A. I will actively press for each of my six points. Furthermore, as President, I shall make available my good offices, through the United Nations and directly, to search for peace and understanding in the Middle East. I shall be a peace President. And I shall dedicate myself to finding peace in the Middle East, just as I pledged to do in Vietnam.

And I shall call upon the Soviet Union to join me in these efforts. We must take the first steps towards peace, and we must take them now.

Our effort must be a combined effort in which we and the Soviet Union join with other major powers—and with the countries in the region—in the tasks of economic development. This co-operation should begin with a programme for the desalination of water, and then go on to other tasks. I do not expect a sudden success, an overnight end to the conflict. But I do expect that quiet counsel and patient effort can lead these countries to the distant day of peace.

Q. In your view, is the United States committed to maintaining the territorial integrity of Israel if she is attacked?

A. Yes. We continue our firm commitment to the State of Israel. We will take no steps in the Middle East that do not conform to that interest.

Q. Should Israel rely on the United Nations for her security against Arab terrorism; should she retaliate, or should she do nothing?

¹ See *ante*, doc. 168.

A. The first duty of government is to protect its citizens. Attacks or invasions must be repulsed. It makes no difference whether the aggressor is a foreign army or foreign-based terrorists.

176

Joint Communiqué on the Polish President Spychalski's Visit to Iraq.¹ [Excerpts]

Baghdad, October 25, 1968

At the invitation of the President of the Iraqi Republic, Mr. Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, the President of the Council of State of the Polish People's Republic, Marshal Marian Spychalski, paid an official visit to Iraq from 23 to 25 October 1968.

As regards the situation in the Middle East, the President of the Council of State of the Polish People's Republic stated that there was full understanding of and support for the just cause of the Arabs in the Polish People's Republic. Both parties were convinced that the total elimination of the consequences of the Israeli aggression against the neighbouring Arab countries and, first and foremost, the evacuation of Israeli forces from the occupied Arab territories, was an absolute pre-condition for any settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute. Both sides condemn Israeli acts of reprisal against the helpless Palestinian Arabs, who are entitled to all admiration and support in their resistance and their struggle against the Israeli aggressors in defence of their lives, their homeland and their legitimate rights.

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Radio Interview with the Israeli Defence Minister Dayan.²

Jerusalem, October 25, 1968

Q. What do you think of the Arab demonstrations

held in the West Bank?

A. I am not underestimating it, but I still hope that we can put an end to it. When I say "we" I mean not only the Israelis or the Israelis' troops, but also the responsible bodies in these places, that is to say, the mayors, the municipalities and the elders in Nablus, Janin and Ramallah.

Q. What is your Ministry doing to co-operate with these local authorities to put down these demonstrations and to keep them from happening?

A. I met with them and I told them that we are not going to accept it or to tolerate it and, what is more, we are not going to make war with students or children. That is to say that on one hand we shall not let fighting going on, and, on the other hand, we shall hold the municipalities and the towns responsible. Practically, this would mean that if they cannot take care of it and handle it, we shall have to do it and we will do it by imposing curfew, by closing schools which make demonstrations, and take more measures affecting freedom of movement and other things that are connected.

Q. General Dayan, what sparks these demonstrations? What, in fact, are they all about?

A. Well, this is a good question. I suppose that, to be fair, the main cause of the demonstrations is that they do not want to see us there. They do not like our occupation, and practically that is what has been told us also by the people that we have met with. I told them that I can see their point and that we do not like it either. We do not like to be an occupation force, but the only solution for this is to change the occupation regime into a peace treaty—a peace agreement. This is the only way to put an end to the military regime there, and I suggested that if they want to put an end to the occupation—as they call it—they should get together and approach our Prime Minister and negotiate peace. They can do it on behalf of the Palestinians, they can do it together with Jordan, or together with Egypt, or all the Arab countries together. For they have to realise that if they do not want to have that repellent regime, then they have to see that this will be replaced by a peace situation, and this can be done only after a peace agreement, a peace treaty.

¹ *Al-Jumhuriya* (Baghdad), 27/10/1968.

² *Israel* in English 11.43 GMT 26/10/1968. *B.B.C.*, ME/2911/A/3-4.

Q. But what, to the best of your knowledge, do these people want? Do they want to come under Hussein? Do they want a Palestinian State of their own? Do they know what they want?

A. When you say "they", do you mean the students or the elders?

Q. Both.

A. Well, it is not the same. Now as far as the students are concerned, the only thing they can say when they shout slogans during the demonstrations—not only do they not shout "Moshe Dayan", but they do not even shout "Hussein". They shout only "Nasser". So I can take it that they are trying to support, I should say, three things by the demonstrations: the first is to take some part in the opposition to our being there; the second is to express support to *Fateh*; and the third is to express support to Nasser's attitude, or, in other words, to the three or four No's of Khartum which they think that Nasser probably represents more than any other Arab leader.

Q. General Dayan, in a talk early this week to a group of U.S. Jewish leaders you said that despite the difficulties, the fact that we are dealing with the Arabs today presents a historic opportunity. Do you still feel that way? Would you enlarge on this?

A. Yes, I do. And the fact is that during these meetings with the people responsible in Ramallah, Nablus and Janin all of them said that they were against the demonstrations and they asked for a chance to handle it and to put an end to it. That is to say, they did not say: we are all against you and we do not want to turn life into normal here. On the contrary, they said that they do want to keep some kind of normality in the areas, and this is what I said to the (?US mission) too, that I think that though we probably cannot get just now a peace treaty with the Palestinians, we can establish a de facto peace situation. And here today, in spite of the demonstrations, I think that the responsible people sincerely want to stop them and to maintain a normal life.

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Speech by the Turkish Prime Minister Demirel During the French President de Gaulle's Visit to Turkey.¹ [Excerpt]

Ankara, October 26, 1968

Central Europe is not the only disturbed area in the world to-day. There is also the Middle East, an area in which Turkey is concerned in the highest degree.

Turkey deplored last year's war between the Arab countries and Israel. But what Turkey profoundly regrets at present is that it is proving impossible to implement the Security Council resolution of November 1967, and thus to lay the foundations for a lasting peace in the area.

179

Joint Communiqué on the French President de Gaulle's Visit to Turkey, 25-30 October.² [Excerpts]

Ankara, October 30, 1968

In response to the invitation extended by Mr. Cevdet Sunay, President of Turkey, during his visit to Paris in June 1967, the President of France, accompanied by Madame de Gaulle, paid an official visit to Turkey from 25 to 30 October 1968. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Michel Debré, was a member of the French President's party.

The two Governments expressed their concern at the lack of progress towards a solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. They consider that continued tension is a grave threat to peace. They consider it important that the resolution unanimously adopted by the Security Council on 22 November 1967, should be implemented

¹ *La Politique Etrangère de la France: Textes et Documents*, 2nd Sem., 1968, pp. 129-130.

² *Turkish Foreign Ministry Bulletin*, October 1968, pp. 92-93. From the French text.

as soon as possible. They record their appreciation for the efforts of Mr. Jarring and express the hope that his mission may lead to a settlement in conformity with the provisions of this resolution, calling for the evacuation of the occupied Arab territories.

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Statements in Parliament by the British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Stewart on the Middle East.¹

[Excerpt]

London, October 31, 1968

Mr. Michael Stewart: I found at the General Assembly a powerful conviction, which I believe was right, that a solution to the Middle East problem must be found on the lines of the Security Council resolution of last November and through the work of Dr. Jarring. I believe that that view, which is widely held among the countries of the United Nations, is a correct view, despite the slow and disappointing progress that Dr. Jarring has been able to make.

I think that the reason why his progress has been slow has been not so much the admittedly great complication of all the issues involved, but because of the presence on both sides, Israel and her Arab neighbours, of two deep and opposite suspicions: a suspicion by Israel's Arab neighbours that Israel has no intention of withdrawing from any of the territories which she has occupied, and a suspicion by Israel that whatever she does her Arab neighbours will never really accept her or let her live in assured peace.

I am not saying that either of those suspicions is justified, although I believe that one could find foolish people in all the countries concerned who will talk in a way that would give colour to those suspicions. The trouble is not whether those suspicions are justified but the plain fact that they are held and that they inhibit both sides from making a forward move.

Our object, therefore—and I believe that Britain as the sponsor of the resolution and as a permanent member of the Security Council has a responsibility, although it is by no means ours alone, to help in this matter—has been in constant conversation with the parties concerned to urge on them courses of action which could help to remove those suspicions without exposing them to unnecessary or unacceptable risks.

I believe, for example, that if Israel would make it clear beyond doubt that she accepts and will carry out the whole of the resolution, that would go some way to dissolving Arab suspicions. If the Arab countries would make it clear that, despite the menacing language of the Khartum declaration,² they will, if the resolution is carried out, accept that they must live as a neighbour in permanent peace with Israel that would go far to relieve Israeli suspicions.

I believe too, that there is one particular aspect of the problem on which Israel could particularly help at the present time. Mr. Eban made it clear that they were going to do something on the unhappy subject of the new batch of refugees from the last war. I hope very much that they will both pursue this subject and consider what they could do for that much older group of refugees. I believe that this is a direction in which they could do something that would not endanger their security but might materially change the atmosphere in which all the parties approach the problem.

What is needed, therefore, is plain statements by the parties concerned of a kind that will reassure each other. They have been held back from making them, I think, through the fear that the first party to screw up courage to walk through the door and make a concession will find himself tricked by his neighbour and that if either side makes a forward move, it will not be reciprocated on the other side.

One or other of them must make up their minds to make a forward move, because while I believe that Britain has a duty here, the Security Council—the United Nations—has a duty. It is no good the parties concerned imagining that they can simply leave this problem to go festering on. Unless they themselves will agree to something,

¹ *Hansard*, 31/10/1968, cols. 190-193.

² See *International Documents on Palestine*, 1967, pp. 655-657.

the rest of the world cannot solve it for them. There is a good deal that the rest of the world can do to help, but I believe that the idea that the Great Powers, whatever one likes to call them, could step in and impose a solution is an illusion.

This places a great responsibility on Israel and the Arab countries. They may all be tempted to think that if they wait and leave it unsolved some turn of events will turn out to their advantage. If they go on thinking that they will make an extremely tragic mistake.

Mr. John Biggs-Davison: (Chigwell): Is not the difficulty here the extent to which the foreign policy of the United Arab Republic is controlled by the U.S.S.R.?

Mr. Stewart: No, I do not think I would accept that. We know quite well, of course, that the Great Powers all have their eyes on that part of the world, but in saying that I think that the hon. Member overlooks many of the facts of the unhappy history between Israel and her Arab neighbours. There is a deep suspicion of Israel among the Arab countries. I was careful to say that this was not a justified suspicion. It is a very real one, and I emphasise again the argument I put forward. The hon. Gentleman's explanation is, if I may put it this way, rather too facile. If the parties concerned had the will to make a settlement, I do not believe that any great Power could frustrate them. Conversely, if they do not have the will, then I do not believe that any of the great Powers could make it for them.

While in New York I also raised with Mr. Riyad of the U.A.R. the question of the ships still blocked in the Canal. I wish that I could tell the House something more definite. However, repeated efforts are being made by the shipowners and I still hope that we will be able before long—I could give no sort of commitment—find some solution to what seems at first a mere technical problem—of getting the trapped ships out—but which is, unhappily, surrounded by all sorts of political complications.

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Statement by the Central Committee of the Labour Zionist Organisation of America (Poale Zion) Supporting the Candidature of Humphrey and Muskie in the American Presidential Election.¹ [Excerpts]

New York, October 1968

Since its founding over sixty years ago, the Labor Zionist Organization of America—Poale Zion, in view of its commitment to the ideals of democracy and social justice, has pursued a policy of endorsing liberal candidates for national office as part of its program of community action. In keeping with this policy, the Central Committee of the LZOA-Poale Zion today endorses the candidacy of Hubert H. Humphrey and Edmund S. Muskie for President and Vice President of the United States.

Of special interest to us are the stands of the candidates on the role of the United States in the world scene. We are heartened by the strong expressions of both parties and both candidates concerning Israel's security needs and the search for real peace in the Middle East, thus continuing a long record of bi-partisan support for the aspirations of Israel. At the same time we must take special note of the positive stand taken by the Johnson Administration in this area in 1967; this was a welcome departure from some of the Eisenhower policies of the 1950's. Moreover, Vice President Humphrey has been a particularly close ally and effective supporter of the Zionist cause throughout his long career of public service.

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Reply by the Israeli Premier Eshkol in the Knesset to a Question on Secure Frontiers with Jordan.²

Jerusalem, November 5, 1968

Question No. 6:

Member of the Knesset Shmuel Mikunis

¹ *Jewish Frontier*, November 1968, p. 25.

² *Knesset Records* (in Hebrew), 5/11/1968, pp. 164-165.

asked the Prime Minister the following question on 26 June 1968:

You recently repeated your statement—which was published in the press—that the River Jordan constitutes a secure frontier with the state of Jordan.

I should therefore like to ask the Prime Minister:

1) Does this statement of his represent an official decision of the government of Israel?

2) Is this statement—that the River Jordan constitutes a secure frontier—to be the basis of negotiations with Jordan?

Prime Minister Eshkol:

My statement reflects the policy of the government which is that Israel will insist, in negotiations for the conclusion of a peace treaty, whatever frontiers may be determined, that there should be no Jordanian Arab army, or any other army, west of the River Jordan.

We shall disclose our proposals for negotiations with Jordan, and with any other Arab country, at the conference table, when Jordan and the other Arab countries see fit to sit down with us for talks. In the meantime, we have submitted to Jordan, through Ambassador Jarring, an agenda which makes it clear that any party can raise any demand or proposal it likes at the negotiations.

183

Replies in Parliament by the British Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Mulley to Questions on the Middle East.¹

London, November 5, 1968

Mrs. McKay asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if, in view of Israel's infraction of international law by her conquest of Arab lands in June 1967, and her continuing occupation in defiance of United Nations resolutions requiring her withdrawal, he will seek further action by the United Nations

to bring about Israeli obedience to her United Nations obligations.

Mr. Mulley: My right hon. Friend the then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs made clear in his speech to the United Nations General Assembly on 21st June, 1967, the view of Her Majesty's Government that war should not lead to aggrandisement. This principle is also embodied in the preamble of Security Council resolution 242 of 22nd November, 1967, which calls for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East based on the twin principles of Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in June 1967 and recognition of the right of every State in the area to live in peace within secure and recognised boundaries. This resolution can only be implemented as a whole on the basis of both these principles and others set out in the resolution. Dr. Jarring, the Special Representative of the Secretary General, is continuing his efforts to promote a settlement on this basis. Her Majesty's Government are always ready to support his work by any appropriate means but recognise no necessity for further initiative by the United Nations at this time.

Mrs. McKay asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if he will make an emergency grant to Jordan to provide reliefs for the Arab refugees exiled from home by Israeli occupation and now facing their second winter in the open desert.

Mr. Mulley: Her Majesty's Government is keenly aware of the increased hardship which many refugees in Jordan will face if they have to remain in the highlands for the winter. But I do not think that an emergency monetary grant to Jordan is the most appropriate solution to the problem nor has the Government of Jordan indicated a need for financial assistance.

¹ *Hansard*, 5/11/1968, cols. 58-59.

184

Statement Circulated by the Soviet Official News Agency Tass on the Middle East.¹**Moscow, November 6, 1968**

The situation in the Middle East has again worsened. In recent weeks Israel has committed a whole series of dangerous armed provocations against the United Arab Republic, Jordan, Syria and the Lebanon.

In violation of the armistice agreement, Israeli troops have subjected to artillery and missile assaults Arab towns and other communities located along the Suez Canal, the River Jordan and on the Israeli-Lebanese border.

Reports are coming in of new war preparations by the Israeli armed forces on the Sinai Peninsula.

On October 31 the Israeli Air Force raided the Nag-Hammadi power plant on the Aswan-Cairo power transmission line and also a bridge spanning the River Nile. The Israeli government officially confirmed this raid and thereby testified to the fact that it is continuing its policy of aggression.

The attack of the Israeli militarists on an area where, as is known, the United Arab Republic is building the Aswan hydro-electric power complex in close co-operation with the Soviet Union and with the participation of Soviet workers and specialists, shows what reckless steps the opponents of a peaceful settlement in the Middle East are prepared to take and to what grave consequences they are liable to push the development of events.

The aggressive actions of Israel, entailing human losses and inflicting material damage, are a direct expression of the general extremist line pursued by the government of that state.

The government of Israel continues an unbridled anti-Arab campaign and is preparing the Israeli population, not for a peaceful political settlement in this region, but for the continuation of hostilities and for retaining by force the captured Arab territories.

A policy of terrorism is being conducted against the peaceful Arab population of these territories and plans are being carried out for the

so-called "development of Arab lands," in other words for their annexation to Israel.

At a time when efforts are being exerted in the United Nations and outside it in the interests of achieving an early peaceful settlement of the Middle Eastern problem, when the Arab states have declared perfectly clear their readiness and intention to seek such a settlement on the basis of the Security Council's decisions, the Israeli government repeats over and over again that it will go on sabotaging these decisions.

More and more frequently the idea of expanding the territory of Israel at the expense of the neighbouring Arab states can be seen through the pronouncements of the leaders who determine the policy of the state of Israel.

It continues to be perfectly obvious today that Israel is brazenly challenging the states that are interested in safeguarding peace and security in the Eastern Mediterranean only because it enjoys the support and patronage of certain imperialist powers which finance the aggressive Israeli policy and supply Israel with modern arms and actually encourage it to foreign adventures.

If it were not for this support, the Israeli militarists would have long ago restrained their ardour and the political leaders of Israel would have assessed the possible consequences of their actions more soberly.

The longer the ruling circles of Israel create obstacles to a peaceful settlement in the Middle East, the higher the price will be that they will have to incur.

The peoples cannot allow Israel to violate the political and economic interests and the security of the states of the Middle East and also of states adjacent to this region.

Israel must not be allowed to profit from her aggression and from her current armed provocations against the Arab states.

The road Israel and its patrons have taken is fraught with the most serious complications. It is the duty of all peaceable states to prevent another dangerous explosion in that region. This makes it imperative, above all, to compel the ruling circles of Israel to take into consideration the interests of other states and peoples.

The armed provocations of the Israeli military are being sharply denounced in the Soviet

¹ *Soviet News* (London), 12/11/1968, p. 62.

Union. The government of Israel bears a grave responsibility before its own people and before the peoples of other countries for all the possible consequences of its reckless actions.

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Report of the Soviet Vice-Premier Mazurov on the State of the Union.¹ [Excerpt]

Moscow, November 6, 1968

Dangerous tension continues also in the Near East in view of the refusal by Israel and the imperialist forces supporting it to obey the U.N. decisions.

Our state has consistently sided with the Arab peoples who were victimized by Israel's aggression and has demanded the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the territories they occupied and a peaceful settlement of the conflict on the basis of the U.N. Security Council's decision of Nov. 22, 1968, as well as the satisfaction of the Palestine Arabs' legitimate rights. Soviet people resolutely condemn the provocations by the Israeli military and express their solidarity with the just struggle of the Arab people for their national and social liberation and against imperialism and neo-colonialism.

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Speech by the French Foreign Minister Debré Before the National Assembly.² [Excerpt]

Paris, November 7, 1968

Why, at a time when a glimpse of hope has appeared in the Far East, should war again be

casting its shadow over the Near East?

Admittedly, Israel's conflict with her Arab neighbours, and with the United Arab Republic first and foremost, has not caused the number of deaths or the extensive destruction which the whole of humanity finds so deplorable in Vietnam; all the same it is, potentially, just as great a danger.

I mentioned it just now. France immediately stated her attitude and supported it by imposing an arms embargo. We helped to draft, and voted for the Security Council resolution last November.

By calling for the liberation of the occupied territories, and by proclaiming that all Near Eastern countries are entitled to enjoy the benefits of international law, we offered the only solution that can lead to a lasting agreement, and it is this concept that forms the basis of the Security Council resolution.

I do not intend to recapitulate the fundamental features of the case in detail.

An impartial envoy has been entrusted by the Secretary-General of the United Nations with the task of laying down the conditions essential for the implementation of the resolution. But he is reluctant to continue his mission because although he has observed a tendency in the United Arab Republic that seems to him favourable for the implementation of the resolution, he sees no chance whatever of progress on the other side. In fact, the Israeli Government is still insisting on direct negotiations. This is an attitude which, we have felt from the first, has not the slightest chance of success.

This is extremely serious and a heavy load of responsibility will fall on such of the parties concerned as may be the cause of failure. There are already too many ominous signs, and they are increasing: more intense confrontations, renewal of hostilities, escalation of terrorism, support for Israel by the United States, support for Egypt by the Soviet Union. The more time passes, the greater the urgency. Let us hope that history will not one day have to record that an opportunity of settling the conflict was thrown away in 1968. Nothing will be possible in the immediate future if Israel does not agree to evacuate the conquered territories. Nothing can be achieved if both sides refuse to recognise each other's right to exist, and if they refuse to realise the implications of this right as regards both freedom of navigation

¹ *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 27/11/1968, p. 7. From *Pravda*.

² *La Politique Etrangère de la France: Textes et Documents*. 2nd Sem., 1968, p. 152.

and the refugee problem.

We have already said that it was disagreement between the United States and the Soviet Union that created this conflict. We say that the great powers should agree to ensure a reasonable solution and to enforce it. We have said, and we repeat, that we are ready to commit ourselves to such system of guarantees as may result from an agreement to ensure the enforcement of international law in this part of the world.

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Statement by the Israeli Premier Eshkol in the Knesset on the Political and Security Situation.¹ [Excerpts]

Jerusalem, November 11, 1968

Mr. President, Members of the Knesset. A few months after the Six Day War I reviewed our situation in this House. At that time we were solely preoccupied with one problem, the struggle for peace. We have tried every means and made every effort to establish peace, and this struggle is still at its height.

I will once more summarise the main principles of the government's policy.

A practical peace settlement and a treaty signed by the parties form the basis of any settlement between us and the neighbouring countries, and all the elements of such a settlement, in particular agreed and secure frontiers, depend on such a peace, and can have no existence without it. Without such a peace the map of the cease-fire lines on all fronts will remain as it is.

It is our intention to secure such a peace through direct negotiations and the signing of treaties between Israel and her neighbours, collectively or individually, for if they are not prepared to have direct contacts with us, it means that they do not recognise us, and without recognition there can be no peace.

Freedom of navigation for us in the Suez Canal and the effective defence of free passage

through the Straits of Tiran are conditions for peace, and peace will lead to regional cooperation towards solving the various problems, especially the solution of the refugee problem within a regional and international framework.

If we look back we can see that the gains we made in the Six Day War and the political principles we defined are still as they were. We still have what we gained, we have not changed our principles, and we still have the strength to confront such battles as may lie ahead of us.

I should like to add that the government has not abstained from any decision demanded by the political situation, or let slip any opportunity offered by the political situation, and if it has not decided more than it actually has done, or not taken such steps that perhaps may seem necessary, that is because the political situation itself has not allowed this. I say this in spite of the fact that, in the meantime, we have experienced a variety of incidents and operations. During the last seventeen months the government has retained security gains without destroying prospects of peace, and without ceasing to examine every possible prospect of peace.

Members of the Knesset. In spite of the official cease-fire, Israeli citizens and soldiers are being killed and wounded—recently the Minister of Defence submitted to this House the numbers of these casualties. Since then the series of bloody incidents has continued. About two weeks ago there was heavy bloodshed on the Canal, and also in the Jordan Valley and other places. The graves are still fresh, and the bereaved families have hardly concluded the Seventh Day commemorations. This House sends its condolences to the bereaved families and its salutations to our soldiers, and their commander, who are on the watch at sea, on land and in the air.

No people can remain indifferent when the blood of its sons is shed. But we do realise that there is something in our history, in our very being, that makes us more sensitive than others to loss of life. It is not difficult to observe this, and it must not be regarded as weakness. This attitude to every individual in Israel, to every single life in Israel, is one of the things that make us what we are. But grief alone is suspect as a political adviser, and even though we grieve, we must look at things with our eyes open. It is

¹ *Knesset Records* (in Hebrew), 11/11/1968, pp. 203-206.

not the fact that we are established on the banks of the Canal and the Jordan that is increasing the number of casualties in Israel; it is the hostility of the Arab rulers who will not accept peace. Over the years we have witnessed cruel and painful losses, and our stand on secure frontiers, although it does not prevent bloodshed, is capable of removing the danger to our very existence. This is the difference.

Thanks to this stand, the Israel Defence Army has recently been able to raid the Nile Valley, thereby giving a warning that it is not Israel only that is open to attack. If there is quiet on this side of the frontiers—all the frontiers—there will also be quiet on the other side.

I must also point out that the number of Arab casualties in dead and wounded will be greater than ours. We regret bloodshed, whoever is the victim, and there would have been no need for any losses had the countries around us been governed by a sense of responsibility and forbearance and a desire for peace.

After their defeat in the war, our enemies tried to throw all their weight into secret warfare, in an attempt to make it a civil war, but they have not succeeded. Although acts of sabotage have increased, such acts have remained within the framework of irregular military activity by the Arab countries after their failure on the field of regular face to face fighting.

The population of the areas under our control have not followed the elements that wanted to make these areas bases and to recruit their inhabitants for a continuous attack on us. We have taken measures to prevent infiltration over our frontiers, and these measures have borne fruit.

An opportunity has been provided for the Jews and the million Arabs in the occupied areas to get to know each other, and the Arab inhabitants of these areas have come to know us in a way they have not done for more than twenty years. This has perhaps lifted a corner of the curtain of separation and fear that the Arab rulers set up between us and their peoples when they fought against the establishment of Israel.

We realise that there is no direct connection of cause and effect between this new mutual acquaintance and readiness to live together. Certainly this mutual acquaintance is essential if we are to live as neighbours, but it is not enough.

The hatred that has been growing for twenty years will not vanish overnight. It is very difficult to impose good neighbourliness and friendship, but we must make every possible effort to do so. Every breach in the walls of separation and fear of the unknown helps, and the policy we pursue in our daily life in the occupied areas may also help.

I must mention that the armies of the neighbouring countries have become stronger. The Soviet Union is still rebuilding the ruins of the Arab armies and strengthening them to the extent that they are now stronger than they were before the Six Day War. Let me give you one important example: the Egyptians now possess about one and a half times as many fighter-bombers as they did before the Six Day War.

But our strength has also increased; this applies to all arms. I should like to draw particular attention to our acquisition of Skyhawks. I want to express my appreciation of and gratitude for the attitude of President Johnson who, when I visited him in Texas at the beginning of this year, showed great awareness and understanding of the need to maintain the balance of power in the Middle East, as was shown at the time by our joint communique. I hope that the further step he has taken in the direction of supplying us with supersonic planes will bear fruit in the near future.

Not only did President Johnson appreciate the political and security aspect of the problem; he also realised, as few other great world personalities have done, the peculiar spiritual and historical character of the state of Israel. I am therefore confident that the Jewish people collectively will remember him for ever, as they have done in the case of other personalities, whether in the United States or other countries, who have stood beside us in times of change and difficulty.

Last week there were presidential elections in the United States. Once more, in this House, I should like to congratulate President-elect Richard Nixon on his election. I well remember my meetings with him; I remember the understanding and friendship his words expressed. I believe that we can depend upon his strong and sincere desire to work for peace and security in this area and the whole world.

I think that there are grounds for assuming

that every American administration will work for the safety, security and prosperity of Israel. Such a policy is in accord with what the United States is trying to do in the whole world. This can be understood from the words of important American personalities of all parties, and of all intellectual backgrounds and trends. Concern for peace in the area, for the security of Israel, for the achievement of an agreed peace, and support for Israel's capacity for self-defence, are common to them all.

Members of the Knesset. Our power to repulse the enemy and, if I may use the expression, to deter him, is now one of the basic forces in the maintenance of peace. We have learned from our experience in the Six Day War that the concept of deterrence is relative. As you know, it was the accepted view in 1967—accepted not only by us, but by experts throughout the world—that an offensive Egyptian war was not to be expected before 1970. Fortunately for us, we did not believe this gloomy forecast, and we were ready to repulse the attack and defeat the enemy. This estimate—that there could be no war before 1970, was mistaken, especially in that it did not take into account the emotional force of wishful thinking, which has nothing to do with reason, that prevailed among the Egyptians. This factor is also valid today and must be taken into account, especially as regards the extent to which we must be prepared.

I now pass on, Members of the Knesset, to an appraisal of the situation in the Middle East.

Developments in the Arab countries seem to be moving between two poles. The first is the pole of dismay at going back to the beginning, the pole of basic study of the way ahead. This attitude, although it is still far from being our attitude, or from being a sound and wise one, indicates a spirit of "let us look for our course and study it". The other pole is that of extreme hostility, which regards war as being the only way out, the only solution.

There can be no doubt that Egypt is a principal factor in the problem of readiness or unreadiness for peace. Egypt was defeated here and failed in the Yemen—not to mention the consequences of the union with Syria—as a result of the errors of her leaders.

Now she is depending more than ever before,

in her security and her economy, on the goodwill of other Arab countries and countries outside the Arab world. Her general influence in the Arab world has diminished, and it is no longer enough that Abdel Nasser wants a summit conference, for such a conference to be held. But it is still Egypt that decides on the Arab world's attitude to Israel, to the extent that those elements in the Arab world that wanted some change now find themselves outside the framework. Jordan, too, even assuming that she has a will of her own in this matter, or that there are elements in Jordan that have their own wishes, is not exempt from pressure from Cairo.

Cairo itself, so it seems, is moving between the two poles I have mentioned—the pole of extremism and that of studying the way ahead. There are extremists in Egypt, both inside and outside the army, and there are also intellectuals who have lost the way and lost themselves. There are also other elements that are perhaps reluctant to see Egypt falling into the clutches of a great power. But certainly there is no positive change in the attitude of the Egyptian leadership, as can be seen from the shooting, which is quite deliberate.

In view of statements by Egyptian spokesmen which have double meanings and which are heard outside Egypt, it is as well to remember what Abdel Nasser said himself. On 14 September he spoke of the "liberation of the territory" as a sacred duty and a fundamental task, and called for efforts to achieve it by all ways and means and by the mobilisation of all possible strength. On 23 July Abdel Nasser explained the concept of the "liberation of the territory", adding the expression "the achievement of victory", when affirming that all military strength must be mobilised to that end. He repeated the principle that "what is taken by force can only be recovered by force", as if it was not he who lit the fire in the area with his own hands. He repeated the Khartoum "No's"¹—"No negotiations, no peace and no recognition", adding a fourth "No"—"No deals at the expense of Palestinian territory and the Palestinian people." To sum up: he regards the mere fact that peace has not been made as a failure for Israel and a victory for himself.

¹ See *International Documents on Palestine, 1967*, pp. 655-657.

Only two conclusions can be drawn from this: in the light of these statements it is clear that Egypt will not be satisfied until she once more tries to annihilate Israel by force. The word "Palestine" has never had a partial meaning in the Arab political dictionary. If Abdel Nasser is seeking the *status quo ante*, it may well be that he does not mean the *status quo ante* of 5 June 1967, but that what he really wants is a return to the *status quo ante* of 2 November 1917, that he thinks that this is within his grasp, and that the inflammatory propaganda about this date, 2 November 1917, has not been in vain. This is the first conclusion.

The second conclusion is that as long as Egypt continues to treat the various terrorist organisations as her spoilt children, and regards peace, which above all things is Israel's aim, as something forbidden, her claim to accept the Security Council resolution can only be regarded as procrastination. But I must warn that this attitude of Egypt's may well—I do not say that it will necessarily do so—but that it may well lead to a dangerous crisis.

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Members of the Knesset. I have mentioned the action taken by the Soviet Union to increase the military strength of the Arab countries. The fact is that the Russians are also engaged in other activities and are interfering more and more in the affairs of the area, both from a desire to strengthen the regimes that support the Soviet Union, and because of international considerations. It is to be doubted whether these actions really will strengthen the regimes that Moscow wants, or increase the prestige of the Soviet Union—what is certain is that they will lead to a deterioration of the situation in the area.

I do not want to add much to this gloomy prophecy, but I must say a word about the people of Israel.

This people will fight if they are attacked, and they will not be alone; the conscience of the peoples and of millions of friends in the world will not allow it.

Members of the Knesset. Although we are obliged to prepare ourselves and increase our strength in all fields—military, economic and social—we shall continue to make political efforts

in the struggle for peace.

As it has been in the past, so is it now. This aim is the basis of our actions. What this means is that peace alone can take the place of the present situation, a peace which fundamentally changes all relations, a peace which is the fruit of understanding and discussion between the two parties, a peace which determines the relations between the two parties, as is the custom of civilised nations.

To speak of peace, of readiness for peace, or of readiness to abrogate the state of belligerency, is not compatible with constant violation of the cease-fire. It is my duty to say—and you are my witnesses—that the fighting has not stopped—the only thing that has happened is that the form of the fighting has changed. We should make it clear to ourselves and to others that countries that engage in bloody incidents, encourage sabotage activity and allow aggressors to use their territory as a base for their attacks and for firing on us, hardly give the impression that they want real peace or the implementation of the international resolution calling for peace.

Our firm endurance and our continuous information and political efforts have created an atmosphere which has frustrated the efforts of the Arab countries and their allies to destroy the prestige and principles of Israel and to oppose her wishes. The activities of our Foreign Minister, of our diplomatic representatives at the United Nations and in the capitals of the world, and of those engaged in information activities in various parts of the world, have not been in vain.

On many occasions this task has not been an easy one, for people have been delighted when we have been exposed to great danger alone. And now that we have defeated our enemies, they are giving us advice that is totally incompatible with the maintenance of our security in the future, with the secure frontiers that are vital to us and with a situation of real peace.

All who advise us to accept anything less than total peace, peace that is recognised, agreed on and guaranteed for ever by both sides; all who propose that we accept anything less than genuine security, less than the full expression of our historical links, are, in fact, proposing that we return to the chaos that prevailed in May 1967.

Our attitude to Dr. Jarring's mission is part and parcel of our struggle for genuine peace.

We support this mission as a matter of principle first and foremost. Dr. Jarring is working, on a basis of the Security Council resolution, to establish a lasting peace, and we say Good Luck to any one who is trying to find a way to such a peace. We say this at a time when we know that Dr. Jarring has not succeeded in making the parties agree to negotiations.

So far the Arab governments have not sent us, through him, the slightest indication of their intention to answer the simple question: Do you want peace or not? And if so, what sort of peace? We say one thing and they answer another. As for us, our basic principle is that the peace that is desired, the peace that is essential, is an agreed peace, not a settlement imposed from outside.

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Joint Communiqué on the Mauritanian President Ould-Dadah's Visit to Syria.¹
[Excerpts]

Damascus, November 12, 1968

In response to an invitation from the Head of State, Dr. Nur al-Din al-Atasi, the President of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania, H.E. Mukhtar Ould-Dadah, visited the Syrian Arab Republic from 8 to 12 November 1968.

In the course of their talks the two sides reviewed the Zionist-imperialist conspiracy against the Arab homeland and the aggression of 5 June 1967 against the Arab nation.

The Mauritanian side affirmed that the Mauritanian people support their brothers in the Arab homeland in their struggle to recover the rights of the Arab people in Palestine and to eliminate the consequences of the Zionist-imperialist aggression.

The two sides agreed that Israel is a racist colonialist base established by imperialism in the heart of the Arab homeland to ensure military,

political and economic domination and to control the resources of the area. They expressed their conviction that armed popular struggle is the most effective way of confronting the challenges of colonialism and imperialism and the ambitions of Zionism, and of liberating the occupied territories. They also affirmed the necessity of making all possible efforts to win the support of world public opinion for the rights of the Arab people in Palestine.

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Joint Communiqué on the Iranian Shah Reza Pahlavi's Visit to Saudi Arabia.²
[Excerpts]

Jiddah, November 14, 1968

On the invitation of HM the King of Saudi Arabia, Faisal ibn Abd al-Aziz Al Sa'ud, HM the Shah of Iran, Muhammad Reza Pahlavi, paid an official visit to Saudi Arabia from 9th to 14th November 1968.

The two Kings declared their absolute support for the current efforts to back the legal rights and demands of the Palestinian people. HM King Faysal expressed his appreciation of the Shah's stand with the Arabs in defence of the Islamic shrines. The two Kings expressed their concern over the gravity of the Middle East situation. Both believe that the fundamental step to achieve permanent stability and peace in the area lies in the Israeli forces' withdrawal from the occupied Arab territories...

¹ *Al-Thawra* (Damascus), 13/11/1968.

² *Jiddah* home service in Arabic, 17.00 GMT, 14/11/1968. B.E.C., ME 2927/E/1.

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Communiqué on the NATO Ministerial Council Meeting, 15-16 November.¹ [Excerpt]

Brussels, November 16, 1968

5. The new uncertainties resulting from the recent Soviet actions [in Czechoslovakia] also extend to the Mediterranean basin. This situation requires that the Allies continue by every available means their efforts to promote stability and a just and equitable peace, as well as mutual co-operation and understanding, in the area. The expansion of Soviet activity in the Mediterranean, including the increased presence of Soviet naval units, requires vigilance to safeguard allied security.

6. The members of the Alliance urge the Soviet Union, in the interests of world peace, to refrain from using force and interfering in the affairs of other States.

Determined to safeguard the freedom and independence of their countries they could not remain indifferent to any development which endangers their security.

Clearly any Soviet intervention directly or indirectly affecting the situation in Europe or in the Mediterranean would create an international crisis with grave consequences.

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Replies by the U.S. Representative to the United Nations Wiggins to Questions on the Middle East.² [Excerpt]

New York, November 17, 1968

Mr. MacVane: Sir, this weekend NATO is-

sued a sort of warning to Russia against intervening in the affairs of countries in Europe and the Mediterranean. Would it be completely unrealistic to, say, start a movement in the United Nations to do something the same?

Ambassador Wiggins: John, no one knows better than you do the limitations of the United Nations, which operates basically with the necessary agreement of the great powers. And whenever we have one of these great problems that involve the great powers, the formal steps that the United Nations can take are inhibited.

Mr. MacVane: Of course, Russia has already intervened to some extent in the Middle East and the Mediterranean.

Mr. Harsch: Well, if we want to do anything about the Middle East to try and restore some relative stability there, what you say surely means it's got to be done by negotiation between Moscow and Washington, not in the United Nations.

Ambassador Wiggins: Well, I would say the U.N. is already operative here through the mission of Ambassador [Gunnar] Jarring, and they are proceeding.

Mr. Harsch: But as far as we can tell, that mission is a complete failure, isn't it?

Ambassador Wiggins: No, I wouldn't say so. I think the mission has gone through two phases. It's gone through a preliminary phase, in which the Ambassador gained the confidence of the parties and solicited their views as best he could get them and sounded out the situation; and then when this session of the General Assembly started, he was, it must be acknowledged, quite discouraged and felt that if he couldn't get hold of something with which he could work, he might have to give it up. But there was forthcoming during the meetings here an exchange of views between the Arab countries and Israel, and I think he was given something with which he could work—not as much as he might have wished, not as forthcoming on either part as he would have liked; but still I think he has obtained enough to encourage him in the belief that he can proceed further with his next steps.

What those next steps are, I think he hasn't

¹ U.S. Department of State Bulletin, 9/12/1968, p. 596.

² U.S. Department of State Bulletin, 9/12/1968, pp. 601-602. Ambassador James Russell Wiggins was interviewed on the American Broadcasting Company's radio and television programme "Issues and Answers."

yet decided; but I think it would be a mistake and premature to say that the Jarring mission has failed. I think it has opened up some chances of making some progress in reconciling these two parties on their essential differences.

Mr. McVane: Are we talking with the Russians about this Jarring mission and about the outcome? At the moment, of course, you have the Arab ministers saying they won't negotiate directly and the Israelis saying we must negotiate directly. Are we trying to come to some understanding with the Russians on this whole thing?

Ambassador Wiggins: John, I think this struggle over the modalities has been largely surmounted by Jarring and the exchange of papers to him, and answers back, as a method of getting around that initial difficulty. And of course, we are exchanging views with all the great powers and other powers here. There are a great many people—one of the virtues of this environment for a problem of this kind is that a great many interested parties have a chance to make their influence felt on both sides, and I think this was helpful to Jarring; and that kind of exchange of views, I'm sure, will continue.

Mr. Harsch: Mr. Ambassador, is it not an observable fact that the Arab interest in a settlement in the Middle East seems to have declined directly from the moment the Russians moved into Czechoslovakia? In other words, is it not an unfortunate or sad observable commentary on the times that force does still seem to prevail, to be the more persuasive influence?

Ambassador Wiggins: I hadn't had that association, Joe. You're sort of harking back to the relation between Hungary and the '56 invasion. I think that situation is not parallel.

Mr. Harsch: You have had a Russian show of force, haven't you—

Ambassador Wiggins: You have a Russian show of force.

Mr. Harsch:—in Czechoslovakia, plus the steady movement of Russian power in the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean? Now, can't you look back and see that the Arab attitude toward the settlement of Israel has been greatly influenced by that? The Arabs have become

much tougher since the Russians showed force.

Ambassador Wiggins: But you also have several times demonstrated the capacity of Israel to resist that kind of aggression. So I don't know that the parallel is clear here. But in any case, I think it important that there is an effort, and I think a genuine effort, on the part of the Soviet Union, on the part of the United States, on the part of Great Britain and other powers, to really try to bring about peace in the Middle East, and I believe these are honest efforts.

Mr. Harsch: Oh, now, this is interesting. You believe that the Soviets want peace in the Middle East?

Ambassador Wiggins: Yes, sir. I do.

Mr. Harsch: So you draw quite a distinction, then, between the attitude of the Soviets now and, say, the attitude of Germany in the period before World War II, where they used a display of power to intimidate.

Ambassador Wiggins: I think you falsely relate the theaters in this respect this time.

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Joint Communiqué on the Iranian Shah Reza Pahlavi's Visit to Kuwait.¹ [Excerpts]

Kuwait, November 17, 1968

...H.M. Muhammad Reza Pahlavi Arya Mehr, Shahanshah of Iran, paid an official visit to Kuwait from 14th to 17th November 1968 at the official invitation of H.H. Shaikh Sabah al-Salem al-Sabah, the Ruler of Kuwait...

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The two Head of State also reviewed the current Middle East situation. They expressed support for the efforts being made to support the legitimate rights and demands of the Palestinian people. They called for the withdrawal of Israeli

¹ Kuwait home service in Arabic, 10.00 GMT, 17/11/1968. B.B.C., ME/2929/E/1.

forces from occupied Arab territory and for the restoration of Jerusalem to its former status, in accordance with the U.N. General Assembly resolutions in this respect.¹ H.H. the exalted Ruler expressed his appreciation of the stand taken by H.M. the Shahanshah Arya Mehr and his support for the Arab stand in defending the Islamic holy places in Jerusalem.

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Speech by the Maltese Prime Minister Olivier at a Banquet in His Honour During a Visit to India.² [Excerpt]

New Delhi, November 18, 1968

We are all too conscious in the Mediterranean of the potentially dangerous situation which is developing, a situation which has evolved rapidly since the Arab-Israeli war of June last year. That war itself has created dangers and has caused to my country economic disabilities of movement through the closure of the Suez Canal. But more unease is felt because of the mounting of tensions as arms build up in the Mediterranean basin. Imbalances and new situations are arising which could lead to the hotting up of a cold war in the Mediterranean. Fears are mounting and counter-action is advocated. The super Powers are involved and the Arab-Israeli dispute looms large as a danger point in the basin.

Malta is therefore anxious to see peace and stability in the Mediterranean following a lasting settlement in the Middle East based on justice and on understanding of realities. For this reason, Malta makes an appeal to India to make full use of her vast influence for the finding of a satisfactory and equitable solution which would ensure lasting peace in the Middle East.

¹ Texts in *International Documents on Palestine, 1967*, pp. 256, 260.

² *Indian Foreign Affairs Record*, November 1968, pp. 321-322.

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Interview Granted by the NATO Commander in Southern Europe Admiral Rivero to the British Weekly "Jewish Chronicle".³ [Excerpts]

Rome, November 1968

Q. What do you think is the real aim of the Soviet Union in the Mediterranean?

A. First, I would say that the Russians have come to realise the value of sea power and naval forces in extending their influence in peacetime, in order to create political and psychological situations which would give aid and comfort to their friends and support them psychologically.

Secondly, they also wish to create some concern in the minds of other countries in the area, with respect to their own security.

Until a few years ago the Soviet Navy was kept very close to home. But now they have embarked on a very ambitious programme of deploying their forces even to remote regions of the globe, far away from their home shores. In other words, the Soviet Navy has become very actively a deep-water navy.

Q. Senator Legaret, of France, recently stated that the importance of the Soviet Fleet in the Mediterranean is "greatly exaggerated," that it has no chance of challenging the American Sixth Fleet and that it is at present smaller than the French and Italian fleets combined. Is this correct?

A. I think this is essentially correct as far as the relative size of the Soviet squadron or fleet is concerned. Certainly the United States' Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean is much more powerful than the Soviet Fleet.

One thing which it is also important to mention with respect to the Soviet Fleet is that it does not possess the air power which would allow it to survive in case of a confrontation with the Nato navies, which possess this air power, and can maintain air superiority over the area.

From the viewpoint of the surface force, although it is a military threat which would need to be dealt with should they take offensive action, its impact in peacetime is in a much more import-

³ *Jewish Chronicle* (London), 22/11/1968, p. 12.

ant sense a political and psychological one.

I always quote as an example when I talk about this subject, the fact that when the Israeli destroyer, Eilat, was attacked by Egyptian missiles fired from a fast patrol boat in the harbour, there were Russian ships in that same harbour.

Their presence there really prevented the Israelis from taking counter-action against that particular unit if they had wanted to do so, because it would have created, you might say, possible direct confrontation with the Soviet forces. So that, even though the Soviet forces did not take part directly, their mere presence had a strong influence on the military situation.

It was a positive factor for their friends, of course. And they exerted a positive influence on, you might say, a tactical situation without direct participation.

Q. Do you know whether the Russians are already operating from their own air bases in Egypt?

A. I do not think so.

Q. Would you say that the sinking of the Israeli submarine, Dakar, might be vaguely connected with or related to the presence of Soviet submarines in the area?

A. I would be very sceptical about it. It is a very serious act and, if discovered, would represent a very serious situation. There is never any certainty that you can attack and sink another ship without some trace. It is really a matter of chance, and they would be taking a very serious risk.

Q. Have Russian atomic submarines equipped with missiles already been detected in the Mediterranean?

A. I cannot say categorically that there are Soviet atomic submarines in the Mediterranean. But there is no reason why they should not be here.

Q. I would like to talk about the possible threat—I mean direct threat—against any country which is neither a Nato member nor Communist. Israel, for instance. What would happen if Israel were directly attacked by Soviet forces?

A. I cannot talk about an area outside my responsibility. I am a Nato commander with a responsibility for the defence of the three countries

that comprise the southern region (Italy, Greece and Turkey). Of course, what happens in the entire area is of interest. You cannot ignore it. But my responsibility relates to executing the political decisions of the members of Nato. So I think it would be most inappropriate for me to speculate on what these decisions would be.

Q. If Moscow supports the Arabs in a new conflict with Israel, what measures could you take?

A. I could not do anything in that case, for Nato is not concerned with that problem.

Q. But the Sixth Fleet, how could it intervene?

A. In my function as Nato commander of the southern region, I should not speak for the United States as well. But I believe that, in case of war, the Sixth Fleet is able to neutralise any threat by the Soviet Union.

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Q. Do you believe that Arab countries with Soviet bases are, for this reason, potential enemies of Nato countries?

A. I would not characterise any country as a potential enemy. I think you have to talk about the circumstances in which those bases might be used, and the situation existing at the time.

If you were engaged in actual hostilities with the Soviet block, and we hope this will not happen, and the Soviet Union were using bases in certain places in the Mediterranean, then I think Nato would have to look at this seriously and decide what action would need to be taken.

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**Telegram From the U.S. Secretary of State
Rusk to the Executive Committee, Near East
Emergency Donations.¹**

Washington, November 22, 1968

November 22, 1968

*Executive Committee
Near East Emergency Donations
Room 701, 610 Fifth Avenue
New York, N.Y.*

Your telegram of November 15 calls our attention to the great human suffering faced this winter by thousands of Arab civilian men, women and children uprooted by the war eighteen months ago, and now inadequately sheltered in makeshift camps in Jordan. These people survived last winter in temporary camps in the Jordan Valley where the climate is mild. But last spring and summer renewed fighting forced them to flee to higher ground where winter conditions can be severe. I share your concern that such a crisis be averted.

In his speech in the U.N. General Assembly November 18, Ambassador Wiggins not only made clear continuing United States support for the United Nations Relief and Works Agency, but also drew particular attention to the plight of those displaced as a result of the June 1967 hostilities, especially the group in Jordan mentioned in your telegram. In addition to our regular contributions to U.N.R.W.A., we have during the past eighteen months made special contributions valued at more than \$8 million to help meet the emergency needs resulting from the June war.

The most direct and efficient means of bringing relief to these displaced persons would be the Israeli Government's agreement to allow them to return to their former homes and refugee camps on the Jordan West Bank. We have strongly urged Israel to take this action. While we are encouraged by the Israeli Government's announcement November 19 that it will allow 7,000 refugees to return, we hope Israel can do more. We have conveyed to the Government of Israel our hope and expectation that the pledge made

by Foreign Minister [Abba] Eban to the United Nations October 8 will be implemented on a meaningful scale.

Your organization deserves special commendation for the fine work it has done on behalf of the refugees. NEED's efforts are in the finest tradition of this nation's record for humanitarian service.

Dean Rusk
Secretary of State

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**Authorised Tass Statement on the NATO
Council Meeting, 15-16 November.² [Ex-
cerpt]**

Moscow, November 23, 1968

Those taking part in the session displayed a heightened interest in the Mediterranean region.

It would, of course, suit the leaders of the North Atlantic bloc if they were in a position to run various parts of Europe, other continents, the Mediterranean and the Middle East, as they thought fit.

These leaders regard the presence of the American Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean as quite natural, although the United States is separated from that region by many thousands of kilometres and has no direct bearing on it.

The presence of the Soviet Fleet in the Mediterranean is inconvenient for them, however. It hampers their aggressive attempts.

The Soviet Union, as a Black Sea, and in consequence a Mediterranean power, exercises its irrefutable right to a presence in that region.

Soviet warships are not in the Mediterranean with the purpose of creating a threat to any people or state; their task is to promote stabilisation and peace in the Mediterranean region.

¹ U.S. Department of State Bulletin, 23/12/1968, p. 662.

² *Soviet News* (London), 3/12/1968, pp. 81, 82. For NATO Communiqué, see *ante*, doc. 190.

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Joint Communiqué on the Rumanian Foreign Minister Manescu's Visit to Turkey.¹
[Excerpts]

Ankara, November 28, 1968

At the invitation of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Turkish Republic, Mr. Ihsan Sabri Caglayangil, made on behalf of the Turkish Government, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Rumania, Mr. Corneliu Manescu, paid an official visit to Turkey from 22 to 28 November 1968.

Reaffirming their concern at the dangerous situation resulting from the continued Middle East crisis, they expressed the hope that the efforts now being made in accordance with the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967 will soon lead to a peaceful solution of this conflict by establishing a just and equitable peace in the area.

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Joint Communiqué on the Somali President Shermarke's Visit to India.² [Excerpts]

New Delhi, November 30, 1968

At the invitation of the President of India, Dr. Zakir Husain, His Excellency Dr. Abdirashid Ali Shermarke, President of the Republic of Somalia, paid a State visit to India from the 22nd to 29th November, 1968.

Both sides expressed their anxiety and concern over the delay in the implementation of the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967, on the Middle East (West Asia) situation

and the resultant growth of dangerous tension in the area.

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Replies by the U.S. Secretary of State Rusk to Questions on the Middle East.³ [Excerpt]

Washington, December 1, 1968

Mr. Agronsky [CBS]: Mr. Secretary, you raised yourself the other problem that we haven't addressed ourselves to yet—the problem of the crisis in the Middle East.

Secretary Rusk: Right.

Mr. Agronsky: Now, Mr. Nixon, in the course of his campaign, charged the Johnson administration—I quote Mr. Nixon now—"it followed halting, lame, and ineffectual policies in responding to the twin problems of Soviet pressure and regional instability in the Middle East." Have you been in contact with any of the Nixon administration people in terms of the Middle East crisis? Is there any kind of advice that you have given them or any indication of a policy that they would intend to follow in the Middle East?

Secretary Rusk: Well, it is not our practice to give unsolicited advice to the new administration, but I have met with Governor Scranton in preparation for his visit to the Middle East. I would not draw too sharp a confrontation between what might be said in the course of the campaign and what our new administration might do in terms of the hard realities of the situation. I have no doubt that the new administration will want us now to support fully the Jarring mission and to press everybody to give cooperation to the Jarring mission and try to find some movement toward peace, because the new administration would like to see on January 21 an improved situation in the Middle East. And I have no doubt that when

¹ Turkish Foreign Ministry Bulletin, November 1968, pp. 58-59. From the French text.

² Indian Foreign Affairs Record, November 1968, pp. 329-330.

³ U.S. Department of State Bulletin, 23/12/1968, p. 643. Secretary Rusk was interviewed on the Columbia Broadcasting System's radio and television programme "Face the Nation."

they come in they will also want to support the Jarring mission and try to move both sides to a peaceful solution here.

Mr. Agronsky: From your long experience with the Soviet Union, can you conceive of any possibility of Russia agreeing with us to limit the arms race in the Middle East?

Secretary Rusk: My guess is that that question will be active only when there is a general settlement in the Middle East. We have pressed the Russians very hard on this for more than a year because we do not want to see an arms race in the Middle East. But they have been very reluctant to get into it until there is a more general settlement of the political issues of the Middle East. I have no doubt that when that moment comes, and it will come despite all the travail, the Soviets might then be willing to talk about a limitation of the arms going into that area.

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Joint Communiqué on the Ceylonese Prime Minister Senanayake's Visit to India.¹ [Excerpts]

New Delhi, December 4, 1968

At the invitation of Shrimati Indira Gandhi, Prime Minister of India, Mr. Dudley Senanayake, Prime Minister of Ceylon, visited India from 22th November to 4th December 1968...

The Prime Ministers expressed concern over the continuing stalemate in West Asia and the frequent breaches of the ceasefire. They were of the view that peace in this region was vital for the economic development and well-being of the countries of Asia and Africa as much as for the peace of the world. There was an identity of views on the important issues of this problem and the approach to a solution. They reiterated the principle that the acquisition of territories gained by military action can neither be recognized nor

condoned. They reaffirmed their conviction that a just and honourable settlement should be found on the basis of the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967.

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Speech by the French Foreign Minister Debré Before the Senate.² [Excerpts]

Paris, December 4, 1968

First there is the Mediterranean, which is to-day a focus of preoccupations, the gravest of which is being caused us by the Middle East conflict, and I must admit that I really cannot understand the censure that is being levelled at the French attitude in this affair. This attitude constitutes nothing more than a desire to implement the Security Council resolution of November 1967, according to which the territories occupied by force should be returned and there should be recognition of the rights of the peoples of that part of the world not only to secure frontiers but also to participation, as by right, in international life—including the right of passage through the Suez Canal.

We are working for the implementation of this resolution and it is our earnest wish that it may be implemented. Throughout I have never concealed our attitude from the foreign ministers of the countries concerned—from the arms embargo to the drawing up of a time schedule to cover the period starting with the evacuation of the occupied territories and ending with the mutual recognition of the states concerned, under the conditions I have just mentioned.

We went even further by declaring that in case, at some meeting or at some session of the Security Council, the possibility of a solution should eventually arise, we were ready to provide our guarantee not only by appending our signature to a treaty, but also by the presence of our soldiers. Thus, far from declining our responsibilities, we

¹ Indian Foreign Affairs Record, November 1968, pp. 295, 297.

² *La Politique Etrangère de la France: Textes et Documents*, 2nd Sem., 1968, pp. 196-197.

declare that we are ready to assume them all, along with all those who are similarly disposed. Our approach is thus in conformity with the principles of international law.

The fact that we have adopted a stern attitude to Israel, which was immediately responsible for the war, has not prevented us from telling the Arab countries, where we enjoy a certain amount of sympathy, that a peaceful solution would involve their recognition of Israel's frontiers and of her right to play her part in international life.

What should be realised is that when, as regards the Mediterranean, we defend certain attitudes which reflect our interests or our political concepts, we are not necessarily followed by all our European partners.

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Joint Statement on Talks Between the U.S. President Johnson and the Iranian Prime Minister Hoveyda.¹ [Excerpts]

Washington, December 5, 1968

At the invitation of President Johnson, His Excellency Amir Abbas Hoveyda, Prime Minister of Iran, is making an official visit to the United States during December of 1968...

The President and the Prime Minister also discussed international affairs... In another area crucial to world peace, they reviewed efforts to bring about a settlement in the Near East between Arabs and Israelis, and they agreed that Iran and the United States should continue to give all possible support to the efforts of Ambassador Gunnar Jarring to bring about a just and lasting peace in accordance with the United Nations Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967.

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News Conference Remarks by the U.S. President-Elect Nixon's Personal Envoy Scranton at the End of His Visit to the U.A.R.² [Excerpt]

Cairo, December 7, 1968

Q. Do you not think that America's absolute support of Israel is undermining American interests in the area?

A. I would not say that absolute support of Israel is America's concern in the Middle East.

We have many and varied concerns in the area, and America's real interests in the area are also many and varied.

Q. Did you discuss the subject of the restoration of relations between the two countries?

A. Yes, I talked about this subject with President Abdel Nasser.

Q. Did you submit any new proposals for the solution of the Middle East problem?

A. I am not empowered to submit proposals. But we talked about all matters connected with the Middle East.

Q. Do you think that President Nixon will revise his statements about the area?

A. I cannot recall the statements you are referring to. I know that he has made many statements about the Middle East, and I also think that he is very concerned with this area, and that is why he entrusted me with my present mission.

Q. Do you intend to visit the refugee camps?

A. Yes, I shall visit the camps during my visit to Jordan.

Q. What is the situation since the suspension of Jarring's mission?

A. According to the information at my disposal Jarring's mission has not ended, and his contacts will be renewed after his arrival in Moscow.

¹ U.S. Department of State Bulletin, 23/12/1968, pp. 661-662.

² Al-Ahram (Cairo), 8/12/1968.

Q. Do you think that Israel's withdrawal from the occupied territories would lead to peace?

A. I am in agreement with the Security Council resolution, and my government approves it.

Q. When do you expect relations to be restored?

A. As I said, I discussed the matter of relations, but I am not a government official. The discussions were encouraging.

Q. Did you raise the question of the Soviet presence in the area with President Abdel Nasser?

A. I talked about this subject with President Abdel Nasser and we agreed that it is the aim of the Soviet Union like the United States, to find a peaceful solution for the problem.

Q. Can the great powers make efforts to solve the Middle East crisis?

A. In my personal opinion, the great powers can always work through the Security Council resolution.

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Joint Communiqué on the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs Waldheim's Visit to Turkey.¹ [Excerpts]

Ankara, December 9, 1968

At the invitation of the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs of Turkey, Mr. Ihsan Sabri Caglayangil, the Foreign Minister of Austria, Mr. Kurt Waldheim, and his wife, paid an official visit to Turkey from 6 to 9 December, 1968.

The Ministers stressed the dangers involved in the continuation of the Middle East crisis. They expressed the hope that the efforts being made on the basis of the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967 will soon result in a peaceful settlement of this conflict and that it

will thus be possible to establish a just and equitable peace in the area.

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Joint Communiqué on the Algerian Foreign Minister Boutaflika's Visit to Cuba.² [Excerpts]

Havana, December 1968

A delegation representing the Algerian Peoples headed by Mr. Abd al-Aziz Boutaflika, member of the Revolutionary Council and Minister of Foreign Affairs in the government of the Algerian Republic, paid an official visit to the Republic of Cuba at the invitation of Dr. Raul Roa, Minister of Foreign Relations in the revolutionary government of Cuba.

As regards the Middle East crisis, the two sides once more condemned in the strongest terms the Israeli aggression, supported by imperialism, against the Arab peoples. Both sides salute, with the deepest admiration, the efforts of the Palestinian people to recover their freedom and their honour.

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Joint Communiqué on Talks Held Between the Kuwaiti Ruler Shaikh Sabah al-Salem as-Sabah and the U.S. President Johnson.³ [Excerpts]

Washington, December 11, 1968

His Highness, Shaikh Sabah al-Salem al-Sabah, Amir of Kuwait, is paying a State Visit to the United States during the month of December 1968, at the invitation of President Lyndon B. Johnson. The two heads of state met at noon

¹ Turkish *Foreign Ministry Bulletin*, December 1968, pp. 77-78. From the French text.

² Algerian *Ahdath Wa Watha'iq*, 10/12/1968, pp. 25-26.

³ U.S. *Department of State Bulletin*, 30/12/1968, pp. 694-695.

on December 11 to discuss the relations between their two governments and to review matters of common importance internationally.

The two leaders reviewed thoroughly the situation in the Middle East. His Highness explained Kuwait's attitude toward the Palestine Question and emphasized the rights of the Palestinian people to return to their homeland, and his total rejection of annexation by force of Arab territories in contradiction of the charter of the United Nations. The President explained that U.S. efforts in the area are directed at the achievement of a lasting and honorable peace based on the United Nations Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967. The President noted that the U.S. Government fully supports the efforts of Ambassador [Gunnar] Jarring to this end.

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Address by the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Sisco on American Foreign Policy.¹ [Excerpts]

San Diego (California), December 11, 1968

These are days of transition in Washington. They afford an opportunity to examine our policies anew—to undertake a searching scrutiny at a time when a new President is about to assume office and the country's mood is one of unrest and of questioning over some of our key policies: Viet-Nam, the U.N., foreign aid, and our security commitments abroad.

A new administration takes over about noon on January 20. On that day the fighting in Viet-Nam which may have occurred in the morning while the present administration was still in office will likely be extended into the afternoon

after the new administration has taken over. If there is a flareup in the Middle East that morning, the new administration will be required to consider what action to take in the U.N. or elsewhere before the sun sets.

A new administration will have to balance continuity and change. It will have new opportunities. It can start afresh, less bound to the past. At the same time, it will face the stark realities of the present. There are constants of geography and power to which any administration must be responsive. There are certain responsibilities that it cannot shirk. Secretary Rusk's successor will have to take into account that in the nuclear age awesome American power may tend to limit rather than give greater freedom of action. No successor can ignore problems which exist in the Middle East, in Europe, in Africa, or in other critical areas of the world. That is, no President or Secretary of State can do so unless there should be a radical shift toward isolationism. I doubt whether any but a small minority of Americans would favor becoming dropouts in world affairs.

It is with some of the specifics which will face the new administration that I now wish to deal briefly. These concern the broad range of our interests: how we meet world crises and build a peaceful and humane order on this planet at a time when perforce we will also be heavily engaged putting our own house in order.

Second in the scale of priorities [after Viet-Nam] is the Middle East. We face an increasingly serious and deteriorating situation there, as is evidenced by the continuing outbreaks of violence and hostilities over the past days and weeks. These incidents are the latest reminders that the divisions and distrust between the Arabs and Israelis remain deeply embedded. The situation has become more complicated also because the Soviet Union, whatever its statements about peace, is seeking ways to expand its influence in the area. We noted a recent *Pravda* article which referred to the need for a political solution. What we are looking for is concrete evidence that the Soviets are exerting their influence toward peace in the Middle East. Progress toward peace

¹ U.S. *Department of State Bulletin*, 13/12/1968, pp. 27-29. The address entitled "Continuity and Change in Foreign Policy" was made by Mr. Joseph Sisco, the U.S. Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs, before a regional foreign policy conference cosponsored by the Department of State and the World Affairs Council of San Diego.

is unlikely as long as the U.S.S.R. continues to blame one side, beams propaganda epithets to the area against the so-called "imperialists," rejects offers to talk seriously about arms limitations in the area, and refuses to cooperate with Security Council efforts to deal effectively with cease-fire violations.

While the question of peace rests primarily with the parties, your Government has worked long and hard in support of the efforts of U.N. Representative Gunnar Jarring, who was mandated by the U.N. Security Council to try to promote agreement on a just and lasting peace. There can be no flagging of efforts to reverse the spiral of violence and counterviolence and to promote the live-and-let-live attitude which is a precondition for a stable and agreed regime of peace.

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Joint Communiqué on the Austrian Foreign Minister Waldheim's Visit to Lebanon.¹ [Excerpts]

Beirut, December 12, 1968

In response to the invitation of the Foreign Minister of the Lebanese Republic, Al-Hajj Husain al-Uwaini, the Foreign Minister of the Austrian Republic, Mr. Kurt Waldheim, paid an official visit to Lebanon from 9 to 12 December 1968.

The Foreign Minister of Lebanon provided his Austrian colleague with a detailed review of the problems of the Middle East, and the Palestine problem in particular. Mr. Waldheim noted the Lebanese point of view and expressed the hope that the efforts being made on the basis of the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967 would lead to a peaceful solution of this conflict.

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Joint Communiqué on the Rumanian Foreign Minister Manescu's Visit to East Germany.² [Excerpt]

Berlin, December 14, 1968

With regard to the alarming situation in the Middle East, both Ministers emphasized the significance of the U.N. Security Council resolution of November 22nd 1967. Its fulfilment constitutes an important condition for peace and security in this region.

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News Conference Remarks on the Middle East by the U.S. Representative to the United Nations Wiggins.³ [Excerpts]

New York, December 20, 1968

Q. When you came here you said that you hoped that you could do one thing at least: to accomplish some progress on a settlement of the Middle East problem. How do you feel now as you are nearing the end of your term? Have you accomplished anything, sir?

A. It is very painful for me to have to say that I don't think we have accomplished very much.

A great effort was made, if you will remember, early in this session to rescue the Jarring mission, which seemed on the point of acknowledging its inability to make any progress; and Ambassador Jarring felt that he had nothing very substantial with which to work. After his long endeavor in talking with the parties, there had been no real exchange of written views.

I think during the period of two months we held—I am speaking now of the United States Mission to the United Nations—more than 50 meetings with the parties and with Ambassador

¹ *National News Agency Bulletin* (Beirut), 12/12/1968, pp. 16-17.

² G.D.R. *Foreign Affairs Bulletin*, 10/1/1969.

³ U.S. *Department of State Bulletin*, 27/1/1969, pp. 80-84.

Jarring and with other states interested in the settlement of the Middle Eastern questions.

These exertions, along with those of other delegations here, I think, did succeed in getting, first, a substantial exchange of written views between the parties.

But after this initial progress I think that very little movement has taken place. I think very little was added to that progress in Ambassador Jarring's recent discussions at Nicosia, and I think that Ambassador Jarring has now decided, as you know, to return to his mission in Moscow; and I assume that shortly after the first of the year, when he has had time to review the exchanges that have taken place, Ambassador Jarring may assume a somewhat greater initiative in trying to renew the exchange of position papers that so far have occurred.

But it is certainly only candid to say that it has not been possible to reach a settlement of the Middle Eastern questions. I guess you could say we had a damage-control operation, in which we rescued the Jarring mission and preserved it for future effort. But that's about the limit of our achievement.

Q. Mr. Ambassador, when you say that Dr. Jarring may assume a greater initiative to obtain an exchange of views, could you tell us a little more—

A. No. He made an effort here to elicit more concrete views from the parties, and I suspect that after the first of the year he will renew that effort and try to get them to be more forthcoming with some material with which he can work.

Q. Mr. Ambassador, what was it that put the Jarring mission in danger of foundering? You say you rescued it.

A. No, I didn't say we rescued it. I said when he came here as the Assembly started, he had not been able to get any exchange of views really at all on paper, and during those two months at least he did get that much forthcoming exchange of views. He got some written statements, as you remember, from these states.

Q. Mr. Ambassador, you say that when Dr. Jarring returned at the beginning of the Assembly

there was an absence of meaningful exchanges, and the mission was in a situation which needed some assistance from major powers here concerned with the Middle East. Would you say that in the future, to bring about a Middle East settlement, involvement of the major powers in a more direct way to further the understanding between the parties is desirable and necessary?

A. I think it is very desirable that they continue to do what they did here. I think it would be very undesirable to have the great powers attempt to impose a settlement on the region.

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Text of Soviet Memorandum for the Implementation of the Security Council Resolution of November 22, 1967 Submitted to the British, French and U.S. Governments.¹

Moscow, December 22, 1968

It appears to us that an eventual political solution of the Middle East crisis requires not only the acceptance of the U.N.'s November 22, 1967 resolution by the parties to the conflict but also their agreement on the practical execution of all the articles of the resolution. It is also necessary that the parties reach agreement about the form, content and details of a final agreement, as well as on the guarantees which each of the parties will have to give to ensure the execution of its commitments contained in the final agreement. At the same time, it is possible to reach agreement on the various priorities for execution of the points of the agreement. For the actual execution of the plan, it should be possible to adopt the timetable presented by the United Arab Republic, which is still appropriate and has a positive role in the search for a solution of the crisis.

In the lights of the new circumstances and the respective positions of the parties the principal points of the practical plan could be as follows:

Israel and the neighbouring Arab States

¹ U.A.R. *Documents and Papers on the Palestinian Question, 1950-1969*, Vol. II, 1969, pp. 580-582.

affirm that they will be prepared to carry out such a plan, that they accept the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967, and to carry out the articles of that resolution. Consequently they agree to establish a timetable and the details for evacuation by Israeli forces of the territories occupied during the conflict, this being done through the intermediary of Dr. Jarring.

At the same time, agreement will be reached on a plan to be implemented by the parties in order to execute the other clauses of the Security Council resolution. In preparing this plan, account will be taken of the need to establish a just and durable peace in the Middle East so that each State in the region will live in security.

The object of these contents will be to negotiate precise stages for executing the above-mentioned Security Council resolution.

Five Stages

1) The Government of Israel and of the neighbouring Arab countries declare that they agree to carry out the whole plan as an overall agreement and simultaneously, the aim being to put an end to the state of belligerency between the Arab States and Israel, to reach a peaceful solution of the crisis following Israel's evacuation of the occupied territories. Israel will thus declare that it is willing, within a definite time, to withdraw its forces from the Arab territories occupied following the contest of the summer of 1967.

2) When the Israeli forces have withdrawn in stages and under the control of U.N. representatives, Israel and the neighbouring Arab States will deposit with the United Nations the requisite documents establishing the end of the state of belligerency, respect for and recognition of the sovereignty of every State in the region, all this being in implementation of the above-mentioned Security Council resolution. In order to carry out an agreement which will be reached through the intermediary of Dr. Jarring, there needs to be acceptance of the following points:

Secure and recognised frontiers (established on the basis of maps);

Freedom of navigation in the region's international water-ways;

Just solution of the refugee problem;

Territorial integrity and political independ-

ence of every State of the region (this can be assured in several ways, such as establishment of demilitarised zones).

It is essential to regard this agreement, in line with the decision to be taken, as an integral whole, covering all the aspects of the region's political solution, as laid down in the decision of the Security Council.

3) During the following month, in conformity with the agreement among the parties, the Israeli forces will withdraw from part of the occupied territories to a line—in Sinai, the West Bank and the Golan Heights—which will have to be agreed. When the Israeli forces have reached this previously agreed line in Sinai (for example, 39 or 40 kilometres east of the Suez Canal) the forces of the United Arab Republic will occupy the Suez Canal and will start to clear the Canal to restore it for navigation.

4) During the month after that, and according to the content of the agreement, the Israeli forces will withdraw to the line which they held prior to June 5, 1967. Thereafter all the territories thus liberated will again revert to Arab administration and the Arab armed forces and police will return to these regions. During the second phase of withdrawal by Israeli forces from U.A.R. territory, the U.A.R. and Israeli troops (if its Government agrees), will declare that they agree to the stationing of United Nations troops on the demarcation lines in Sinai, at Sharm al-Shaikh and Gaza, being a return to the situation of May 1967.

The Security Council would pass a resolution to send United Nations troops, in conformity with the U.N. Charter. It would also re-affirm the principle of freedom of navigation for the ships of all nations in the Straits of Tiran to Aqaba.

5) After the withdrawal of Israeli troops to international frontiers which will be drawn with the concurrence of the Security Council or by signed multilateral treaty, the diplomatic documents already deposited with the United Nations by the Arab countries and Israel will become binding. In conformity with the U.N. Charter, the Security Council will pass a resolution guaranteeing the Arab and Israeli frontiers (this does not exclude a guarantee by the four permanent members of the Security Council).

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Joint Communiqué on the Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko's Visit to the U.A.R.¹**Cairo, December 24, 1968**

Andrei Gromyko, Foreign Minister of the U.S.S.R. paid an official friendly visit to the United Arab Republic from December 21 to 24.

President Gamal Abdel Nasser of the United Arab Republic received the Soviet Foreign Minister and had talks with him which were marked by the atmosphere of friendship and mutual trust characteristic of relations between the U.S.S.R. and the U.A.R.

Talks also took place between Andrei Gromyko and Mahmoud Riyad, Foreign Minister of the U.A.R.

A number of questions pertaining to bilateral relations between the U.S.S.R. and the U.A.R. were discussed at these meetings.

Views were also exchanged on questions relating to the situation in the Middle East resulting from the Israeli aggression against Arab states on June 5, 1967.

Both sides hold the view that the policy of territorial expansion followed by Israel in that area and proclaimed in statements by responsible Israeli officials impedes the establishment of peace in the Middle East.

Israel's refusal to carry out the Security Council's resolution of November 22, 1967, and her continuing occupation of territories of three Arab states are proof of this expansionist policy on the part of Israel and constitute a continuation of aggression against the sovereignty and security of those states, in violation of the basic principles of the United Nations Charter.

The Soviet Union and the United Arab Republic declare that the establishment of peace in the Middle East requires that Israel carry out the Security Council's resolution and withdraw her forces from all the Arab territories occupied by Israel as a result of the aggression of June 5, 1967.

The government of the Soviet Union again declares its full support for the just struggle of the U.A.R. and other Arab countries for the

elimination of the consequences of the aggression.

The government of the U.S.S.R. highly appreciates the positions taken by the United Arab Republic and notes that the U.A.R. has declared her acceptance of the Security Council's resolution and her readiness to carry it out and also to co-operate fully with Ambassador Gunnar Jarring, the special representative in the Middle East of the United Nations secretary-general.

The government of the U.A.R. highly appreciates the steps taken by the Soviet government towards eliminating the consequences of the Israeli aggression, defending the lawful rights and independence of the Arab peoples and towards establishing a lasting and just peace and security in the Middle East.

Both sides reaffirm that the friendly relations between the U.S.S.R. and the U.A.R. are based on an unshakable foundation of mutual trust.

They regard it as important that mutual consultations and contacts on questions of interest to both states should continue in the future.

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Statement by the Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko at the End of His Visit to the U.A.R.²**Cairo, December 24, 1968**

We are very satisfied with our talks with President Nasser, who is very highly respected in the U.S.S.R., with Foreign Minister Riyad and other U.A.R. leaders.

The questions discussed during these talks are of great interest for the U.A.R., the U.S.S.R. and other countries which resolutely support peace and rights of nations.

Among other problems, we discussed the situation in the Middle East in connection with the necessity to eliminate the vestiges of the Israeli aggression.

We have also considered the further development and strengthening of relations between the U.S.S.R. and the U.A.R.

¹ *Soviet News* (London), 31/12/1968, p. 120.

² *Ibid.*

All our talks took place in the warm and friendly atmosphere which is characteristic of the relations which exist between our two countries.

Both parties have reaffirmed their determination to go along the chosen road and to consolidate the close friendship between our countries.

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Joint Communiqué on the Meeting of the Iranian, Pakistani and Turkish Leaders.¹
[Excerpts]

Karachi, December 27, 1968

In accordance with the decision taken at their meeting at Ramsar in July 1967, His Imperial Majesty Muhammad Reza Pahlavi Shahanshah Aryamehr, His Excellency Field Marshal Muhammad Ayub Khan, President of Pakistan and His Excellency Mr. Sulaiman Demirel, Prime Minister of Turkey, met in Karachi from 25th to 27th December, 1968. The meeting was also attended by His Excellency Mr. Amir Abbas Hoveyda, Prime Minister of Iran, His Excellency Mr. Ardeshir Zahedi, Foreign Minister of Iran, His Excellency Mr. Ihsan Sabri Caglayangil, Foreign Minister of Turkey, His Excellency Mr. M. Arshad Husain, Foreign Minister of Pakistan and high officials of the three countries.

The three Heads of State/Government also expressed their concern over the continuation of the explosive situation in the Middle East. Restating the views contained in the Ramsar Communiqué, they reiterated their opposition to the use of force to secure territorial gains. They called for an early solution of the conflict on the basis of the Security Council Resolution of 22nd November, 1967, in the interest of just and lasting peace.

¹ *Pakistan Documents Series*, 28/12/1968. This meeting was held within the framework of the Regional Cooperation for Development Pact concluded between the three countries in 1964.

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Interview Granted by the French Ambassador to the U.A.R. Francois Puaux to the Egyptian Daily "Al-Ahram".¹ [Excerpt]

Cairo, December 27, 1968

Q. From your office in the Quai d'Orsay on the Seine, how do you, as director of political administration, see France's attitude to the problems of the Middle East?

A. France is always linked with the peoples of the Middle East by emotional ties and relationships. These ties, like all emotional ties, have, over the centuries, been subject to changes and reversals. Sometimes they grow closer and stronger, at other times weaker and more hesitant; they improve and rise to their height, and then subside again. During these emotional crises relations have been involved in dramatic struggles.

But essentially our attitude to the Middle East has never changed; it has always been, and will always remain, one of friendship and cooperation with the Arab countries. It was natural that this policy should be implemented again once the affair of Algeria was ended. Sound understanding based on logic, and humane feelings, are now the basic foundation of our foreign policy.

On this basis it is obvious how immense must be our concern and preoccupation with the present situation in the Middle East. No real progress has been made towards a solution of this crisis since the beginning of the conflict in June 1967, and hopes of peace have been constantly diminishing and retreating.

France's attitude is clear and well known to all. France has defined her attitude in the clearest possible manner, and President de Gaulle made it clear at the beginning of the crisis.

Basically, we believe that every state in the Near East has the right to live in security within recognised frontiers. Since the beginning of the crisis we have said that any military invasion is unacceptable, and that such invasion cannot be the basis of a settlement and will be rejected in international law.

The attitudes we adopt in our policy are

¹ *Al-Ahram* (Cairo), 27/12/1968.

derived from these principles. This is why we laid an embargo on the export of arms, and we shall maintain this attitude.

As regards the details of the settlement, the Security Council adopted a resolution last year, a resolution which rests on a foundation of justice, to solve all the problems that caused this conflict. The United Arab Republic is to be commended for accepting this resolution, and we hope that all the countries concerned will adopt the same attitude. Since the beginning France has given her support to the mission of Ambassador Gunnar Jarring. Although this mission has not yet led to specific results, the important thing about it is that it keeps the door open to a settlement. There will remain a specific moment which should not be overlooked if the aim is to avert the dangers of further deterioration of the conflict.

We believe that the four great powers now have the opportunity, or rather the duty, of taking the initiative.

Q. This is where France's role comes in. What contacts is your government going to make, and what initiative will it take, as regards calling a summit conference of the four great Powers?

A. I am glad that you asked the question in this form, as it gives me the opportunity to define our attitude, which has sometimes caused a great deal of confusion.

We have never called for the convening of a "summit conference" of the four great Powers to discuss the Middle East crisis. We did not do so in June 1967, and we do not do so today.

On the night of the meeting of the French Council of Ministers on the 11th of this month, December, M. Debré proposed that the four great Powers should concentrate on the enforcement of the resolution of November 1967. This does not require a meeting of the four great Powers or their governments. I think that you will agree with me that the efforts of the four great Powers, in the form we propose, will not be inconsistent with the responsibility and the role of the Security Council, of which the four great Powers are permanent members.

At his press conference on 27 November 1967, President de Gaulle stated that, had it not been for the tragedy of Vietnam, the Middle East conflict would not have gone as far as it has.

This attitude was not understood at the time, but I think that now the connection between the Middle East crisis and the Vietnam war is clear. This connection constitutes a slow development towards the making of peace in Vietnam, which alone will allow the four great Powers to concentrate on the Middle East crisis and reach a settlement of it.

President de Gaulle proposed this attitude on 24 May 1967, before the crisis. You can imagine how things would have developed if the world had listened to this proposal.

As we see it, the basic duty of the four great Powers is to discuss the details of the enforcement of the resolution. Such details may well include:

1-A phased programme for the enforcement of the resolution.

2-Guarantees provided by the great Powers.

If ever there seems to be a possibility of a settlement, France will be ready to make her political and military resources available on the spot so as to take part in the enforcement and implementation of the settlement.

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Interview Granted by the Deputy Secretary-General of the United Israel Labour Party Shimon Peres to the French Daily "Le Monde".¹ [Excerpts]

December 28, 1968

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Q. But President Nasser and King Hussein have expressed their willingness to come to a peaceful settlement, in accordance with the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967...

A. The text of the resolution is a typical product of British diplomacy...It is open to every interpretation—which is why we do not consider it a sound basis for peace. For example,

¹ *Le Monde* (Paris), 28/12/1968. The English version is taken from the *New Middle East* (London); February 1969, p. 62.

it is essential to negotiate in order to define the new frontiers.

Q. To negotiate in such conditions would spell the end of Nasser and Hussein.

A. That is their problem, not ours.

Q. All depends on your attitude with regard to the occupied territories. Would you give them back...?

A. We are ready to pay the highest price for peace. I can't tell you today what that price will be, nor whether it will be translated entirely in terms of territorial concessions. No decision has yet been taken on the subject. But it is certain that we will make sacrifices.

Q. Sacrifices?

A. Yes—since we would be giving back territories to people who had no real historical right to keep them. After all the west bank of the Jordan does not belong to Amman...

Q. Is it Israeli then?

A. No, but it is not Jordanian. King Abdullah annexed it in 1948 by war...we are nevertheless ready to hand over some of the territories when peace is concluded...It goes without saying, that Jerusalem is not negotiable, that the Golan Heights (formerly Syrian) are essential to Israel's security. As for the Jordan, as Mr. Eshkol said, no Arab army will have the right to cross that river. In Sinai, the problem is basically Sharm el-Shaikh, commanding the entry to the Gulf of Aqaba. Obviously, after what happened in May, 1967, a guarantee—whether by the U.N. or any other Power—on the subject of freedom of navigation, will not be satisfactory for us. Our best guarantee would be an Israeli presence. Where? That remains to be determined at the negotiating table. However, all this is pure speculation, because the Arab States haven't modified their fundamental attitude to Israel.

Q. So how can you get peace then?

A. With the Palestinians, the majority of whom (1,300,000 out of two million) live in territories controlled by Israel since the Six Day War. The question with them is not so much a matter of territory, but of human relations. Our

main objective—I would say even the best bet—is to create the necessary atmosphere for the people to live together harmoniously, a coexistence which would lead directly to peace. We do not want to make them Israelis, and we respect their national aspirations. Actually they are allowed to run their own affairs as they know best, excepting of course, the responsibility for security.

Q. Are you in favour of their economic integration, in spite of everything?

A. We would like to improve their fate by transforming their under-developed society; to allow them to benefit from our infra-structure (roads, irrigation, hospitals etc), from our system of social security, higher wages, reduce unemployment. But we are not trying to make them into a nation of proletarians.

Q. Do you think you can hold on to the occupied territories without upsetting world opinion?

A. I know we have lost sympathy throughout the world, apart from diplomatic setbacks. It is not the first time we are a minority, or even isolated at the U.N. But for us that is of secondary importance. Czechoslovakia after the invasion had a great deal of international sympathy—but she lost her independence. If we do have to choose, we would prefer independence to sympathy...

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Cable of Solidarity From the East German State Council Chairman Ulbricht to the Lebanese President Helou Following the Israeli Attack on Beirut Airport.¹

Berlin, December 29, 1968

Excellency,

I have learned with great indignation of the impudent raid the Israeli soldiery conducted against Beirut international airport. This criminal raid violated not only the sovereignty of the Republic of Lebanon but also the most elementary

¹ G.D.R. *Foreign Affairs Bulletin*, 10/1/1969, p. 1.

and generally-recognized rules of international law.

The State Council, the Government and the people of the German Democratic Republic condemn most sharply this new act of piracy by Israel. I assure you, Excellency, of the German Democratic Republic's sincere solidarity with the Lebanese people as well as with all other Arab peoples.

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Statement to the Press by the French Foreign Minister Debré on the Israeli Attack on Beirut Airport.¹

Paris, December 29, 1968

As was predictable on the first day, ever since the cycle of violence started last year, one incident of this kind has inevitably led to another.

It is becoming clearer every day that the Middle East conflict is a threat to world peace.

More than ever before, as the French government has repeatedly proposed, it is the duty of the four great powers to reach an agreement for the implementation of the United Nations Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967.

France is ready to play her part in the implementation of that resolution at any time and in all fields.

Both because of the considerable material losses it has entailed and because of the obvious dangers at political level involved in such an audacious operation, this raid fully justifies the urgent convening of the Security Council.

My delegation has already, I regret to say, had several occasions to affirm that the very idea of reprisals is unacceptable. From this point of view, the raid of yesterday, 28 December is inadmissible, and must therefore be condemned.

It is the duty of the Council to put an end to actions which result in the spread of violence to one Near Eastern country after another; such ventures can only compromise the efforts that are

being made to establish a just and lasting peace. As already mentioned by my delegation, no satisfactory settlement can be reached except by the implementation of the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967. Joint action by the member states, and especially by those which have particular responsibilities, is henceforth an urgent necessity, for it is becoming clearer every day that the conflict in the Near East is a threat to world peace.

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Interview Granted by the French Foreign Minister Debré to French Radio and Television (O.R.T.F.).² [Excerpts]

Paris, December 30, 1968

Q Mr. Minister, as soon as you were informed of the Israeli raid on Beirut Airport you recalled that France is always opposed to reprisals that provoke a vicious circle of violence. You then insisted once again that it was the duty of the four great powers to come to an agreement to implement the resolution adopted by the Security Council on 22 November 1967. Are we to understand from this that you are advocating a conference between the four powers: the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and France?

A. One should be on one's guard against spectacular meetings. The only reasonable course, and experience has confirmed this, is that no meeting should be held if no tangible results have been attained before hand. As far as the Middle East is concerned, it is essential, now that recent events have confirmed the fears we have felt for over a year, and shown that the situation is highly explosive and may at any moment lead to a wider conflict—it is essential that the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and France, which are the four powers fundamentally concerned, apart from the parties to the conflict, should come to an agreement. But there would have to be previous negotiations and discussions before such agreement could be reached. No meeting can be held until such time as the main guide-lines, the general trend, and

¹ *La Politique Etrangère de la France: Textes et Documents*, 2nd Sem., 1968, pp. 246-247.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 247-249.

even certain details, have been approved by all.

Q. Do you think, Mr. Minister, that the parties directly concerned, the Arab states and Israel, should, if necessary, be associated with the work of the four great powers, and if so, in what way?

A. The parties concerned, i.e., the United Arab Republic and Jordan on one side, and the State of Israel on the other, must be associated with the work. This is absolutely essential; there can be no question of an imposed solution. In trying to arrive at a solution, the great problem, as you know, is that it will be difficult, indeed, as we see it, practically impossible, to find a formula to bring these states face to face with each other. But it is essential that they should be associated with the negotiations, and from the moment the four powers reach an understanding it seems to me that it will be relatively easy to decide on a procedure that will lead to the finding of such a formula.

Q. In your opinion, Mr. Minister, what means would be at the disposal of the four great powers to induce the belligerents to agree to make peace?

A. In the first place there is the appeal to human reason and international law. Here, the resolution adopted by the Security Council in November 1967, which called both for the evacuation of the occupied territories and for the recognition by all the states, including Israel, of what is normally accepted under international law, especially freedom of navigation, is a good statement of principle, for it expresses both what is necessary from the point of view of reason and what is essential from the point of view of law. Then, once the four powers have come to an agreement and secured the consent of the parties concerned, they could provide guarantees for the implementation of the resolution.

Here the French Government has already made it known that it is ready to assume its part of the responsibility.

Q. But, there are, unfortunately, other conflicts in the world: Vietnam, Biafra. Do you think, Mr. Minister, that, in spite of appearances at present, the year 1969 offers prospects of appeasement, if not of peace?

A. What we must clearly realise is that we are living in an extremely difficult world where we can, and should, be glad that at least we do not seem to be approaching total confrontation, and under such circumstances, we have every reason to be optimistic. But at the same time, antagonisms of every kind are so acute that we are certainly not advancing towards peace. There are local conflicts all the time and the great value of the policy that General de Gaulle has formulated and so persistently implemented is that it stresses the importance of easing tension; that is to say, in fact, that it emphasises the importance of ways and means of resolving such conflicts as arise being discussed by the great powers.

This is certainly not very exciting, but it is the only way of maintaining peace for the greater part of humanity and of the world.

Q. One last question, Mr. Minister, what would be the part played by France in making peace?

... France is playing, and should continue to play, her part in reminding the world of the principles which are the only sound foundations on which a peaceful world can be built: I mean the right of peoples to self-determination, the just enforcement of international law, aid to developing countries and real disarmament. These are principles that are too often forgotten.

It is by reminding the world of these principles, by taking part in all activities involving their enforcement, that France can best share in the task, at once so difficult and so essential, of building peace. And in doing this, let it be remembered, she will be strengthened by her authority and her impartiality, by our European effort and our efforts to ease tension.

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Reply by the Soviet Ambassador to France Zorin to a Question on the Middle East.¹**[Excerpt]****Paris, December 30, 1968**

Q. Do you think that the time has come for the U.S.S.R. and France to take joint action for a settlement of the Middle East conflict?

A. The urgent need for the settlement of the Middle East problem, so strongly advocated by the Soviet Union, has once again been confirmed by the Israeli attack on Beirut Airport. This attack is the latest incident in the long series of crimes committed by Israeli militarism which are intensifying the dangers of the Middle East situation.

I think there is a reasonably good basis on which our countries could take joint action towards a peaceful solution of the Middle East problem, in addition to efforts made by the four great powers which are permanent members of the Security Council.

A very important point is that there is no great difference between the attitudes of the Soviet Union and France; both are seeking a peaceful political settlement in the Middle East on the only possible basis, which is the implementation of the Security Council resolution of 22 November, 1967, which provides for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the occupied Arab territories.

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Statement by an Iranian Government Spokesman on the Israeli Attack on Beirut Airport.²**Teheran, December 30, 1968**

In pursuance of its constant policy which maintains that it is essential that international

differences should be solved by peaceful means and that there should be no resort to force in the relations between countries, the Iranian government rejects all action liable to aggravate the Middle East crisis or to delay the implementation of the Security Council resolutions adopted on 22 November 1967.

Iran therefore announces its regret at what happened recently at Beirut International Airport and, while expressing her sympathy for the Lebanese people, condemns the action undertaken by the Israeli commandos.

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New Year's Eve Message Broadcast by the French President de Gaulle to the French Nation.³ [Excerpt]**Paris, December 31, 1968**

...We are in a position to take effective action in helping to find a solution for the acute problems of the world.

What are these problems? Everyone knows them. They are:...an international solution of the Middle East drama, a solution which has already been outlined but which it is essential should be enforced—which the great powers are in a position to do through the evacuation of territories occupied by force; guarantees to both parties of their legitimate frontiers and their security; freedom of navigation for everyone everywhere and, finally, an acceptable future for the refugees.

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 249-250.

² *Al-Hayat* (Beirut), 1/1/1969.

³ *La Politique Etrangère de la France: Textes et Documents*, 2nd Sem., 1968, pp. 252-253.

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Statement by the Turkish Foreign Minister Caglayangil on the Israeli Attack on Beirut Airport.¹**Ankara, December 31, 1968**

The condemnation by the whole world of the Israeli commando attack on Beirut Airport is an

¹ Turkish *Foreign Ministry Bulletin* (in Turkish), December 1968, p. 35.

indication of how grave a view is taken of this act of aggression. All explanations offered by Israel to justify her use of shameless and brutal force against another country are entirely unsatisfactory. Such attacks give satisfaction only to those who do not desire a peaceful solution of the Middle East crisis and who are working to achieve a different result for these reasons.

Turkey condemns the attack on Beirut Airport.

United Nations

PART I

Security Council Complaints and Resolutions

A. Jordan-Israel

224

Letter From the Jordanian Permanent Representative to the President of the Security Council Requesting an Urgent Meeting of the Council, March 21, 1968.¹

I have the honour to refer to my letter No. PAL/6/B/160 dated 19 March 1968, in which I informed Your Excellency that the Government of Jordan had received reliable information that the Israeli authorities were contemplating a mass armed attack against the East Bank of Jordan and stressed the gravity of the situation which would arise if no steps were taken to avert that Israeli mass attack.

Today the Israeli authorities launched their mass attack.

Upon instructions from my Government, I request an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider a most serious situation resulting from this act of aggression.

Please accept, etc.

(Signed)

Muhammad H. EL-FARRA
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

225

Letter From the Israeli Permanent Representative to the President of the Security Council Requesting an Urgent Meeting of the Council, March 21, 1968.²

On instructions of my Government I have the honour to refer to my letters to you dated 18 March 1968 (S/8475) and to the Secretary-General dated 18 March 1968 (S/8470, A/7071).

In these letters I drew attention to the grave situation created by the continuous armed attacks and raids carried out from Jordan territory in violation of the cease-fire. I stressed that these acts imposed a heavy strain on the structure of the cease-fire and that my Government must maintain its right and duty to take all necessary measures for the security of the territory and population under its jurisdiction.

In the meantime information has been received that an increased large-scale campaign of raids, murder and sabotage was about to be launched from Jordan. In order to avert this grave development, the Israel Defence Forces this morning were compelled to take localized and limited preventive measures against the training centres and staging bases of the raiders situated on the East bank of the Jordan River.

In bringing this development to your attention I have the honour to request that the Security Council be urgently convened in order to deal with the continuous acts of aggression and violations of the cease-fire by Jordan.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed)

Yosef TEKOAH
Permanent Representative of Israel
to the United Nations

¹ U.N. doc. S/8484.

² U.N. doc. S/8486.

226

Supplementary Information Provided by the Secretary-General U Thant on the Fighting Between Jordan and Israel, March 21, 1968.¹

1. The Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Lt. General Odd Bull, advised me most urgently on the morning of 21 March 1968 that he had appealed to the Governments of Israel and Jordan to stop the fighting which had begun on the same morning and to observe the Security Council cease-fire. The appeal, which was delivered to the Government of Israel at 1025 hours GMT and to the Government of Jordan at 1046 hours GMT, was as follows: "Deeply concerned with the breach of the cease-fire in the Israel-Jordan cease-fire sector. I appeal to the Governments of Israel and Jordan to observe the cease-fire and suspend all military activities in the area. I am informing the Secretary-General of the United Nations of this message."

2. In recent days there have been indications from various sources of increasing tension in the Israel-Jordan sector, relating to terrorist activities on the Israel side and threats of retaliatory action on its part. There have also been reports of an unusual build-up of Israel military force in the Jordan valley area. Unfortunately, little or no verified information on these developments has been available to the Secretary-General because no United Nations Observers are deployed in the Israel-Jordan sector as has been reported previously to the Council (see S/PV. 1371, p. 11, S/7930/Add. 55, para. 3, and S/7930/Add. 62, para. 4).

3. In the afternoon of 20 March, the Chief of Staff of UNTSO reported that Colonel Daoud, Senior Jordan Delegate, had asked the UNTSO Liaison Officer in Amman to inform Major Levinson, Israel Defence Forces Liaison Officer, that he would like to meet urgently with Major Levinson under the auspices of the United Nations either in the Mixed Armistice Commission or at Government House. At 1430 hours GMT the message was transmitted to Major Levinson who reserved his answer. At 2130 hours GMT Major Levinson responded that he was ready to meet Colonel Daoud on Thursday, 21 March,

at 1100 hours GMT at Allenby Bridge without United Nations presence. In this connexion Major Levinson stated that "Israel's stand has always been that such talks should be direct without United Nations presence and that even in this particular case they would not be able to change their attitude". General Bull reported that he had transmitted Major Levinson's reply to Colonel Daoud. In the circumstances, Major Levinson's reply, rejecting any United Nations presence, seemed unnecessarily negative and rigid.

227

Supplementary Information Provided by the Secretary-General U Thant on the Fighting Between Jordan and Israel, March 21, 1968.²

1. In response to the appeal made by the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Lieutenant-General Odd Bull, on 21 March 1968 (S/7930/Add. 64, para. 1),³ Major Levinson, the Israel Defence Forces Liaison Officer, sent the following answer to General Bull at 1200 hours GMT on 21 March: "Agree. Will take all possible measures to expedite on condition of reciprocity."

2. At about the same time the office of the UNTSO Liaison Officer in Amman reported to General Bull the following answer to his appeal from Jordan: "Once the Israel forces, which started the armed aggression, withdraw to the positions previously held by them and cease fire, then Jordan forces will respond positively to your appeal. Israel has admitted his aggression and his forces are presently on the East Bank of the Jordan."

² U.N. doc. S/7930/Add. 65.

³ *Supra*.

¹ U.N. doc. S/7930/Add. 64.

228

**Resolution Adopted by the Security Council
on the Israel Military Action Against Jordan,
March 24, 1968.¹**

The Security Council,

Having heard the statements of the representatives of Jordan and Israel,

Having noted the contents of the letters of the Permanent Representatives of Jordan and Israel in documents S/8470, S/8475, S/8478, S/8483, S/8484² and S/8486,³

Having noted further the supplementary information provided by the Chief of Staff of UNTSO as contained in documents S/7930/Add. 64 and Add. 65,⁴

Recalling resolution 236 (1967)⁵ by which the Security Council condemned any and all violations of the cease-fire,

Observing that the military action by the armed forces of Israel on the territory of Jordan was of a large-scale and carefully planned nature,

Considering that all violent incidents and other violations of the cease-fire should be prevented and not overlooking past incidents of this nature,

Recalling further resolution 237 (1967)⁶ which called upon the Government of Israel to ensure the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the areas where military operations have taken place,

1. *Deplores* the loss of life and heavy damage to property;

2. *Condemns* the military action launched by Israel in flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter and the cease-fire resolution;

3. *Deplores* all violent incidents in violation of the cease-fire and declares that such actions of military reprisal and other grave violations of the cease-fire cannot be tolerated and that the

¹ U.N. doc. S/RES/248. The resolution was adopted unanimously at the 1407th meeting, see table of votes, p. 191.

² *Ante*, doc. 224.

³ *Ante*, doc. 225.

⁴ *Supra*.

⁵ Text in *International Documents on Palestine, 1967*, p. 251.

⁶ Text *ibid*.

Security Council would have to consider further and more effective steps as envisaged in the Charter to ensure against repetition of such acts;

4. *Calls upon* Israel to desist from acts or activities in contravention of resolution 237 (1967);

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to keep the situation under review and to report to the Security Council as appropriate.

229

Letter From the Jordanian Permanent Representative to the President of the Security Council Requesting an Urgent Meeting of the Council, March 29, 1968.⁷

Pursuant to my letters dated 27 March 1968 (document S/8505) and 29 March 1968, I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that today, 29 March 1968 at 1130 hours local time, the Israeli authorities renewed their aggression against the East Bank of Jordan in complete defiance of the unanimous resolution adopted by the Security Council on 24 March 1968 (S/RES/248 (1968))⁸ in which the Security Council declared that "grave violations of the cease-fire cannot be tolerated and that the Security Council would have to consider further and more effective steps as envisaged in the Charter to ensure against repetition of such acts."

Upon instructions from my Government, I request an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider a most serious situation resulting from this act of aggression.

Please accept, etc.

(Signed)

Muhammad H. EL-FARRA
Ambassador

Permanent Representative

⁷ U.N. doc. S/8516.

⁸ *Supra*.

230

Letter From the Israeli Permanent Representative to the President of the Security Council Requesting an Urgent Meeting of the Council, March 29, 1968.¹

On instructions of my Government I have the honour to refer to my letters of today addressed to you concerning renewed Jordanian acts of aggression and violations of the cease-fire, and to request an urgent meeting of the Security Council.

Please accept, etc.

(Signed)

Yosef TEKOAH

Permanent Representative of Israel
to the United Nations

231

Supplementary Information Provided by the Secretary-General U Thant on the Fighting Between Jordan and Israel, March 30, 1968.²

1. Accounts presented by both parties confirm that heavy and prolonged firing including artillery exchanges and aerial activity, took place on 29 March between the armed forces of Israel and Jordan. This new outbreak of fighting, coming so soon after the Security Council's resolution of 24 March (S/RES/248 (1968)),³ is greatly deplored. Mindful of paragraph 5 of that resolution, calling upon the Secretary-General to "keep the situation under review and to report to the Security Council as appropriate", I especially regret my inability to submit to the Council a helpful report on yesterday's fighting. Reports by me on incidents of fighting must be based on verified information from objective sources. As I have previously pointed out to the Council (S/PV. 1371, p. 11, S/7930 Add. 55, para. 3, S/7930 Add. 62, para. 4 and S/7930 Add. 64,⁴ para. 2) no UNTSO Observers are sta-

tioned in the Israel-Jordan sector. Therefore, with regard to this most recent fighting, the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Lt. General Odd Bull, has had to advise me that "it is practically impossible for me to report on the developments in the Israel-Jordan cease-fire sector due to the fact that no United Nations observation is operating in the area."

2. I may take this occasion to point out that the presence of United Nations Observers in an area can be helpful in preserving a cease-fire in ways other than reporting. The mere fact of their watchful presence can be something of a deterrent to military activity. They can be in position to report on indications of the build-ups which often precede military action. When fighting does break out they can quickly intervene on the spot with the opposing local commanders to arrange immediate cease-fires. It may be noted that, largely because of the presence of United Nations Observers, the Security Council cease-fire resolutions are better served and maintained in the Suez Canal and Israel-Syria sectors than in the Israel-Jordan sector.

232

Statement Approved by the Security Council on the Hostilities Between Jordan and Israel, April 4, 1968.⁵

Having heard the statements of the parties in regard to the renewal of the hostilities, the members of the Security Council are deeply concerned at the deteriorating situation in the area. They, therefore, consider that the Council should remain seized of the situation and keep it under close review.

¹ U.N. doc. S/8517.

² U.N. doc. S/7930/Add. 66.

³ *Ante*, doc. 228.

⁴ *Ante*, doc. 226.

⁵ U.N. doc. S/PV. 1412 (Prov.) The Statement was approved at the 1412th meeting.

233

Letter From the Jordanian Representative to the President of the Security Council Requesting an Urgent Meeting of the Council, April 25, 1968.¹

Upon instructions from my Government and with reference to my letters of 3 and 4 August 1967, 27 December 1967, 23 and 29 February 1968, 8 March 1968, 16 and 18 April 1968 (documents S/8007, S/8109, S/8110, S/8311, S/8427, and Add. 1, S/8433, S/8445, S/8546, S/8549). I have the honour to state the following:

The General Assembly, in its resolution 2253 (ES-V),² declared the Israeli measures for the annexation of Jerusalem as invalid and called for their rescission. That resolution was reaffirmed by the General Assembly in its resolution 2254 (ES-V)³ which provided specifically in operative paragraphs 1 and 2 the following:

1. Deplores the failure of Israel to implement General Assembly resolution 2253 (ES-V);
2. Reiterates its call to Israel in that resolution to rescind all measures already taken and to desist forthwith from taking any action which would alter the status of Jerusalem.

Since the adoption of these resolutions Israel has continued to carry out its plans for annexation and illegal appropriation of Arab lands in Jerusalem. Far from heeding the Security Council and General Assembly directives, the Israeli authorities have persisted in carrying out projects calculated to bring about drastic changes in the national and historical character of the Holy City.

The Israeli acts of violation are culminating now in the Israeli military parade to be held in Jerusalem on 2 May 1968, and which will start in the occupied City of Jerusalem. Its main reviewing stand will also be in Arab territory.

The nature of the parade and the heavy military equipment to be used are a breach of the General Armistice Agreement, a violation of the Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, and constitute a serious provocation

which will lead to further deterioration in an already explosive situation.

Therefore, upon instructions of my Government, I request an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider this development and the situation in Jerusalem and take effective measures to remedy the situation.

Please accept, etc.

(Signed)

Muhammad H. EL-FARRA
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

234

Note by the Secretary-General U Thant on the Intended Israeli Military Parade in Jerusalem, April 26, 1968.⁴

1. In view of all of the circumstances involved, I consider it my duty to call to the attention of the Security Council and of the General Assembly a note verbale which I found it necessary to address to the Government of Israel on Saturday, 20 April 1968. The note relates to the military parade which the Government of Israel intends to hold on Israel's Independence Day on 2 May. It is understood that much of this parade will be on the east side of the Armistice Demarcation Line and in part of what is known as the "Old City of Jerusalem".

2. Prior to dispatching the note I had become aware of concern in various quarters about the aggravating effect of such a parade in the Old City at this time on tensions in the area and on the efforts to achieve peaceful settlement of the exceedingly difficult problems in the relations between the Arab States and Israel. The note had the sole purpose of conveying to Israel authorities my own concern about this matter.

3. The text of the note in question is as follows:

"The Secretary-General of the United Nations presents his compliments to the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations and has the honour to refer to the re-

¹ U.N. doc. S/8560.

² Text in *International Documents on Palestine, 1967*, p. 256.

³ Text *ibid.*, p. 260.

⁴ U.N. doc. 8/8561. Also issued under the symbol A/7087.

ported decision of the Israel authorities to hold a parade in Jerusalem on 2 May 1968. From reports received the intended parade would appear to be of a military nature and much of it will take place on the east side of the Armistice Demarcation Line and in part of what is known as the 'Old City of Jerusalem'.

"The Secretary-General feels obliged to convey in this note the concern about these reports which he has already expressed orally in talks with the Permanent Representative of Israel. The Secretary-General wishes to emphasize that the holding of a military parade in this area at the present time will almost surely cause an increase in tension in the Near East and could well have an adverse effect on the efforts now going forward to find a peaceful settlement of the problems in the area.

"The Secretary-General's concern about the proposed military parade in that part of Jerusalem mentioned above also relates specifically to pertinent resolutions of the General Assembly (resolutions 2253 (ES-V) and 2254 (ES-V))¹ and of the Security Council (resolution 162 (1961)) and as well to his position on the General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Jordan as stated in the introduction to his annual report, 16 June 1966-15 June 1967, chapter V, paragraph 43.²

"The Secretary-General takes this opportunity to renew to the Permanent Representative of Israel the assurances of his highest consideration."

4. No reply to this note has so far been received from the Government of Israel.

235

Resolution Adopted by the Security Council on the Intended Israeli Military Parade in Jerusalem, April 27, 1968.³

The Security Council,

¹ Texts in *International Documents on Palestine, 1967*, pp. 256, 260.

² See *ibid.*, pp. 376-377.

³ U.N. doc. S/RES/250. The resolution was adopted at the 1417th meeting unanimously, see table of votes, p. 191.

Having heard the statements of the representatives of Jordan and Israel,

Having considered the Secretary-General's note (S/8561),⁴ particularly his note to the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations,

Considering that the holding of a military parade in Jerusalem will aggravate tensions in the area and will have an adverse effect on a peaceful settlement of the problems in the area,

1. *Calls upon* Israel to refrain from holding the military parade in Jerusalem which is contemplated for 2 May 1968;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the implementation of this resolution.

236

Report by the Secretary-General U Thant on Intended Israeli Military Parade in Jerusalem, May 2, 1968.⁵

1. This report is submitted in pursuance of the request of the Security Council, in its resolution 250 (1968)⁶ unanimously adopted on 27 April 1968, to the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the implementation of that resolution, which called upon Israel to refrain from holding the projected military parade in Jerusalem on 2 May 1968.

2. In the light of the resolution, it is with regret that I have to inform the Council that it has been confirmed on the morning of 2 May that the parade took place in Jerusalem on 2 May as scheduled. It began at 1000 hours local time. The parade was in the area east of the Armistice Demarcation Line for approximately two hours and ten minutes. So far as I know, there have been no incidents.

3. The members of the Security Council will have noted the reply of 30 April from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Israel⁷ to my

⁴ *Supra.*

⁵ U.N. doc. S/8567.

⁶ *Supra.*

⁷ S/8565 and A/7089. [Footnote in source text.]

cable of 27 April which was sent immediately after the adoption by the Council of the above-mentioned resolution, officially transmitting the text of the resolution. In this regard, members of the Council will also recall that immediately after the adoption of the resolution, the Permanent Representative of Israel informed the Council that "This resolution cannot be accepted by my Delegation because it concerns a question which, under the cease-fire, falls within the purview of Israel's internal jurisdiction."

4. In the absence in this sector of United Nations Observers having authority to observe and report on the parade, it is not possible for me to provide the Council with fully verified information about the parade. The information which follows, however, which has been received from various sources, is, I believe, substantially accurate and reliable.

5. I was informed on 29 April that planning and rehearsals for the parade were continuing, including the construction of spectators' stands to accommodate 60,000 people, and a main reviewing stand, both in that part of Jerusalem to the east of the ADL. I was also informed that the parade route was being wired off along its entire length, and this included the wiring off of private homes near the parade route in the eastern part of Jerusalem. The main equipment and personnel concentrations for the parade were said to be in the eastern part of Jerusalem near the airport. The rehearsals for the parade included aerial demonstrations as well as motor cavalcades, and marching units. The principal rehearsals began on the night of 27 April and continued until 0900 hours on the following day and included tanks, armoured personnel carriers, artillery and missile units.

6. I have also been informed that the preparations for the parade mentioned in the preceding paragraphs were accompanied by the setting up of "static road blocks" after dark at key intersections in the eastern part of Jerusalem by numerous vehicle and foot patrols throughout the eastern part of Jerusalem and by the stopping and checking of local vehicles at control points. I was advised that some sections of the main road in the eastern part of Jerusalem, which is the parade route, were blocked on frequent occasions, and it was announced that all roadways along

the parade route would be closed to traffic from the early morning hours of 2 May through the early morning hours of 3 May, and that local traffic to Jerusalem from the West Bank would be prohibited during this period. Extensive security units of the Israel Defence Forces were said to have been positioned in the eastern part of Jerusalem to include the parade route, the spectator area and roadways into the area and in the downtown section of the eastern part of Jerusalem.

7. On 30 April, I was informed that the main and longest part of the parade route would be in the "Old City" east of the ADL. On the same date, the *Jerusalem Post* published a detailed report on the personnel and equipment participating in the parade, which would, it appeared, be solely military and would include many types of military vehicles, weapons, aircraft and captured material. A list of the units, vehicles, and equipment scheduled to take part in the parade, as described in the *Jerusalem Post* article, is given in the annex to this report.

ANNEX

Excerpts from article in the *Jerusalem Post* of 30 April 1968 relating to the parade in Jerusalem on 2 May 1968:

"The first 14 minutes will be devoted to the fly-past.

Planes participating in the aerial display and, apart from the two new aircraft—the Skyhawk and the Bell 205 helicopters—are not necessarily in their order of appearance:

The Fouga CM 170 F Magister, a two-engine jet trainer and support strike aircraft...; the Dassault (French) M.D. 450 Ouragan—a single-seat fighter; the Mystere (French, Dassault) single-seat fighter...; the Dassault Super-Mystere B2...; the Dassault Mirage 3c, the delta-winged fighter...; Sud Aviation's Vautour, a fighter bomber.

The jets will be followed by piston engined Boeing 377 Stratocruisers...; twin-engined Nord built in France and often used in paratroop transport; the helicopters include Sikorsky S58s, the new Bells and Sud Aviation's...SA 321 Super Frelon which can carry a platoon of soldiers and all their equipment each...

At 10.20, the ceremonial column will set out.

This will be spearheaded by a formation of motorcycle outriders followed by five jeeps carrying the five army flags; ten jeeps bearing the command and corps flags and, in conclusion, 59 jeeps bearing the campaign ribbon decorated standards of the Defence Force Brigades.

The armoured column follows immediately afterwards.

Three Centurion tanks with the commanding officers of the armoured units participating in the parade; a scout unit of the paratroop corps (61 jeeps); a scout unit of the Golani Brigade (six jeeps) followed by another six-jeep scout unit of the armoured corps, and 19 scout jeeps of the Border Police.

Next in line will be 20 half-tracks of a mechanized infantry unit, and a column of eight armoured cars.

The tank column will be headed by its commanding officers in three Patton 'medium-class' tanks... 04 AM (French) light tanks... 14 Sherman tanks... 22 more Patton tanks, with this column closed by 22 Centurions...

The Artillery column follows:

The commanding officers of the artillery units participating, in three half-tracks; 18 recoilless guns mounted on jeeps; SS-11 anti-tank missiles (French) mounted on 13 half-tracks; 120 mm. mortars on 13 half-tracks; 160 mm. mortars... on 13 half-tracks; 105-mm. self-propelled guns; 155-mm self-propelled guns; 18 radar-controlled L-70 anti-aircraft guns—40 mm.

Probably most interest will be centred on the captured equipment, which comes next.

Three regular Sherman tanks of the I.D.F. and the commanding officers of the column will lead off.

Four armoured troop carriers 'Al Walid' (Egyptian); four BTR 152 Soviet-made troop carriers (Egyptian and Syrian); four M-113 armoured troop carriers (Jordanian); four B.T.R. 50 armoured troop carriers (Egyptian and Syrian); four P.T.-76 Amphibian (Egyptian) Soviet-made light tanks; two 2.S.O. 2-57 self-propelled guns (Egyptian); eight T-55 tanks (Egyptian), 36 tons, mounting a 100 mm. gun and capable of operating for 500 km.; two S-U

100 self-propelled guns (Egyptian); two Stalin-3 heavy tanks (Egyptian), 45 tons each, mounting 122 mm. guns; eight Recovery tanks of the I.D.F.;

The captured artillery is headed by a jeep and the commanding officer of this section—followed by four Jordanian recoilless guns, jeep-mounted.

Next come:

Four howitzers 122 mm. for mountain use (Egyptian and Syrian); four 130 mm. long-range guns (16 km.) used by Egyptians and Syrians; four M-46 long-range guns, accurate at 20 km., used by Syrians; four British 'Long Toms'—055 mm. long-range guns...; two truck-mounted 130 mm. 'Katyushas' firing 32 rockets over 6 km. (Egyptian); two BM-24 240 mm. rocket launchers, firing 12 rockets over 7 km. (Egyptian); four light-calibre D.S.K. short-range anti-aircraft guns (Egyptian and Syrian); four 57 mm. M 43 anti-tank guns. Finally two S.A.2 anti-aircraft missiles 10 ½ m. long...

The Infantry Column:

The infantry section is preceded by its commanding officers in a procession of 30 jeeps. They are followed by the unit flags and the Army band.

A group of officer cadets is followed by pilot-trainees—a Navy unit and crack-unit Golani Brigade paratroopers; a second paratroop unit and representatives of the Women's Corps.

This is followed by a first-line unit of the engineers; Flag unit of the Golani Brigade; units of the minorities; Golani Brigade (regular infantry assault troops); Signal Corps; Flag unit of the Nahal Corps; Nahal men's and women's units; Gadna Youth Corps; Flag unit of the Training Command; Border Police; Israel Police Unit; another section of the Defence Force brass band;—and concluding the parade—a unit of the Military Police."

237

**Resolution Adopted by the Security Council
Deploing the Israeli Military Parade in
Jerusalem, May 2, 1968.¹**

The Security Council,

Noting the Secretary-General's reports of 26 April (S/8561)² and 2 May 1968 (S/8567),³

Recalling resolution 250 (1968) of 27 April 1968,⁴

Deeply deplores the holding by Israel of the military parade in Jerusalem on 2 May 1968 in disregard of the unanimous decision adopted by the Council on 27 April 1968.

238

**Resolution Adopted by the Security Council
on Measures Taken by Israel to Change the
Status of Jerusalem, May 21, 1968.⁵**

The Security Council,

Recalling General Assembly resolutions 2253 (ES-V) and 2254 (ES-V) of 4 and 14 July 1967,⁶

Having considered the letter (S/8560)⁷ of the Permanent Representative of Jordan on the situation in Jerusalem and the report of the Secretary-General (S/8146),

Having heard the statements made before the Council,

Noting that since the adoption of the above-mentioned resolutions, Israel has taken further measures and actions in contravention of those resolutions,

Bearing in mind the need to work for a just and lasting peace,

¹ U.N. doc. S/RES/251. The resolution was adopted at the 1420th meeting unanimously, see table of votes, p. 191.

² *Ante*, doc. 234.

³ *Supra*.

⁴ *Ante*, doc. 235.

⁵ U.N. doc. S/RES/252. The resolution was adopted at the 1426th meeting by a vote of 13 to none, with 2 abstentions, see table of votes, p. 191.

⁶ Texts in *International Documents on Palestine, 1967*, pp. 256, 260.

⁷ *Ante*, doc. 233.

Reaffirming that acquisition of territory by military conquest is inadmissible,

1. *Deplores* the failure of Israel to comply with the General Assembly resolutions mentioned above;

2. *Considers* that all legislative and administrative measures and actions taken by Israel, including expropriation of land and properties thereon, which tend to change the legal status of Jerusalem are invalid and cannot change that status;

3. *Urgently calls upon* Israel to rescind all such measures already taken and to desist forthwith from taking any further action which tends to change the status of Jerusalem;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the implementation of the present resolution.

239

Letter From the Jordanian Permanent Representative to the President of the Security Council Requesting an Urgent Meeting of the Council, August 4, 1968.⁸

With reference to my letters of 4 and 5 June 1968 and further to my letter of 4 August 1968, and upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to request an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the grave situation resulting from the continued Israeli acts of aggression against Jordan.

Please accept, etc.

(Signed)

Muhammad H. EL FARRA
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

⁸ U.N. doc. S/8721.

240

Letter From the Israeli Permanent Representative to the President of the Security Council Requesting an Urgent Meeting of the Council, August 5, 1968.¹

I have the honour to request an urgent meeting of the Security Council to resume consideration of the Israel complaint submitted in my letter of 5 June 1968 (S/8617), namely, "the grave and continual violations of the cease-fire by Jordan, including:

A. Firing across the cease-fire lines from Jordanian military positions, and in particular the repeated and wanton shelling of Israel villages,

B. Armed infiltrators and terrorist acts from Jordan territory with the connivance, aid and encouragement of the Jordanian Government and armed forces."

In connexion with this complaint, I would draw attention to the further violations set out in my letter to the President of the Security Council dated 2 August 1968 (S/8716).

Please accept, etc.

(Signed)

Yosef TEKOAH

Permanent Representative of Israel
to the United Nations

acts of aggression against Jordan in violation of the cease-fire resolution.

The attached list of incidents of Israeli attacks on Jordanian villages and farms follow the same systematic Israeli policy outlined in my letter of 20 June 1968, namely, the destruction of civilian life in the Jordan Valley.

It is important to note that the Israeli armed forces do not only fire on Jordanian villages and farms from their posts in the occupied Arab territory, but actually cross towards the East Bank of Jordan in direct violation of the cease-fire resolution. All these Israeli attacks are in conformity with high Israeli officials' statements. The attacks are not only increasing in number but also penetrating deeper into centres of the East Bank of Jordan. The Israeli attacks were first limited to the Jordan Valley. Now they are directed against villages and towns in the East Bank Heights. Some of the villages attacked are only nineteen miles west of Amman.

I will be grateful if this letter with its annex be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

Please accept, etc.

(Signed)

Muhammad H. EL-FARRA

Ambassador

Permanent Representative

241

Letter From the Jordanian Permanent Representative to the President of the Security Council With a List of Israeli Attacks on Jordanian Villages, August 9, 1968.²

Further to my letter of 20 June 1968 (S/8649) and upon instructions from my Government I have the honour to bring to Your Excellency's attention another series of Israeli continuous

¹ U.N. doc. S/8724.

² U.N. doc. S/8741.

<i>Date and time</i>	<i>Place</i>	<i>Details of incidents</i>
17.6.68 0110	El-Baqura and El-Adasiye	The Israeli forces opened their medium machine-guns and mortar artillery on these villages in the northern part of the Jordan Valley. Fire returned. Exchange of fire went on until 1210.
17.6.68 2100	Makhadet Um Sidrat 9 kms north of Damiya Bridge	Israeli forces used field artillery. Fire returned and exchanged until 2220.
17.6.68 2355	Wadi Araba	A half-track full of Israeli soldiers crossed towards the Jordanian police station and fired on it. Fire exchanged for thirty minutes as the Israelis retreated.
19.6.68 2400	El-Baqura and El-Adasiye	Israeli forces opened fire. Fire exchanged for ten minutes.
20.6.68 1720	South of King Hussein Bridge	Israeli forces opened fire on Jordanian posts. Fire returned and exchange of fire continued until 1750.
23.6.68 0640	Manshiye	Israeli forces opened fire. Fire exchanged until 0735.
1.7.68 1408	Damiya Bridge area	Israeli forces opened fire using machine-guns, mortar and tanks artillery. Fire returned and exchanged intermittently until 1500.
2.7.68 1030	East of Damiya Bridge	Israeli forces opened fire. Fire exchanged until 1100.
3.7.68 0410	Mindassa and Um Nakhala	The Israeli military forces opened fire on these villages north of King Hussein Bridge. Fire returned and exchanged until 0445.
3.7.68 1540	East of Damiya Bridge	Israeli armed forces opened fire using machine-guns, tanks and field artillery. Fire returned and exchanged intermittently until 1610.
3.7.68 1655	Same area (Damiya Bridge)	Israeli forces resumed the shelling. Shelling returned until 1720.
4.7.68 2400	Wadi El-Yabis	Heavy artillery was used by the Israeli forces against Jordanian posts. Shelling returned and exchanged until 0050 of 5.7.68.
5.7.68 1630	North of Damiya Bridge	Israeli military forces opened fire on Jordanian farmers. Fire returned and exchanged until 1740.
12.7.68 0810	North of Mindessa Bridge	Israeli forces opened fire. Fire returned and exchanged until 0930.
12.7.68 1035	Same area	Israeli forces resumed fire from tanks. Fire returned and exchanged until 1050.

<i>Date and time</i>	<i>Place</i>	<i>Details of incidents</i>
19.7.68 1245	Wadi Khalid north-east of Mukheibeh	Israeli forces opened fire from half-track vehicles on the Syrian Heights. Jordanian forces returned fire and destroyed the vehicle. Fire stopped at 1340.
21.7.68 1115	Aqraba	Israeli forces opened fire from the Syrian Heights. Fire returned and exchanged until 1120.
24.7.68 1525		The Israeli forces opened machine-gun fire from Khirbit Al Duwear west of Al Himma on Jordan posts. Fire was returned and exchanged until 1610. One Jordan soldier wounded and three Israeli casualties.
25.7.68 0248	North of King Hussein Bridge	Israeli forces opened fire. Fire was returned and exchanged intermittently until 0315.
25.7.68 1740	Same area	The Israeli forces opened fire. Fire was returned and silenced at 1800.
27.7.68 2005	Manshiya	Israeli armed units opened fire on Jordan posts. Fire was returned and continued for ten minutes.
28.7.68 1600		Israeli forces opened fire on Jordan posts from a post near Al Himma. Fire was returned and the exchange lasted for thirty minutes.
28.7.68 1735		Israeli firing resumed. Fire was returned and exchanged intermittently until 1845. An Israeli armed vehicle was burnt.
29.7.68 1300	Manshiya	Israeli forces opened fire. Fire was returned and exchanged until 1320.
29.7.68 1730	East of King Hussein Bridge	Israeli forces opened fire using machine-guns, mortars and 106 mm artillery.
29.7.68 1830	Same area	The Israelis attacked, backed by tanks fire. Fire was returned and exchanged until 1915.
2.8.68 1625	Um el-Shurat Bridge	Israeli armed forces opened fire. Fire was returned and exchanged until 1650.

242

**Resolution Adopted by the Security Council
on Israeli Military Attacks Against Jordan,
August 16, 1968.¹**

The Security Council,

Having heard the statements of the Representatives of Jordan and Israel,

Having noted the contents of the letters of the Representatives of Jordan and Israel in documents S/8616, S/8617, S/8721² and S/8724,³

Recalling its previous resolution 248 (1968)⁴ condemning the military action launched by Israel in flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter and the cease-fire resolutions and deploring all violent incidents in violation of the cease-fire,

Considering that all violations of the cease-fire should be prevented,

Observing that both massive air attacks by Israel on Jordanian territory were of a large scale and carefully planned nature in violation of resolution 248 (1968),

Gravely concerned about the deteriorating situation resulting therefrom,

1. *Reaffirms* its resolution 248 (1968) which, *inter alia*, declares that "grave violations of the cease-fire cannot be tolerated and that the Council would have to consider further and more effective steps as envisaged in the Charter to ensure against repetition of such acts";

2. *Deplores* the loss of life and heavy damage to property;

3. *Considers* that premeditated and repeated military attacks endanger the maintenance of the peace;

4. *Condemns* the further military attacks launched by Israel in flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter and resolution 248 (1968) and warns that if such attacks were to be repeated the Council would duly take account of the failure to comply with the present resolution.

¹ U.N. doc. S/RES/256. The resolution was adopted at the 1440th meeting unanimously, see table of votes, p. 191.

² *Ante*, doc. 239.

³ *Ante*, doc. 240.

⁴ *Ante*, doc. 228.

B. U.A.R.-Israel

243

Letter From the Acting Israeli Permanent Representative to the President of the Security Council Requesting an Urgent Meeting of the Council, September 2, 1968.⁵

Upon instructions from my Government and further to the letter dated 28 August 1968 (S/8788) from the Acting Permanent Representative of Israel to the President of the Security Council, I have the honour to request an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the deliberate and planned military attack by the United Arab Republic against Israel forces on 26 August 1968, in flagrant violation of the cease-fire.

The seriousness of this attack is aggravated by the negative reply of the United Arab Republic authorities to representations made by Israel, through General Odd Bull, to return the kidnapped soldier, to take effective steps against those responsible for the attack, and to give assurances that it would not be repeated.

Please accept, etc.

Shabtai ROSENNE

Acting Permanent Representative of Israel
to the United Nations

244

Letter From the Israeli Permanent Representative to the President of the Security Council Requesting a Resumption of the Meetings of the Council, September 8, 1968.⁶

I have the honour to refer to our conversation earlier this afternoon and, on instructions from my Government to bring to your most urgent attention the flagrant and unprovoked violation of the cease-fire today, 8 September 1968, by the armed forces of the United Arab Republic

⁵ U.N. doc. S/8794.

⁶ U.N. doc. S/8805.

in the Suez Canal sector.

At 1300 hours local time Israeli forces in the Suez Canal sector discovered an anti-vehicle mine laid in a track on the east bank of the Canal approximately 10 kilometers north of Port Taufiq.

Two hours later, at approximately 1500 hours, immediately following the demolition of the mine by Israeli field engineers, United Arab Republic military positions opened fire on them and on other Israeli forces in the area. Fire was returned in self-defence.

Ten minutes later at approximately 1510 hours Egyptian artillery fire was opened along an extended sector from Kantara to the Port Taufiq area. Fire was returned.

The United Nations Military Observers proposed a cease-fire for 1650 hours. Israel agreed and complied but the United Arab Republic forces continued shelling along the whole length of the Canal sector. Fire was returned in self-defence.

At 1810 hours the UNMO's made another proposal for a cease-fire for 1830 hours. Again, Israel agreed.

By 1835 hours fire ceased, except for small arms fire by the Egyptian forces in the Port Taufiq area.

Israel casualties include eight soldiers killed and sixteen wounded, three seriously.

One UNMO was also wounded by United Arab Republic fire, and two observer posts were hit and had to be evacuated.

I shall keep you informed of any further reports that I may receive.

In the light of the above, I have the honour to reiterate my request for an immediate resumption of the meetings of the Security Council, adjourned on 5 September.

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as a Security Council document.

Please accept, etc.

(Signed)

Yosef TEKOAH

Permanent Representative of Israel
to the United Nations

245

Letter From the U.A.R. Permanent Representative to the President of the Security-Council Requesting an Urgent Meeting of the Council, September 8, 1968.¹

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that Israel has committed another premeditated act of aggression by opening fire today about 1600 local time against the cities of Port Tawfic, Suez, Ismailia and Kantara.

In view of the gravity of the situation, I request an urgent meeting of the Security Council.

Please accept, Sir, etc.

(Signed)

Mohamed Awad EL KONY
Permanent Representative
of the United Arab Republic

246

Supplementary Information Provided by the Secretary-General U Thant on Cease-Fire Violations Between U.A.R. and Israel, September 8, 1968.²

The following report on a firing incident which took place on 8 September 1968 in the Suez Canal Sector was received from Lieutenant-General Odd Bull, Chief of Staff of UNTSO, on the same day at 2058 hours local time:

"1. Observation Post OP Lima³ reported at 1306Z GMT explosions observed on east side of the Canal in the OP Gold/OP Red area. Again at 1308Z, explosions observed in the same area.

"2. OPs Red and Gold reported that explosions were seen at 1308Z on both sides of the Canal about one kilometre south of OP Red.

"3. At 1311Z OP Lima reported heavy explosion observed on west side opposite area OP Gold and OP Red. At 1314Z OP Lima

¹ U.N. doc. S/8806.

² U.N. doc. S/7930/Add. 78.

³ The locations of the various United Nations Observation Posts in the Suez Canal Sector are given in documents S/8053/Add. 3 and 4. [Footnote in source text.]

reported heavy explosion observed on east side close to OP Red, and at 1317Z OP Lima reported heavy explosion observed in OP Gold and OP Red area. OP Lima reports confirmed by OPs Red and Gold.

"4. Between 1308Z and 1317Z fire died down to resume with intensity at 1329Z.

"5. At 1325Z OP Pink reported IDF (Israel Defence Forces) initiated fire.

"6. At 1332Z OP Mike reported fire initiated by U.A.R. Fire returned by IDF at 1336Z. Artillery, mortars, tanks, heavy machine-guns and light machine-guns used. OP Gold reported UAR initiated fire at 1332Z.

"7. At 1436Z OP Copper reported fire initiated by U.A.R. At 1332Z OP Blue reported initiation of fire by UAR. At 1343Z OP Kantara reported fire initiated by UAR. At 1342Z OP Silver reported fire initiated by UAR. At 1345Z OP Yellow reported fire initiated by UAR.

"8. At 1335Z OP Hotel reported hearing firing. At the same time OP Lima reported exchange of fire in OP Red area.

"9. At 1440Z fire was returned in OP Copper area, at 1343Z in OP Silver area and immediately in the other OP areas.

"10. First cease-fire time was proposed at 1355Z for 1450Z. Accepted by Senior Israel Representative at 1405Z and by Senior U.A.R. Liaison Officer at 1418Z. This first cease-fire was not effective.

"11. At 1350Z OP Echo reported firing by IDF with artillery and mortars. At 1355Z OP Juliet reported artillery, mortar and tank fire from both sides.

"12. Due to damage to Kantara Control Centre communications message from headquarters UNTSO to Kantara Control Centre were then relayed by Ismailia Control Centre.

"13. At 1411Z all OPs on west side of Canal reported shooting from both sides of Canal with artillery, tanks and machine-guns.

"14. From 1435Z to 1452Z all OPs on western side of Canal reported heavy firing from both sides with artillery, mortars, tanks, heavy machine-guns and light machine-guns.

"15. As firing continued in most areas a new cease-fire time was proposed for 1630Z.

At 1541Z Ismailia Control Centre informed Kantara Control Centre that according to information from UNTSO headquarters IDF Liaison Officer accepted cease-fire time of 1630Z. At 1607Z Senior U.A.R. Liaison Officer accepted cease-fire time of 1630Z. Firing continued in most areas. IDF ceased firing at or soon after 1630Z, UAR finally ceased fire at 1705Z.

"16. Cease-fires as follows: OP Copper area: IDF 1630Z, UAR 1705Z; OP Kantara area: IDF 1650Z, UAR 1650Z; OP Yellow area: IDF 1630Z, UAR 1647Z; OP Silver area: IDF 1625Z, UAR 1630Z; OP Pink area: IDF 1607Z, UAR 1630Z; OP Gold area: IDF 1640Z, UAR 1646Z; OP Red area: IDF 1652Z, UAR 1652Z; OP Blue area: IDF 1636Z, UAR 1650Z.

"17. During the incident, weapons used were small arms, light machine-guns, heavy machine-guns, tanks, mortars, artillery, from both sides. OP Pink reported ground-to-ground missiles used by IDF. Kantara Control Centre heard three rounds that sounded like ground-to-ground missiles used by IDF.

"18. Casualties: Major E. T. F. Flyger, UNMO, Argentina, was very slightly wounded at OP Red. Wound caused by wooden splinters from door. IDF Liaison Officer advised eight IDF soldiers killed and seventeen wounded, and two civilians wounded, Kantara.

"19. Damage: East side: Kantara Control Centre reported antenna damage, electric power line cut, water truck damaged and windows broken at Kantara Control Centre headquarters. OP Silver: Two caravans burnt out. Caravans damaged at OPs Gold and Red. Slight damage to jeeps OP Kantara, OP Yellow light damage. West side: Severe damage caused to Ismailia Control Centre headquarters and some damage to United Nations residences. Full report of damage to follow."

247

Resolution Adopted by the Security Council on Cease-Fire Violations, September 18, 1968.¹

The Security Council,

Recalling the declaration of the President of the Security Council of 9 September 1968, as made at the 1448th meeting of the Council,

Gravely concerned about the deteriorating situation in the Middle East,

Convinced that all Members of the United Nations should co-operate towards a peaceful settlement in the Middle East,

1. *Insists* that the cease-fire ordered by the Security Council in its resolutions must be rigorously respected;

2. *Reaffirms* its resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967,² and urges all the parties to extend their fullest co-operation to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the speedy fulfilment of the mandate entrusted to him under that resolution.

C. Lebanon-Israel

248

Letter From the Lebanese Permanent Representative to the President of the Security Council Requesting an Urgent Meeting of the Council, December 29, 1968.³

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to bring to your attention the flagrant act of aggression committed by the Israeli Air Force against Lebanon on Saturday December 28, 1968 at 9.30 p.m. Beirut time. Israeli authori-

ties admitted responsibility for this wanton and premeditated attack against the Civilian International Airport of Beirut. In view of the gravity of the situation endangering the peace and security of Lebanon, I would request Your Excellency to convene an urgent meeting of the Security Council.

Please accept, etc.

(Signed)

Edouard GHORRA
Ambassador

Permanent Representative

249

Letter From the Acting Israeli Permanent Representative to the President of the Security Council Requesting an Urgent Meeting of the Council, December 29, 1968.⁴

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to request an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the constant violation by Lebanon of the United Nations Charter and the cease-fire resolutions of the Security Council, by assisting and abetting acts of warfare, violence and terror by irregular forces and organizations harboured by Lebanon and operating from that country against Israel territory, citizens and property and in particular with regard to attacks upon Israel civil aviation.

Please accept, etc.

(Signed)

Shabtai ROSENNE

Acting Permanent Representative of Israel
to the United Nations

¹ U.N. doc. S/RES/258. The resolution was adopted at 1452nd meeting by a vote of 14 to none, with 1 abstention, see table of votes, p. 191.

² Text in *International Documents on Palestine, 1967*, pp. 268-269.

³ U.N. doc. S/8945.

⁴ U.N. doc. S/8946.

250

**Resolution Adopted by the Security Council
on the Israeli Attack Against Beirut Airport,
December 31, 1968.¹**

The Security Council,

Having considered the agenda contained in document S/Agenda/1462,

Having noted the contents of the letter of the Permanent Representative of Lebanon (document S/8945),²

Having noted the supplementary information provided by the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization contained in documents S/7930 Add. 107 and 108,

Having heard the statements of the representative of Lebanon and of the representative of Israel concerning the grave attack committed

against the civil International Airport of Beirut,

Observing that the military action by the armed forces of Israel against the civil International Airport of Beirut was premeditated and of a large scale and carefully planned nature,

Gravely concerned about the deteriorating situation resulting from this violation of the Security Council resolutions,

And deeply concerned about the need to assure free uninterrupted international civil air traffic,

1. *Condemns* Israel for its premeditated military action in violation of its obligations under the Charter and the ceasefire resolutions;

2. *Considers* that such premeditated acts of violence endanger the maintenance of the peace;

3. *Issues* a solemn warning to Israel that if such acts were to be repeated, the Council would have to consider further steps to give effect to its decisions;

4. *Considers* that Lebanon is entitled to appropriate redress for the destruction it suffered, responsibility for which has been acknowledged by Israel.

¹ U.N. doc. S/RES/262. The resolution was adopted at the 1462nd meeting unanimously, see table of votes, p. 191.

² *Ante*, doc. 248.

TABLE OF VOTES IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL

	Y = Yes			N = No			A = Abstention			a = Absent														
	RES.248			RES.250			RES.251			RES.252			RES.256			RES.258			RES.259			RES.262		
	Y	N	A	Y	N	A	Y	N	A	Y	N	A	Y	N	A	Y	N	A	Y	N	A	Y	N	A
Algeria	Y			Y			Y			Y			Y				A		Y			Y		
Brazil	Y			Y			Y			Y			Y		Y				Y			Y		
Canada	Y			Y					A	Y			Y		Y						A	Y		
China	Y			Y			Y			Y			Y		Y				Y			Y		
Denmark	Y			Y			Y			Y			Y		Y						A	Y		
Ethiopia	Y			Y			Y			Y			Y		Y				Y			Y		
France	Y			Y			Y			Y			Y		Y				Y			Y		
Hungary	Y			Y			Y			Y			Y		Y				Y			Y		
India	Y			Y			Y			Y			Y		Y				Y			Y		
Pakistan	Y			Y			Y			Y			Y		Y				Y			Y		
Paraguay	Y			Y			Y			Y			Y		Y				Y			Y		
Senegal	Y			Y			Y			Y			Y		Y				Y			Y		
U.K.	Y			Y			Y			Y			Y		Y				Y			Y		
U.S.A.	Y			Y					A	Y			Y		Y						A	Y		
U.S.S.R	Y			Y			Y			Y			Y		Y				Y			Y		

PART II

Violations of Human Rights

251

Resolution 6 (XXIV) on Questions of Human Rights in the Territories Occupied As a Result of Hostilities in the Middle East, Adopted by the Commission on Human Rights, February 27, 1968.¹

"The Commission on Human Rights,

"Recalling provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 regarding the protection of civilian persons in time of war,

"Mindful of the principle embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights regarding the right of every-one to return to his own country.

*"Recalling resolution 237 (1967), adopted by the Security Council on 14 June 1967,² in which the Council considered that essential and inalienable human rights should be respected even during the vicissitudes of war and called upon the Government of Israel, *inter alia*, to facilitate the return of those inhabitants who had fled the areas of military operations since the outbreak of hostilities,*

"Recalling also resolution 2252 (ES-V)³ of the General Assembly, which welcomed with great satisfaction Security Council resolution 237 (1967) of 14 June 1967 and called for humanitarian assistance,

"1. Notes with appreciation the resolutions

¹ U.N. doc. E/CN.4/L. 1008, 28/2/1968. The resolution was adopted by the Commission at its 973rd meeting by a vote of 31, with Israel abstaining. The members of the Commission were as follows: Argentina, Austria, Chile, Congo (Democratic Republic of), Dahomey, France, Greece, Guatemala, India, Iran, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Lebanon, Madagascar, Morocco, New Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Senegal, Sweden, Ukraine, Soviet Union, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, United States, Venezuela and Yugoslavia. This resolution was later on endorsed by the Economic and Social Council at its 1530th plenary meeting as resolution 1336 (XLIV), May 31, 1968.

² Text in *International Documents on Palestine, 1967*, p. 251.

³ Text *ibid.*, pp. 255-256.

adopted by the Security Council and the General Assembly in accordance with the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Geneva Conventions of 1949 regarding human rights in the territories occupied as a result of the hostilities in the Middle East;

"2. Affirms the right of all the inhabitants who have left since the outbreak of hostilities in the Middle East to return and that the Government concerned should take the necessary measures in order to facilitate the return of those inhabitants to their own country without delay;

"3. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Commission informed upon developments with respect to operative paragraphs 1 and 2 above."

252

Telegram From the Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights to the Government of Israel Regarding Violations of Human Rights, March 8, 1968.*

The United Nations Commission on Human Rights is distressed to learn from newspapers of Israeli acts of destroying homes of Arab civilian population inhabiting the areas occupied by the Israeli authorities subsequent to the hostilities of June 1967. The Commission on Human Rights calls upon the Government of Israel to desist forthwith from indulging in such practices and to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms.

⁴ U.N. doc. E/CN.4/L. 1040, 13/3/1968. The telegram was sent upon the decision of the Commission at its 990th meeting on March 8, 1968.

Resolution I on Respect for and Implementation of Human Rights in Occupied Territories, Adopted by the International Conference on Human Rights, Tehran, May 7, 1968.¹

The International Conference on Human Rights,

Being guided by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

Having heard the statements made in the Conference with regard to the question of "respect for and implementation of human rights in occupied territories", and noting the note submitted by the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East,

Bearing in mind the provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 regarding the protection of civilian persons in time of war,

Recalling Security Council resolution 237 (1967)² and General Assembly resolution 2252 (Es-V)³ in which the Council and the Assembly considered that essential and inalienable rights should be respected even during the vicissitudes of war and called upon the Government of Israel to facilitate the return of those inhabitants who have fled the areas of military operations since the outbreak of hostilities,

Recalling further articles 2, 18 and 30 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and resolutions 2253 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967 and 2254 (ES-V) of 14 July 1967⁴ adopted by the General Assembly, calling upon Israel to rescind all measures already taken and to desist forthwith from taking any action which would alter the status of Jerusalem and deploring the failure of Israel to implement that resolution,

Mindful of the principle embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights regarding the right of everyone to return to his own country,

Further recalling:

(a) Resolution 6 (XXIV)⁵ of the Commission on Human Rights affirming the rights of the inhabitants who have left since the outbreak of hostilities in the Middle East to return, and that the Government concerned should take the necessary measures in order to facilitate the return of those inhabitants to their own country without delay,

(b) The telegram dispatched by the Commission on Human Rights on 8 March 1968,⁶ calling upon the Government of Israel to desist forthwith from acts of destroying homes of Arab civilian population inhabiting areas occupied by Israel,

1. *Expresses* its grave concern for the violation of human rights in Arab territories occupied as a result of the June 1967 hostilities;

2. *Draws the attention of* the Government of Israel to the grave consequences resulting from disregard of fundamental freedoms and human rights in occupied territories;

3. *Calls on* the Government of Israel to desist forthwith from acts of destroying homes of Arab civilian population inhabiting areas occupied by Israel, and to respect and implement the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 in occupied territories;

4. *Affirms* the inalienable rights of all inhabitants who have left their homes as a result of the outbreak of hostilities in the Middle East to return, resume normal life, recover their property and homes, and rejoin their families according to the provision of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;

5. *Requests* the General Assembly to appoint a special committee to investigate violations of human rights in the territories occupied by Israel and to report thereon;

6. *Requests* the Commission on Human Rights to keep the matter under constant review.

¹ U.N. doc. A/CONF. 32/31, May 8, 1968. The resolution was adopted by the Conference at its 23rd plenary meeting. It was transmitted by the President of the Conference to the President of the General Assembly in a telegram dated May 8, 1968 (A/7098, May 10, 1968).

² Text in *International Documents on Palestine, 1967*, p. 251.

³ Text *ibid.*, pp. 255-256.

⁴ Texts *ibid.*, pp. 256, 260.

⁵ *Ante*, doc. 251.

⁶ *Supra*.

254

Legal Analysis of the Security Council Resolution 237 (1967) by the Secretary-General U Thant, July 15, 1968.¹

1. Under a strictly legal interpretation of Security Council resolution 237 (1967) of 14 June 1967² and General Assembly resolution 2252 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967³ it is clear that they do not apply to minorities in the territories of even those States most directly concerned. Operative paragraph 1 of Security Council resolution 237 (1967) calls upon Israel to ensure the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the areas where military operations have taken place. This paragraph applies without question to the area occupied by Israel since June 1967. Strictly interpreted it would not, however, apply to Arabs in, for example, Nazareth or Haifa, and of course could not apply to Jewish persons in Arab States since paragraph 1 is addressed solely to Israel.

2. Likewise operative paragraph 2 strictly interpreted could not apply either to Arab persons in Israel or to Jewish persons in the Arab States. The provisions of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949 at present have application only to civilians in the occupied territories. Article 4 of the Convention provides, *inter alia*, that 'Persons protected by the Convention are those who, at a given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or occupying Power of which they are not nationals.' Part II of the Convention (articles 13-26) is excepted from this rule and its provisions 'cover the whole of the populations of the countries in conflict, without any adverse distinction based, in particular, on race, nationality, religion or political opinion.' However, these articles relate to such matters as hospital, safety and neutralized

zones, protection for the wounded and sick, the infirm, the aged and the very young, and assistance to families dispersed by the war. They are designed to alleviate suffering caused by the actual fighting and do not appear to be substantively relevant to the present question.

3. Moreover, article 6 of the Convention provides that 'In the territory of Parties to the conflict, the application of the present Convention shall cease on the general close of military operations. In the case of occupied territory, the application of the present Convention shall cease one year after the general close of military operations; however, the occupying Power shall be bound, for the duration of the occupation, to the extent that such Power exercises the functions of government in such territory, by the provisions of the following articles of the present Convention: 1 to 12, 27, 29 to 34, 47, 49, 51, 52, 53, 59, 61 to 143.' These articles which continue to apply contain in fact all the important provisions applicable to inhabitants of occupied territories after the general close of military operations. Thus, paragraph 2, continues to be applicable in occupied areas, but strictly interpreted has no application outside of such areas.

4. It was only on a broad and humanitarian interpretation, which admittedly was tenuous, that the Gussing Mission was enabled to inquire into the question of the Jewish minorities in Syria and the United Arab Republic. There is no legal basis on which this precedent could be extended to Iraq and Lebanon or any other Arab State whose territories lie outside the areas where military operations have taken place and with respect to which the Special Representative would have no primary mission under the terms of operative paragraph 1 and 2 of Security Council resolution 237 (1967).

5. Unquestionably, however, both operative paragraph 1 and operative paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution 237 (1967), as well as General Assembly resolution 2252 (ES-V), apply to areas occupied by Israel since June 1967, and the Secretary-General is under an obligation to follow their effective implementation and to report thereon to the Security Council and the General Assembly.

¹ This legal analysis was attached to a letter addressed to the Permanent Representative of Israel dated July 15, 1968. It was included in the report submitted by the Secretary-General to the Security Council entitled "Note by the Secretary-General Under Security Resolution 237 (1967) and General Assembly Resolution 2252 (ES-V) to the Security Council, U.N. doc. S/8699, July 31, 1968.

² Text in *International Documents on Palestine, 1967*, p. 251.

³ Text *ibid.*, pp. 255-256.

255

Resolution on Respect for Human Rights in the Arab Territories Occupied by Israel in 1967, Adopted by the Security Council, September 27, 1968.¹

The Security Council,

Concerned with the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the Arab territories under military occupation by Israel following the hostilities of 5 June 1967,

Recalling its resolution 237 (1967) of 14 June 1967,²

Noting the report by the Secretary-General, contained in document S 8699 and appreciating his efforts in this connexion,

Deploring the delay in the implementation of resolution 237 (1967) because of the conditions still being set by Israel for receiving a Special Representative of the Secretary-General,

1. *Requests* the Secretary-General urgently to dispatch a Special Representative to the Arab territories under military occupation by Israel following the hostilities of 5 June 1967, and to report on the implementation of resolution 237 (1967);

2. *Requests* the Government of Israel to receive the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, to co-operate with him and to facilitate his work;

3. *Recommends* that the Secretary-General be afforded all co-operation in his efforts to bring about the implementation of the present resolution and resolution 237 (1967).

256

Resolution Establishing a U.N. Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Violations of Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, Adopted by the General Assembly, December 19, 1968.³

The General Assembly,

Guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

Bearing in mind the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949,

Mindful of the principle embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights regarding the right of everyone to return to his own country, and recalling Security Council resolution 237 (1967) of 14 June 1967,⁴ General Assembly resolutions 2252 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967⁵ and 2341 B (XXII) of 19 December 1967,⁶ Commission on Human Rights resolution 6 (XXIV) of 27 February 1968⁷ and Economic and Social Council resolution 1336 (XLIV) of 31 May 1968, in which those United Nations organs called upon the Government of Israel, *inter alia*, to facilitate the return of those inhabitants who have fled the area of military operations since the outbreak of hostilities,

³ U.N. doc. A/RES/2443 (XXIII). The resolution was adopted at the 1748th meeting by a roll-call vote of 60 to 22, with 37 abstentions.

Against: Australia, Bolivia, Botswana, Dahomey, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El-Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Gambia, Israel, Ivory Coast, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Mauritius, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Swaziland, Togo, United States.

Abstentions: Argentina, Austria, Barbados, Belgium, Brazil, Burma, Cameroon, Canada, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, France, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Luxembourg, Malawi, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Philippines, Portugal, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Sweden, Trinidad and Tobago, United Kingdom, Uruguay.

⁴ Text in *International Documents on Palestine, 1967*, p. 251.

⁵ Text *ibid.*, pp. 255-256.

⁶ Text *ibid.*, pp. 467-468.

⁷ *Ante*, doc. 251.

¹ U.N. doc. S/RES/259. The resolution was adopted at the 1454th meeting by a vote of 12 to none, with 3 abstentions.

² Text in *International Documents on Palestine, 1967*, p. 251.

Recalling the telegram dispatched by the Commission on Human Rights on 8 March 1968, calling upon the Government of Israel to desist forthwith from acts of destroying homes of the Arab civilian population in areas occupied by Israel,¹

Recalling also Security Council resolution 259 (1968) of 27 September 1968,² in which the Council expressed its concern for the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the Arab territories under military occupation by Israel, and deplored the delay in the implementation of Council resolution 237 (1967),

Noting resolution I on respect for and implementation of human rights in occupied territories, adopted by the International Conference on Human Rights on 7 May 1968,³ in which the Conference, *inter alia*:

(a) Expressed its grave concern at the violation of human rights in Arab territories occupied by Israel,

(b) Drew the attention of the Government of Israel to the grave consequences resulting from the disregard of fundamental freedoms and human rights in occupied territories,

(c) Called upon the Government of Israel

to desist forthwith from acts of destroying homes of the Arab civilian population inhabiting areas occupied by Israel and to respect and implement the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 in occupied territories,

(d) Affirmed the inalienable rights of all inhabitants who have left their homes as a result of the outbreak of hostilities in the Middle East to return home, resume their normal life, recover their property and homes, and rejoin their families according to the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

1. *Decides* to establish a Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, composed of three Member States;

2. *Requests* the President of the General Assembly to appoint the members of the Special Committee;

3. *Requests* the Government of Israel to receive the Special Committee, co-operate with it and facilitate its work;

4. *Requests* the Special Committee to report to the Secretary-General as soon as possible and whenever the need arises thereafter;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide the Special Committee with all the necessary facilities for the performance of its task.

¹ *Ante*, doc. 252.

² *Supra*, doc. 255.

³ *Ante*, doc. 253.

PART III

The Palestine Refugees

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Note by the Secretary-General U Thant to the Security Council on Humanitarian Assistance to the Palestine Refugees, March 2, 1968.¹ [and Report of the UNRWA Commissioner-General].

1. In its resolution 2252 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967² on humanitarian assistance, the General Assembly, after welcoming Security Council resolution 237 (1967) of 14 June 1967,³ commended the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) for his efforts to continue the activities of the Agency with respect to all persons coming within his mandate, endorsed the efforts of the Commissioner-General to provide humanitarian assistance, as far as practicable, on an emergency basis and as a temporary measure, to other persons in the area who were displaced and were in serious need of immediate assistance as a result of the recent hostilities and appealed to all Governments, as well as organizations and individuals, to make special contributions for the above purposes to UNRWA and also to the other intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations concerned. On 19 December 1967, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2341 B (XXII),⁴ in which it reaffirmed its resolution 2252 (ES-V) and reiterated its appeal for special contributions.

2. This human problem arising out of the situation in the Middle East has been further enlarged by events in the last few weeks. Governments now considering their response to the appeal of the General Assembly may wish to consider the situation described in the following

report from Mr. Laurence Michelmores, Commissioner-General of UNRWA, on recent developments. In particular, the Secretary-General wishes to draw attention to paragraph 8 of the Commissioner-General's report and appeals to all Governments to make urgently whatever contribution now facing the Government of Jordan and UNRWA.

Report of the UNRWA Commissioner-General Michelmores on the "Exodus From the Jordan Valley"

1. Recent military incidents along the River Jordan, particularly those of 8 and 15 February 1968, have caused casualties and widespread alarm among the civilian population living on the east side of the Jordan Valley. The Jordanian authorities have stated that forty-six civilians lost their lives and fifty-five were injured in the latest of those incidents on 15 February. The cumulative total of civilian casualties reported by the Jordanian authorities in the military incidents which occurred in the Jordan Valley between November 1967 and February 1968 now exceeds eighty deaths and 140 persons injured. Among those who have lost their lives or suffered injuries have been displaced persons from areas occupied by Israel in June 1967 and some of the refugee residents of UNRWA's long-established Karameh Camp. The UNRWA warehouse at Karameh was destroyed and several UNRWA schools, health and other facilities were damaged.

2. The cumulative effect of these incidents has been to cause about 75,000 refugees and displaced persons and many of the villagers in the Valley to abandon their homes and temporary shelters and seek refuge on higher ground to the east, away from the scene of the firing. While the movement out of the Valley had begun prior to 15 February 1968, it became a flood after the military action on that day, and was continuing as of 1 March.

3. At the beginning of February 1968, the seven tented camps in the Jordan Valley, run by

¹ U.N. doc. S/8435, also issued as A/7060. The note was submitted under the General Assembly resolution 2252 (ES-V) and Security Council resolution 237 (1967).

² Text in *International Documents on Palestine, 1967*, pp. 255-256.

³ Text *ibid.*, p. 251.

⁴ Text *ibid.*, pp. 467-468.

UNRWA, sheltered 57,000 Palestine refugees and other Palestinians who left the West Bank and the Gaza Strip after the hostilities of June 1967. There were also some 23,000 pre-1967 Palestine refugees resident in Karameh Camp. By 1 March, there were less than 2,000 persons remaining in the tented camps and 500 in Karameh. Other refugees not resident in UNRWA camps and many, perhaps half, of the inhabitants of the villages in the northern part of the Valley are also reported to have moved towards Amman, but their numbers are not yet known.

4. At the request of the Jordanian Government, UNRWA is continuing its services for persons remaining in the Valley and is working closely with the Government in providing emergency assistance to the persons newly displaced from the Jordan Valley at the places where they are now located. Many of those from the UNRWA tented camps took tents as well as blankets and other personal possessions with them and are now reerecting their tents at various sites where they have taken refuge.

5. The Jordanian Government has established a new tented camp—Baqa—near Suweileh (North-West of Amman) and 40,000 persons were there by 1 March, with more reported to be on their way. At the request of the Jordanian Government, UNRWA has assumed responsibility for running this camp. Arrangements are proceeding with the utmost speed to install a water distribution system, erect latrines, and establish health services and facilities for distributing food rations and for providing hot meals. In the meantime, bread, sardines and cheese are being brought from the Jordan Valley, so that classes may be resumed soon.

6. A further 6,000 newly displaced persons have moved to the site of a former tented camp at Souf near Jerash, and 5,000 are at Marka, on the outskirts of Amman. Other smaller groups have gathered at various locations in and near Amman and Zerka. Still others have moved in with families in and around Amman, further increasing the congestion there, and swelling the population of existing UNRWA camps. Several new camps may be required outside the Valley, and UNRWA had offered to collaborate with the Government in establishing and administering them.

7. These developments confront the Jordan Government and UNRWA with a new emergency of large proportions. While the dimensions of the problem cannot yet be fully assessed, there will certainly be a need for thousands of additional tents and for funds to establish health, sanitation, water distribution, food distribution, supplementary feeding, educational services and other facilities.

8. UNRWA already faces a deficit of \$4 million for its existing services, and the new burdens resulting from the exodus from the Jordan Valley increase the need for funds as well as for additional tents. Unless special contributions are forthcoming at this critical time, it is hard to see how the essential needs of the refugees and displaced persons can continue to be met.

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Note on the Palestine Refugees submitted by the UNRWA Commissioner-General Michelmores to the International Conference on Human Rights, Teheran, April 29, 1968.¹

The Commissioner-General has the honour to submit to the Conference the attached note entitled "Human Rights and the Palestine Refugees".

Whilst no report was requested from him by the Preparatory Committee for the Conference, the secretariat of the Conference had received indications that various delegations have expressed a desire to have a note or statement by the Commissioner-General placed before the Conference. The Commissioner-General is glad to avail himself of the opportunity afforded by this wish of the delegations concerned to submit for the consideration of the Conference the attached note. The Conference will be aware that the

¹ U.N. doc. A/CONF. 32/22. This note which was submitted by the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) was later on transmitted by the U.N. Secretary-General U Thant to the Third Committee of the General Assembly in response to the request made at its 1622nd meeting (A/C.3/L. 1639, November 29, 1968).

details of the Agency's work are fully reported, annually, to the General Assembly (most recently in A/6713)¹ and, in addition, in 1967, were made the subject of two special reports to the Assembly by the Commissioner-General on the humanitarian aspects of the situation in the Middle East (A/6787 and A/6723 and Add. 1), and of a report by the Secretary-General, based on information provided by the Commissioner-General and the Secretary-General's Special Representative, Mr. Gussing, dated 18 August 1967 (S/8124).² The Conference will also recall that the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in a note dated 2 March 1968 (A/7060),³ circulated a further report by the Commissioner-General on the exodus from the Jordan Valley:

Human rights and the Palestine refugees

Twenty years ago, on 10 December 1948, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It was also twenty years ago that nearly three quarters of a million Palestinians became refugees. On 8 December 1949, in resolution 302 (IV) the General Assembly conferred on UNRWA a mandate which envisaged a programme of assistance to the Palestine refugees. This resolution did not specifically use the phrase "human rights" or overtly express any connexion between this mandate and the basic concepts of human rights adopted by the Assembly in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; but the connexion between the two resolutions, both in the period for which they have endured and in their humanitarian aims, is nevertheless clear.

The tragic circumstances in which the Palestine refugees found themselves, and the harsh conditions they have had to face over the last twenty years, raise inevitably the question whether their status can be reconciled with the precept of article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, that

"All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights...". The Palestine refugees have faced their hardships with courage and, in a very real sense, it has been part of UNRWA's task to assist, as best it could within the limited resources available to it, in preserving for more than one and a quarter million Palestine refugees some semblance of human dignity, without which human rights are meaningless. This task has been discharged by the Agency for nearly twenty years and the details of the execution of this task have been a matter of annual report to the General Assembly. However, in the most summary terms it may be stated that, since its inception, UNRWA has provided basic rations of about 1,500 calories a day for about 850,000 persons in a refugee population which, by May 1967, numbered 1.3 million persons. It has afforded supplementary feeding to specially vulnerable groups, such as infants, school-children and pregnant women. It has distributed more than 10,000 tons of clothing and built camp shelter for more than half a million people.

The Agency has also provided a simple but effective community health service, with technical guidance from the World Health Organization, and there has never been a major epidemic amongst the refugees in UNRWA's care. Moreover, following upon the events of June 1967, the Agency has, pursuant to General Assembly resolution 2252 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967,⁴ extended its assistance to tens of thousands of newly displaced persons, in addition to the previously registered refugees. It has accommodated some 70,000 people in emergency, tented camps set up in East Jordan and the Syrian Arab Republic. The increased burdens imposed upon the Agency as a consequence of the events of June 1967, burdens which show no sign of lessening, have been fully reported to the General Assembly in the Commissioner-General's last annual report (A/6713, paras. 24-49 and 59).

No one can pretend that the standard of living thus provided conformed to "the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services" referred to in article

¹ See *International Documents on Palestine, 1967*, pp. 381-460.

² This was an interim report submitted by the Secretary-General U Thant to the Security Council and the General Assembly (A/6787, S/8124). The final report was submitted on September 15, 1967, A/6797 (also issued as S/8158, October 2, 1967), see *ibid.*, pp. 331-376.

³ *Supra.*

⁴ Text in *International Documents on Palestine, 1967*, pp. 255-256.

25 of the Universal Declaration. Equally, with an expenditure of ten United States cents per day per person for food, clothing, shelter, health and education, no one could expect that UNRWA could do so.

There remained one prospect of material improvement in the welfare of the refugees which, even in the absence of massive financial aid, offered some possibility of restoring a measure of human dignity. This lay in seeking to enlarge and improve the educational opportunities of the refugees in accordance with the aims envisaged in article 26 of the Universal Declaration and the special emphasis placed upon the rights of the child in the General Assembly's Declaration on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1959. This UNRWA has done, within the financial limitations of its limited budget. A whole educational system has been developed since 1948, with technical advice and guidance from UNESCO, and there are today more than 250,000 children receiving full-time education in 440 schools constructed or rented by UNRWA, in temporary tented schools in the emergency camps created since last June, or in government or private schools subsidized by UNRWA. It may be added that by 1966, 45 per cent of this school population consisted of girls, and that every effort was made to recognize the principle of equality of the sexes, affirmed in the Preamble to the Universal Declaration. In addition to this elementary and preparatory schooling, ten well-equipped, residential centres for vocational and teacher training have been established, from which already more than 10,000 young refugee men and women have graduated to apply their skills throughout the Arab world, and in addition to contribute to the living standards of their families. Over 40 per cent of UNRWA's budget is now spent on education and, owing to the efforts of the young refugees themselves and their innate intelligence and ability, a gradual but evident process of rehabilitation has been at work. The value of this education to the young refugees cannot be denied, wherever their future may lie.

In final analysis, however, all these endeavours are palliatives: they have helped to maintain minimum standards of living for the refugee population, they have restored some of their confidence and, possibly, preserved something

of their human dignity. What they have not done is to put an end to their refugee status and accord to them the full measure of human rights which the Universal Declaration and the international covenants require. The larger problem, which is both political and human, has remained and falls largely outside UNRWA's mandate and its capabilities.

It will be recalled that it was in relation to this larger problem that, in December 1948, only a few months after the refugees had fled from their homes, the General Assembly adopted resolution 194 (III), in paragraph 11 of which it resolved "that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live in peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible." In the same paragraph, the Assembly instructed the Conciliation Commission "to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation, and to maintain close relations with the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees and, through him, with the appropriate organs and agencies of the United Nations". Paragraph 11 has been reaffirmed year after year by the Assembly but has remained unimplemented. After nineteen years the refugees have still had neither an opportunity of returning to their homes nor compensation for their property. Since the two issues of repatriation and compensation are linked together as alternatives in the resolution, the continuing deadlock over repatriation has had the result of denying the refugees of any benefit from the property they left behind in 1948. It would hardly seem that this can have been the intention of the Assembly in adopting its resolution nineteen years ago. Suggestions have been made from time to time for measures to enable the refugees to receive compensation, irrespective of whether they would have the opportunity of returning to their homes and without prejudice to this or any other political claims they may have; but those suggestions have not been pursued.

The importance of the 1948 resolution remains undiminished at the present time, and this for two reasons. In the first case it is now widely accepted that, without some solution to the refugee problem, peace within the Middle East is unlikely to be achieved. It may be recalled that the Security Council, in resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967,¹ affirmed the necessity of "a just settlement of the refugee problem" as an ingredient of any just and lasting peace in the area. The Secretary-General, in his introduction to the annual report on the work of the Organization for the period 16 June 1966–15 June 1967 had earlier stated that:

"It seems to me also that there are certain fundamental principles which have application to the issues of the Middle East and which no one would be disposed to dispute as to their intrinsic worth, soundness and justness, at least when taken separately...people everywhere, and this certainly applies to the Palestine refugees, have a natural right to be in their homeland and to have a future..." (A/6701/Add.I, para. 49).²

In the second case, without a just solution to the refugee problem the human rights which are enshrined in these international instruments cannot be achieved for the Palestine refugees: they will remain a people to whom the full realization of these rights is denied. It may thus be appropriate to search for a solution not only as a political settlement but as a means of implementing human rights. Perhaps a solution to this sad intractable problem may be more effectively and hopefully pursued by tempering considerations of a political character with simple humane concern for restoring human rights to the Palestine refugees.

Pending the solution to this larger problem there is an immediate problem to which the Security Council made reference in its resolution 237 (1967) of 14 June 1967,³ and which is referred to under the heading "Respect for human rights and for humanitarian principles in time of military conflict" in the study submitted by the Secretary-General as Conference document A/CONF. 32/5 Add. 1. This is not a problem which any organ of the United Nations has placed within UNRWA's competence, and I must stress that, in consequence, the Agency's

concern with this problem has necessarily been limited to the implications which this problem has for its programmes of assistance and its proper interest in the general welfare of the persons entitled to that assistance, whether under its normal mandate or the extended mandate conferred by General Assembly resolution 2252 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967.

One aspect of this problem concerns those refugees and other displaced persons who inhabit the areas where military operations took place in June 1967 and who have fled since the outbreak of hostilities. These number over 400,000 persons, many of whom are now existing in crowded, temporary habitation, deprived of means of livelihood, of their property and homes, and often separated from their families. For all these persons the Security Council called upon the Government of Israel to facilitate their return, and this call was endorsed by the General Assembly. In practice as I reported to the Assembly in my last annual report (A/6713, para. 36), the number who actually returned prior to the end of August 1967 was a little over 14,000. Since then a further small number have been able to return under arrangements for reuniting families. The period since August has also seen a continuing movement of people out of the occupied areas.

The Agency's position has been consistent and perfectly clear on this question, and that is that, on grounds of common humanity, these people should be permitted to return. In a statement I issued on 3 July 1967, I said:

"Our mission is purely humanitarian and it is on grounds of common humanity that I urge this action—the return of the displaced persons—on all concerned. For this is a situation where the obligations of humanity must, I believe, prevail"

It may be added that, in terms of UNRWA's capacity to help these unfortunate people, a return to where they were living before the recent hostilities would increase that capacity precisely because it is there that UNRWA has the installations and facilities necessary to make its services effective: the tented camps and emergency facilities now provided on the East Bank of the Jordan and in Syria and the United Arab Republic offer no adequate substitute.

The other aspect of this problem concerns that part of the population who now find them-

¹ Text *ibid.*, pp. 268-269.

² See *ibid.*, pp. 376-379.

³ Text *ibid.*, p. 251.

selves in occupied territory. It was on this aspect of the problem that the Security Council made to the Governments concerned the recommendation that they scrupulously respect the humanitarian principles governing the protection of civilian persons in time of war, contained in the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949. The Civilians Convention of 1949, as any reading of it will disclose, has an intimate connexion with considerations of human rights, for its essential purpose is to safeguard minimum human rights in times of military occupation. It must be in the interest of all the Governments concerned to ensure full compliance with this Convention and to demonstrate to world opinion that full compliance is achieved.

It may be recalled that, following upon the Security Council's request to the Secretary-General in resolution 237 (1967) of 14 June 1967 that he follow the effective implementation of that resolution, the Secretary-General appointed Mr. Nils-Goran Gussing as his Special Representative to obtain for him, on the spot, the information required for the proper discharge of his responsibilities. In due course, on 15 September 1967, the Secretary-General published a report based upon the information submitted to him by Mr. Gussing (A/6797). UNRWA's role, during Mr. Gussing's mission and thereafter has been confined to lending such assistance and furnishing such information to the Secretary-General and his Representatives as they might require and as would follow from the Agency's limited connexion with these matters, as described above. It only remains to be added that, in a series of notes exchanged with the Governments of Israel, the Syrian Arab Republic, Jordan and the United Arab Republic during the past three months (S/8553, dated 19 April 1968) the Secretary-General has sought the concurrence of the Governments concerned to the dispatch of a Representative to the area who, once again, will assist the Secretary-General in meeting his reporting obligations under the relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions.

Report of the UNRWA Commissioner-General Michelmores Covering the Period 1 July 1967-30 June 1968.¹

INTRODUCTION

1. The year which followed the hostilities of June 1967 in the Middle East was one of new hardships and anxieties for the Palestine refugees, as they lived under the shadow of dangers and uncertainties. Those who became refugees for a second time (about 175,000), together with most of the 350,000 or more other persons newly displaced from the occupied areas of southern Syria, the West Bank of Jordan, Gaza and Sinai, were in need of the very essentials of physical survival—food, water, shelter, blankets, clothing and health care and, scarcely less important, the education of their children. For many, these needs could be met only in tented camps, where winter cold and storms brought additional suffering. Inhabitants of the camps in the Jordan Valley found themselves exposed to the physical danger of military action as well, and fled again to the higher lands away from the Jordan Valley; for many it was their fourth move within a year.

2. Refugees who remained in the areas occupied by Israel, mainly in the West Bank and Gaza, felt the effects of economic dislocation, the loss of jobs and remittances from abroad, currency and banking difficulties and the pressure of increased living costs. Although the situation of some groups was alleviated as the year progressed, serious economic problems continued. Inhabitants of these areas were subject also to the psychological stress of living under an occupying authority and to restrictions of movement, curfews and the anxieties inseparable from military security measures. Refugees in Lebanon, Syria and east Jordan also felt the impact of economic difficulties which beset the areas in which they lived. For all of the refugees, the future was uncertain as they anxiously awaited the measures that might follow the Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967² calling for a just and lasting peace and including as one of

¹ U.N. doc. A/7213, 15/9/1968.

² Text in *International Documents on Palestine, 1967*, pp. 268-269.

its elements a "just settlement of the refugee problem." They awaited also the realization of Security Council resolution 237 (1967)¹ and General Assembly resolution 2252 (ES-V)² calling upon the Government of Israel to facilitate the return of those who were displaced after the outbreak of hostilities to their former places of residence. They noted, too, that the General Assembly once again, in resolution 2341 A (XXII),³ adopted on 19 December 1967, noted "with deep regret that repatriation or compensation of the refugees as provided for in paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III)⁴ has not been effected, that no substantial progress has been made in the programme endorsed in paragraph 2 of resolution 513 (VI)⁵ for the reintegration of refugees either by repatriation or resettlement and that, therefore, the situation of the refugees continues to be a matter of serious concern". The General Assembly asked for continued efforts towards the implementation of paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III). It is evident to the Commissioner-General, from his contacts with the Arab Governments concerned and with the refugees, that this paragraph, upon which the refugees had for so long built their hopes, remains of crucial importance to them.

¹ Text *ibid.*, pp. 251.

² Text *ibid.*, pp. 255-256.

³ Text *ibid.*, pp. 466-467.

⁴ Paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, provides: "[the General Assembly] *Resolves* that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible."

⁵ Paragraph 2 of resolution 513 (VI) of 26 January 1952, is at follows: "[The General Assembly] *Endorses*, without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948 or to the provisions of paragraph 4 of resolution 393 (V) of 2 December 1950 relative to reintegration either by repatriation or resettlement, the programme recommended by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for the relief and reintegration of Palestine refugees, which envisages the expenditure of \$50 million for relief and \$200 million for reintegration over and above such contributions as may be made by local governments, to be carried out over a period of approximately three years starting as of 1 July 1951."

3. Faced with the uncertainty of when and how the prospects offered by these resolutions of United Nations organs might be given reality, the refugees lack a basis on which to plan their lives and to build for the future.

4. While these uncertainties persist, planning how best to meet the future needs is equally difficult for UNRWA, the Governments concerned and the many non-governmental organizations which are trying to alleviate the hardships of the refugees and other displaced persons. In the meantime, attention has had to be focused on immediate, urgent problems. During the year, the Agency's field staff have carried on their work for the refugees with steadfast devotion in the face of many difficulties. Their efforts have been directed towards re-establishing and maintaining the Agency's basic services of relief, health and education for the whole refugee population and to devising means to meet the urgent new needs which have emerged. A summary of the situation in each field of UNRWA's operation follows.⁶ Throughout this report the term

⁶ Information concerning the origin of the Agency and its mission and work will be found in the following annual reports and other United Nations documents:

- A. Final report of the United Nations Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East (28 December 1949) (A/AC. 25/6, parts I and II).
- B. Report of the Secretary-General on Assistance to Palestine Refugees:
Official Records of the General Assembly, Fourth Session, Ad Hoc Political Committee, Annexes, vol. II, (A/1060), p. 14.
- C. Proposals for the continuation of United Nations assistance to Palestine refugees. Document submitted by the Secretary-General to the fourteenth session of the General Assembly (A/4121).
- D. Report by the Secretary-General under General Assembly resolution 2252 (ES-V) and Security Council resolution 237 (1967) (A/6787).
- E. Reports of the Director (Commissioner-General) of UNRWA and special reports of the Director and Advisory Commission to the General Assembly:
 - (i) *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Session, Supplement No. 19* (A/1451/Rev. 1).
 - (ii) *Ibid.*, *Sixth Session, Supplements Nos. 16 and 16A* (A/1905 and Add. 1);
 - (iii) *Ibid.*, *Seventh Session, Supplements Nos. 13 and 13A* (A/2171 and Add. 1);
 - (iv) *Ibid.*, *Eighth Session, Supplements Nos. 12 and 12A* (A/2470 and Add. 1);
 - (v) *Ibid.*, *Ninth Session, Supplements Nos. 17 and 17A* (A/2717 and Add. 1);
 - (vi) *Ibid.*, *Tenth Session, Supplements Nos. 15 and 15A* (A/2978 and Add. 1);

“refugees”, “displaced refugees” or “newly displaced refugees” refers to those persons who were registered with UNRWA prior to the June 1967 hostilities; the term “displaced persons” or “other displaced persons” refers to those who were displaced after the outbreak of the June 1967 hostilities and who are not registered with UNRWA.

UNRWA services

5. In Lebanon the Agency's services continued to function normally throughout the past year. The number of refugees registered with UNRWA was 166,264 at the end of June 1968

- (vii) *Ibid.*, *Eleventh Session, Supplements Nos. 14 and 14A* (A/3212 and Add. 1);
- (viii) *Ibid.*, *Twelfth Session, Supplement No. 14* (A/3686 and A/3735);
- (ix) *Ibid.*, *Thirteenth Session, Supplement No. 14* (A/3931 and A/3948);
- (x) *Ibid.*, *Fourteenth Session, Supplement No. 14* (A/4213);
- (xi) *Ibid.*, *Fifteenth Session, Supplement No. 14* (A/4478);
- (xii) *Ibid.*, *Sixteenth Session, Supplement No. 14* (A/4861);
- (xiii) *Ibid.*, *Seventeenth Session, Supplement No. 14* (A/5214);
- (xiv) *Ibid.*, *Eighteenth Session, Supplement No. 13* (A/5513);
- (xv) *Ibid.*, *Nineteenth Session, Supplement No. 13* (A/5813);
- (xvi) *Ibid.*, *Twentieth Session, Supplement No. 13* (A/6013);
- (xvii) *Ibid.*, *Twenty-first Session, Supplement No. 13* (A/6313);
- (xviii) *Ibid.*, *Twenty-second Session, Supplement No. 13* (A/6713);
- (xix) A/6723 and Add. 1. For the printed text, see *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-second Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1967*, documents S/8001 and Add. 1;
- (xx) A/6787 and Corr. 1;
- (xxi) A/7060.

F. Pertinent General Assembly resolutions:

194 (III) of 11 December 1948; 212 (III) of 19 November 1948; 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949; 393 (V) of 2 December 1950; 513 (VI) of 26 January 1952; 614 (VII) of 6 November 1952; 720 (VIII) of 27 November 1953; 818 (IX) of 4 December 1954; 916 (X) of 3 December 1955; 1018 (XI) of 28 February 1957; 1191 (XII) of 12 December 1957; 1315 (XIII) of 21 April 1961; 1725 (XVI) of 20 December 1961; 1856 (XVII) of 20 December 1962; 1912 (XVIII) of 3 December 1963; 2002 (XIX) of 10 February 1965; 2052 (XX) of 15 December 1965; 2154 (XXI) of 17 November 1966; 2252 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967; 2341 (XXII) of 19 December 1967. [This footnote and the following ones in the report are in source text.]

and the number receiving rations was 103,727. During 1967, the Agency completed the work (on which it had been engaged for the past five years) of reviewing the ration entitlements of all families on the ration lists. This is a continuous process and the review has now recommenced from the beginning. The effect has been to enable the Agency to provide rations within the existing ration ceiling for all cases of proved need among newly born children and refugees applying for reinstatement on the ration rolls on grounds of having lost their capacity to support themselves. The number of applicants in the latter category has increased markedly since the hostilities. The Agency has received effective co-operation from the authorities in Lebanon in carrying out the review and rectification of the ration rolls. In health and education matters also, the Agency has benefited from the full co-operation of the authorities. Outstanding problems of concern to both the Government of Lebanon and the Agency are the replacement of unsatisfactory camps in the Beirut area, a settlement of certain large claims by the Agency for exemption from certain forms of taxation and for the reimbursement of taxes and other charges already paid by UNRWA. These claims are referred to in more detail in annex II of this report.

6. In Syria also the Agency's established services have functioned more or less normally. The number of refugees registered with UNRWA was 149,537 at the end of June 1968 and the number receiving rations was 100,503, including 4,583 added as a result of the emergency. Little progress can be reported in verifying need among ration recipients, but the authorities maintain adequate controls to reflect deaths and absences and in these respects the rolls in Syria are believed by the Agency to be reasonably accurate. In operating its health and education services, the Agency has received effective co-operation from the authorities. In education, an important matter now under discussion between the Government and the Agency is the reopening of the UNRWA training centre at Homs, which was occupied by Syrian displaced persons after the hostilities of June 1967. Agreement has been reached that the centre should be reopened for vocational training (instead of teacher training, as previously intended), but certain details remain

to be settled. Another question concerning education is the implementation of the UNESCO Executive Board's resolutions of 3 November 1967 and 20 June 1968 concerning, *inter alia*, the textbooks used in UNRWA/UNESCO schools. This is discussed in detail in paragraphs 17-19. Finally, as in the case of Lebanon, certain claims by UNRWA for reimbursement of taxes and other charges are outstanding and are referred to in more detail in annex II of this report.

7. One further operational problem calls for comment. Consequent upon the closure of the Suez Canal, and the resulting difficulty in finding shipping destined for Aqaba, most of the Agency's supplies for Jordan have had to be imported via the Port of Beirut. Here the Agency faces not only a tax on every ton unloaded in the port, but also its bulk supplies of flour and sugar are not allowed direct transport by road to Jordan. By virtue of a Tripartite Agreement of 1950 between the Government of Lebanon, Syria and Jordan, these have to be transported by rail at higher cost to the Agency. In late 1967, the freight-cars made available to the Agency simply did not suffice to move the large volume of supplies required in Jordan so that, as a temporary measure, the three Governments allowed transport by road as far as Damascus; thereafter these supplies had to be trans-shipped onto the railway. This has both complicated and made more expensive the Agency's supply operations. The whole matter of the Agency's claim for these excess rail costs, which have been incurred since 1950, is referred to in annex II of this report.

8. The most urgent task confronting the Agency in Syria during the past year has been the provision of temporary shelter and other essential services for the registered refugees uprooted from the Quncitra area, now occupied by Israel. The total number of these newly displaced refugees is 17,500. Most found shelter in the homes of relatives and friends or in rented accommodation in Damascus and elsewhere, but, by the end of 1967, some 4,500 were accommodated in three tented camps, two on the outskirts of Damascus and one at Dera'a. The number of displaced refugees seeking accommodation in the tented camps, however, continued to increase and, at the request of the Syrian authorities, UNRWA established a further tented camp in

the Damascus area and expanded one of the camps established last autumn. At 30 June 1968, there were 7,746 refugees living in the tented camps. During the bitterly cold and stormy winter of 1967-1968, the refugees living in the tented camps in Syria had to face much hardship and discomfort. UNRWA sought to alleviate the misery of life in these camps by providing stoves for heating, bedding, concrete floors under the tents, surfaced pathways and roads, and ditches for surface drainage through the camps. The Agency has supplemented the food ration with additional protein and enlarged the hot meal programme for the newly displaced refugees in these camps, as well as for those living outside who are in special need. Syrian displaced persons from the southern area, estimated at 100,000, have been provided with food, shelter and other services by the Government of Syria, and UNRWA's help has not been required.

9. In Jordan, there were some 724,000 refugees registered with UNRWA before the hostilities, including persons who were temporarily residing outside of the Agency's area of operations. After the exodus to east Jordan, the number of registered refugees still residing on the West Bank is estimated by the Agency at about 245,000 and the number in east Jordan at about 455,500, plus some 38,500 registered refugees from Gaza who have entered east Jordan since the hostilities. However, the total figure of 494,000 refugees will include some unreported deaths and absences.

10. At the time of writing this report, the situation in east Jordan is still confused as a result of the movements of population that have continued throughout the year and the difficulty of obtaining accurate figures. In addition to the 494,000 registered refugees shown in UNRWA records as now located in east Jordan, the Government of Jordan has registered some 237,500 displaced persons from the West Bank plus about 8,500 displaced persons from, Gaza a total of 246,000 displaced persons—which, when added to the 494,000 UNRWA-registered refugees, would bring the total number of refugees and displaced persons living in east Jordan to 740,000. However, there is, doubtless, some duplication between the UNRWA registrations and those of the Government, as well as within each group,

and efforts are now under way to identify and eliminate these extra registrations. The actual number of rations issued to all recipients in east Jordan during June 1968 was 590,000. Of these, 350,000¹ were issued to UNRWA-registered refugees and the remaining 240,000 to Government-registered displaced persons. (Those receiving rations represent about 40 per cent of the total population of east Jordan.) At the Government's request, UNRWA has assumed the whole responsibility for ration distribution in east Jordan, the food-stuffs issued to the Government-registered recipients being supplied from Government stocks or by UNRWA against reimbursement to UNRWA by the Government of equivalent supplies, or their cash value, plus the cost of transport and distribution. Negotiations with the Government are continuing as to the precise amounts due to the Agency.

11. Paragraphs 34 to 38 of last year's report (A 6713) described the result of the arrangements made in July and August 1967, under which slightly more than 14,000 persons returned to the West Bank. Since then, some others have been able to return on grounds of special hardship or family reunion. For the period September 1967 to 30 June 1968, the total figure is given as 2,000 by Jordan and as 3,000 by Israel. However, these numbers are exceeded by the numbers of persons who have moved from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to east Jordan over the same period. Some easing of the difficulties faced by the refugees and other displaced persons in east Jordan has resulted from the greater freedom of movement across the river Jordan in both directions, which has been permitted in recent months. Nevertheless, the Commissioner-General feels that he should reiterate once again that UNRWA's capacity to help will be much greater if, in accordance with Security Council resolution 237 (1967), which was endorsed by the General Assembly, the inhabitants who had fled are allowed to return to the places where they were living before the hostilities and where UNRWA's installations and facilities already exist. The General Assembly's attention is also called to the references to this

matter in the resolutions adopted by the International Conference on Human Rights on 7 May 1968 (A/7098); by the Economic and Social Council in resolution 1336 (XLIV) adopted on 31 May 1968, which endorsed resolution 6 (XXIV) adopted by the Commission on Human Rights on 27 February 1968; and by the World Health Assembly on 23 May 1968, which is reproduced as annex IV of this report. The Commissioner-General also hopes that the return to the territories now occupied as a result of the June 1967 hostilities ought to be considered, and the return permitted at the earliest possible date and without waiting for the achievement of the "just settlement of the refugee problem" to which Security Council resolution 242 (1967) refers. This, in the belief of the Commissioner-General, would conform to the wishes of the vast majority of the refugees concerned.

12. Meanwhile, during the past year, UNRWA has done its best, in close co-operation with the Jordanian authorities and with a number of voluntary agencies, to cope with the appalling problem of the great mass of refugees and other displaced persons who now eke out a miserable existence in east Jordan. One of the first difficulties faced by the Agency was that, since its administrative headquarters within Jordan were previously in Jerusalem, a completely new administrative structure had to be established in Amman. At the request of the Government of Jordan, UNRWA has accepted responsibility for running all of the six tented camps (population 78,400) now established on the uplands in east Jordan.² As already mentioned, UNRWA has also undertaken, at the Government's request, the whole responsibility for ration distribution. Schools have been improvised for the children in the tented camps and for displaced refugee children living elsewhere. In all, schooling in east Jordan has had to be provided by the Agency for 20,000 more children than before the hostilities. Emergency health services have been organized with invaluable help from the Norwegian Refugee Council, the Swedish and British Save the Children Funds, the Lutheran World Federation,

¹ Including 43,553 children among the newly displaced refugees living outside tented camps, who have been excluded because of ration ceilings, but for whom the Government is providing rations during the emergency.

² A report of the Commissioner-General on the flight of the refugees from the previous camps in the Jordan Valley was distributed by the Secretary-General on 2 March 1968 as document A/7060 and S/8435, *ante*, doc. 257.

the Iraqi Medical Mission, the Iranian Red Lion and Sun Society and the Jordanian Red Crescent Society. Medical supplies continue to be received through the American Middle East Rehabilitation Inc. (United States of America). For the displaced refugees in the tented camps, the food ration has been increased to provide additional protein, the number of rations has been augmented by 10,000 issued to children and 2,000 to adults not previously included, and the hot meal programme has been provided to increased numbers. A substantial contribution from the Oxford Committee for Famine Relief (OXFAM) will cover the cost of the continuation of the emergency supplementary feeding programme for most of 1968. The provision of tents has been a continuing urgent need. The Government and UNRWA have pooled their resources, and donations of tents have been received from Governments (France and the United States providing the largest quantities), and from many non-governmental sources, such as OXFAM, the Near East Council of Churches, the German Diakonisches Werk and the American organization, NEED, Inc.

13. In spite of the added burdens and strain imposed by the continuing emergency in east Jordan, the Agency's relief and health services have operated throughout the year without serious interruption and, in general, in a normal and regular manner. However, this was less true of the education services; these were maintained, but they suffered as a result of the continued movement of the population (see paragraph 102). Much credit for these achievements is due to the Agency's field staff in east Jordan. Effective co-operation has been maintained with the Government, and the provision of services to both refugees and other displaced persons has continued to have the character of a combined operation in which the Government, voluntary agencies and other international organizations, such as the World Food Programme (WFP) and UNICEF have all played their part. A notable advance has been made during the year in improving the system of ration distribution as a result of measures taken by the Government to ban from the distribution centres the so-called "merchants" trafficking in ration cards and rationed commodities. As a result, this long-standing abuse has now

been largely eliminated and, given continuing vigilance by the authorities and UNRWA, should not recur. Important matters outstanding between the Government and the Agency relate, as in Lebanon and Syria, to certain financial claims by the Agency against the Government, the largest being that in respect of the excess rail costs (see annex II). The difficulties concerning certain textbooks, whose use in UNRWA/UNESCO schools had been held in suspense as a result of the UNESCO Executive Board's resolution of 3 November 1967, should be lessened, and hopefully resolved under the Executive Board's resolution of 20 June 1968, as reported below (see paragraphs 17-19).

14. On the West Bank, UNRWA's services recovered quickly from the disruption caused by the hostilities and have functioned in a regular and effective way throughout the year. During the first weeks of the school year, attendance at the UNRWA/UNESCO schools was affected by general unrest and was both low and subject to sudden fluctuations. The three UNRWA training centres were similarly affected. But since November attendance has been regular and the schools and training centres have been running smoothly, with only occasional difficulties arising from the political uncertainty prevailing on the West Bank. Some school classes were handicapped by a lack of textbooks (as explained in paragraphs 17-19), but these difficulties were partly overcome by the preparation by UNRWA of teaching notes. The UNRWA health services have also operated regularly and without serious difficulty during the year. In both education and health matters, after initial questions of policy and jurisdiction had been explored with the authorities, the Agency has been left to carry on its work with little restriction or interference and, in general, the co-operation between UNRWA and the Israel authorities continued to be effective. Extensive revision of UNRWA's registration records and ration rolls has been necessary because of the large movement of refugees from the West Bank to east Jordan. In the process of rectifying the records, efforts have also been made, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 2341 (XXII), to ascertain deaths or absences which had not previously been recorded. Technical problems involved

in ascertaining and reflecting such information in registration records have been under study. Consultations have also been held with the technical staff of the Government of Israel on the reconciliation of the UNRWA statistics with those produced in the census conducted by that Government in September 1967. More recently, emphasis has shifted to the statistics produced from the issue of identification cards. Against the Agency's current estimate of about 245,000 registered refugees remaining on the West Bank (including Jerusalem), the number of rations being distributed by the Agency is 140,000 for normal recipients. Assistance was also given during 1967 to some 6,000 emergency cases not previously registered with the Agency, but responsibility for this group was assumed by the Government of Israel at the beginning of 1968. The Agency has been assured that the level of assistance for this group will be maintained.

15. In Gaza, the aftermath of the hostilities has been painful and prolonged and the Agency's services felt the effects of the succession of incidents and security measures, such as curfews, interrogations, detentions, and, on some occasions, the demolition of houses which followed. In addition, economic activity, always precariously based in Gaza, has slumped and the demand for the Agency's services, particularly supplementary feeding, has increased. The full range of the Agency's services was quickly re-established after the hostilities, and has been maintained. Between 40,000 and 45,000 registered refugees are believed to have left Gaza since the hostilities. The Agency's current estimate of the total number of registered refugees remaining in Gaza is about 265,000. The number of rations being issued by UNRWA in Gaza is 206,638 for regular recipients and 2,435 for emergency cases. As on the West Bank, the revision of the UNRWA registration records to reflect the movement out of Gaza, as well as deaths not previously reported, has been a major task. During the past year, UNRWA has had to undertake a considerable amount of replacement or repair of refugee shelter and other UNRWA installations which had been demolished or damaged in actions taken by the military authorities. Claims for reimbursement of expenditure involved have been presented to the Government of Israel. The Agency's

education services operated throughout the year. Attendance has been below normal, even after allowing for those who had left the Gaza Strip, and has also fluctuated with the frequency of incidents. By the turn of the year all UNRWA/UNESCO schools, with one exception, were repaired and functioning, but they continued to be handicapped by the lack of textbooks, as explained in paragraphs 17-19, and by the shortage of experienced teachers, some of whom were stranded in the United Arab Republic at the time of the hostilities and were not able to return to their duties in Gaza (see paragraph 105). However, the latter problem was largely resolved during the spring of 1968, when the bulk of these teachers, as well as some other UNRWA staff, were allowed to return. The Agency's health services have operated regularly throughout the year, but have been hampered by shortage of staff. A substantial number of the doctors and nurses serving with UNRWA in Gaza at the time of the hostilities were nationals of the United Arab Republic. In the following months, some resigned and left the Gaza Strip. It has proved extremely difficult to find replacements and a number of posts are still vacant. During the year, the Agency was unable to send staff of Arab nationality to the occupied territories, but agreement was secured in August 1968 to the movement of key Arab staff to these areas for limited periods.

16. In the United Arab Republic, UNRWA has during the past year met the cost of relief support provided by the United Arab Republic authorities for some 3,000 registered refugees from Gaza. (The total number of registered refugees now in the United Arab Republic is believed to be considerably larger and the Government estimates the number of refugees and other displaced persons from Gaza at 13,000.) The Agency has also provided additional scholarships for stranded refugee students from Gaza attending universities in the United Arab Republic and some financial help for refugees at the secondary level. At the present time, the Agency is exploring with the authorities concerned the possibility of extending some modest help from UNRWA to other stranded refugee students attending universities there.

Special aspects of education and training

17. Mention has been made above of difficulties that have arisen regarding the use of textbooks in UNRWA/UNESCO schools. The policy which the Agency has followed in the past has been to conform as closely as possible to the national systems of education in each of the Arab host countries. This was necessary in the interests of the refugee children who are growing up in the social and economic environment of those countries and who need to sit for the state examinations in order to secure entrance to the secondary schools and institutions of higher education of those countries (not provided by UNRWA). Consequently the curricula and textbooks employed in the UNRWA/UNESCO schools have in the past been those prescribed by the host Governments for their own national systems of education. After the hostilities of June 1967, the Government of Israel renewed the criticism it had previously expressed that textbooks used in UNRWA/UNESCO schools contained passages giving a distorted account of the events leading up to and following the establishment of the State of Israel and that they tended to induce hatred of Israel in the minds of the children using them. The authorities in the occupied areas raised with UNRWA their objections to the continued use of a considerable number of such books in those areas. Later they prohibited the use of most of the textbooks previously prescribed for use in Gaza and of about one-third of those prescribed for use on the West Bank. They also indicated their intention to print expurgated and amended versions of the books for use in the government schools in those areas. The Agency brought these developments to the notice of UNESCO, which is responsible for the technical aspects of the UNRWA/UNESCO education programme, and the Director-General arranged to bring these matters, and UNESCO's participation with UNRWA in educational activities in the occupied areas, to the attention of UNESCO's Executive Board. On 3 November 1967, the UNESCO Executive Board, meeting in Paris, unanimously approved a resolution (see annex III) which authorized the Director-General of UNESCO to co-operate with UNRWA in continuing to provide education for the refugees, both in the occupied areas and elsewhere, subject

to observance of the principles of international law regarding occupied territories and on the basis of certain principles, which included the ethical ideals laid down in the UNESCO Constitution and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the prior right of parents to choose the kind of education given to their children, respect for national, religious and linguistic traditions and the need for students to be able to pursue their studies in a system having the same socio-cultural, and particularly linguistic, characteristics.

18. The implementation of this resolution gave rise to some difficulty. In January 1968, the Director-General of UNESCO began to arrange consultations with representatives of the governments concerned. Meanwhile, it was agreed between the Director-General of UNESCO and the Commissioner-General of UNRWA that the Agency would continue, as a temporary measure, to employ the textbooks already in use in UNRWA/UNESCO schools (except for those which had been prohibited by the authorities in the occupied areas), but that the Agency would defer introducing any new textbooks which appeared *prima facie* to be in possible conflict with the resolution, pending scrutiny of the texts in the light of the principles enunciated in the resolution. Certain newly prescribed textbooks in Jordan and Syria were thus referred to UNESCO for scrutiny. The Arab Governments concerned have vigorously protested both the suspension of procurement and use of new books for the UNRWA/UNESCO schools in the territories controlled by them and the suspension of the use of books banned in the occupied territories by the Government of Israel, pending the review of these books by UNESCO. They have emphasized their concern for the education of the children affected and the consequences for those wishing to pursue their education in higher institutions of learning. They have made known to the Commissioner-General their view that, as applied to the territories controlled by them, the UNESCO Executive Board resolutions could constitute an infringement of their sovereignty and a violation of the right of each national, religious or linguistic community to pursue the educational programmes which conform to its traditions and cultural heritage. The Arab Governments have also

expressed the view that, in relation to the schools in occupied territories, alterations of curricula or textbooks are contrary to the basic human rights of the inhabitants and are contrary to United Nations resolutions, to the basic objectives of UNESCO and the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 13 August 1949. This question was reviewed by the UNESCO Executive Board at its session in Paris in May/June 1968, and a further resolution (see annex III) was unanimously approved by the Executive Board on 20 June 1968. The new resolution reaffirmed the principles laid down in the resolution of 3 November 1967, approved the steps taken to implement it by the Director-General as well as his collaboration with the Commissioner-General, and authorized the Director-General to pursue his efforts in this respect, notably by setting up a Commission of outside experts to examine the textbooks used in UNRWA/UNESCO schools and to make recommendations thereon to the Director-General for the assent and co-operation of the Member States concerned. The resolution also noted the intention of the Director-General to assign a UNESCO staff member to the post of Supervisor, UNRWA Education Services (Gaza-West Bank), and invited the Director-General to report progress on the implementation of his resolution at the session of the Executive Board to be held in the spring of 1969.

19. Meanwhile, in the occupied areas the Agency has not introduced into the UNRWA/UNESCO schools the expurgated or amended testbooks prepared by the authorities in Israel for use in the government schools in those areas. Instead, as a temporary substitute for the prohibited textbooks, the Agency has produced its own cyclostyled teaching notes. The texts of these notes were prepared in the UNRWA/UNESCO Institute of Education by specialists attached to UNRWA's Department of Education in Beirut on the basis of textbooks previously used in the schools. Although these teaching notes are not a wholly satisfactory substitute for proper textbooks, it seemed to the Agency that they were the best device that could be adopted under the circumstances. The production of these notes has been a major undertaking and has certainly made a notable contribution to the continuation

of the educational programme for the refugee children in the very difficult conditions prevailing in the occupied areas during the past year.

20. One other major problem which has emerged regarding the provision of education in the occupied areas is that of devising some method of holding examinations for the children completing the secondary cycle of education and of securing, if possible, recognition of the result of these examinations by education authorities in the Arab world so that successful students may be able to continue their education in Arab institutions of higher education, of which there are none in the occupied areas. UNRWA has represented to all the authorities concerned the importance of finding a solution to this problem in the interests of the young refugees whose whole educational future is at stake; and the Agency has indicated that it would be prepared to give any assistance within its power in making administrative arrangements for holding examinations. Some progress has been made in this matter, as reported below in paragraphs 104 and 106.

21. An encouraging development in education during the past year has been the generous provision of funds for a number of important educational projects. This has enabled the Agency to make an impressive start on the expansion of its schools and training centres as part of a programme of educational improvements which was drawn up in 1966/1967 in response to suggestions from the host governments that the Agency should lay down a comprehensive education plan based on the actual developing needs of the refugee society, irrespective of the immediate availability of funds. It was, unfortunately, not possible to discuss the details of this plan in the course of 1967, as had been intended, at a conference with representatives of the host governments, of UNESCO and of UNRWA; but it is believed that the proposals on which UNESCO and UNRWA have been working are generally in line with educational planning in those countries. The proposals were incorporated in a programme and budget for 1967/1968 which was communicated to the host governments in 1967. UNRWA and UNESCO are preparing a similar study for 1968/1969, and it is hoped that means will be found during 1968 for consultations on this subject with the educational authorities of the govern-

ments concerned.

22. Special contributions were made by various donors in support of particular aspects of the educational and training programme, or of the programme in general. Thus, the Government of Sweden, in addition to increasing its contribution to the general UNRWA budget, contributed \$2 million from technical assistance funds to help finance educational and training activities.

23. A substantial contribution was also received during the year from the Danish Technical Co-operation Secretariat, comprising \$318,000 for school buildings in Syria and \$460,000 to help meet the operating costs of the Agency's two training centres at Ramallah. Switzerland has continued to help finance the UNRWA/UNESCO Institute of Education with technical assistance funds. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany is providing funds for the expansion and improvement of a training centre in Jordan, and for university scholarships.¹ It is hoped that other governments may also undertake special financing of educational and training activities, in addition to their regular contributions. Many individuals and organizations have supported the vocational and teacher training programme by providing scholarships for trainees.

24. Very significant help for education and training has also come from the American private organization NEED, Inc., (Near East Emergency Donations, Inc.).² Although this assistance does not pass through the UNRWA budget, funds amounting to \$4 million have been made available to UNRWA for the construction of fourteen schools in Jordan, two new training centres in Jordan, the expansion of two training centres elsewhere, the expansion of the Institute of Education, and the operation of three temporary vocational and teacher-training programmes.

**Assistance from international organizations,
voluntary agencies and other non-governmental
sources**

25. Other United Nations agencies and special programmes have made notable contributions in the assistance of refugees and other displaced persons during the year. The participation of UNESCO in the education and training programme has been a major factor in the continued constructive work in that field and in coping with the special problems that have arisen in the course of the year. The role of WHO in the health programme has been equally vital. The resolution adopted by the World Health Assembly, after reviewing the health programme for the Palestine refugees, is included as annex IV of this report, in the belief that it will be of interest to the General Assembly.

26. For the newly displaced persons not registered with UNRWA, the food supplies provided to the governments concerned by the World Food Programme, and the food and other assistance given by UNICEF, have helped to avoid starvation and to lessen the distress of those in need. In an endeavour to fulfil a continuing need for such assistance, the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Director-General of the Food and Agriculture Organization launched a joint appeal on 30 April 1968 for special contributions of food.

27. In his report of last year, the Commissioner-General paid tribute to the many donors for their generous and immediate response to appeals for assistance at the time of the hostilities. Throughout the past year most of the same donors have continued to provide funds and supplies to alleviate the needs of the refugees, and the Commissioner-General would wish once again to express to them his grateful thanks and appreciation for this additional assistance. Contributions made direct to UNRWA from all non-governmental sources are shown in Table 20 of annex I.

28. The voluntary agencies, both those operating so effectively and devotedly in the field (see table 18 of annex I), and those based elsewhere which have provided generous and understanding support to the limit of their means, have won the admiration of all who have had the privilege of association with them.

¹ The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany is also financing an urban shelter scheme at Amman to accommodate about 3,000 families.

² NEED, Inc. has also provided about \$1.7 million towards the establishment and improvement of the temporary camps in east Jordan and Syria.

Future programme

29. The current mandate of UNRWA is due to expire on 30 June 1969 and the General Assembly will no doubt wish to consider during the coming session whether the Agency's mandate should be extended for a further period and, if so, for what period and under what conditions. In this connexion, it is relevant to recall that the achievement of a just settlement of the refugee problem is among the provisions and principles listed in Security Council resolution 242 of 22 November 1967 as a basis for the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, and the outcome of the Mission of the Secretary-General's Special Representative to the Middle East would, of course, materially affect UNRWA's future role. It seems more than likely, however, that whatever stage might be reached in the Special Representative's effort, an extension of UNRWA's services beyond 30 June 1969 will be essential. The Commissioner-General believes that further comment on the question of the extension of the Agency's mandate might be deferred until the General Assembly session. He would, however, wish to recall a point that he made in paragraph 35 of his report for 1964/1965¹ when the question was last under consideration by the General Assembly. Should the Assembly decide that the appropriate means of continuing to meet the needs of the refugees is by an extension of the Agency's mandate for a fixed period of time, the Commissioner-General would observe that there would be advantages in the planning and efficient administration of the Agency's programme, in particular its educational services, in having the extension for as long a period as possible.

30. As an alternative to a fixed period, the General Assembly may wish to give consideration to an extension of the Agency's mandate for an indefinite period, subject to annual review by the General Assembly. This would be a more flexible arrangement and would allow the adjustment of the UNRWA programme as may be required by future developments, while still keeping complete control in the hands of the General Assembly.

31. As for the content of the UNRWA

programmes during such extension as the General Assembly may authorize, this again must depend to a large extent on the outcome of the present efforts to work out a peaceful settlement in the area, including a just settlement of the refugee problem. If those efforts are successful, there would very likely be a continuing need for UNRWA's services for a transitional period while the settlement is taking effect. If, however, the aim of a just settlement of the refugee problem is not achieved and if UNRWA is called upon in those circumstances to continue providing services for the needy refugees, the basis of the Agency's operations will presumably continue to be much the same as in the past.

32. Subject to these considerations, the Agency would wish to emphasize the need for further improvements which are highly desirable in the educational and health services provided to the refugees, and its hope that funds might become available for these purposes. In education, the Agency would wish to continue its efforts to improve the quality of the teaching provided in the UNRWA/UNESCO schools. The main elements in such an improvement would be a further substantial increase in the proportion of qualified teachers, to be achieved by an expansion of in-service training facilities, and a reduction in the pupil/teacher ratio by the recruitment of more teachers and the construction of additional classrooms. Another priority objective would be the replacement, over a period of about three years, of the many thoroughly unsatisfactory school buildings, both rented premises and temporary structures erected by UNRWA in the early years after 1950. The Agency would also wish to continue to expand and improve the training programme, both pre-service teacher training and vocational, with the aim of increasing capacity by 50 per cent. A considerable beginning has already been made in this latter respect with the special allocations of funds received during the past year. It is perhaps hardly necessary to emphasize that these proposed improvements and expansion of the Agency's schools, training centres and in-service training programme could achieve their purpose only if the funds were forthcoming to meet the running costs of the existing programme, as well as of the improvements.

33. In health, the Agency would wish to

¹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Supplement No. 13 (A/6013).*

give attention, after the maintenance of its existing services, to three major improvements. First, it would hope to continue the process on which it has been engaged for some years past, of replacing unsatisfactory buildings now used as health centres and clinics and to improve the equipment and facilities needed there. Many of the replacements so far carried out have been financed by special donations from non-governmental sources and the Agency would hope to receive further donations of this kind in future. Second, the Agency would hope to be able to make a determined effort to improve living conditions in the UNRWA camps, particularly those in urban areas. Some of these improvements, such as the provision of better roads and pathways, street lighting and community services, would fall outside the scope of the health services. But a major part of the work of camp improvement would be the provision of better water supplies, sewage schemes and other sanitary services. The third objective would be to improve the health care and nutritional protection afforded for the pre-school group of children aged from two to six years. In the past this especially vulnerable group has received less attention, relative to their needs, than the infants during their first two years of life.

Finance

34. Financially, the Agency's situation continues to be precarious and the outlook for the future is even more alarming. In the four years ending 31 December 1966, expenditures exceeded income by \$6 million, and the Agency's working capital was reduced to \$14.2 million. In 1967, a number of special contributions were made after the hostilities to help the Agency carry on during the emergency. Taking these contributions into account, the Agency ended the year on 31 December 1967 with \$2.5 million more than it had at the beginning. For 1968, however, expenditures will be materially higher than before, because of increased needs and higher prices, and are expected to exceed income during the year by \$3.7 million.¹ Even after offsetting

against this \$3.7 million deficit for 1968 the "carry-over" of \$2.5 million from 1967, there will still be a gap of \$1.2 million and, the Agency's working capital will fall to its lowest level.

35. For the year 1969, a further increase in expenditure appears inevitable. To carry on the present programmes will cost \$42.5 million. Income, on the basis of present indications, is not expected to exceed \$37.6 million. The prospective deficit is consequently \$4.9 million. Nor can any further deficits be covered by the remaining working capital, which on 1 January 1969 will probably be reduced to \$13.0 million. Very little of this amount will be in the form of cash, but will consist of supplies in the "pipeline" (about \$6 million) and contributions pledged, but not yet received (about \$7 million).

36. In the Commissioner-General's opinion, it would be neither feasible nor realistic to attempt to resolve this problem by reducing services to the refugees. The services being provided at an average cost of less than \$40 per refugee per year are, under present economically depressed conditions in the area, even more vital to the refugees than before the hostilities, and any attempt to reduce services by closing food distribution centres, health centres or schools would have a disastrous effect on people already suffering severe hardships and psychological tensions as a result of the events of the past year. Increased income is therefore absolutely essential, and the Commissioner-General urgently requests the General Assembly to take measures to assure that financial resources will be adequate to carry on the humanitarian mandate which the General Assembly has entrusted to UNRWA.

Summary and conclusions

37. It is a matter of satisfaction that, by concerted efforts on the part of the Governments, the intergovernmental organizations and voluntary agencies, the immediate and essential physical needs of the thousands of persons displaced by the June 1967 hostilities, and their aftermath,

¹ The Commissioner-General gratefully acknowledges the actions of the following countries, which increased their regular contributions or made special contributions in 1968: Abu Dhabi, Canada, Republic of China, Den-

mark, Federal Republic of Germany, Finland, France, Ireland, Mexico, Niger, Norway and Sweden. The United Kingdom increased its sterling contribution in order to maintain the dollar value. (A complete list of government contributions is given in table 20 of annex I.)

have been largely met. At least it can be said that, while human suffering abounds among those displaced, neither famine nor epidemic have been added to their plight.

38. However, while aid from many quarters came immediately and generously after the hostilities, with the passage of time interest and aid will almost inevitably begin to dwindle. Yet, the situation of these thousands of displaced refugees and other persons is likely to worsen rather than improve as the full impact of the hostilities and tensions in the Middle East burden the economies of those Arab countries which have become a place of refuge. The financial responsibilities falling on these countries have been particularly heavy and are continuing.

39. In relation to UNRWA, its capacity to help is reduced by the fact that some of its best camps, schools, clinics and other facilities stand idle in Jericho and other camps on the West Bank are partly empty, while the former inhabitants eke out a bare subsistence in tented camps or other temporary accommodation in east Jordan. UNRWA has been prepared, and is prepared, to improve the conditions within these emergency, tented camps to the best of its ability. But the incongruity of having to improvise and expend limited resources, while decent, permanent camps and facilities lie idle on the West Bank is striking.

40. UNRWA's position has therefore been that, in the absence thus far of the "just settlement of the refugee problem", which the Security Council's resolution 242 of 22 November 1967 rightly views as an essential part of a "just and lasting peace in the Middle East", those who fled after the outbreak of hostilities should be allowed to return to the places where they were living before June 1967. This, it is believed, corresponds to the expressed will of both the Security Council and the General Assembly.

41. In any event, with or without this enormous relief to UNRWA which such a return would bring, UNRWA is determined to carry out its present mandate from the General Assembly to the maximum limits possible within its budgetary capabilities. UNRWA believes, in the event that the General Assembly should

decide to prolong its mandate, that the situation of the refugees requires it not only to maintain, but also to expand its health and education services and it will do so to the extent that the availability of funds permits. Some funds for capital projects, particularly in the field of education, are already being made available by generous donations from governments and non-governmental bodies. Above all, what is needed by the Agency is the basic, and assured, cost of running its established services and the new facilities being made available from these funds for capital projects. It is these normal, operational costs which are vital to the maintenance of these services and, correspondingly, to the daily lives of the refugees. In recent years, appeals for increased voluntary contributions have been made repeatedly by the General Assembly itself, the President of the General Assembly on occasion and the Secretary-General, and by the Commissioner-General of UNRWA. While increased support has come from some contributors, the total response has fallen considerably short of what is required. During the twenty-first session of the General Assembly, the suggestion was made that one means of improving the present unsatisfactory basis of UNRWA's financing might be to transfer the Agency's administrative expenses—something between \$3.2 to \$4 million a year—to the assessed budget of the United Nations. The General Assembly may wish, during the present session, to give further consideration to this proposal or to other means of assuring that the necessary funds would be forthcoming. The Commissioner-General feels bound to point out, however, that unless the Agency in one way or another receives additional contributions, amounting to 10 per cent of its prospective income for the current year, a reduction in services to the refugee population would be inescapable, with resulting human hardship and suffering and the likelihood that the efforts of the Secretary-General's Special Representative appointed under Security Council resolution 242 (1967) would be jeopardized. The Commissioner-General knows that the General Assembly is fully aware of the importance of the fact that a prolongation of UNRWA's mandate should be accompanied by the willingness of the Member States to provide the funds necessary to carry out that mandate.

**REPORT ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE
AGENCY FROM 1 JULY 1967 TO 30 JUNE 1968**

42. This section of the report describes the Agency's main activities during the period 1 July 1967 to 30 June 1968. Practically all aspects of the Agency's operation during this period have been affected by the hostilities of June 1967 and subsequent military actions, as well as the additional responsibilities entrusted to the Agency in General Assembly resolution 2252 (ES-V) and reaffirmed in resolution 2341 (XXII). Some of the difficulties encountered as a result of the military actions and the measures taken in compliance with the resolution are included with the normal reporting under each activity. Supplemental information on the estimated expenditure for each activity in the calendar year 1968 and the actual expenditure in 1967 is given in chapter II of the report, which presents the Agency's budget for the year 1969. A note on the legal aspects of UNRWA's work is appended as annex II of the report.

A. Relief services

43. The movement of refugees from the West Bank to east Jordan continued throughout the year and has been supplemented by a steady flow of refugees from Gaza, although there was a noticeable drop in numbers towards the end of the year covered by this report. This movement inevitably caused difficulties with the Agency's records and strict identification procedures were introduced at distribution centres in Gaza, the West Bank and east Jordan to ensure that only eligible refugees were issued rations. In Gaza and on the West Bank, other checks have been, and continue to be, made on the existence and presence of family members, particularly in those cases where families have become divided in the movement of the population to east Jordan and where family rations have been claimed and issued to eligible family members in two places. As a result of the strict controls which have been introduced, a substantial number of ineligible persons have been removed from the ration rolls. It will, however, be many months before precise figures will be available in view of the constant movement of the population; for example, some refugees, whose entitlement to rations has been removed because of absence in West Bank and

Gaza, subsequently claim rations in east Jordan.

44. Before the hostilities in June 1967, the registration records for the whole of Jordan were held in Jerusalem (West Bank) and it was there also that the majority of the eligibility and registration staff was located. Following the hostilities, it became necessary to establish a new record centre in Amman (east Jordan) to which those departments of the Agency concerned with relief services in that area could refer. Because of the limited number of trained staff available in east Jordan, and the operational problems inherent in the unstable situation, it has not been possible to complete the task of establishing new records in Amman in respect of the newly displaced registered refugees. Considerable progress had been made by February, when the exodus of refugees from the new Jordan valley camps, prompted by a series of military actions, made obsolete the records then established and new ones had to be started afresh, so that the refugees could receive rations and services in their new locations. The records in respect of displaced registered refugees are still incomplete, and the need to proceed with this essential task has inevitably delayed the registration and the normal recording of the changes in family composition, such as births, deaths, marriages, etc. The number of births alone among the refugees normally residing in east Jordan, which have yet to be recorded in the Agency's records, may amount to 12,000. It is with these deficiencies in mind therefore that the following statistics must be read.

45. The number of refugees registered with the Agency on 30 June 1968 was 1,364,294¹ compared with 1,344,576 on 31 May 1967. The number of UNRWA rations issued in June 1968 was 862,988 including issues being made on an emergency basis. (In each of the first few months after the hostilities, as many as 956,000 rations were issued). The number of refugees registered with the Agency, but not receiving rations is

¹ This figure is larger than the total of the numbers reported in the Introduction for each field (see paragraphs 5, 6, 10, 14, 15 and 16), as it includes registered refugees now in the United Arab Republic and others formerly registered on the West Bank or in Gaza who are now living elsewhere. The total registration figure includes about 30,000 people in special categories, such as, Jerusalem Poor, Gaza Poor and Frontier Villagers.

501,000 compared with 485,000 in June 1967. Tables 1 to 3 of annex I give statistics of the number of registered refugees, the categories of services to which they are entitled, and changes in the composition and entitlement of refugee families as recorded by the Agency.

46. In addition to its normal programme of distribution of rations to registered refugees, the Agency, at the request of the Jordan Government and at the Government's expense, has distributed rations to all displaced persons (not registered with the Agency) in east Jordan. In the month of June 1968, 240,000 such persons received rations.

Eligibility and registration

47. Although it has not been possible to continue normal rectification in east Jordan and the West Bank because of the confusion created in respect of the Agency's registration records by the mass movement of the population, nevertheless a substantial number of ineligible persons have been removed from the ration rolls in the process of establishing the present whereabouts of registered refugee families. Considerable progress in this respect has been made in Gaza and the West Bank, but much remains to be done. In east Jordan, where the majority of the displaced refugees have taken shelter, progress has been much slower because of the continuous movement of refugees into and within the territory. Also in east Jordan, because of the volume of work, it has not been possible, as stated in paragraph 44, to reflect in Agency records all changes in family composition reported during the year. Therefore, the Agency's registration records, in respect of east Jordan and, to a lesser extent Gaza and the West Bank, and the statistics based on these records, are incomplete.

48. In Lebanon and Syria, work in respect of eligibility and registration has proceeded normally throughout the year.

49. In all areas of the Agency's operation, the names of 55,327 persons, including 47,390 ration recipients, were removed from the rolls during the twelve months ending 30 June 1968 (compared with 21,554 in the twelve months ending 30 June 1967). However, a number of newly displaced refugees were being issued with

"temporary" rations in east Jordan during June 1968 and a large proportion of these will be reinstated on the ration rolls once their eligibility has been established. In place of those refugees who have been removed from the ration rolls, 16,078 rations were issued during the year to children on the waiting list whose families were found to be suffering extreme hardship.

50. All children of displaced refugees (9,597) residing in the tented camps in east Jordan have been issued with rations by the Agency as an emergency measure, and the children of those displaced refugees living outside camps have been issued with rations donated by the Jordan Government. Similarly, in Syria 3,022 children of displaced refugees have been issued with rations by the Agency.

51. The financial position of the Agency made it necessary to continue its restrictions on the number of ration recipients, and the number of children over the age of one year for whom no rations are available continues to grow. By June 1968, these children totalled 299,232, of whom 154,372 were in east Jordan, 71,722 on the West Bank, 7,665 in Lebanon, 28,300 in Syria and 37,173 in the Gaza Strip, although, as stated above 9,597 of these children in east Jordan and 3,022 in Syria are being issued with rations by the Agency as an emergency measure and a further 43,553 are being issued with rations donated by the Jordan Government.

Basic rations

52. The content of the basic food rations, which provided approximately 1,500 calories per day in summer and 1,600 in winter, remained unchanged during the period covered by this report. Details of the rations and of other supplies distributed to the refugees are contained in table 4 of annex I. During the year, the Agency imported for its normal programme some 112,300 tons of flour and some 25,500 tons of other foodstuffs for distribution to the refugees. The cost of these supplies, together with the cost of distribution, accounted for approximately 33 per cent of the Agency's budget.

Supplementary feeding

53. In view of the fact that UNRWA's basic ration contains no items of fresh food or animal protein, the supplementary feeding programme was established with a view to meeting all basic nutritional requirements of the most vulnerable sectors of the refugee population. Supplements consist of liquid milk, hot meals and vitamin preparations, provided on a daily basis to selected categories, while extra dry rations are issued monthly to pregnant and nursing women and tuberculosis out-patients. As a substitute for milk, CSM (a high protein blended food consisting of cornflour, soya bean and milk powder) is presently being issued in the normal programme to children from six to ten years of age. As an emergency measure since the June hostilities, CSM has also been issued as a high-protein food to certain other categories, as indicated below.

54. The Agency's milk distribution programme is made possible normally by a special annual contribution of skim milk power from the United States Government. During the period under review, this amounted to 1,011 metric tons, as well as 1,029 metric tons of CSM. A substantial contribution (2,100 tons) of skim milk power was also received from the Canadian Government. The receipt of these quantities of skim milk has made possible the resumption of the school milk programme, which had been suspended in the previous year due to shortage of supplies, and the expansion of milk distribution to newly displaced refugee children from six to fifteen year of age. The Agency maintained the daily issue of a mixture of whole and skim milk to infants from the age of six to twelve months and to non-breast-fed babies under six months, as well as the distribution of reconstituted skim milk on twenty-six days a month to children one to six years of age, to pregnant and nursing women and to patients on medical recommendation.

55. The Agency continued to provide nutritionally-balanced hot meals six days a week in supplementary feeding centres and food distribution points varying in number from 106 to 121 and located in camps in other communities having sizable refugee populations. Owing to the mass movement of refugees out of certain

areas, eight centres (one in Syria, five on West Bank, two in east Jordan) ceased to operate, while for the newly established emergency camps temporary feeding arrangements had to be made. Normally, the meals are available to all children up to the sixth birthday, and on medical recommendation to those from six to fifteen years of age, with a daily ceiling of 45,000 for both groups. Following the hostilities, the ceiling was increased from 45,000 to 71,500 to include an additional 8,000 children below six years of age and 18,500 displaced children six to fifteen years of age. A balanced high-protein menu continued to be provided for the treatment of infants and young children suffering from gastro-enteritis or malnutrition, or both. Vitamin A and D capsules were issued twenty-six days a month to children below six years of age who were attending supplementary feeding centres. Elementary school children continued to receive multi-vitamin tablets on twelve days in the month; these were replaced by vitamin A and D capsules early in 1968. Extra dry rations were issued monthly, on medical certification, to expectant mothers from the fifth month of pregnancy, to nursing mothers for a full year after delivery, and to non-hospitalized tuberculosis patients. Children in the age group six to ten years received, with effect from October 1967, a monthly issue of 500 grams of CSM.

56. An emergency supplementary feeding programme, which was introduced for newly displaced refugees and other displaced persons following the June hostilities, was continued throughout the period of this report. This consisted of a daily hot meal and milk six days a week, to all displaced children up to fifteen years of age, as well as a monthly protein supplement of one twelve-ounce tin of meat and 500 grams of CSM to all displaced refugees in Syria, to those living in tented camps in east Jordan and to displaced and identified hardship cases on the West Bank. In Syria, a further supplement consisting of flour, oil, and rice was provided to displaced refugees living in tented camps and to identified cases of hardship among the same category living outside these camps in order to have the Agency's ration conform as closely as possible in food value to that issued by the Syrian Government to the Syrian displaced persons.

57. In response to appeals made by the Commissioner-General for assistance in meeting the increased demands which were made upon the Agency as a result of the June 1967 hostilities, many contributions were received in cash or in kind. The latter included milk, canned meat and various other food items.

58. Tables 5 and 6 of annex I give, in summary, the numbers of various categories of refugees who were benefiting from the milk and supplementary feeding programmes.

Camps and shelter

59. The number of refugees recorded as residing in established Agency camps fell from 532,990 in May 1967 to 454,232 in June 1968 (see table 7, annex I), mainly because of the exodus to east Jordan from the large camps in the Jordan Valley on the West Bank, following the hostilities in June 1967. The Agency has, however, with the assistance of the Jordan Government, established six new emergency camps in east Jordan in which 78,400 (see table 8, annex I) registered refugees and displaced persons were living in June 1968.

60. Because of the uncertain situation which prevailed throughout the year, no new major construction work was undertaken apart from emergency measures. The housing scheme in Amman to rehouse 600 families was just completed at the outbreak of hostilities, but before the families for whom the shelters were intended could be moved, they were occupied by refugees and other displaced persons from the West Bank. In Lebanon, ninety shelters were built in Rashidieh Camp to rehouse refugees whose shelters had suffered damage from the sea during winter storms or who had been transferred from other locations. In Gaza, work was confined to the repair of refugee shelters and installations damaged during and following the hostilities. No shelter programmes were authorized for Syria or the West Bank.

61. Immediately following the hostilities, seven emergency camps were established in east Jordan and a programme to improve conditions in the camps during the winter was put in hand. One thousand framework shelters had been erected

and work on 2,000 more was well in hand before the end of 1967. In addition, the construction of latrines, water supplies, paths, storm water drainage and concrete floors with low-skirting walls for tents was in progress. The latter, together with erection of framework shelters, had, however, to be abandoned owing to insistence of the refugees on temporary measures only to alleviate their living conditions. Finally, when a fresh outbreak of hostilities occurred in February 1968, the occupants abandoned the valley camps almost overnight. The situation there did not permit their return and all work was stopped. The establishment of six new camps in the hill areas of Jordan was then immediately put in hand. At one of these locations, Zizia, the Iranian Red Lion and Sun Society undertook the construction of camp facilities of a more solid character, and these are nearing completion.

62. In Syria, of the 17,500 refugees displaced from south Syria because of the hostilities, 7,746 were accommodated in tented camps by 30 June 1968. Considerable progress has been made in improving the living conditions in these camps. Latrines and drinking water have been provided in all camps and, in order to protect the refugees against rainstorms and flooding, concrete storm water disposal systems and concrete floors with low-skirting walls around the tents were constructed, as well as concrete pathways and asphalt roads.

Special hardship assistance

Clothing

63. The voluntary agencies, through the generous help of their contributors abroad, continued to bear the main responsibility for meeting the needs of the refugees for clothing, considerably increased during 1967, as a result of the hostilities, when many of the refugees fled from their homes with only the clothing they were wearing. During the year, over 1,400 tons of used clothing were received by UNRWA and distributed to registered refugees in need in east Jordan and on the West Bank, Lebanon and Gaza. The Agency itself spent some \$30,000 on inland transportation costs and on ocean freight for clothing received from abroad.

64. While the following agencies generously

maintained and indeed increased their regular contributions to meet the needs of the many thousands of registered refugees and other displaced persons, other special donations were received from various organizations in the United States, Canada and Europe, which were of great assistance in meeting emergency clothing needs.

American Friends Service Committee
 Canadian Lutheran World Relief
 Caritas-Verband (Federal Republic of Germany)
 Church of Scotland
 Church of World Service (United States)
 Lutheran World Relief, Inc.
 Mennonite Central Committee (United States)
 Oxford Committee for Famine Relief (United Kingdom)
 Red Cross Society (Canada)
 Unitarian Service Committee of Canada
 United Church of Canada
 Vastkustens Efterkrishjelp (Sweden)
 Women's Royal Voluntary Service (United Kingdom)

Case-work programme

65. This programme continued to render assistance to the most needy members of the refugee community who, because of chronic illnesses, widowhood, old age or owing to circumstances arising from the emergency, became destitute and in special need of material assistance or guidance. This past year, some 12,000 families were assisted with small cash grants to help them survive their particularly critical situation. Others were assisted with special issues of clothing, blankets, kerosene and layettes.

66. In the months following the hostilities, the Agency's welfare staff on the West Bank extended emergency social services to both refugees and displaced persons in the area, particularly inhabitants of villages in the border areas, which had been destroyed: Assistance included cash, clothing, blankets, layettes, utensils, etc. Similar emergency assistance was provided in Gaza, and to newly displaced refugees in east Jordan and Syria.

67. In addition, case-workers counselled

refugees on personal and family problems. They also placed in institutions 161 orphans and fifty aged persons.

B. Health services

68. Although the hostilities of June 1967 and the series of military incidents which took place at the end of 1967 and early this year created many difficulties for the Agency's health services, the Agency, in co-operation with the government health authorities concerned in the respective fields, was able to establish emergency medical facilities and services and provide basic sanitation services for the refugees and other displaced persons sheltered in tented camps in east Jordan and Syria. Such facilities and services were progressively improved and their standard raised to that provided by the Agency in its normal programme.

69. This latter programme, available to the whole of the entitled Palestine refugee population, continued as a comprehensive system of health protection, comprising both preventive and curative services. At the same time, the Agency continued to adhere to the principle that its health services should be at levels largely equivalent to the services provided by the respective Governments for comparable sections of their own populations. Technical guidance continued to be available from WHO in accordance with the agreement by which that organization provides advisory and consultative service in health matters to UNRWA. At the twenty-first session of the World Health Assembly, which met in Geneva in May 1968, the annual report of UNRWA's Director of Health was considered and the Assembly subsequently adopted a resolution which is reproduced in annex IV of this report. During the year, the UNRWA health services benefited from the advice of a WHO maternal and child health nutrition team, which studied the health and nutrition status of the mothers and children among the newly displaced refugees.

70. As in past years, and particularly following the June 1967 conflict, the Agency has received generous contributions to the health programme from various donors, including Governments, charitable organizations, universities, business corporations and individuals; contributions of

vaccines from Governments in the area of the Agency's operation had a special preventive value. Whether in cash or in kind, these contributions have been designed to meet a variety of needs related mainly to the emergency and have included such items as temporary health centre buildings and basic sanitation facilities in tented camps, provision of personnel, free hospital and laboratory services, medical supplies, supplementary food items, infant layettes, and support in immunization campaigns.

71. During the period under review, the Agency made provision for health services to refugees and other displaced persons at locations numbering 120 at the beginning and 108 by the end of the period. While the Agency operated health centres or clinics at most of those locations, host Governments and voluntary agencies made available mainly medical care on a subsidy basis at seventeen points. Of the ninety-one Agency centres, eight were of an emergency or temporary type established in the tented camps (six in the valley area of east Jordan and two in the Damascus area of Syria). When the Jordan valley camps were abandoned in February 1968 after a series of military actions, five new centres of a temporary type were established in the relocated tented camps of the east Jordan uplands. Health services in the sixth temporary camp established at Zizia were provided by the Iranian Red Lion and Sun Society. Meanwhile, as a result of the June hostilities and subsequent events, the Agency lost the use of health centre or clinic facilities at seven locations in the Quneitra area of Syria (where no refugees remained), four on the West Bank and nine in east Jordan, including six in the valley area, but excluding those in the abandoned camps. While all health centres continued to function in the Gaza Strip, a rather serious staffing problem arose there with the departure of some of the medical officers and graduate nurses of United Arab Republic nationality and with the difficulties encountered in securing replacement for them.

72. In recent years, the Agency has endeavoured to replace old, unsatisfactory health centres and clinics. Most of the remaining old centres have been in operation since 1948 when, under the emergency situation prevailing at that time, there was virtually no choice but to use such

accommodation as was available. In 1967, a new centre with modern facilities was completed at Jabalia camp in the Gaza Strip to replace an old health centre, for which purpose funds had been donated by the Belgian Committee for Refugees. A new centre is presently being constructed to replace an old one at Rafah Camp in the Gaza Strip with funds donated by the Norwegian Refugee Council. Funds have been received from the Oxford Committee for Famine Relief (United Kingdom) for replacement of the centre at Jalazone Camp on the West Bank. It is hoped that further contributions will be forthcoming to enable the Agency to replace the remaining unsuitable health centres.

Curative and preventive medical services

Clinics, hospitals and laboratories

73. The curative services which are provided include medical consultations, referrals to specialists and hospitals, ophthalmic treatment, injections and dressings, dispensing of medicines, and limited dental care. The preventive services comprise communicable diseases control, maternal care, infant care, school health and health education of the public. Table 9 of annex I provides a summary of health centre attendance.

74. The number of registered refugees eligible for health services was higher than that of the previous year by 1.8 per cent. In addition, some 15,000 displaced persons (not registered with UNRWA) availed themselves of the Agency's out-patient services in east Jordan, in accordance with the extended mandate entrusted to the Agency by General Assembly resolution 2252 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967.

75. The Agency's hospital policy continued to be one of subsidizing occupancy of beds in local institutions operated by government or local authorities, universities, charitable organizations or private agencies. In addition, the Agency maintained its direct operation of two hospitals on the West Bank, one a small cottage hospital at Qalqilya and the other a tuberculosis hospital at Nablus. The latter was closed in March 1968 when alternative facilities of a better standard were provided at the subsidized Augusta Victoria Hospital in Jerusalem. The Government of

Israel has assumed certain obligations of providing special medical treatment on a basis comparable to that on which the governmental authorities had previously provided similar treatment. The Agency shared with the Government Health Department in Gaza the operational responsibilities of another tuberculosis hospital. Agreements with a number of the subsidized hospitals had to be revised to take into account the mass movement of refugees to east Jordan. Table 10 of annex I shows the hospital facilities available to the refugees.

76. Laboratory services were provided to meet the Agency's clinical and public health needs, by Government, university or private laboratories—in certain instances free of charge, but mostly on a subsidy basis. The Agency continues to maintain its own central laboratory in Gaza, as well as four small clinical laboratories there and in Lebanon. This service is now in the process of being extended through the establishment of similar small laboratories in selected larger health centres.

Control of communicable diseases

77. No cases of the six quarantinable diseases (cholera, plague, relapsing fever, smallpox, typhus and yellow fever) were reported among the refugee population during the period under review. Programmes of mass vaccination and revaccination against smallpox were carried out in all fields, in co-operation with the Governments, in view of the threat occasioned by outbreaks in certain of the Middle East States. The emergency created by the mass movement and relocation of refugees and other displaced persons in Jordan and Syria, at the time of the June 1967 conflict, called for both urgent and longer-term measures of health protection. Steps were taken by the Agency, in co-ordination with the Ministries of Health in the two countries, to avert epidemics through mass disinfection and immunization, in addition to the basic sanitation measures undertaken. While the practice of giving six-monthly reinforcing doses of cholera vaccine had been introduced on a regular basis for the refugee population in all fields, it was decided at the end of 1967 that this was no longer necessary and was discontinued.

78. Communicable eye diseases, and particularly trachoma, have continued to show a downward trend among the refugees. While there was a moderate increase in the incidence of specific dysenteries, notably in east Jordan, there has been an over-all decrease in respect of infectious hepatitis. In the last six months of 1967, acute poliomyelitis showed a sharp rise of incidence over the previous two-year level, but a steady decline of this incidence has been apparent in the first half of 1968. Mass immunization of children against poliomyelitis was being supplanted gradually in most of the fields by the procedure of routine immunization of infants in their first year of life. Other diseases which showed an increased incidence during the year included measles (especially in east Jordan) and cutaneous leishmaniasis (confined to Syria). The reported incidence of new cases of tuberculosis showed a marked decline in Gaza. By the end of the reporting period, there was a moderate increase in east Jordan in the number of discovered cases of tuberculosis, not surprising in view of the large increase in the number of refugees. At present, the Jordan Government is conducting a mass tuberculosis survey and control programme in the tented camps of east Jordan. In Lebanon, the number of reported cases of tuberculosis has shown a substantial increase, which is attributed to a more active case-finding programme. In Syria, the incidence has remained at a relatively low level.

79. Table 11 of annex I lists the numbers of cases of communicable diseases reported among the refugee population.

Maternal and child health

80. At the end of the reporting period, maternal and child health services were being provided in seventy-seven of the Agency's health centres, including the eight temporary centres in the tented camps of east Jordan and Syria, and in one voluntary agency clinic. Certain clinics ceased to function in those health centres, which became non-operative as a result of the hostilities. Four semi-mobile maternal and child health units were donated by the Norwegian Refugee Council and were operated by teams provided by the Norwegian Save the Children Fund, the Jordanian

Red Crescent Society, the British Save the Children Fund and the Lutheran World Federation. Special attention continued to be devoted to expectant and nursing mothers, infants and children in the first two years of life and to school children. Infant health clinics continued to report regularly on underweight infants. Those suffering from severe gastroenteritis or malnutrition, or both, were referred to one of the Agency's seventeen rehydration/nutrition centres or, in locations where these centres do not exist, to supplementary feeding centres, where a special high-protein diet is available for them. Infants and small children continued to be routinely immunized against diphtheria, tetanus, whooping cough, the enteric groups of fevers, poliomyelitis and smallpox, while BCG vaccination was being added during the course of the year.

81. The school health programme, conducted by health units and mobile health teams, included school-entrance and follow-up medical examinations, prophylactic immunization of children and teachers, sanitary inspection of school premises and health education activities.

82. Statistical information on maternal and infant care and on school health services is presented in table 12 of annex I.

83. While it is considered that infants and children of school age are provided with at least minimally satisfactory standards of health care, the Agency has long believed that its health protective services for the pre-school sector (two to six years) of the child population were not adequate. In order to provide regular supervision, parental guidance and specific corrective and preventive care for this vulnerable age group, it is hoped that it may be possible to establish, throughout the Agency's area of operations, mobile health teams which would work closely with the regular staff of the Agency's health centres. Such teams would carry out screening examinations, prescribe the necessary medical, nutritional and other care required. Their activities would be complemented by the health centre staff, particularly in follow-up care and in health educational activities. The implementation of such a scheme would be dependent upon funds being made available for the purpose.

Health education

84. The health education programme, which is directed to all sectors of the refugee population under the general guidance of twenty-four health education workers, aims at promoting health awareness and stimulating self-help among the refugees. Widespread use is made of visual aids such as posters, pamphlets, health calendars, flannelgraphs and health films. Activities included special programmes for World Health Day and the celebration of the twentieth anniversary of the World Health Organization in all fields. Special attention was paid during the period under review to the needs of the newly displaced refugees, in view of their less favourable living conditions.

Nursing services

85. At the end of the period under review, the Agency was employing 167 graduate nurses and midwives, 297 auxiliary nurses and fifty-six traditional midwives (*dayahs*). This staff has provided nursing services in both the preventive and curative fields, engaging in the following activities: maternal and child health, layette distribution, school health, health education, home-visiting, supervision of infant-feeding, individual and mass immunization, tuberculosis and venereal diseases control, and care of the sick in clinics, hospitals and rehydration/nutrition centres. Nursing services were maintained at effective levels in the tented camps of east Jordan and Syria, despite the difficult working conditions, and in the Gaza Strip, although a serious shortage of nursing staff arose there as a result of departures following the hostilities. Due credit must be accorded to the nursing staff of the various clinics and hospitals subsidized by the Agency for the part they played in the medical care programme for the refugees.

Nutrition

86. While a general surveillance of the health of the refugees is maintained through the Agency's preventive and curative services, the aim of the supplementary feeding and milk distribution programme is to protect the nutritional state of the most vulnerable groups of the population, which include those in the age of growth and development (infants, pre-school and school

children), pregnant and nursing women and selected medical cases.

87. The details of this programme, which is administered and operated by the Agency's Health Department, are described in paragraphs 53 to 58 of this report.

Environmental sanitation

88. The environmental sanitation programme is primarily concerned with the provision, in Agency administered camps, of safe and adequate water supplies, sanitary waste disposal, surface drainage, and control of insect and rodent vectors of disease. The programme was largely maintained at the established level. In the tented camps for refugees and other displaced persons in east Jordan and Syria, similar facilities and services of a more temporary nature were provided. The construction of family latrines to replace public latrines in the established camps continued to be encouraged and assisted by the Agency. Composting, incineration or dumping, depending on local circumstances, continued as the methods employed in garbage disposal. Close co-operation was maintained with government health authorities in the malaria eradication programmes. Fly control was based mainly on prevention of breeding by biological methods, supplemented by insecticidal spraying. The sanitation labourer force in camps was maintained at a ratio of 1.7 labourers per 1,000 of camp population with the exception that in the newly established tented camps a ratio of 2.5 labourers is being applied.

89. If funds could be made available the Agency considers that the improvement of environmental sanitation facilities in established camps is desirable. These improvements would consist of the extension of piped water supplies, mechanization of refuse disposal, extension or improvement of drainage and sewerage systems (in collaboration with local authorities where possible), support for the programme of individual family-latrine construction, and improvement in methods of vector control.

Medical education and training

90. In the field of health sciences, 311 refugee students are holders of Agency university scholar-

ships (see paragraph 134). Of these, 252 are studying medicine, ten dentistry, forty-eight pharmaceutical chemistry and one sanitary science. In addition, forty-six students are receiving basic nursing training and twelve students midwifery training. There are thirty-nine students under training as assistant pharmacists, eleven as public health inspectors, six as x-ray technicians, fifteen as laboratory technicians and six as physiotherapists. A course in in-service training in maternal and child health was given to sixteen and eight graduate nurses in Lebanon and Syria, respectively, while in Gaza fourteen senior staff nurses, nine practical nurses and six midwives received individual maternal and child health training at the UNRWA Swedish Health Centre.

C. Education and training services

91. For most of the Agency's schools, the 1966-1967 school year had just come to an end when the large-scale hostilities took place in June 1967. In Syria and east Jordan, the empty school buildings served as temporary shelter for the thousands of refugees and other displaced persons while tented camps were being established in the valley and on the uplands of east Jordan and in south and central Syria.

92. While the coincidence of the hostilities with the end of the school year lessened their immediate impact on the general education programme, it was necessary to make major adjustments before the next school year began in order to cope with the situation resulting from the movement of tens of thousands of refugee families from their former places of residence. As the Agency's vocational and teacher training centres are normally operated for a longer period into the summer, the outbreak of the hostilities interrupted the school year at these centres. At that time, all of the training centres were immediately closed. While most of the centres re-opened shortly after the cessation of hostilities, those on the West Bank remained closed throughout the summer months. At the beginning of the 1967-1968 school year, it was found that many of the trainees did not report back to the centres on the West Bank; to a lesser extent, the same situation prevailed in Gaza. The opening of the centres in the occupied areas was also

affected by curfews and other measures taken by the authorities on security grounds. However, training was subsequently resumed in all the areas, with the intention of extending the school year as required to make up for the late start. In the following paragraphs, some of the difficulties encountered, and the measures taken in the areas affected by the hostilities in order to permit the continuation of the education and training programme for the children of the displaced refugee families, are described briefly, in addition to the normal reporting.

93. In previous annual reports, tributes have been paid to the large measure of support received by the Agency, from both governmental and non-governmental sources, specifically directed towards its activities in the field of education and training. The importance of the Agency's work in this field has received increasing recognition, not only as a means of achieving the economic rehabilitation of individual refugees, but also as a form of technical assistance to a community in special need of external aid. Some of this assistance is also referred to in the following paragraphs.

General education

94. The number of refugee children benefiting from the Agency's general education programme continued to increase in the 1967-1968 school year in Lebanon and Syria, and to a greater extent in east Jordan owing to the influx of refugee families from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. For this same reason, school population on the West Bank and in Gaza had decreased and, particularly in the Gaza Strip, attendance at schools was adversely affected by events which occurred throughout the year. The attendance of children in the tented camps in east Jordan was interrupted by the movement of the refugee population on several occasions within that area as a result of military actions and winter storms. However, it was possible to provide virtually all refugee children of school age in all of the Agency's areas of operations with at least the opportunity of continuing their education if circumstances permitted. In most areas, there were indications of a return to normality towards the end of the 1967-1968 school year, leading to the expectation that the next school year would

see an over-all increase in school enrolment, consistent with the normal trend in recent years, resulting in further demands on the Agency's resources.

95. In statistical terms, it may be reported that during the school year just ended the Agency operated 446 elementary and preparatory schools, 261 of them Agency-built, 154 in rented premises, twenty-six tented schools in the newly-established camps and five shared premises with Government schools, providing education for 179,591 refugee children. An additional 41,602 refugee children were enrolled in Government and private schools in the elementary and preparatory cycles, covering the first nine years of education, making a grand total of 221,193, an over-all decrease over last year's enrolment of 2.5 per cent.

96. Attendance at secondary schools was also somewhat less than normal during the school year 1967-1968 (15,226 as against 18,200 in the 1966-1967 school year). The Agency itself does not operate schools in the upper secondary cycle of general education, but provides a measure of assistance by way of grants, allowances or subsidies to eligible refugee students enrolled in Government and private schools. Some 14,000 refugee students were assisted in this way during the 1967-1968 school year. As pointed out in previous reports, the subsidy paid by the Agency covers only a small part of the actual cost of the education provided, the main burden being borne by the Governments concerned.

97. Tables 13-16 of annex I provide details of numbers and distribution of refugee students receiving education, but any survey of the figures for the school year 1967-1968 must take into account the varying adverse conditions which prevailed in each of the Agency's areas of operation during that period and which are summarized below.

98. An appreciable percentage of the Agency's teaching staff, which now numbers 5,250, was affected by the hostilities and their aftermath. Hundreds of those who had already left the West Bank and the Gaza Strip at the end of the 1966-1967 school year on leave or who had joined the mass movement of their fellow Palestinians following the conflict, were not

immediately permitted to return. As a result, in the early months of the new school year, considerable time and effort were expended by the Agency in its endeavour to meet the need for teaching staff. The application of the restrictions, imposed by the authorities on the movement of Arab nationals into the occupied areas, to Agency staff of Arab nationality (locally recruited and international) also added to the problems of reorganizing the UNRWA/UNESCO education services.

Lebanon

99. Despite some unrest among the refugee population, the school year began and ended on schedule and was carried on throughout the year under more or less normal conditions, with a 7 per cent increase in the enrolment over-all in the elementary, preparatory and secondary cycles. The teaching of French in Lebanon was extended to the fourth preparatory grade at the beginning of this school year. Funds are being sought to enable the Agency to undertake a programme of school construction in Lebanon in order to provide sorely needed additional schools and to replace unsatisfactory premises.

Syria

100. The Agency had lost the use of its seventeen schools in the Quneitra area of Syria owing to the evacuation of that area by the refugee families. Consequently, at the beginning of the 1967-1968 school year, it was necessary to find places for about 3,000 refugee children in schools elsewhere. Most of the children were enrolled in established UNRWA/UNESCO schools in and around Damascus, which operated on a double shift to accommodate the increased numbers of pupils in that area, and two new schools were set up, one of which was in a tented camp. The opening of the schools in the fall had to be delayed, owing to the occupation of many of the classrooms by refugees until other accommodation could be found for them. However, by the end of October all of the Agency's schools were operating. Following on the late start in the academic year, school enrolment showed an increase in all three levels of general education, averaging 4.2 per cent over the previous school year.

101. Plans have been prepared for the construction of new schools in Syria to replace rented premises which are, for the most part, not suited for use as schools, as well as to replace old buildings and provide additional accommodation for the increasing number of children attending schools. As mentioned in paragraph 23 of this report, the Danish Technical Co-operation Secretariat has already contributed a substantial sum for this purpose and it is expected that some of the schools will be ready for occupancy early in 1969.

East Jordan

102. At the beginning of the 1967-1968 school year, the Agency had to find school places in east Jordan for a total of some 20,000 additional refugee children, 11,000 of whom were living in tented camps. Practically all existing schools in the urban areas of east Jordan, particularly in Amman, have been on double shift throughout this school year to accommodate the children of families who took up residence with relatives, friends or in other private quarters. In the tented camps, where schools were established under canvas, winter storms and flooding, and a series of military actions, resulting in further mass movements of the refugees in February and March, disrupted the schooling of the children. In an endeavour to help them make up for the time lost during the year, the closing of the schools thus affected has been delayed until 15 July. Despite all the efforts that were made to provide educational services in east Jordan, it seems clear that many children who previously attended schools either on the West Bank or in Gaza did not attend classes in 1967-1968, or attended only irregularly. A programme of school building is planned for east Jordan to replace old premises and provide additional accommodation, which will be financed by funds from NEED, Inc., and from other sources.

West Bank

103. Only minor damage and some looting of Agency schools occurred at the time of the hostilities in June 1967. The re-equipping of the looted schools was facilitated by the transfer of furniture and equipment from the Agency's

schools left idle by the flight of refugees (twenty schools, mostly in the Jericho area, are standing empty). At the beginning of the school year, there was a reluctance on the part of many refugee families to send their children to school. Measures taken by the authorities in connexion with security incidents, and restrictions on movement of the population also affected the education programme. While Agency schools opened at the beginning of September, Government schools remained closed until 11 November. During the first few months of the school year, attendance was generally at a very low level, but this situation gradually improved and by the early spring of 1968 teachers and pupils alike were endeavouring to offset the loss of time by giving more serious attention to their work. The schools are remaining open until 18 July to help compensate for the time lost at the beginning of the school year. There was a lack of textbooks for some subjects (see paragraphs 17-19), and teaching notes were prepared by Agency staff to replace them. While the Agency had sought to make special arrangements for the return of staff members to the West Bank, including a number of teachers, the Government of Israel indicated that they could apply to return only within the framework of certain rules for the return of residents of the West Bank, published by the Government on 10 July 1967. The Agency, therefore, encouraged such staff to apply by completing the application form provided for this purpose. However, among the persons given permits to return prior to the end of August 1967, only nine teachers, of a total of sixty-seven who had applied, were permitted to return.

104. The problem of holding examinations for students completing the secondary cycle referred to in paragraph 20 of this report, is believed to have been satisfactorily solved, at least for the time being. Most of the 1967 examinations had been held prior to the event of the hostilities. For 1968, a committee of Arab educators residing on the West Bank has undertaken the task of conducting end-of-year examinations in July, and the certificates to be issued to successful candidates by this committee are expected to be endorsed by the Jordan education authorities as being equivalent to their State certificates.

Gaza

105. In the Gaza Strip, during and immediately after the hostilities, ninety of the Agency's 100 schools were damaged and looted in varying degrees to the extent of an estimated \$220,000 in value. By the end of 1967, with the exception of one school at Rafah, which had been completely demolished, all Agency schools were repaired and re-equipped. An acute problem in the Gaza Strip throughout the school year was the shortage of qualified and experienced teachers. At the time of the hostilities, the schools were closed and some 180 teachers had already left on leave or to take university examinations in neighbouring countries, mostly in the United Arab Republic; subsequently forty-eight teachers were deported, six were killed during the hostilities and another forty left their posts shortly after the hostilities or during the school year, making a total of 274 teachers displaced. It was, therefore, necessary to recruit replacements who, for the most part, were unqualified. Following correspondence and negotiations with the Government of Israel, the endeavours of the Agency, supported by the Director-General of UNESCO, to have its teachers, who were stranded in the United Arab Republic, returned, finally met with considerable success. In March/April 1968, 134 were permitted to return and the number still stranded in the United Arab Republic was reduced to six. Seventy of the seventy-nine textbooks used in the Gaza Strip were banned by the occupying authorities and teaching notes were prepared by Agency staff and put into use as available during the school year (see paragraphs 17-19). Attendance at schools varied considerably throughout the year, as it was interrupted and affected by measures taken by the authorities, such as curfews, demolition of houses adjacent to Agency schools in camps, detention of teachers, and intrusion into schools. Although the schools normally close at the beginning of June, they remained open until the end of June to make up for some of the time lost during the year.

106. The problem of holding examinations for the students completing the secondary cycle of education also arose in the Gaza Strip (see paragraph 20). The hostilities of June 1967 took place before the commencement of the end-of-year examinations and, including the students

who completed the secondary cycle in June 1968, there were some 4,500 pupils for whom the possibility of following higher studies in Arab universities depended on their taking examinations which would be recognized by Arab education authorities. (Examinations held by the local authorities in January 1968 were not so recognized.) One group of some 500 Gaza pupils succeeded in going to east Jordan to sit for the United Arab Republic secondary school-leaving certificate examinations organized at a centre in Amman in June 1968. For the remaining students, examinations conducted by the Gaza Department of Education were finally arranged for early July 1968, the results of which, it is hoped, will be recognized by Arab education authorities.

Youth activities programme

107. The Agency's youth activities programme in some areas was disrupted at the time of the hostilities in June 1967. Repairs to centres, where necessary, are being carried out and damaged equipment replaced so that the programme can be developed in accordance with circumstances prevailing in the various fields. The Agency operates a total of thirty-four youth activities centres, six of which have been established in the tented camps in east Jordan. Co-operation with the World Alliance of YMCA's with respect to these activities has continued to be fruitful and a new programme is being developed this year to educate youth in community service. This programme provides for technical guidance to Agency staff responsible for youth activities, the training of refugee volunteer leaders in youth activities, and the development of services to the community in the tented camps. This new programme is being sponsored and financed jointly by UNRWA and the YMCA.

108. Since August 1967, four youth work camps have been operated in the emergency camps in east Jordan, where a large number of volunteers from UNRWA's youth activities centres participated in community projects designed to improve living conditions. These young men assisted in the pitching of tents for schools, clinics, distribution centres and living quarters, improving camp roads, unloading trucks of supplies, carrying out surveys of the

refugee population, clearing ground for sports activities and giving effective leadership in recreational programmes for school boys. One of these work groups consisted of thirty refugee scouts from a camp in Amman, who volunteered for services and helped to establish the installations of the new tented camps at Baqa'a (east Jordan).

Pre-school play centres

109. The operation of the Agency's pre-school play centres is normally financed from special contributions. Although insufficient funds for this purpose were received during the year, the Agency continued to operate the established centres, because of the greater need following the hostilities of June 1967 to keep under supervision the children in this vulnerable age group. Originally intended to provide refugee children of pre-school age with rudimentary training in a cheerful atmosphere, the scope of the programme has now been extended to provide routine medical supervision of the children and to the provision of a meal and milk before they return home. The physical condition of children attending these centres is noticeably superior to other refugee children in the same community. It is hoped that sufficient special contributions will be received to enable the establishment of similar centres in the new refugee camps as well as the continuation of the present programme.

Teacher training

110. The Agency's programme of teacher training falls into two distinct categories, the pre-service training of secondary school graduates in two-year courses at UNRWA training centres or in Government centres, and the in-service training of Agency teaching staff undertaken by the UNRWA/UNESCO Institute of Education, which operates Agency-wide from its headquarters in Beirut, Lebanon.

Pre-service

111. The Agency's three existing residential teacher training centres, each of which presently conducts two-year courses, resumed operation in the fall of 1967. At the Ramallah Women's Training Centre (West Bank), a combined teacher and vocational training institution, the only

second-year students were those whose homes were on the West Bank or Gaza and whose families had not crossed over to east Jordan. (At the time of the hostilities, all of the trainees were evacuated from this centre by special arrangement, but the West Bank and Gaza residents were given special authorization and crossed back from east Jordan on 27 August 1967.) Of 160 teacher trainees who should have continued their second year, only 117 returned. It was decided, therefore, to enrol a larger number of first-year trainees in order to make as full use of the Centre as possible and, as refugees from the other countries were not permitted to enter the occupied territory, the new intake was made up of refugee girls from Gaza and the West Bank who could qualify for entrance. There are now 297 teacher trainees at the Centre, of whom 180 are first-year students.

112. At the Ramallah Men's Teacher Training Centre, it was found that a large number of trainees, who were in the first year of their course prior to June 1967, had fled to east Jordan. Of the 200 who were in the first year, only sixty students reported back to the centre to continue their training. As the centre has a capacity for a total of 400 trainees, the enrolment of first-year students was substantially increased and consisted of 322 young men from Gaza and the West Bank, making a total of 382 first-and second-year students.

113. At the Technical and Teacher Training Institute at Sibilin in the Lebanon, there are 204 teacher trainees, of whom 117 are in their first year. The larger number of first-year students was decided on by the Agency to compensate in some measure for the loss of employment and university opportunities as a result of the hostilities.

114. To serve the needs of the displaced West Bank students, who were being trained as teachers in the two UNRWA pre-service centres at Ramallah, two new temporary teacher training courses were organized by the Agency in east Jordan; one for girls in a rented school in Amman with an enrolment of thirty-six second-year and seventy-eight first-year trainees, and the other for young men at the Agency's vocational training centre at Wadi Seer, near Amman, with an

enrolment of 120 second-year and eighty first-year trainees. (NEED, Inc. has provided the funds to cover the cost of this training.) Elsewhere in Amman, twenty-two trainees from the Ramallah Pen's Teacher Training Centre were found temporary quarters to enable them to conclude their training.

115. The total number of refugee students enrolled in UNRWA pre-service teacher training courses in 1967-1968 was therefore 1,219, compared with 1,121 in 1966-1967.

116. In order to augment the facilities for teacher training, especially for young men from east Jordan and for girls from east Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, the Agency plans to construct two new training centres near Amman with funds provided by NEED, Inc.

In-service

117. Since its establishment in 1964, and within the framework of its first phase of operations, the UNRWA/UNESCO Institute of Education has completed two of its basic two-year courses for the in-service training of elementary school teachers. Out of an initial 862 teachers enrolled in the first course in October 1964, and of 600 enrolled in the second course in May 1965, 741 and 151 teachers, respectively, have successfully completed all the requirements of their training programme, and have been recognized by the Agency as professional certified teachers. The low number of successful candidates in the second course is because of the non-completion of the course by teachers who were enrolled from Gaza and the West Bank. Their training was scheduled to be completed in the summer of 1967, but had to be delayed to the first half of 1968 as a consequence of the June 1967 conflict. They are expected to qualify at the end of June 1968.

118. In addition, 1,384 Agency teachers are still undergoing in-service training with the Institute, having begun their training in 1965, 1966 or 1967, and following two-year or three-year basic professional courses, depending on the level of their academic background on enrolment. Of these, 742 will complete their training in August 1968, 484 in August 1969 and 158 in August 1970. The total number of teachers who

have so far been involved in this programme of on-the-job professional training is 2,846. This represents about 54 per cent of the total number of UNRWA teachers.

119. At the beginning of the 1967-1968 school year the Institute embarked upon the second phase of its operation, namely, the training of teachers engaged in UNRWA/UNESCO preparatory schools, by organizing a two-year course of 193 preparatory teachers of mathematics, from all fields of the Agency's operation. Training courses in other subjects will be started at the beginning of the 1968-1969 school year.

120. The Institute was established in co-operation with UNESCO and the Government of Switzerland, which provided the funds for its operation, in rented premises in Beirut, Lebanon. While at its inception the Institute was considered by UNESCO as a pilot project, the success of its activities during the four years of its existence, as well as its potential for expansion into all areas related to the improvement of teaching methods, have become apparent. Consistent with the Agency's considered need to continue and to expand its efforts to improve the quality of teaching in UNRWA/UNESCO schools, it is important that the Institute be accommodated in more permanent quarters and, to this end, NEED, Inc. has agreed to provide funds for the purchase or construction and the equipment of a suitable building.

Vocational and technical education

121. Many trainees from the vocational training centre for boys at Kalandia and from the girls' training centre at Ramallah, both of which are on the West Bank, who were still in their first year at the time of the conflict, were unable to return to the centre for their second year. Therefore, when these centres opened in the fall of 1967, a considerable number of second-year places were unfilled. At both centres, it was decided to increase the enrolment of first-year students and to re-arrange the programme of instruction accordingly.

122. Arrangements were made for sixty-six displaced students from the Ramallah Women's Training Centre to complete their vocational

training courses in the YMCA training centre in Beirut, Lebanon. NEED, Inc. has provided the funds to cover the cost of this training. The young men from the Kalandia Vocational Training Centre, who found themselves in east Jordan and who wished to complete their courses, were enrolled for the second year of their training at UNRWA's Wadi Seer Vocational Training Centre near Amman. At this latter Centre, in order to accommodate its own second-year trainees, those from the Kalandia Centre and the 200 teacher trainees (see paragraph 114), it was necessary to revise and reduce the vocational training programmes for first-year students. However, long-standing plans for the expansion and improvement of the training centre at Wadi Seer are about to be implemented as a result of a special contribution from the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, part of which will be used for the construction and equipment necessary to increase the Centre's capacity.

123. When the Gaza Vocational Training Centre re-opened in September 1967, in anticipation of the absence of a number of second-year trainees, additional training places were made available for first-year students. However, during the first months following the re-opening of the Centre, more second-year students eventually returned and, as it was not possible to accommodate all of them on a residential basis, some were enrolled as day students. In paragraph 131 of last year's report (A/6713), the plan for the expansion of the Gaza Vocational Training Centre was set out. The Agency is now proceeding with the construction work, which is being financed with funds provided by NEED, Inc.

124. At the Damascus Vocational Training Centre in Syria, all of the trainees returned to the Centre in September 1967 for their second year and, for the first-year courses, more than 1,000 qualified young men applied for the 200 places that were available.

125. At the two Sibli training centres in Lebanon, the situation has remained normal throughout the school year.

126. Details of enrolment by type of training for the school years 1966-1967 and 1967-1968 are given in the following table; further details

of the courses of study and the centres attended are given in table 17 of annex I.

<i>Type of Training</i>	<i>1966/1967</i>	<i>1967/1968</i>
Vocational training for		
girls	237	311 ^a
Metal trades	699	711
Electrical trades	360	348
Building trades	356	349
Technical and commercial training	440	409
	<hr/> 2,092	<hr/> 2,128

^a Includes 100 girls following courses at the YMCA training centre in Beirut.

127. Further expansion of the vocational training programme is an important objective of the Agency, in its endeavour to give as many as possible of the refugee boys and girls an opportunity to acquire skills which will enable them to lead useful lives no matter where their future lies. In addition to the expansion projects mentioned above, plans are in train to increase vocational training facilities in Syria, and with funds provided by NEED, Inc., to expand the Ramallah Women's Training Centre, and to establish vocational training courses at the new women's training centre to be built near Amman.

128. Since the events of last year, the employment prospects of graduates from the Agency's vocational training centres in the occupied areas have suffered a reverse. Consequently, the placement of vocational graduates dropped considerably in 1967.

129. Only twenty-seven graduates out of a total of 950 could be given the opportunity of gaining further trade experience by working in modern industrial concerns in Europe. The number was lower than usual because the receiving countries were unable to absorb more this year, owing to the depressed economic situation in Europe. However, negotiations are in progress with interested countries and, on the basis of their goodwill and desire to assist the refugees, it is hoped that the programme will be re-instated at its former level so that it will be possible to give more vocational graduates the opportunity to participate in this valuable training scheme after completion of their courses in August 1968. (The

Federal Republic of Germany has recently agreed to accept a new group of 100.) At present, 170 refugee trainees are working in industry abroad, in the following countries: the Federal Republic of Germany (115); Sweden (32); Norway (12); Switzerland (8); Denmark (2); and Finland (1).

Adult training courses

130. The Agency continued its handicrafts training courses in all areas for the refugees who lack qualifications for admission to its vocational training centres. Thus forty-five trainees attended one-year carpentry courses at three centres on the West Bank, and 1,770 girls and young women completed six-month sewing courses at thirty-four centres. In addition, refugee women were instructed in cooking lessons on how best to use UNRWA's dry rations with vegetables in season. This year, 722 young women participated in the afternoon programmes of women's activities in fifteen centres. Activities include literacy training and classes in handicrafts, needlework, child care, first aid and household skills. Products of the handicrafts and needlework classes were sold on a co-operative basis and the profits used to buy materials and to help meet the running costs of the centres. Libraries, cultural activities and recreational programmes complemented the training aspects of the programme, and attendance at centres was almost double that of last year. The operation of these centres is dependent on special donations.

Training of the handicapped

131. Considerable progress has been made in developing the attitude of the community towards this programme and it is now accepted that, with proper education and training, the disabled can often lead reasonably normal lives and become useful and productive members of society. During the period under review, 288 disabled boys and girls were placed in institutions. This number is slightly lower than in previous years owing to difficulties resulting from the hostilities. The total assisted includes seventy trainees placed free of charge in various institutions in the Middle East and fifty-four blind children attending the Pontifical Mission Centre for the Blind in the Gaza Strip. In addition, there are

thirty-four workers producing goods for sale at the Home Service Sections of the Centre in Gaza. A number of disabled trainees, who had completed their training when hostilities broke out, were unable immediately to return to their homes and their living expenses were met by the Agency. Some have since been reunited with their families and arrangements for the return of the balance are in progress.

132. Ten blind students, who completed their elementary education at the Pontifical Mission Centre for the Blind in the Gaza Strip, have been admitted to UNRWA/UNESCO schools to continue their preparatory education with the sighted. There are ten blind students attending higher institutions of learning, seven boys at Damascus University, two girls at the Beirut College for Women in Lebanon, and one girl at Haigazian College, also in Lebanon. Six other blind students, four boys and two girls, are enrolled at private secondary schools in the host countries. It is encouraging to note that blind students are now accepted in schools to study side by side with the sighted. The Centre for the Blind in Gaza continues to render a great service to the community. The students, in addition to completing their elementary education in a very happy atmosphere, also receive training

and may continue their education either in Agency or Agency-sponsored schools and in the Agency's vocational training centres. Deaf students who have completed their secondary school education may also be accepted in UNRWA vocational training centres.

University education

133. UNRWA awarded a total of 718 scholarships for university study during the academic year 1967-1968. These scholarships are awarded only for one year at a time, but are renewable from year to year for the duration of the course of study undertaken by the individual student provided he successfully passes the end-of-year examination held by his faculty. Of the 718 scholarships awarded, 442 were continuing and 276 were new scholarships. The latter figure is considerably in excess of the 146 new awards made in 1966-1967. This increase was designed by the Agency as a means of helping academically meritorious refugee students from the occupied territories who were already enrolled in Arab universities and who found themselves cut off from other means of support.

134. The distribution of university scholarships is shown in the following table:

University scholarship holders by course of study and country of study during the academic year 1967-1968

<i>Course of Study</i>	<i>United Arab Republic</i>	<i>Lebanon</i>	<i>Syria</i>	<i>East Jordan</i>	<i>West Bank</i>	<i>Iraq</i>	<i>Turkey</i>	<i>Total</i>
Medicine	177	22	51	—	—	2	—	252
Pharmacy	133	3	12	—	—	—	—	48
Dentistry	6	—	4	—	—	—	—	10
Public health	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1
Engineering	118	24	43	—	—	3	1	189
Agriculture	17	—	2	—	—	—	—	19
Arts ^a	20	16	14	11	9	—	—	70
Science ^a	36	21	8	19	22	2	—	108
Education	15	—	2	—	—	—	—	17
Commerce and economics	2	1	—	1	—	—	—	4
All courses	424	88	136	31	31	7	1	718

^a Includes students who may later enter the medical or engineering schools of their university.

135. Although it is unlikely that the Agency will be able to increase its own expenditure on this highly important cycle of education, other possibilities are being considered of adding to the total number of university awards open to Palestine refugee students. In fact, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany is making funds available which will enable the Agency to provide scholarships for an additional 550 students in the 1968-1969 academic year. Several Governments have granted scholarships directly to Palestine refugee students. These include Iraq, Turkey, Algeria, Libya, Pakistan, Yugoslavia and the Federal Republic of Germany. The Agency, with the assistance of UNESCO, is seeking to extend such opportunities by contacting other countries which are in a position to offer scholarships to foreign students, in the hope that they will make some of their scholarships available to Palestine refugees.

D. Common services and general administration

136. During the year under review, the Agency's administrative costs have risen and it is expected that this trend will continue for so long as increased demands are made on the Agency's services.

137. As one of the results of the occupation of the West Bank by Israel, the Agency's Field Office in Jerusalem, which, before the hostilities, had administered the Agency's programmes for the whole of Jordan, could no longer serve east Jordan. It was therefore necessary to set up a new Field Office in Amman in order to continue the Agency's services to the refugees already established in east Jordan, as well as to provide administration for the services to those newly displaced. The provision of extra rations and other services to the newly displaced refugees in east Jordan and Syria and to the refugees on the West Bank and in Gaza, who had lost their means of livelihood as a result of the hostilities, has also increased the Agency's administrative and staff costs. At the beginning of the 1967-1968 school year, in order to provide teaching staff in Gaza and the West Bank, it was necessary to recruit temporary replacement teachers while at the same time continuing to pay those who were stranded in the United Arab Republic, pending

their return to their posts. Restrictions imposed on the movement of local staff into the occupied areas made it necessary to utilize the services of international staff and to provide special transportation. Costs of port operations and transportation of supplies within the occupied areas are met by the Government of Israel.

138. Although, in the first six months of 1967 (prior to the hostilities) the staff complement had been reduced below that of 1966, by the end of June 1968 the number of locally recruited staff had risen to 11,500 including temporary staff. International staff numbered 102, making a total of 11,602.

139. Apart from the emergency measures which were implemented as required throughout the past year, the pattern of services remains unchanged. In addition to the Agency's Headquarters in Beirut and the five Field Offices, it maintains the following services: public information services and liaison offices in New York, Geneva and Cairo; the transport of persons and goods within UNRWA's area of operations; market research, purchasing, control and warehousing of supplies and equipment; personnel administration, translation, legal, financial, statistical, recording and engineering services and the protection of the Agency's property.

E. Financial operations

140. The financial accounts of UNRWA are published separately, together with the related report of the Board of Auditors. This section, therefore, presents in summary form the Agency's actual financial operations in 1967 and its estimated financial operations in 1968. (UNRWA's fiscal period is the calendar year, whereas the present report covers the period 1 July 1967 to 30 June 1968.)

141. To show as clearly as possible the financial impact upon the Agency of the hostilities of June 1967 and their aftermath, the following summary of financial operations during 1967 reflects both the normal (i.e., pre-June level) programme of the Agency and the "emergency" increase in that programme:

	<i>Normal programme</i>	<i>Emergency programme</i>	<i>Total</i>
	(in millions of US dollars)		
Income received			
Pledges by Governments	34.5	5.8	40.3
Other contributions	1.1	1.3	2.4
Other income	1.2	—	1.2
Exchange losses and devaluation of currencies	(0.8)	—	(0.8)
Total income	36.0	7.1	43.1
Expenditure and commitments			
Relief services	17.6	2.0	19.6
Health services	4.9	0.1	5.0
Education services	15.1	0.2	15.3
Replacement or repair of Agency property and other extraordinary costs resulting from the hostilities	—	0.7	0.7
Total expenditure and commitments	37.6	3.0	40.6
Net surplus (deficit)	(1.6)	4.1	2.5
Add working capital at 1 January 1967 (after adjustment of prior year's accounts)	14.2	—	14.2
Working capital at 31 December 1967	12.6	4.1	16.7

142. Perhaps the most significant point of the foregoing summary is that the Agency again—for the fifth consecutive year—incurred a massive deficit on its normal programme amounting to \$1.6 million. Although the exceedingly generous response of contributors—both governmental and non-governmental—to the appeal of the Agency for funds to meet the needs arising out of the hostilities more than covered those needs in 1967, the excess will be quickly absorbed in meeting the same needs in 1968. The Agency's basic and chronic financial difficulties remained unabated at the close of 1967 and persisted in 1968 (see paragraphs 147-150).

143. The foregoing figures do not include those related to the receipt and expenditure of funds made available by NEED (Near East Emergency Donations, Inc.) mentioned elsewhere in this report. For technical reasons, these funds are not regarded as part of the Agency's funds. During 1967, the Agency received a total of \$3.5 million of NEED funds and by 31 December 1967 had expended or committed \$1.3 million,

principally for the provision of emergency shelter and sanitary arrangements for refugees and other displaced persons in east Jordan and for the displaced refugees in Syria. Had NEED funds not been available for these purposes, Agency funds would have had to have been used.

144. Although the Agency's total working capital at the close of 1967 stood at \$16.7 million, this by no means represented any real improvement in the Agency's financial position, since \$4.1 million of this resulted from contributions for the emergency not expected to be repeated in the future. The dual basic financial problems of the Agency therefore remained largely unresolved at the close of 1967, i.e., the chronic shortfall of income and the inadequacy of working capital.

145. Unliquidated commitments carried forward from 1967 (or prior years) to 1968 totalled approximately \$0.9 million, compared with \$0.8 million of such commitments which had been carried forward from 1966 to 1967. During 1967, savings on liquidation of commitments from prior years totalled some \$0.2 million, compared with

\$0.1 million in 1966.

146. At the end of 1967, unpaid pledges from Governments totalled \$7.6 million, compared with \$7.2 million at the end of 1966, reflecting a minor slow-down in the rate of payment of contributions in 1967 by certain Governments. The free cash position at the end of 1967 showed cash resources in excess of current liabilities and provisions for future liabilities amounting to \$0.5 million, compared with \$1.6 million at the end of 1966 and \$2.9 million at the end of 1965. Inventories of supplies and advances to suppliers at \$7.0 million were higher than at the close of 1966 (\$5.0 million). There was no significant change in other assets.

147. The financial prospects for the Agency in 1968 are far from encouraging, as the following summary table clearly shows:

	<i>Millions of US dollars</i>
Estimated income:	
Pledges by Governments	37.5
Other contributions	2.3
Other income	0.7
Total income	<u>40.5</u>
	<i>Millions of US dollars</i>
Estimated expenditure and commitments:	
Relief services	20.0
Health services	5.7
Education services	18.5
Total expenditure and commitments:	44.2
Estimated surplus (deficit)	(3.7)
Add working capital at 1 January 1968	<u>16.7</u>
Estimated working capital at 31 December 1968	<u>13.0</u>

148. As noted in paragraph 143, for 1968 the preceding figures do not include the expected receipt and expenditure of NEED funds. Needless to say, however, these funds will relieve the Agency's budget of a very substantial burden, particularly in the provision of additional and replacement school facilities and training centres. As of 30 June 1968, the Agency had received a total of \$4.5 million in NEED funds and had expended or committed \$1.5 million, principally on emergency shelter facilities for refugees and other displaced persons and for improvement

and expansion in the Agency's facilities for education and training of the refugees.

149. As the preceding table shows, the Agency expects to incur a deficit of some \$3.7 million in 1968, an amount considerably in excess of the net surplus of emergency contributions in 1967. However, this estimate is subject to a number of assumptions, the more important of which are (a) that unit costs will not increase, (b) that the Agency will not be called upon to provide assistance to additional numbers of displaced persons, (c) that some \$11.8 million of expected pledges by Governments will be forthcoming and (d) that contributions from non-governmental sources will continue at the same very high rate as in 1967. While the latter two of these seem reasonably safe assumptions, the first may well prove to be seriously wrong. As for assumption (b), this depends very largely upon the amount of assistance received by the Governments in the area for their programmes of assistance to displaced persons not registered with UNRWA.

150. The prospective deficit of \$3.7 million for 1968 results primarily from the high level of recurrent expenditure which occurred in 1967 over that of 1966. The aftermath of the hostilities of June 1967 had led to a markedly higher level of recurrent expenditure for the Agency, and while contributions have also increased somewhat, they have not increased sufficiently to cover both the gap already existing between income and expenditure before June 1967 and the subsequent increase in expenditure.

BUDGET FOR 1969

A. Introduction

151. The budget proposed for 1969 amounts to \$42,469,000 compared with 1968 estimated expenditure at \$44,239,000 and 1967 actual expenditure and commitments \$40,540,000.

152. To some extent, the estimates for both 1968 and 1969 must be considered provisional, since expenditure accruing as the aftermath of the mid-year hostilities in 1967 and the subsequent mass exodus in early 1968 from the Jordan Valley

camps to six new tented camps in the uplands have posed problems, particularly of "winterization" of tented accommodation before the onset of the 1968/1969 winter, the costs of which can be funded only from special contributions made for this purpose.

153. The budget for 1969 reflects the estimated costs of maintaining relief, health and education services at the same levels of normal programmes as in former years, but continuing the emergency supplements to vulnerable categories among the displaced and redisplaced refugees, as found essential in late 1967 and throughout 1968.

154. The marked rise in the cost of living, throughout the Agency's areas of operations, but most particularly in Gaza, has made it imperative to provide some relief to local staff, effective from mid-year 1968. In the event that there are further revisions in staff salaries in 1969, this will require adjustment of the budget now presented. The unit prices of our other ordinary supplies also continue to increase, as well as hospital bed rates and construction costs wherever the Agency is obliged to construct or replace premises.

155. Further, in educational services, especially in Jordan, where the Agency now operates tented schools in six new camps and in Syria, where the Agency has had to rent at inflated rates such premises as are available for schools, the average class occupancy, perforce, is much lower than the average of fifty pupils aimed at in Agency-built schools. Of the latter, at the date of this report there were 388 classrooms idle on the West Bank and in Gaza owing to the hostilities. Since approximately 80 per cent of the costs of operating UNRWA schools are related directly to teachers' salaries, the lower rate of occupancy obliges the Agency to employ many more teachers. This untoward situation will ameliorate by the scholastic year 1969/1970, by which time extensive school construction will have been completed with funds provided by special contributions for this purpose. Disruptions to school services in both banks of Jordan, in Gaza and in Syria during the second half of 1967 reduced educational expenditure for that calendar year. However, the prolongation of the 1967/1968 school year, in partial compensation for lost time, the deferment of all in-service summer courses in 1967,

but operation of many of them as winter courses in 1968, problems with textbooks, especially in Israeli-occupied territory, and other measures related to the emergency have invalidated direct comparisons of educational costs between operating years.

156. Costs of administration, as well as related operational costs, have risen directly as the result of the establishment of an additional Field Office in Amman to serve East Jordan. The former Field Office in Jerusalem is maintained, but on a reduced level, to serve the refugee population still resident in the occupied West Bank. The economies attained in administrative costs over the three prior years have been much more than offset by the cost of the establishment of a fifth Field Office.

157. Provision of essential temporary environmental sanitation facilities in the nine new tented camps is significantly more expensive than in permanently constructed camps with cement block shelters, with public latrines of the septic tank type and with a high ratio of private latrines. Provision and operation of public bath houses, installation and maintenance of extensive water supply systems and of slaughter-houses have further inflated the costs under this heading.

158. Cases requiring special hardship assistance are manifold more numerous than in years prior to the June 1967 hostilities and certainly much more desperate. It is beyond the Agency's resources to cope adequately with this problem. The budget provisions are little more than a token gesture of admission of the need. The Agency is greatly indebted to the many voluntary societies who share part of this burden as far as their own limited funds will permit.

159. Although strenuous measures have been taken to rectify the ration rolls, the numbers of technically eligible persons continue to increase and, almost without exception, the needy are more needy than ever.

160. For commodity prices for basic rations, which comprise nearly 30 per cent of the budget, it has been assumed that world prices during 1969 will not exceed those prevailing during 1968, although there are certain trends to the contrary. If significant variations occur in food commodity prices, it may be necessary to revise estimates in other sections of the budget.

B. Budget estimates*General*

161. The following table is a summary of

the budget estimates for 1969 together with comparative data for the years 1968 and 1967. These estimates are described in some detail in the paragraphs which follow the table:

		<i>1969 Budget estimates</i>	<i>1968 Estimated expenditure</i>	<i>1967 Actual expenditure</i>
		(in 1,000s of US dollars)		
Part I	<i>Relief services</i>			
	Basic rations	13,131	13,081	13,107
	Supplementary feeding	2,222	2,270	1,804
	Shelter	406	594	732
	Special hardship assistance	593	576	723
	Share of common costs from Part IV	3,366	3,466	3,256
	Total, Part I	19,718	19,987	19,622
Part II	<i>Health services</i>			
	Medical services	3,690	3,623	3,082
	Environmental sanitation	1,044	1,007	917
	Share of common costs from Part IV	1,059	1,093	1,026
	Total, Part II	5,793	5,723	5,025
Part III	<i>Education services</i>			
	General education	11,216	11,823	10,119
	Vocational and professional training	3,135	4,012	2,591
	Share of common costs from Part IV	2,607	2,694	2,523
	Total, Part III	16,958	18,529	15,233
Part IV	<i>Common costs</i>			
	Supply and transport services	3,383	3,475	3,266
	Other internal services	2,367	2,486	2,272
	General administration	1,282	1,292	1,267
	Total, Part IV	7,032	7,253	6,805
	Costs allocated to operations	(7,032)	(7,253)	(6,805)
	Net, Part IV	-	-	-
Part V	Replacement or repairs of Agency property lost or damaged and other extraordinary costs due to hostilities	-	-	660
	Total, all Parts	42,469	44,239	40,540

162. The presentation in three main parts follows the same pattern as that of recent years—relief, health and education services. The fourth part relates to the services common to the first three parts to which the costs have been allocated in the computed ratio by which they benefit. It should be specially noted that the estimated expenditure figure for 1968 includes \$ 3,355,000 of non-recurrent capital cost items (mostly funded from contributions received for these particular purposes) whereas the 1969 estimates include only \$549,000 for such works. For recurrent costs, the 1969 estimates exceed those of 1968 by approximately \$1 million.

Relief services

Basic rations

1969 budget estimates	\$13,131,000
1968 estimated expenditure	\$13,081,000
1967 actual expenditure	\$13,107,000

163. The rations issued are described briefly in paragraph 52 above and in annex I, table 4. Costs included under this heading are for purchase and distribution of basic food items and soap. The costs of warehousing and transport within the UNRWA area, however, are treated under "supply and transport services" in paragraphs 188-190 below.

164. These estimates provide for ration issues to a total of 875,000 beneficiaries inclusive of approximately 11,000 half-rations to frontier villagers at an estimated cost not exceeding commodity prices prevailing in 1968.

165. As stated for a number of years past, many of the premises used as distribution centres are old and unsuitable or improvised. Some are in pressing need of replacement. Nevertheless, in view of general financial stringencies, no construction items have been proposed.

Supplementary feeding

1969 budget estimates	\$2,222,000
1968 estimated expenditure	\$2,270,000
1967 actual expenditure	\$1,804,000

166. The current programme, as necessitated by post-June 1967 circumstances, is described in paragraphs 53 to 58 above and in annex I, tables 5 and 6. Again, as with basic rations, and as mentioned in paragraph 163 above, warehousing and transport within the UNRWA area are charged to "supply and transport services".

167. The nutritional value of the supplemental hot meals served remains the same, but the authorized numbers of beneficiaries have been continued in 1969 at the higher level found necessary during 1968. Other supplemental items of diet including milk, CSM and tinned meat have been continued for specified vulnerable categories. Additionally, a special contribution of milk from the Canadian Government will be issued during the autumn/winter 1968/1969. Whereas the imported commodities are estimated at the same price levels as for the basic ration programme, i.e., 1969 estimates at the 1968 actual prices, fresh food items in all areas are progressively more costly.

168. As with distribution centres, many of the premises used for supplementary feeding centres are old and unsuitable and some so dilapidated that action may no longer be deferred. A provision of \$47,000 has been made for extraordinary maintenance, such as replacement of roofs, for enlargement of inadequate buildings and for replacement of four centres.

Shelter

1969 budget estimates	\$406,000
1968 estimated expenditure	\$594,000
1967 actual expenditure	\$731,000

169. This programme is described in paragraphs 59-62 above and in annex I, table 7. Estimates include the rental value of camp sites (most of which are made available by the host Governments) and for the administrative control of existing shelters, for certain limited maintenance and for roads and paths within camps.

170. A minimal provision has been included of \$75,000 for shelter construction in established camps to take care of social cases and other hardship cases and of \$25,000 for essential road construction.

171. On the other hand, an urgent problem is that of shelter in the tented camps, where many hundreds of the tents now in use will require replacement before the onset of the 1968-1969 winter. To the extent possible, tents will be replaced by framework shelters of a more solid type before the end of 1968. However, there is a distinct possibility that it will be necessary to augment the provision of shelter in 1969, in which case every effort will be made to secure contributions to meet these needs.

Special hardship assistance

1969 budget estimates	\$593,000
1968 estimated expenditure	\$576,000
1967 actual expenditure	\$723,000

172. This budget heading includes all provisions, other than those for food, shelter and health and education services, for assistance to refugee families suffering special hardships. This assistance is limited to welfare casework and to the distribution of donated used clothing, donated layettes, blankets and winter fuel. The programme is described in paragraphs 63 to 67 above.

173. Significant progressive reductions have been made during recent years in the quantities of imported used clothing. Further, arrangements have been made to relieve the Agency of the freight costs on such shipments from the United States.

174. Stocks on hand of blankets for the displaced persons and refugees in the tented camps are believed to be adequate for the winter of 1968/1969. However, if the tented camps continue in operation, it will be necessary to purchase further supplies (unless donations are received) during 1969 for the following winter.

Health services

Medical services

1969 budget estimates	\$3,640,000
1968 estimated expenditure	\$3,623,000
1967 actual expenditure	\$3,082,000

175. The programmes of preventive and curative medical services are described in paragraphs 68 to 87 above and in annex I, tables 9-12.

176. No improvements in the standard of care or other changes have been provided for in the estimates for 1969 other than the provision of seven more clinical laboratories at established health centres where local facilities, immediately available, will improve the service without increasing the eventual operating costs. (The small capital outlay will be amortized by subsequent savings in fees presently paid for these services). A limited number of additional staff posts is necessary to cope with both the natural increase in population and the additional demands for medical attention from the thousands of displaced refugees, especially in the tented camps. Further, hospital bed rates continue to rise, together with unit costs of medical supplies, for which an essential provision has been included.

177. Although certain sub-standard health centres have recently been replaced with funds contributed for the purpose, there remain five other centres where replacement of unsatisfactory premises is long overdue. However, no provisions for them have been made in the budget; it is hoped that some further contributions for this purpose may be received in 1968 or 1969. Similarly, in the maternal and child health programme, inclusive of the rehydration/nutrition programme for infant cases of gastro-enteritis or malnutrition, no provision is included for extension or improvement of premises, highly desirable though this is.

178. For replacement of essential equipment and ambulance vehicles, a minimal provision has been made of \$50,000.

Environmental sanitation

1969 budget estimates	\$,1044,000
1968 estimated expenditure	\$,1007,000
1967 actual expenditure	\$ 917,000

179. The programme is described in paragraphs 88 and 89. Although recurrent costs have been reduced in recent years by more proficient techniques and by expansion of the private latrine programme (which reduces the costs of provision

and maintenance of public latrines), these economies have been virtually offset by increased unit prices of supplies (inclusive of effective insecticides where resistance has developed to cheaper treatments) and by the higher ratio of sanitation staff required in the nine new tented camps.

180. Although a great deal of construction work is required in more permanent drainage for disposal of storm water in camps, conversion of pit latrines to septic tank type, construction of more efficient incinerators and extension of water supply systems (all of which would engender long-term economies), the present budget provisions are limited to essential works in repair and extension of existing drainage, to construction of new percolation pits in localities where the saturation point is reached, replacement of corroded water pipes and provision for replacement of worn out pumps, engines and other equipment to an aggregate of \$50,000.

Education services

General education

1969 budget estimates	\$11,216,000
1968 estimated expenditure	\$11,823,000
1967 actual expenditure	\$10,119,000

181. For a description of the Agency's general education programme, see paragraphs 94 to 106 above and annex I, tables 13 to 16. Several minor activities conducted outside UNRWA/UNESCO schools are also included under this heading: youth activities (paragraphs 107 and 108), women's activities (paragraph 130) and pre-school play centres (paragraph 109). Although women's activities and pre-school play centres are considered as Agency programmes, they are normally operated only when funds are specially contributed for these purposes.

182. Of all Agency services provided for refugees, general education is among the most pressing: It is on this that families pin their hopes of future prospects; this is most noticeable in the tendency for boys to remain throughout the preparatory cycle, for girls both to attend in larger numbers and to continue longer, as well

as for greater numbers to press for admission to the secondary cycle.

183. Standards are maintained at modest levels, generally not lower than those observed in government schools. Extensive school construction programmes financed with special contributions, however, include certain ameliorations in floor space per pupil and in sanitation facilities at marginal costs. Average class occupancies will be lower in the scholastic year 1968/1969. Capital costs in 1968, at \$1,208,000 (mostly funded from special contributions) are expected to decline to \$40,000 in 1969.

184. The UNRWA/UNESCO Institute of Education (see paragraphs 117-120) continues to operate, with conspicuous success, in-service training programmes to improve the qualifications of teachers already on the staff. This particular activity is expected to cost \$377,500 in 1969 (inclusive of all educational in-service training projects).

Vocational and professional education

1969 budget estimates	\$3,135,000
1968 estimated expenditure	\$4,012,000
1967 actual expenditure	\$2,591,000

185. Details of these programmes are given in paragraphs 110 to 133. They include teacher, trade and commercial courses conducted in the Agency's residential training centres, as well as similar training subsidized by the Agency in centres operated by Governments and other organizations. Also included is the cost, at about \$350,000 per annum, for scholarships awarded at universities in the Agency's area, more particularly described in paragraphs 133-135 above, for candidates selected on the dual bases of outstanding academic qualifications and economic need. This heading also includes several special categories of training activities such as adult craft training in woodwork and sewing, training of physically handicapped children and some additional assistance to graduates from Agency centres to obtain on-the-job training in their industrial specialities in factories abroad (which is usually limited to defraying transport expenses).

186. Operational costs rose by some \$200,000 in 1968 and are expected to entail a further increase of some \$300,000 in 1969. This is due first, to the expansion of training capacity at the eleven centres from 3,247 actual attendances in 1967/1968 to 3,764 training capacity in 1968/1969, secondly to staffing requirements and thirdly to the general rise in costs of supplies. Although the over-all costs increased, the unit costs for each trainee reflect a significant decrease.

187. Capital costs estimated at \$1,214,000 in 1968 (all from special contributions) will decline in 1969 to an estimated \$86,000 related almost entirely to replacement and updating of equipment with a minor provision for adult craft training in the new tented camps.

Common costs

Supply and transport services

1969 budget estimates	\$3,383,000
1968 estimated expenditure	\$3,475,000
1967 actual expenditure	\$3,265,000

188. This budget heading comprises the procurement of all supplies, commodities and equipment, their control and warehousing, and the operating of freight and passenger transport within the UNRWA area of operations for all Agency activities.

189. Economies attained are expected to enable the recurrent costs to be held in 1969 to about the same level as in 1968.

190. The replacement of old vehicles has been severely restricted for several years and this austerity measure will be continued again in 1969 at even less cost than in 1968. For the replacement of passenger vehicles \$40,000 is proposed, \$60,000 for freight vehicles and \$10,000 for equipment and modifications to warehouse premises, compared with an aggregate of \$181,000 for these purposes in 1968.

Other internal services

1969 budget estimates	\$2,367,000
1968 estimated expenditure	\$2,486,000
1967 actual expenditure	\$2,272,000

191. These services, other than supply and transport treated in paragraphs 188-190 above, include the registration and determination of eligibility of refugees, internal administration services, translation, legal financial, technical (engineering), data processing services and the protection of the Agency's installations and property.

192. The significant rise in costs reflected in 1968, due largely to the necessity to establish an additional Field Office in Amman (see paragraph 156 above), will be contained in 1969 by the imposition of all feasible administrative economies, but it is believed that no further significant reduction could be implemented except at grave risk of endangering the Agency's ability to control its operations.

General administration

1969 budget estimates	\$1,282,000
1968 estimated expenditure	\$1,292,000
1967 actual expenditure	\$1,267,000

193. Included under this budget heading is all general administration required for the Agency's headquarters, for the five field offices and their subordinate area and camp operations; also maintenance of the liaison offices in New York, Geneva and Cairo and the operation of public information services.

194. Only marginal increases have occurred in costs over the current three-year period and the observation made in the concluding sentence of paragraph 192 above is equally valid with respect to these services.

Allocation of common costs

195. The summary table in paragraph 161 above reflects the allocation of common costs to the three main categories of Agency services—relief, health and education. Any such allocation involves a degree of judgement; the percentages allocated were deduced from a detailed analysis by field offices and applied as weighted averages. They are believed to be an accurate assessment.

C. Financing the budget

196. The problem of financing the 1969 budget is summarized as follows (in millions of US dollars):

Budget 1969	42.5	
Estimated funds available from:		
Non-governmental contributions	1.0	
Miscellaneous income	<u>0.7</u>	<u>1.7</u>
Balance to be covered by contributions from Governments		<u>40.8</u>

197. As shown in paragraph 147 above, it is likely that the working capital will have been reduced on 1 January 1969 to \$13.0 million, which the Agency considers below the minimum of working capital to finance the "pipeline" of supplies and to ensure continuation of normal activities in the first months of the year, pending actual receipt of annual contributions. Operations in 1969 may thus depend upon early if not advance payment of Government contributions (on which past experience does not lead the Agency to be optimistic).

198. As indicated in paragraph 196, the financing of the 1969 budget will require contributions from Governments of \$40.8 million.

On the basis of such information as is presently available, the Agency would estimate that governmental contributions would not exceed \$35.9 million. This estimate compares with prior years:

1968	\$37.5 million
1967	\$34.5 million plus \$5.8 million special contributions
1966	\$35.0 million
1965	\$34.0 million

The vital necessity of ensuring increased contributions has been emphasized in paragraph 41.

199. The estimate of non-governmental contributions at \$1 million is based on the high level of such contributions received in the twelve months ending 30 June 1968. In view of other pressing causes to be supported in other parts of the world, it is difficult to predict whether this level of contributions from non-governmental sources will in fact be attained by UNRWA in 1969. Nevertheless, active steps will continue to be taken to attract funds.

200. Finally, it is no longer feasible for the Agency to cover a shortfall in income by drawing on the working capital; this is already at a precarious level.

ANNEXES

ANNEX I — TABLES

STATISTICS CONCERNING REGISTERED POPULATION

Table 1

Total registered population according to category of registration 1950-1968^a

Year ended	"R" Category				"S" Category		"N" Category		Grand total ^e 4 + 5 + 6 + 7
	1 Full ration recipients	2 Half-ration recipients ^b	3 Babies and children registered for services only	4 Total 1 + 2 + 3	5 Other members receiving no rations ^d	6 Members of families receiving education and medical services ^d	7 Members of families receiving no rations or services ^d		
June 1950	f	f	f	960,021	—	—	—	960,021	
June 1951	826,459	51,034	2,174	879,667	—	—	24,455	904,122	
June 1952	805,593	58,733	18,347	882,673	—	—	32,738	915,411	
June 1953	772,166	64,817	34,765	871,748	—	—	45,013	916,761	
June 1954	820,486	17,340	49,232	887,058	—	—	54,793	941,851	
June 1955	828,531	17,228	60,227	905,986	—	—	63,403	969,389	
June 1956	830,266	16,987	75,026	922,279	—	—	74,059	996,338	
June 1957	830,611	16,733	86,212	933,556	18,203	4,462	62,980	1,019,201	
June 1958	836,781	16,577	110,600	963,958	19,776	5,901	63,713	1,053,348	
June 1959	843,739	16,350	130,092	990,181	21,548	6,977	68,922	1,087,628	
June 1960	849,634	16,202	150,170	1,016,006	22,639	8,792	73,452	1,120,889	
June 1961	854,268	15,998	169,730	1,039,996	23,947	9,515	77,566	1,151,024	
June 1962	862,083	15,805	176,772	1,054,660	20,004	9,027	91,069	1,174,760	
June 1963	866,369	15,705	197,914	1,079,988	21,195	10,420	98,567	1,210,170	
June 1964	863,284	15,617	226,494	1,105,395	23,369	13,168	104,653	1,246,585	
June 1965	859,048	15,546	251,131	1,125,725	29,387	18,589	107,122	1,280,823	
June 1966	845,730	15,392	284,025	1,145,147	39,485	24,367	108,750	1,317,749	
June 1967	845,790	15,328	312,649	1,173,767	39,997	25,331	106,991	1,346,086	
June 1968	824,366 ^g	14,704 ^g	316,166	1,155,236	60,219	26,900	121,939	1,364,294 ^h	

- a The above statistics are based on the Agency's registration records, which do not necessarily reflect the actual refugee population owing to factors such as unreported deaths and undetected false registration.
- b Before 1954, half rations were issued to babies and bedouins, as well as to frontier villagers in Jordan. Since then, babies have been eligible for full rations after their first anniversary if the ration ceiling permits. Bedouins are eligible to receive full rations. Half rations are issued only to frontier villagers on the West Bank. Frontier villagers displaced to east Jordan after the hostilities of June 1967 are issued with full rations.
- c Includes babies below one year of age and children who, because of ration ceilings, are not issued rations. (These children without rations number 154,372 in east Jordan, 71,722 in the West Bank, 37,173 in Gaza, 28,300 in Syria and 7,665 in Lebanon). No births have been documented in east Jordan since the hostilities of June 1967.
- d Columns 5, 6 and 7 show the number of persons whose registration for assistance by the Agency has been reduced or cancelled according to their family income as known to the Agency and the income scale in force in their country of residence.
- e The members of "R" families receiving no rations (column 5) shown for 1957 to 1968 correspond to a level of income insufficient to cancel the whole family's entitlement to rations. The increase in 1968 represents mainly refugees who were absent from Gaza after the hostilities of June 1967, many of whom are now being issued with rations in east Jordan on a temporary basis, pending documentation of their transfer. Up to 1956, such persons were reported together with families of the "N" Category (column 7). In 1966, a new sub-category of registration was introduced for persons registered for rations, but whose entitlement has been temporarily suspended (e.g., by reason of their employment by the Agency or acceptance in institutions). At the end of June 1968, persons registered in this sub-category numbered 12,699.
- f The "S" Category of registration (column 6) was created in January 1965 in place of the previous "E" and "M" Categories and is being extended to all areas in accordance with appropriate income scales.
- g "N" Category (column 7) includes refugees whose income is such as to disqualify them for rations or normal services, or who have received assistance to enable them to become self-supporting.
- h In general, it must be pointed out that the distribution of refugees by category of registration gives only a partial picture of the number of self-supporting refugees owing to the limitations faced by the Agency in determining their actual income or degree of need.
- i The total population as at 30 June 1952 included 19,616 refugees receiving relief in Israel who were UNRWA's responsibility to that date.
- j Details not available.
- k Does not include refugees receiving rations since the hostilities of June 1967 on a temporary basis.
- l See footnote 8 in chapter I of the report (p. 18).

Table 2

Recapitulation of changes in composition and/or entitlement of families registered for rations^a

Nature of changes	1 July 50 to 30 June 63	YEAR ENDED					Total 1950-1968
		30 June 64	30 June 65	30 June 66	30 June 67	30 June 68	
<i>Increases</i>	<i>b</i>				<i>c</i>	<i>c</i>	
Births	424,311	48,802	43,857	43,945	40,506	26,803	628,224
New Registration	45,330	189	258	283	74	75	46,209
Loss of self-support ^d	63,610	4,475	6,136	7,340	7,117	5,621	94,299
Returned from absence	13,046	992	773	1,168	1,679	3,872	21,530
Miscellaneous ^e	29,901	515	1,135	212	529	995	33,287
Total	576,198	54,973	52,159	52,948	49,905	37,366	823,549
<i>Decreases</i>	<i>b</i>						
Deaths	84,443	11,624	9,053	7,155	6,233	7,158	125,666
False registration and duplication	53,900	2,080	1,422	204	166	565	58,337
Self-support ^d	148,173	12,007	13,514	23,401	10,190	8,850	216,135
Absence	38,515	1,915	6,894	2,077	3,296	34,068 ^f	86,765
Miscellaneous ^e	131,767	1,846	747	770	1,669	4,686	141,485
Total	456,798	29,472	31,630	33,607	21,554	55,327	628,388
	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	
Population at 30 June	1,079,988	1,105,395	1,125,725	1,145,147	1,173,767	1,155,236	

a This table recapitulates changes over eighteen years affecting the total number of ration recipients, their babies and children registered for services (column 4 of table 1). Births, new registrations, deaths, false registrations and duplications result in additions to or deletions from the registration records. Self-support and absence reflect transfers to or from the lower categories of registration (shown in columns 5, 6 and 7 of table 1).

Transfers within or between areas, as well as issue of rations (when available) to children registered for services, are not shown in this table.

b Includes changes effected during the 1950-1951 census operation.

c No births and virtually no other changes have been documented for east Jordan since the hostilities of June 1967.

d Covers income, employment with the Agency, assistance towards self-support etc., or the cessation thereof.

e Miscellaneous changes include up to June 1953, a number of additions to or deletions from the registration records, as well as certain changes in category of registration. The deletion of refugees in Israel from the Agency's records is also reported mainly under this heading (40,930 persons over the period July 1950-June 1953).

f This figure represents mainly refugees who were absent from Gaza after the hostilities of June 1967, many of whom are now in east Jordan.

Table 3

Recapitulation of changes in composition of total registered population^a

Nature of changes	1 July 50 to 30 June 63	YEAR ENDED					Total 1950-1968
		30 June 64	30 June 65	30 June 66	30 June 67	30 June 68 ^c	
<i>Additions</i>							
Births	428,216	50,298	46,059	46,212	42,971	29,286	643,042
New registration	46,326	333	412	351	166	533 ^d	48,121
Miscellaneous ^b	5,159						5,159
Total	479,701	50,631	46,471	46,563	43,137	29,819	696,322
<i>Deletions</i>							
Deaths	86,671	12,008	9,621	7,866	6,963	7,855	130,984
False and duplicate registration	55,218	2,225	2,524	1,633	8,041	3,623	73,264
Miscellaneous ^b	89,165						89,165
Total	231,054	14,233	12,145	9,499	15,004	11,478	293,413
Total registered population at 30 June		1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968
		1,210,170	1,246,585	1,280,823	1,317,749	1,346,086	1,364,294

a This table recapitulates changes affecting the total number of registered population (column 8 of table 1) over eighteen years.

Transfers within or between areas are not shown herein.

In comparing the figures in this table with those in table 2, it should be borne in mind that deletions from the ration rolls do not necessarily entail deletions from the total registered population. Persons ceasing to draw rations because of absence or self-support continue to be registered within the total population. On the other hand, some deaths and false and duplicate registrations are reported among persons registered but not receiving rations, and this accounts for the minor differences under these headings in the two tables. In the earlier years of the Agency's history, the distinction between ration recipients and registered population was incompletely recorded.

b Nature of changes reported under "miscellaneous" was not specified during the census operation. Figures reflect those amendments which resulted in addition or deletion in the total registered population, and removal of refugees in Israel from UNRWA registration records.

c No births and virtually no other changes have been documented for east Jordan since the hostilities of June 1967.

d Actual new registrations were seventy-five. The remainder represents corrections of deletions previously made in error.

*Table 4**Relief services*

Basic rations and other supplies distributed by UNRWA

1. *Basic dry rations*

A monthly ration for one person consists of:

- 10,000 grammes of flour
- 600 grammes of pulses
- 600 grammes of sugar
- 500 grammes of rice
- 375 grammes of oils and fats

This ration provides about 1,500 calories per day per person.

In winter, the monthly ration is increased by:

- 300 grammes of pulses
- 400 grammes of flour

It then provides about 1,600 calories per day per person.

2. *Other supplies distributed*

1 piece of soap (150 grammes) per month to each ration beneficiary.

1 $\frac{1}{2}$ litres of kerosene were allocated to ration beneficiaries and to babies and children registered for services, in camps in east Jordan, West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria during five winter months. In Gaza, 1 litre was allocated to these beneficiaries, whether or not they lived in camps, during five winter months.

Table 5

UNRWA supplementary feeding programme

Average number of beneficiaries

1 July 1967—30 June 1968

Country	Daily cooked meal beneficiaries				Monthly dry ration beneficiaries			
	Average for the period				Average for the period			
	Number of feeding centres	0-2 Years	2-15 years and special cases	Total	Pregnant women	Nursing mothers	TB out-patients	Total
East Jordan	13	230	2,557	2,787	763	2,458	156	3,377
West Bank	29	577	13,989	14,979	598	3,156	205	3,959
	5 ^a	154	259					
Gaza	23	1,860	16,065	17,925	3,392	9,917	584	13,893
Lebanon	18	418	4,347	4,765	979	2,750	129	3,858
Syria	18	322	5,534	5,856	649	1,584	101	2,334
East Jordan displaced refugees	106	3,561	42,751	46,312	6,381	19,865	1,175	27,421
Syria displaced refugees			15,390	15,390	114 ^b	512 ^b	11 ^b	637
			2,437	2,437				2,437

^a Centres operated by voluntary societies.^b Displaced refugees average for two months (May and June).

Table 6

UNRWA milk programme

Daily number of beneficiaries

Average for 1 July 1967-30 June 1968

Country	Number of milk centres		Daily number of beneficiaries Average for the year			Total
	Preparation and distribution	Distribution only	Milk centres	Schools ^a	Orphanages, medical prescriptions	
East Jordan	14	—	5,631	4,017	114	9,762
West Bank	37	8	4,849	7,510	94	12,494
	11 ^b		41			
Gaza	23 ^c	—	14,432	25,962	92	40,486
Lebanon	21	—	13,982	7,753	264	21,999
Syria	18	1	12,365	15,962	89	28,416
	124	9	51,300	61,204	653	113,157
East Jordan (displaced refugees)			2,341			2,341
Syria (displaced refugees)			4,033			4,033

a Average for ten months in West Bank, nine in Lebanon, eight in east Jordan, seven in Syria, and six in Gaza.

b Centres operated by voluntary societies.

c Including one preparation centre only.

Table 7

Number of refugees in UNRWA camps according to area as at 30 June 1968^{a b}

Area	Number of camps	Number of families	Number of persons ^c	Percentage of total population
East Jordan	5	15,513	89,681	31.2
West Bank	20	12,884	66,497	24.6
Gaza	8	32,078	195,879	62.4
Lebanon	15	14,538	78,449	47.2
Syria	6	4,797	23,726	15.9
Total	54	79,810	454,232	33.3

a This table does not include displaced persons and registered refugees in the tented camps (see table 8 below).

b In general, refugees not living in UNRWA camps live in the villages and cities in the area and are eligible for the same range of services except that the Agency does not provide sanitation services for them. Their economic status differs little from that of refugees in camps.

c Refugees enumerated are all those officially registered in camps irrespective of their category of registration.

The figures do not include refugees in camps who are not given shelter by UNRWA, but benefit from sanitation services only.

Table 8

Number of displaced persons and registered refugees in tented camps according to area as at 30 June 1968

Area	Number of camps	Number of persons
East Jordan	6	78,400
Syria	4	7,746
Total	10	86,146

Table 9

Health services

Number of visits to UNRWA and subsidized clinics,
1 July 1967—30 June 1968

	East Jordan	West Bank	Gaza	Lebanon	Syria	Total
General medical cases	410,806	249,494	478,917	406,159	432,581	1,977,957
Injections	368,112	205,422	422,851	249,166	224,121	1,469,672
Dressing and skin treatments	324,942	197,084	370,977	252,968	98,147	1,244,118
Eye cases	276,141	168,149	402,556	129,012	33,194	1,009,052
Dental	6,948	13,257	22,002	20,628	8,902	71,737
TOTAL	1,386,949	833,406	1,697,303	1,057,983	796,945	5,772,536

Table 10

Hospital facilities available to Palestine refugees, 1967-1968

*(Statistics refer to the actual situation as at 30 June 1968)**Hospitals*

Government and local authorities	34
Voluntary societies or private	39
UNRWA	<u>2^a</u>
Total	75

In addition, there are nine maternity centres; one in Syria, two in West Bank and six in Gaza

^a Including the Tuberculosis Hospital, Nablus, which was closed in March 1968.

Number of beds available	East Jordan	West Bank	Gaza	Lebanon	Syria	Total
General	221	325	370	149	79	1,144
Tuberculosis	20	35	150	28	20	253
Maternity	25	33.5	68	7	7	140.5
Paediatrics	40	62	66	32	—	200
Mental	47	85	—	54	2	183
TOTAL	353	540.5 ^a	654	270	108	1,925.5

^a Awaiting review.

Rehydration/Nutrition Centres

	East Jordan	West Bank	Gaza	Lebanon	Syria	Total
Number of centres	4	1	6	3	3	17
Number of cots	38	20	98	30	21	207

Table 11

Infectious diseases recorded among Palestine refugee population

1 July 1967 - 30 June 1968

	East Jordan	West Bank	Gaza	Lebanon	Syria	Total
Cholera	0	0	0	0	0	0
Plague	0	0	0	0	0	0
Yellow fever	0	0	0	0	0	0
Smallpox	0	0	0	0	0	0
Typhus (louse-borne)	0	0	0	0	0	0
Relapsing fever (louse-borne)	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ankylostomiasis	0	0	75	1	0	76
Bilharziasis	0	0	15	0	0	15
Brucellosis	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chicken-pox	1,412	897	2,220	1,589	1,116	7,234
Conjunctivitis	16,247	5,874	8,713	4,406	7,700	42,940
Diphtheria	5	0	0	0	0	5
Dysentery	2,645	665	1,888	825	110	6,133
Enteric group fevers	23	0	52	2	175	252
Gonorrhoea	1	0	7	0	9	17
Infectious hepatitis	138	25	373	73	66	675
Leishmaniasis cutaneous	0	0	0	0	17	17
Malaria	0	0	1	0	0	1
Measles	2,587	1,221	1,807	687	571	6,873
Meningitis (cerebrospinal)	3	0	1	5	5	14
Mumps	847	177	322	395	673	2,414
Pertussis	20	87	77	304	32	520
Poliomyelitis	8	1	26	26	21	82
Rabies	0	0	0	0	0	0
Relapsing fever (endemic)	0	2	0	0	0	2
Scarlet fever	1	0	0	0	1	2
Syphilis	0	0	26	35	9	70
Tetanus	1	0	2	1	0	4
Tetanus neonatorum	2	0	28	0	0	30
Trachoma	356	67	361	79	83	946
Tuberculosis (pulmonary)	65	10	123	134	28	360
Typhus (endemic)	0	0	0	0	0	0

Table 12
Maternal and child health
1 July 1967-30 June 1968

	East Jordan	West Bank	Gaza	Lebanon	Syria	Total
<i>Ante-natal services</i>						
Number of ante-natal clinics	10	22	9	18	19	78
Number of pregnant women newly registered	4,026	3,169	11,995	4,158	2,727	26,075
Average monthly attendance	1,035	833	3,753	1,290	760	7,671
Number of STS performed	800	1,186	2,050	1,359	680	6,075
Number of cases positive serology	0	0	24	28	12	64
Number of home visits (pre-natal care)	217	163	112	955	982	2,429
<i>Infant health care</i>						
Number of infant health centres	10	20	9	18	19	76
Number registered 0-1 year, monthly average	4,184	3,151	13,736	4,342	2,511	27,924
Number attended 0-1 year, monthly average	2,869	2,055	10,231	3,534	1,948	20,637
Number registered 1-2 years, monthly average	4,014	3,539	9,199	4,036	2,654	23,442
Number attended 1-2 years, monthly average	1,449	1,050	1,322	1,411	1,093	6,325
Number of smallpox vaccinations	1,986	1,618	11,071	3,785	3,046	21,506
Number of TAB immunizations completed	2,507	2,232	4,740	3,178	2,264	14,921
Number of triple vaccine immunizations completed	3,344	2,523	9,222	3,957	2,239	21,285
Number of home visits (infant care)	5,631	9,897	7,957	11,362	10,032	44,879
<i>School health services</i>						
Number of school teams	1	1	1	1	1	5
Number of children examined	14,895	12,894	6,311	4,784	16,154	55,038
Number of school inspections	70	404	415	125	181	1,195
Number of TAB boosters given	29,702	3,711	43,608	31,163	3,285	111,469
Number of diphtheria boosters given	7,703	5,225	5,552	5,499	3,362	27,341
Number of triple vaccine (one dose)	0	350	0	0	0	350
Number of triple vaccine (two doses)	0	674	0	0	0	674
Number of triple vaccine (three doses)	0	0	0	0	0	0
Number of smallpox revaccinations	0	0	0	7,791	2,102	9,893
Number of cholera boosters given	0	0	0	9,034	0	9,034
Number of BCG given	0	4,803	0	4,744	0	9,547

EDUCATION AND TRAINING SERVICES

General education

Table 13

UNRWA - UNESCO schools

Number of elementary and preparatory pupils, 1951-1968

Country	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968
JORDAN																		
Elementary	16,345	15,882	30,118	39,188	42,144	43,649	42,431	41,600	39,519	38,223	38,309	41,000	45,531	50,220	55,713	60,802	65,849	45,593 ^a
Preparatory	-	-	87	790	1,612	2,862	4,274	5,357	6,714	6,898	7,437	8,384	8,492	8,868	9,623	11,113	12,838	9,043 ^a
Secondary	-	-	-	22	82	200	334	495	578	612	598	875	-	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	16,345	15,882	30,205	40,000	43,838	46,711	47,039	47,452	46,811	45,733	46,344	50,259	54,023	59,088	65,336	71,915	78,687	54,636 ^a
WEST BANK																		
Elementary	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	18,957
Preparatory	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4,587
TOTAL	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	23,544
GAZA																		
Elementary	19,543	22,551	25,702	31,107	34,016	35,087	34,876	35,163	34,806	36,633	36,591	37,885	38,470	38,905	41,164	40,757	41,362	35,395
Preparatory	61	164	675	1,781	3,339	4,937	6,410	7,495	8,244	8,481	9,841	10,641	12,797	13,627	15,032	15,644	16,710	12,358
TOTAL	19,604	22,715	26,377	32,888	37,355	40,024	41,286	42,658	43,050	45,114	46,432	48,526	51,267	52,532	56,196	56,401	58,072	47,753
LEBANON																		
Elementary	4,564	6,291	9,332	11,695	12,567	12,983	13,155	13,936	14,881	15,422	16,292	17,124	17,411	18,041	19,836	19,547	20,744	21,312
Preparatory	-	-	86	384	620	948	1,003	996	1,325	1,668	2,159	2,676	2,680	3,491	3,710	3,648	3,451	5,168
TOTAL	4,564	6,291	9,418	12,079	13,187	13,931	14,158	15,932	16,206	17,090	18,451	19,800	20,091	21,532	23,546	23,195	24,195	26,480
SYRIA																		
Elementary	2,599	2,895	5,410	8,758	9,700	10,288	11,042	11,332	12,256	13,354	13,685	14,430	15,618	16,463	17,631	18,720	19,564	20,197
Preparatory	-	-	166	864	671	936	1,180	1,562	1,916	2,592	3,589	4,122	4,459	4,946	5,284	5,740	6,449	6,981
TOTAL	2,599	2,895	5,576	9,622	10,371	11,224	12,222	12,894	14,172	15,946	17,274	18,552	20,077	21,409	22,915	24,460	26,013	27,178
GRAND TOTAL																		
Elementary	43,051	47,619	70,562	90,748	98,427	102,007	101,504	102,031	101,462	103,632	104,877	110,439	117,030	123,629	134,344	139,826	147,519	141,454
Preparatory	61	164	1,014	3,819	6,242	9,683	12,867	15,410	18,199	19,639	23,026	25,823	28,428	30,932	33,649	36,145	39,448	38,137
Secondary	-	-	-	22	82	200	334	495	578	612	598	875	-	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	43,112	47,783	71,576	94,589	104,751	111,890	114,705	117,936	120,239	123,883	128,501	137,137	145,458	154,561	167,993	175,971	186,967	179,591

a East Jordan only.

Table 14

Number of refugee pupils attending government
and private schools, as at 31 May 1968

Country	Elementary		Preparatory		Secondary		All levels		Total
	Government schools	Private schools	Government schools	Private schools	Government schools	Private schools	Government schools	Private schools	
East Jordan	8,502	911	3,415	291	2,988	328	14,905	1,530	16,435
West Bank	9,217 ^a	1,225	2,744 ^a	512	2,476 ^a	382	14,437 ^a	2,119	16,556
Gaza	-	-	-	-	5,015	-	5,015	-	5,015 ^b
Lebanon	792	4,806	172	1,658	46	1,320	1,010	7,784	8,794
Syria	5,720	230	1,156	251	1,353	1,318	8,229	1,799	10,028
Total	24,231	7,172	7,487	2,712	11,878	3,348	43,596	13,232	56,828

^a Figures not yet verified for eligibility.

^b Including an estimated 700 secondary students receiving education in the United Arab Republic.

Table 15

UNRWA-UNESCO schools showing number of pupils by grades as of 31 May 1968

Elementary

Country	I		II		III		IV		V		VI		Total	
	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls
East Jordan	4,961	4,537	4,453	4,027	4,267	3,576	4,285	3,486	3,662	2,832	3,221	2,286	24,849	20,744
West Bank	1,743	1,887	1,718	1,743	1,492	1,594	1,572	1,634	1,461	1,418	1,489	1,206	9,475	9,482
Gaza	3,148	2,860	3,323	2,737	3,025	2,711	3,291	3,045	2,821	2,469	3,457	2,508	19,065	16,330
Lebanon	2,274	2,019	1,985	1,853	1,668	1,449	1,930	1,567	1,746	1,375	2,011	1,435	11,614	9,698
Syria	1,986	1,721	1,974	1,677	1,827	1,456	1,945	1,586	1,771	1,263	1,731	1,260	11,234	8,963
Total	14,112	13,024	13,453	12,037	12,279	10,786	13,023	11,318	11,461	9,357	11,909	8,695	76,237	65,217
Grand total	27,136		25,490		23,065		24,341		20,818		20,604		141,454	

Preparatory

Country	I		II		III		IV		Total	
	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls
East Jordan	2,593	1,624	1,853	1,077	1,286	610	-	-	5,732	3,311
West Bank	1,228	875	823	634	595	432	-	-	2,646	1,941
Gaza	2,196	2,299	2,227	2,029	1,896	1,711	-	-	6,319	6,039
Lebanon	1,609	940	603	302	712	300	443	259	3,367	1,801
Syria	1,507	1,022	1,373	806	1,403	870	-	-	4,283	2,698
Total	9,133	6,760	6,879	4,848	5,892	3,923	443	259	22,347	15,790
Grand total	15,893		11,727		9,815		702		38,137	

Table 16
Distribution of refugee pupils receiving education as of 31 May 1968

Country	Number of UNRWA-UNESCO schools	Number of pupils in elementary classes at UNRWA-UNESCO schools		Number of pupils in preparatory classes at UNRWA-UNESCO schools		Number of refugee pupils in government and private schools (elementary, preparatory and secondary)		Total number of refugee pupils receiving education
		Boys	Girls	Total	Boys	Girls	Total	
East Jordan	112	24,849	20,744	45,593	5,732	3,311	9,043	71,071
West Bank	90	9,475	9,482	18,957	2,646	1,941	4,587	40,100
Gaza	103	19,065	16,330	35,395	6,319	6,039	12,358	52,768
Lebanon	59	11,614	9,698	21,312	3,367	1,801	5,168	35,274
Syria	82	11,234	8,963	20,197	4,283	2,698	6,981	37,206
Total	446	76,237	65,217	141,454	22,347	15,790	38,137	236,419

Table 17

UNRWA-UNESCO vocational and technical education enrolment, 1967-1968 school year

	EAST JORDAN		WEST BANK	LEBANON		SYRIA	GAZA
	Vocational Training Centre Wadi Seer	VTC Kalandia	Women's Training Centre Ramallah	VTC Siblin	Technical and Teacher Training Institute Siblin	VTC Damascus	VTC Gaza
Trades and professions							
A. METAL TRADES							
Instrument mechanic	-	-	-	30	-	-	-
Fitter machinist	24	20	-	23	-	12	45
General mechanic	-	25	-	24	-	22	-
Diesel plant site mechanic	31	-	-	11	-	32	-
Auto mechanic	40	-	-	30	-	34	64
Refrigeration and air-conditioning	31	-	-	-	-	-	35
Panel beater paint sprayer	16	-	-	-	-	-	-
Sheetmetal worker	-	-	-	12	-	15	-
Blacksmith/welder	27	22	-	-	-	12	27
Welder	-	-	-	13	-	25	-
Moulder	-	-	-	-	-	-	9
B. ELECTRICAL TRADES							
General electrician	-	45	-	43	-	33	47
Wireman cable jointer	-	17	-	-	-	-	-
Radio TV mechanic	31	-	-	30	-	30	18
Telecommunication mechanic	-	-	-	-	37	-	-
Auto electrician	-	-	-	-	-	17	-
C. BUILDING TRADES							
Builder/shutterer	30	15	-	-	-	9	48
Plasterer/tile setter	13	-	-	8	-	-	-
Plumber	16	9	-	12	-	13	-
Carpenter/wood machinist	29	14	-	11	-	29	53
Upholsterer	-	-	-	9	-	-	-
Plumber/sheetmetal worker	-	-	-	-	-	-	31
D. TECHNICIANS							
Land surveyor	-	29	-	-	-	-	-
Quantity surveyor	12	15	-	-	-	-	-
Construction technician	-	27	-	-	-	20	-
Architectural draughtsman	-	18	-	-	-	22	-
Foreman instructor	-	-	-	-	17	-	-
E. COMMERCIAL							
Business and office practice (men)	-	61	-	103	-	-	17
Secretaries (women)	-	-	63	-	-	-	-
F. PARA-MEDICAL							
Assistant pharmacist	-	-	-	-	-	42	-
Laboratory technician	-	-	-	-	-	15	-
Public health inspector	-	-	-	-	11	-	-
G. VOCATIONAL COURSES FOR GIRLS							
(other than commercial)							
Home and institutional management	-	-	26	-	-	-	-
Infant leader	-	-	22	-	-	-	-
Dressmaking	-	-	46	-	-	-	-
Clothing production	-	-	27	-	-	-	-
Hairdressing	-	-	27	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	300	317	211	359	65	382	394
GRAND TOTAL	1,817 men		211 women				

OTHER ASSISTANCE TO REFUGEES

Table 18

Voluntary agencies in the area of UNRWA operations
giving active help to Palestine refugees, 1967-1968

Baptist Mission (United States)

Church Missionary Society

Commonwealth Save the Children Fund

Co-operative for American Relief Everywhere (CARE)

Lutheran World Federation

Mennonite Central Committee

Near East Council of Churches

Pontifical Mission for Palestine Refugees

UNRWA Women's Auxiliary

World Alliance of YMCA's

World Council of Churches

World Young Women's Christian Association

Young Men's Christian Association

Young Women's Christian Association

FINANCE

Table 19

Summary statement of income, expenditure and working capital
1 May 1950—31 December 1968^a
(In US dollars)

For the period	Income			Expenditure	Adjustments to working capital b increases (decreases)	Balance of working capital (operating reserve)
	Pledges from Governments	Other income	Total income			
1 May 1950 to 30 June 1951	39,477,281	1,346,325	40,823,606	33,598,972	—	7,224,634
1 July 1951 to 30 June 1952	67,686,495	1,018,785	68,705,280	28,573,058	215,792	47,572,648
1 July 1952 to 30 June 1953	26,867,673	440,419	27,308,092	26,778,934	518,220	48,620,026
1 July 1953 to 30 June 1954	22,684,330	575,024	23,259,354	29,192,012	(157,264)	42,530,104
1 July 1954 to 30 June 1955	23,673,500	594,161	24,267,661	29,222,705	(114,217)	37,460,843
1 July 1955 to 30 June 1956	23,385,026	571,866	23,956,892	32,198,550	(164,814)	29,054,371
1 July 1956 to 31 December 1957	42,378,773	1,072,872	43,451,645	52,464,139	198,575	20,240,452
1 January to 31 December 1958	32,555,876	1,104,793	33,660,669	32,777,564	36,519	21,160,076
1 January to 31 December 1959	32,625,400	1,405,205	34,030,605	35,015,817	110,688	20,285,552
1 January to 31 December 1960	33,828,887	2,629,135	36,458,022	34,674,460	150,084	22,219,198
1 January to 31 December 1961	34,386,052	2,306,293	36,692,345	39,051,521	194,943	20,054,965
1 January to 31 December 1962	34,308,775	1,346,239	35,655,014	35,688,844	615,154	20,636,289
1 January to 31 December 1963	34,444,063	1,251,994	35,696,057	36,207,078	448,589	20,573,857
1 January to 31 December 1964	33,963,601	1,198,130	35,161,731	37,192,861	(922,665)	17,620,062
1 January to 31 December 1965	34,000,353	1,134,525	35,134,878	37,618,472	155,708	15,292,176
1 January to 31 December 1966	34,969,322	1,358,729	36,328,051	37,498,420	152,209	14,274,016
1 January to 31 December 1967	40,335,873	2,733,256	43,069,129	40,540,693	(115,529)	16,686,923
1 January to 31 December 1968 (estimated)	37,482,188	2,900,000	40,382,188	44,239,000	—	12,830,111
TOTAL	629,053,468	24,987,751	654,041,219	642,533,100	1,321,992	

a The figures in this table are based on the Agency's audited accounts through 1967, modified to reflect, for each period, the income and expenditure (including commitments) applicable to the budget for that period, regardless of when the income was actually received or the expenditure actually incurred. This basis of reporting was first adopted in the Commissioner-General's report for 1961-1962 and a few minor changes have since had to be made in the figures contained in that report (see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Supplement No. 14* (A/5214)).

b These adjustments represent principally the liquidation in subsequent years of liabilities and commitments at less than amounts originally charged to expenditure account. Also included are adjustments arising from revaluation of inventory, recovery of assets previously charged to expenditure, and price variations on supplies not chargeable to a particular budget heading. These adjustments are shown separately because of the difficulty in identifying the specific prior year to which the adjustments pertain. The adjustments made in the period 1 January to 31 December 1964 and 1 January to 31 December 1967 also include transfers of \$1,761,792 and \$460,854 respectively to bring up the provisions for deferred staff costs to the level required by the Agency's revised social security arrangements.

Table 20

Detailed statement of income to UNRWA, 1 May 1950-31 December 1968a
(In US dollars)

Contributor	For the period							Total income
	1 May 1950 to 31 December 1963	Twelve months to					31 December 1968b	
		31 December 1964	31 December 1965	31 December 1966	31 December 1967	31 December 1968b		
I. PLEDGES BY GOVERNMENTS								
Abu Dhabi	-	-	-	-	20,927	40,000	60,927	
Australia	2,776,703	201,600	201,600	201,600	201,600	201,600	3,784,703	
Austria	16,950	5,000	10,000	10,000	29,350	10,000	81,300	
Bahrain	23,687	-	-	-	-	-	23,687	
Belgium	336,000	32,000	30,000	30,000	35,000	35,000	498,000	
Bolivia	5,000	-	-	-	-	-	5,000	
Brazil	25,000	-	-	-	-	-	25,000	
Burma	9,546	-	-	-	-	-	9,546	
Cambodia	7,141	-	-	-	-	-	7,141	
Canada	15,431,688	925,926	1,111,111	1,111,111	2,463,768	1,727,315	22,770,919	
Central African Republic	-	398	-	-	-	-	398	
Ceylon	3,400	1,000	1,000	1,000	3,000	800	10,200	
China	-	3,279	-	10,000	20,000	30,000	63,279	
Congo (Democratic Republic of)	-	-	-	-	20,000	-	20,000	
Cuba	5,000	-	-	-	-	-	5,000	
Cyprus	1,123	279	280	280	560	560	3,082	
Denmark	592,090	79,540	114,733	209,348	496,986	684,666	2,177,363	
Dominican Republic	6,000	-	-	-	-	-	6,000	
El Salvador	500	-	-	-	-	-	500	
Ethiopia	35,500	-	-	-	-	-	35,500	
Federal Republic of Germany	2,232,076	400,000	503,145	500,000	752,800	2,092,263 ^e	6,480,284	
Finland	23,000	10,000	10,000	10,000	65,000	60,000	178,000	
France	11,780,118	228,564	213,238	229,778	1,258,137	1,071,912	14,781,747	
Gambia	30	-	-	-	-	-	30	
Gaza Authorities	617,497	104,072	155,302	167,437	155,547	152,579	1,352,434	
Ghana	15,000	3,000	3,000	3,000	6,000	3,000	33,000	
Greece	230,017	15,000	15,000	15,000	15,000	15,000	305,017	
Haiti	6,000	-	-	-	-	-	6,000	
Honduras	2,500	-	-	-	-	-	2,500	
Holy See	13,965	6,000	1,000	2,500	28,500	2,400	54,365	

Table 20 (continued)

Contributor	For the period							Total income
	Twelve months to							
	1 May 1950 to 31 December 1963	31 December 1964	31 December 1965	31 December 1966	31 December 1967	31 December 1968 ^b		
I. PLEDGES BY GOVERNMENTS (continued)								
Iceland	—	—	—	—	12,000	—	12,000	
India	290,518	21,008	21,008	13,333	13,333	13,333	372,533	
Indonesia	240,000	—	—	—	—	—	240,000	
Iran	43,153	6,000	6,000	—	12,695	7,120	74,968	
Iraq	—	2,000	—	100,000	100,000	100,000	302,000	
Ireland	63,876	20,000	25,000	25,000	65,000	40,000	238,876	
Israel	256,547	—	—	—	683,911	591,000	1,531,458	
Italy	501,326	160,000	160,000	160,000	240,100	160,000	1,381,426	
Jamaica	—	—	560	560	3,000	560	4,680	
Japan	112,500	20,000	30,000	30,000	140,000	40,000	372,500	
Jordan	1,336,565	105,357	105,320	173,819	163,737	127,000	2,011,798	
Kuwait	602,750	220,110	220,000	220,000	220,000	220,000	1,702,860	
Laos	4,687	—	—	—	—	—	4,687	
Lebanon	583,469	29,241	33,495	37,231	51,839	51,357	786,632	
Liberia	26,500	—	—	—	3,000	—	29,500	
Libya	24,000	20,000	20,000	100,000	100,000	100,000	364,000	
Luxembourg	28,000	3,000	3,000	3,000	3,000	3,000	43,000	
Malawi	—	140	140	140	—	—	280	
Malaysia	24,738	1,500	1,500	1,500	11,500	1,500	42,238	
Malta	—	—	—	—	5,000	—	5,000	
Mexico	115,691	—	—	—	—	20,000	135,691	
Monaco	5,849	204	204	204	204	204	6,869	
Morocco	99,563	19,763	19,763	20,000	25,000	25,000	209,089	
Netherlands	651,899	114,883	166,228	140,625	115,518	110,193	1,299,346	
New Zealand	1,876,000	140,000	140,000	140,000	84,000	67,200	2,447,200	
Niger	—	—	—	510	510	2,500	3,520	
Nigeria	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000	30,000	
Norway	585,569	63,000	70,000	77,000	293,497	91,000	1,180,066	
Pakistan	520,542	20,964	20,964	31,446	20,964	20,969	635,849	
Philippines	11,250	1,250	1,250	1,250	1,250	1,250	17,500	
Qatar	62,728	—	—	10,000	10,000	10,000	92,728	
Republic of Korea	6,500	—	—	—	—	—	6,500	
Republic of Viet-Nam	21,000	—	—	—	—	—	24,000	
Rhodesia and Nvasaland	39,200	—	—	—	3,000	—	39,200	

Saudi Arabia	1,618,413	—	297,778	594,778 ^c	297,778	297,778	3,106,525
Singapore	—	—	—	—	1,000	1,000	2,000
Spain	16,667	33,333	—	—	166,481	—	216,481
Sudan	153,940	—	—	—	—	—	153,940
Sweden	1,316,246	354,959	447,445	2,354,641	2,200,773	2,222,369	8,896,433
Switzerland	604,820	115,554	268,612	297,791	254,630	196,760	1,798,167
Syria	1,165,030	90,226	88,965	91,480	93,726	93,500	1,622,927
Thailand	4,125	—	—	—	6,800	—	10,925
Trinidad and Tobago	—	—	—	—	1,000	1,500	2,500
Tunisia	10,000	4,000	4,000	5,000	4,000	4,000	31,000
Turkey	51,759	8,000	8,000	8,000	10,000	10,000	95,759
United Arab Republic	4,602,016	248,591	246,712	255,960	120,452	—	5,473,731
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	79,724,004	5,400,000	5,400,000	5,000,000	5,000,000	4,500,000	105,024,004
United States of America	315,968,069	24,700,000	23,800,000	22,550,000	24,200,000	22,200,000	433,418,069
Uruguay	5,000	—	—	—	—	—	5,000
Yugoslavia	488,700	20,000	20,000	20,000	20,000	20,000	588,700
Sundry Governments through World Refugee Year Stamp Plan	238,211	—	—	—	—	—	238,211
TOTAL GOVERNMENT PLEDGES	448,302,131	33,963,601	34,000,353	34,969,322	40,335,873^d	37,482,188	629,053,468

II. CONTRIBUTIONS FROM OTHERS

UNESCO	1,696,194	300,927	279,294	332,215	343,221	340,000	3,291,851
WHO	500,955	45,798	51,303	51,402	60,878	60,000	770,396
Sundry donors	5,240,556	455,397	485,453	438,770	1,944,709	1,800,000	10,364,885
TOTAL CONTRIBUTIONS FROM OTHERS	7,437,705	802,122	816,050	822,387	2,348,808^d	2,200,000	14,427,072

III. MISCELLANEOUS INCOME AND EXCHANGE ADJUSTMENTS

	8,225,406	396,008	318,475	536,342	384,448	700,000	10,560,679
TOTAL INCOME	463,965,242	35,161,731	35,134,878	36,328,051	43,069,129	40,382,188	654,041,219

- a The figures in this table through 1967 are based upon the Agency's audited financial statements, modified to show for each year the government pledges applicable to that year, regardless of when payment was actually made.
- b The figures for 1968 are estimated.
- c Includes a late contribution of \$ 297,000 for 1964.
- d Includes special contributions for the emergency situation arising from the hostilities of June 1967 as follows:
- from Governments \$ 5,841,465
- from others \$ 1,309,928
- e In the case of certain assisted projects, funds to be provided in 1968 will be limited to actual cash requirements in that year.

Table 21

Statement of income from non-government sources
1 January 1967 to 30 June 1968
(In US dollars)

Name of contributor	Year 1967	First six months of 1968
<i>Australia</i>		
United Nations Association of Australia	19,328	69
United Nations Association of Australia—Victorian Division	1,004	—
United Nations Junior Set—Sydney	735	—
Unilever	112	—
<i>Austria</i>		
Caritas	3,873	—
<i>Belgium</i>		
Comité belge pour les Réfugiés	—	70,000
Entraide Socialiste Belge	1,508	—
Entraide Socialiste Belge and Caritas Catholica	14,930	—
Manta S.A. Belgium	—	3,480
<i>Canada</i>		
Ambassador Maybee	92	—
Arab Refugee Emergency Appeal of Windsor	124	122
Baird, Dr. R.P.	—	460
Canadian Embassy	75	—
Canadian Red Cross Youth		
Quebec Division	464	—
Ontario Division	925	—
Saskatchewan Division	460	—
Canadian Save the Children Fund	4,378	—
Finnemore, Mrs. C.	—	91
Henderson, Mrs. Dorothy	460	—
Peel County Secondary School	926	—
Point Grey Secondary School, Vancouver, B.C.	—	170
Unitarian Service Committee	1,811	—
United Church of Canada	—	6,371
United Nations Association of Canada	1,263	—
Sundry donors	206	21
<i>Denmark</i>		
Danish Refugee Council	58,839	4,670
<i>Federal Republic of Germany</i>		
Berliner Bank	1,000	—
Bosch, Robert, GmbH	500	—
Caritas and Chevaliers St. Sepulcre	53,875	—
Daimler Benz Co., Stuttgart	1,000	1,000
Deutsche Bank AG	—	500
Deutscher Evangelischer Kirchentag	6,590	—

Table 21 (continued)

Name of contributor	Year 1967	First six months of 1968
<i>Federal Republic of Germany (continued)</i>		
Diakonisches Werk	111,500	335,842
Frankfurter Bank	500	—
Freimaurerisches Hilfswerk, Hanover	1,250	—
Index—Werk (KG) Esslingen	500	—
Innere Mission und Hilfswerk (through World Council of Churches)	8,630	—
MISEREOR	25,000	—
Refugee Campaign—Bonn	21,000	—
Solms, Johann Georg Graf	1,250	—
The Near East Representative of German Banks, Beirut	1,000	—
Sundry donors	101	14
<i>Finland</i>		
Finnish Association of Folk High Schools and Folk Academies	1,500	—
Finnish Refugee Council	48,900	13,800
Hufvudstadsbladet, Helsinki	1,000	—
Paraisten Kalkkivuor, OY	500	—
Stockmann Department Store, Helsinki	1,000	—
Sevenska Osterbottoms Folkshogskola Folkakademi Yttermark	500	—
Sipilä, Mrs. Helvi	500	—
Tehtaanpuiston Yhteiskoulun Teinikunta	500	—
Union of Finnish Girl Guides	500	—
<i>France</i>		
Alamichel, Claude	210	—
Cimade	1,020	—
Communauté de L'Arche	612	—
El Mallawany, I,	—	206
Lycée Jeanne d'Arc—Nancy	163	—
Meyer, Georges	102	—
Secours Catholique de France	898	—
Sundry donors	41	240
<i>Gaza</i>		
Abu Abdallah Family	101	34
Abu Ayyad Family	37	12
Abu Ayyad and Awada Families	72	24
Abu Khusa Family	32	11
Abu Middain Family	1,997	666
Abu Ommar Family and Khalil Khalil	37	12
Abu Salim Family	490	163
Abu Salah Naser	28	9
Abu Sha'b Family	442	147
Abu Uriban Family	94	31

Table 21 (continued)

Name of contributor	Year 1967	First six months of 1968
<i>Gaza (continued)</i>		
Abu Uriban and Abu Middain Families	48	16
Awada Family	1,566	522
Awada and Abu Middain Families	321	107
Daghma Family	110	37
El Mussaddar Family	281	94
Gaza Municipality	55	18
Mussadar and Qur'an Families	374	125
Saleh Ali Barbakh	46	15
Tarazi Family	115	38
Waqf Department	6,587	2,196
<i>Ireland</i>		
Irish National Committee for UNICEF	560	—
<i>Italy</i>		
Immaculata, Mrs. Salviaki	—	480
<i>Jamaica</i>		
Manchester High School	264	—
<i>Japan</i>		
Sundry donors	52	—
<i>Jordan</i>		
Municipal Council—Qalqilia	616	308
The Jordan Red Crescent	—	281
Voluntary Agencies Joint Venture		
American Friends Service Committee	—	1,039
Friends Service Council (London)	—	1,245
Lutheran World Federation	—	15,557
Mennonite Central Committee	—	15,557
WCC/NECC	—	15,557
Anonymous	2,769	730
Sundry donors	18	—
<i>Lebanon</i>		
Foreign airlines	6,154	160
Greek Orthodox Community	621	267
Heirs of Saaddine Shatila	1,242	534
Merck, Sharp, Dohme and Grosst	—	101
Mneimneh and Bohsaly	1,398	601
Singer Company	—	450
Syrian Lebanese Mission	1,864	801
Anonymous	3,547	684
Sundry donors	20	—

Table 21 (continued)

Name of contributor	Year 1967	First six months of 1968
<i>Liechtenstein</i>		
General and Metal Holding Company	20,000	—
<i>Luxembourg</i>		
Biermann, P.	—	500
<i>Netherlands</i>		
Stichting Orphans Aid	500	—
Van Der Valk, P.C.	200	—
UNESCO Centrum Netherlands	10,000	—
Sundry donors	—	7
<i>New Zealand</i>		
New Zealand Council of Organizations for Relief Services Overseas (CORSO)	45,668	1,128
United Nations Association of New Zealand South Canterbury Branch	375	130
<i>Norway</i>		
Kroksnes, Arthur	141	141
Norwegian Red Cross	456	129
Norwegian Refugee Council	85,870	41,831
Save The Children Fund (Redd Barna)	490	420
<i>Portugal</i>		
Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation	62,000	5,000
<i>Saudi Arabia</i>		
Baroodi, Jamil M.	1,000	—
College of Petroleum and Minerals	600	—
<i>Sweden</i>		
Andersson, Malte	500	—
Eriksson, Bengt	—	500
Ericsson, Messrs. L.M.	583	—
Hilson Henning	99	—
Hult, A.	295	—
Swedish Committee for Palestine Refugees	610	69
Swedish Organization for Individual Relief	30,286	393
Swedish Save The Children Federation	185,587	11,892
The Swedish West Coast Post-War Relief	5,427	—
Sundry donors	4	10
<i>Switzerland</i>		
Caritas	7,000	—
Club der Berufs and Geschäftsfrauen	56	—
Feller, E.	231	—
Hoffmann la Roche	1,623	2,000
Krbec, Miss Eva Marie	278	93

Table 21 (continued)

Name of contributor	Year 1967	First six months of 1968
<i>Switzerland (continued)</i>		
Swiss Association for International Civil Service	—	602
Waser, Professor Heinz	116	—
Mrs. Weeks and Miss Krbec	139	—
Sundry donors	114	7
<i>Syria</i>		
Local authorities	2,019	1,010
Sundry donors	20	—
<i>United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland</i>		
Anglo-Arab Association	24,400	—
British Bank of the Middle East	70,000	—
Cadbury Fry Export Department, Birmingham	377	—
Cambridge University, UNA Refugee Department	658	—
Camden Borough Council	129	—
Christian Aid	14,000	—
Collegiate School for Girls, Blackpool	—	499
Council for Education in World Citizenship	5,600	—
Freedom from Hunger (Tenby) Committee	504	—
Golcher, W.E.	—	72
Iraq Petroleum Company	13,846	—
Luthwaite, Miss Hilda	140	—
May, E.G.	63	—
Marrickville R.S.R. Club	71	—
Mulford, Mr. and Mrs. W.	280	—
New Milton Christian Aid Week Committee	504	—
Oxford Committee for Famine Relief (OXFAM)	124,761	282,523
Oxford Committee for Famine Relief, through World Council of Churches	10,000	—
Petts Wood Methodist Church	504	216
Rogers, Miss M.	504	432
Save The Children Fund	266	—
St. Helen's School	504	—
Standing Conference for British Organizations for Aid to Refugees:		
From Astor Bursary Fund	41,020	912
From Menuhin Concert Proceeds	1,473	—
From Middle East Relief Fund	33,600	1,865
From other sources	207,473	—
Tomlinson, Miss Ruth	140	—
United Nations Association of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	7,084	543
Veitch, G.	300	—
War on Want	68,800	15,600

Table 21 (continued)

Name of contributor	Year 1967	First six months of 1968
<i>United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (continued)</i>		
Wings of Friendship	1,893	—
Anonymous	278	—
Sundry donors	77	75
<i>United States of America</i>		
American Council for Judaism Philanthropic Fund	5,000	—
American Middle East Rehabilitation Inc. (AMER)	78,874	15,548
American Mission, Beirut	988	425
American Women's Club of Lebanon	475	481
Arab American Community of Ann Arbor, Michigan	1,454	—
Arab American Community of Michigan	1,375	—
Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO)	60,000	60,300
Arab Club, Monterey	—	169
Arab Refugee Emergency Appeal	3,252	—
Astor Bursary Fund		
Astor Bursary Fund	5,981	—
The Hanes Foundation	500	—
Trustees of the Charles E. Merrill Trust	15,000	—
Baird Foundation	114	—
Beltran, Dr. Frank A.	50	—
Boucher, Emile P.	61	—
Buehrig, Dr. Edward E.	100	—
Cafarelli, John	75	—
Cline, Miss Pearl	100	—
Committee of Concern for Hong Kong Refugees	118	—
Co-operative for American Relief Everywhere (CARE)	—	11,740
Dahrn Women's Group (ARAMCO)	380	—
Decter, Mr. and Mrs. Avi	50	—
Dutton, Miss Patricia A.	—	15
Ellis, Mr. and Mrs. Richard	100	—
Fallers, A. Lloyd	100	—
Fellowship Club	50	—
First Congregational Church	50	—
Ford Motor Company	26,826	—
Friends Service Council	—	1,204
Gardner, Dr. and Mrs. Cary	100	—
Garrison, Roy	100	—
Garth, William le Roy Estate	2,958	283
Goldburg, Rabbi Robert E.	100	—
Graduate Students for Refugee Relief	—	1,400
Graef, Mrs. Gretchen	50	—
Greater Seattle Committee to Aid Arab Refugees	—	100
Group of families from Rome	75	—
Habib, Dr. Roshdy	50	—

Table 21 (continued)

Name of contributor	Year 1967	First six months of 1968
<i>United States of America (continued)</i>		
Hansen, Mrs. Richard L.	50	—
Hauser, Ernest	100	—
Hess, Mrs. Gertrude C.	—	50
Hibner, Mrs. Don T. Jr.	50	—
Holbrook, Dwight	100	—
Holy Land Center Inc.	2,400	2,203
Hoppe, Denis and Family	100	—
Howard, A. and Martha R. Wolf Fund	500	—
Howe, Miss Letitia T.	500	—
Hurburt, G.W.	50	—
International Rescue Committee	2,500	—
Islamic Centre of New York	4,755	—
Islamic Club of Western Michigan	2,375	—
Kellner, Mrs. Mary	50	—
Kirkpatrick, Virginia	50	—
Kirkpatrick, Mr. and Mrs. W.C.	50	—
La Buhn, Edmund	50	—
Lawyer, Mrs. Margretta Scott	100	—
Lawyer, Capt. John E. Jr.	130	—
Lombardi, Miss Helen Brown	100	—
Manasse, Mrs. Anne Marie	—	130
McEachern, Miss Janet	100	—
McLaughlin, Mr. and Mrs. Ronald C.	50	—
Members of the Faculty Committee for Peace and Reconciliation in the Middle East	77	—
Mennonite Central Committee	12,000	13,234
Miami University, Oxford, Ohio	—	500
Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company, Ltd.	—	180
Mukwonago Union High School	108	274
NAJDA—American Women for the Middle East	1,500	500
Near East Christian Committee	154	—
Nicely, Mrs. Katharine T.	100	—
NOTS Hebrew Congregation	67	—
Ottinger Foundation	—	1,000
Pal—Aid International Inc.	1,060	185
Post, Miss Elizabeth M.	150	—
Rollform Corporation	50	—
Sady, Emile J.	50	—
Scarsdale—Hartsdale Chapter of the United Nations Association of the U.S.A. Inc.	—	100
Scheffler, Julius L.	50	—
Schuller, Mrs. Thomas	62	—
Seeger, Mr. and Mrs. Peter	300	—
Selby, Peter Spengler	102	—

Table 21 (continued)

Name of contributor	Year 1967	First six months of 1968
<i>United States of America (continued)</i>		
Shanzer, Dr. Hilda	60	—
Smith, Richard T. Jr.	74	—
Sochocki, Mrs. Waltraud	100	—
Stephens College of Columbia, Missouri	—	750
Stewart, Mrs. Dunlop	92	—
The Academy of Islam International	1,000	—
The Arab Student's Club	64	—
The Walkathon Committee	351	—
Union Theological Seminary, New York	—	450
United Nations Council of Greenwich, Connecticut	—	300
United Nations Women's Guild	1,100	—
United States Committee for Refugees	510	300
U.S. Omen	4,500	231
Westchester Group of the United Nations Women's Guild	300	—
Yusuf, Dr. S.	75	—
Sundry donors	2,515	407
<i>International Organizations</i>		
Caritas International	—	1,051
Caritas Jordan	—	3,390
International Christian Committee	357	—
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions	—	1,500
International Federation of Business and Professional Women		
Central Committee	—	5,537
Australia	1,020	1,008
Canada	—	6,027
Japan	—	200
New Zealand	—	499
Sweden	—	199
Switzerland	499	502
United Kingdom	2,016	1,498
Lutheran World Federation	37,083	14,582
Near East Council of Churches	—	25,440
The Staff of the International Atomic Energy Agency	255	—
United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO)	343,221	169,633
United Nations Emergency Force (Canadian Army Contingent)	2,916	—
United Nations Emergency Force (Danor Battalion)	239	—
United Nations Emergency Force (XXV Swedish Battalion)	1,163	—
Women's Auxiliary of UNRWA	3,733	—
World Council of Churches/Catholic Relief Services	—	5,649

Table 21 (continued)

Name of contributor	Year 1967	First six months of 1968
<i>International Organizations (continued)</i>		
World Council of Churches/The Near East Council of Churches	104,890	43,550
World Health Organization (WHO)	60,878	30,582
Zonta Helsinki Congress	1,535	—
Zonta International	16,842	13,000
Sundry donors	275	225
	2,348,808	1,300,815

Table 22

Direct contributions to refugees^{a b}
for the year ended 30 June 1968
(In US dollars)

Governments	Education services	Social welfare services	Medical services	Housing	Security services	Miscellaneous services	Administrative costs	Total
Israel	602,854	65,714 ^c	742,857	-	-	1,094,000 ^d	-	2,505,425
Jordan	1,401,850	256,757	259,624	-	980,000	20,916	103,068	3,022,215
Lebanon	44,872	9,615	14,423	564,103	133,013	14,199	77,147	857,372
Syria	691,960	213,942	56,490	1,266,495	36,058	88,188	293,269	2,646,402
United Arab Republic	1,187,950	2,202,998	16,100	23,000	-	-	55,662	3,485,710
Total	3,929,486	2,749,026	1,089,494	1,853,598	1,149,071	1,217,303	529,146	12,517,124

a In addition to the foregoing contributions direct to the refugees, all Governments listed also made contributions to UNRWA for the latter's budget. These contributions are reported in the Agency's own accounts and are set out in tables 19 and 20. It is also to be noted that UNRWA (and, in some cases, voluntary agencies working with the refugees) enjoy exemption from customs duties and taxes. In addition, the cost of the normal services provided by these Governments is increased by reason of utilization of these services by refugees.

b All data shown are based upon information provided by the Governments concerned, and are expressed in dollars computed by applying the Agency's accounting rates of exchange, which are based on official or free market rates as appropriate.

c Gaza Strip only.

d Includes housing, security, administrative costs and social welfare services in West Bank.

UNRWA PERSONNEL

Table 23

Staff employed by UNRWA at 31 December 1966
and at 31 December 1967

	Locally recruited staff	UNRWA	International Staff		Grand Total
			Seconded and loaned from other United Nations organs	Total	
31 December 1966	11,404	85	27	112	11,516
31 December 1967	10,908	68	27	95	11,003

Note: Virtually all locally recruited staff are refugees.

ANNEX II

LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE WORK OF THE AGENCY

A. General legal activities and problems

1. Last year's report afforded an opportunity to review generally the nature and scope of the legal problems arising in the course of the Agency's operations and, since some years had elapsed since a similar review was undertaken, this was done in a fairly comprehensive manner (see A/6713). It is not necessary to repeat that kind of general review in this year's report: suffice it to say that the legal problems remain unchanged in their scope and variety.

2. There are, however, a number of specific problems which are worthy of note. Reference was made in paragraphs 6 and 8 of annex II to last year's report to the difference of opinion which had arisen between the Agency and Syria over the question whether locally recruited staff of Syrian nationality, employed by the Agency within Syria, enjoyed the full measure of privileges and immunities conferred on United Nations officials under article V of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations of 1946. By a decree of 1 August 1967, Syria

had excluded all such staff from the privileges and immunities of this convention, with the exception of exemption from taxation on salaries. In furtherance of an undertaking given by the Agency in the course of negotiations with the Government, the Agency submitted a memorandum to the Government on 15 May 1968, explaining the precise scope and effect of these privileges and immunities. This memorandum is now believed to be under study by the Government and meetings are expected shortly which will, hopefully, clarify the issues involved and arrive at a solution which is consistent with the 1946 Convention and Syria's adherence to that Convention.

3. Another problem affecting the Agency and its authority over its staff arises from the participation of representatives of the Government of Syria in the selection of candidates for area posts at grade 5 and above. A Selection Board, acting in an advisory capacity, has operated since 1954 and has included a representative of the Government. Correspondence between the Agency and the Government has sought to clarify the extent to which transfers initiated by the Agency and promotions of existing staff, or appointments to vacant posts from among existing staff members, should fall within or outside this

established procedure. The Agency has requested specific proposals from the Government and, on receipt of these, will consult with the Government with a view to establishing a *modus operandi* which will not derogate from the Commissioner-General's exclusive authority over his staff. Requests by the Government for outright termination or transfer of staff pose a quite different problem. These have occurred and, in the course of discussions in August 1967, it had been agreed that there would be consultation over particular cases with a view to demonstrating the justification for such requests. No such consultation has yet taken place, but it remains the view of the Agency that this would be desirable in the interests of both the Government and the Agency. As far as the Agency is concerned, action against staff members must be well-motivated, and must be demonstrated to be so, if the Agency is to conform to the standards demanded of a United Nations agency in its treatment of staff.

4. A further problem, also affecting locally recruited staff, has arisen in the territories occupied by Israel after the June 1967 hostilities. This problem results from the detention of staff, sometimes for periods of many months, on the ground that their activities have created a situation in which the occupying authorities must exercise powers of detention, interrogation and, in some cases, trial. It must be emphasized that in no case to date has it been alleged that the acts giving rise to their detention have been "official acts", performed as part of their duties for the Agency. However, long periods of detention deprive the Agency of the services of these staff members and, quite apart from this, the Agency has an interest in the well-being of its own officials. The problem of the detention of staff members is not, in itself, new to the Agency. However, consistently with past practice, the Agency has requested and the Government of Israel has agreed to accord priority of investigation to the cases of detained UNRWA staff and also to enable visits to such staff by Agency Field Directors.

5. A most important requirement for certain Agency staff is freedom of movement throughout the different areas of the Agency's operations. Obviously, this does not apply to all staff, but it is essential for those international staff and the

key area (or locally recruited) staff upon whom Agency-wide duties of supervision and control rest. As explained in paragraph 9 of annex II to last year's report (A/6713), certain nationalities among the internationally recruited staff face difficulties within Syria: they cannot be stationed there and can transit through the territory or pay special visits on official business only by virtue of special arrangements. These arrangements have been made by the Government, and they have on the whole worked well. The Agency had hoped, however, that, as they were of a restrictive nature, they would be of a purely temporary character, and it would hope to see the restrictions lifted in the near future.

6. A somewhat comparable problem existed prior to August 1968 in relation to certain international and key area staff of Arab nationality, who were denied freedom of movement into the occupied territories on official business of the Agency. The Agency's request for this freedom of movement, however, was acceded to by the Government of Israel in August 1968 in the sense that such freedom of movement was granted in principle; the Agency has since provided full details of these staff and, subject to security clearance by the Government, these staff will now be permitted to make visits on official business. It must also be noted that, following the Agency's requests, early in 1968 some 146 UNRWA staff, who had been stranded in the United Arab Republic as a result of hostilities, were allowed to return to their posts in Gaza.

7. The installations and premises of the Agency benefit from the inviolability which attaches to all United Nations premises and which is further specified in section 3 of the 1956 Convention. In general, this inviolability is respected. The Agency was obliged to protest, however, by a note verbale dated 15 May 1968, against a violation of the Agency's vocational training centre in Damascus by personnel undergoing military training.

8. Moreover, in relation to the occupied territories, the Agency has, on various occasions, protested to the authorities against incursions into Agency premises by military or police personnel engaged in searches or military training. More serious instances have occurred in the course of the military activities taking place in

the Jordan Valley: Agency installations were damaged in the shelling or raids by Israeli forces on Karameh on 20 November 1967, on 8 and 15 February and 21 March 1968. Claims relating to these incidents are in the course of preparation.

9. The Agency has undertaken revision of a number of international staff rules so as to produce greater conformity with the common system applied elsewhere in the United Nations. Similar revision of the rules and conditions of employment of area and other locally recruited staff has been undertaken. The Agency has also reviewed its internal procedures, such as, for example, Organization Directive No. 13, which deals with claims examination. Certain standardization of contractual forms has also been achieved in order to facilitate operations and strengthen Agency control.

B. Claims

General

10. In last year's report, the Agency summarized the principal pecuniary claims against Governments and undertook to report to the General Assembly on the progress made in presenting, prosecuting and settling these claims. Some progress has been made within the past year, as will be evident from the following paragraphs.

11. A heavy burden of legal work has arisen from the damage or loss caused to Agency installations and the property of staff members during the hostilities of June 1967 and, to a lesser extent, during the military activities which have occurred both within and outside the occupied territories since that time. Many months of careful examination and scrutiny of a great deal of documentary and other evidence have preceded the formulation of claims which are shortly to be presented to Governments. In relation to the property losses of staff members, these claims have already been examined, and recommendations made, within the Agency's own Claims Board, established to give effect to the Agency's liability for service-incurred losses.

Lebanon

12. Following the presentation to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of a comprehensive note verbale on 2 May 1967, recapitulating the Agency's claims, the Agency and the Government agreed on the establishment of a Mixed Commission, which held a series of four meetings in October and November 1967. At the conclusion of these meetings, the Government members of this Mixed Commission (representing the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Justice and Finance) prepared a report, which was ultimately placed before the Council of Ministers in May 1968.

13. While the Agency has not seen the text of the report presented to the Council of Ministers, it is understood that the Agency's interpretation of the concept of a "direct" tax (section 7 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations of 1946), its conception of charges for "public utility services" as being charges for specific services rendered which can be identified as such and justified as proportionate to those services (section 7) and its view on the non-applicability to international claims of periods of prescription provided in local law were all, in principle, accepted by the Government.

14. Certainly the actual decision of the Council of Ministers on 22 May 1968, as communicated to the Agency by a note from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs dated 12 July 1968, is "to approve in principle" UNRWA's claims. The Ministers of Finance and Foreign Affairs have been charged with ensuring the completion of the formalities necessary for the refund of the various taxes paid by the Agency and dealt with in the report—totalling over half-a-million Lebanese pounds—and with the initiation of such measures as may be necessary to give effect to exemption for the future. The Ministry of Finance has been instructed to establish a committee of experts for the purpose of verifying the precise amounts owed on these claims. This action will presumably be limited to a verification of accounts and will not extend to a reopening of the general questions of liability.

15. The Agency believes that, with the implementation of this decision by the Council of Ministers, those claims forming the subject-matter of its note verbale of 2 May 1967 will be fully and finally settled.

Syria

16. The claims referred to in paragraph 14 of annex II to last year's report were all re-presented to the Government in a comprehensive note verbale of 1 October 1967; as with the representation of claims against Lebanon, the Agency had proposed a meeting between its representatives and those of the Government in the belief that, via some form of Mixed Commission, real progress might be made.

17. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in a reply dated 26 June 1968, has not felt able to agree to this proposal. In relation to certain claims for the refund of customs duties on fuel and emergency taxes on benzene and gas-oil—totalling some £S42,399 out of a total claim of £S272,577—the Ministry has proposed, in certain cases, the nomination of an Agency representative to explore these claims with the Customs Administration and, in others, a more detailed breakdown of these claims for submission to the appropriate government departments. The Agency is, of course, fully prepared to take such action if it will lead to a settlement of the claims. However, the majority of its claims have been rejected on basically the same arguments used in previous notes from the Ministry.

18. It thus appears that the most promising avenue of further progress lies in the isolation of the issues which ground the rejection of these claims and selection of an appropriate mode of settlement of these issues, bearing in mind section 30 of the 1946 Convention. The issues appear to be the following:

(a) Whether the Agency's claims are subject to periods of prescription provided for in Syrian law;

(b) Whether the Agency's claim to exemption from certain taxes on fuel for periods prior to 1 October 1953 is barred by the fact that the Government's accession to the 1946 Convention was, by Syrian law, effective only on that date;

(c) The question of what constitutes a "direct" tax for the purpose of section 7 of the 1946 Convention and whether the Agency is subject to "indirect" taxation;

(d) The meaning of the words "whenever possible" in section 8 of the 1946 Convention as

applied to refund of taxes on cement purchased locally;

(e) Whether portage fees are chargeable to the Agency on trucks carrying exclusively Agency supplies entering the Damascus Customs Zone.

The Agency will, accordingly, propose an appropriate mode of settlement of these issues to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and will report to the General Assembly on progress made with these claims.

Jordan

19. These claims were all re-presented to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in a note verbale dated 18 April 1968. No formal reply has been received to this note, but, in a meeting with the Supreme Ministerial Committee in June 1968, three representatives of the Government were delegated to meet with representatives of the Agency to discuss these claims. It is hoped that meetings can take place at an early date.

20. It may also be noted that, in a letter dated 11 April 1968, the Government has resubmitted to the Agency a claim which had last been submitted to the Agency in 1959.¹ The claim arises from a dispute regarding the Agency's action in 1955 in withholding \$154,706 as compensation for the breach by the Government of a contract for the sale to the Agency of flour. The Agency has, since 1959, indicated its willingness to accept international arbitration and has reiterated its offer to arbitrate by a letter dated 18 May 1968. The Government's reply, dated 11 June 1968, has indicated a willingness to undertake local arbitration, so that the issue between the Agency and the Government remains exactly the same as in 1959.

21. Late in 1967, the Agency entered into a number of substantial construction contracts for the purpose of undertaking "winterization" programmes in the temporary camps established by the Agency in the Jordan Valley. In December 1967, the Jordanian Government instructed both the contractors involved and the Agency to cease this work and the Agency accordingly

¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fourteenth Session, Supplement No. 14 (A/4213)*, annex H.

notified the contractors of this decision. At the same time, the Agency also informed the Jordanian Government that it would expect the Government to bear any loss arising from the abandonment of this work and the cancellation of the contracts involved. The Agency has since received claims from four contractors and, on the basis of the fact that the decision to cease work was the Government's decision and not the Agency's, the Agency is presently attempting to persuade the Government to assume liability for the compensation of these contractors. In the event that the Government should refuse to do so, the Agency will be forced to accept arbitration, since all its contracts provide for arbitration of disputes arising from the contracts. Unless the Government agrees to be a party to such arbitration, however, the arbitration would involve only the Agency and the contractor. Nevertheless, should such an arbitration go against the Agency, the Agency would then be compelled to seek a new and separate arbitration with the Government.

The claim against Lebanon, Syria and Jordan jointly in respect of excess rail charges

22. No progress has been made on this, the largest of the Agency's claims with a value of approximately \$1.5 million.

23. The Agency's identical notes verbales of 15 March 1967 to all three Governments had proposed a joint meeting of representatives of the Agency and of all three Governments. To date, apart from an expression of willingness to meet by the Lebanese Government (conditional on the willingness of the other two Governments to meet), no reply has been received to these notes. In presenting its other claims to the Governments individually, the Agency has reminded these three Governments of the proposal made in March 1967, but this has not had the effect of stimulating a response. It will be apparent that, so long as the Governments evince no interest in a meeting with the Agency, progress on this claim is impossible.

24. It may also be noted that, consequent upon the closure of the Suez Canal, the majority of the Agency's supplies to Jordan have had to be imported via Beirut rather than Aqaba. Thus,

during 1967/1968, the annual rate at which this claim has grown has been much higher than in recent years. In 1967, the Agency proposed that its bulk supplies of flour and sugar should be transported directly by truck from Beirut to Amman, as this was cheapest and most expeditious route. It had been the Agency's hope that, at least during this period when the large numbers of refugees and other displaced persons in east Jordan posed unprecedented supply problems for the Agency, some relaxation of the restrictions of the Tripartite Agreement of 1950 might have been made. However, the solution which emerged was that tonnage in excess of the railroad's capacity could be moved from Beirut to Damascus by truck, but thereafter had to be transported by rail. While this was not the ideal solution for the Agency since it involved extra expense and "double-handling", it must nevertheless be recorded that, owing to the co-operation of the three Governments, a very large volume of supplies was moved and a breakdown in the supplies to Jordan was avoided.

United Arab Republic

25. These represent the least of the Agency's claims against Governments so that, during the past year, priority has been given to the preparation and re-presentation of other, more substantial claims. However, work on these claims is now in progress and their presentation can be expected shortly.

26. A problem of some novelty has arisen from the fact that, following the occupation of Gaza, the Israel authorities took custody of the cash assets found in the Gaza Branch of the Bank of Alexandria, at which time the Agency's account with the Branch had a balance of approximately £E37,000. Correspondence with the Cairo Office of the Bank and with the Commissioner for Banks of Israel has revealed some considerable divergence of view over the amount of cash actually held at the Branch and taken over by Israel. In a note verbale to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Republic of 15 January 1968, the Agency expressed its view that the Bank of Alexandria should honour the obligations of the Bank, irrespective of the circumstances affecting one particular Branch, and sought the assistance of the Ministry in persuading the Bank to make

these funds available to the Agency. The Agency received a reply to this note, dated 1 April, indicating that Israel must be regarded as responsible for any obligations concerning these funds and, in further correspondence, the Agency has been informed that full liquidity was maintained by the Bank in respect of UNRWA's account in Gaza. The Agency, in a second note dated 15 May 1968, has sought further information on the question of the degree of liquidity maintained. The Agency will continue to explore this whole matter in consultation with the two Governments concerned and with the Bank.

Israel

27. Following discussions between a representative of the Agency and representatives of the Government on 19 January 1968, all the claims of the Agency arising out of the military occupation of Gaza in 1956 and referred to in last year's report (A/6713, paragraph 22), and also the counter-claim by Israel have been settled. The settlement was recorded in an exchange of letters dated 22 and 26 January 1968.

ANNEX III

77 EX/34

PARIS, 3 November 1967

UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION

Resolution

Item 6.8 – *Co-operation with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency*

The Executive Board,

1. *Having examined* the report of the Director-General on co-operation with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) (document 77 EX/34),

2. *Conscious* of the enhanced importance of this co-operation in present circumstances and of the educational work in question on humanitarian grounds and in the interests of peace,

3. *Authorizes* the Director-General to co-operate with UNRWA in educational matters wherever UNRWA educational establishments may be available with observance of the principles of international law regarding occupied territories and in the spirit of the agreement signed between UNESCO and UNRWA on 26 January 1967 and on the basis of the following principles:

(a) The ethical ideals laid down in the UNESCO Constitution and in Article 26, dealing with education, of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, paragraph (2) of which provides that "Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace", while paragraph (3) stipulates that "Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children";

(b) The directives adopted in resolution 7.81 by the General Conference at its ninth session (1956) which required in particular that the necessary measures be adopted to "ensure that everywhere education shall respect the national, religious and linguistic traditions of the inhabitants, and that its nature shall not be altered for political reasons";

(c) The demand for unity in any system of education which implies that students shall be able later to pursue their studies in establishments at a higher level of the system to which the establishment they are attending belong, or of a system having the same socio-cultural, and particularly linguistic, characteristics;

4. *Invites* the Director-General to submit a report to the Executive Board at its next session on the implementation of this resolution, with any specific proposals by which he may consider it necessary or desirable to obtain the approval or authorization of the Board.

*Executive Board
Seventy-seventh session
October/November 1967*

78 EX/16 and Add. I and II
PARIS, 20 June 1968

UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL,
SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL
ORGANIZATION

Resolution

Item 7.4 – *Co-operation with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA)*

The Executive Board,

1. *Having examined* the report of the Director-General on Co-operation with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) (document 78 EX/16, Add. 1. and 2),

2. *Reaffirming* the necessity to ensure that children in UNRWA/UNESCO educational establishments should receive education in accordance with the principles laid down in resolution 6.8, adopted by the Executive Board at its seventy-seventh session,

3. *Approves* the steps taken by the Director-General to implement this resolution both as regards co-operation with the Commissioner-General of UNRWA and negotiations with the Member States concerned,

4. *Authorizes* the Director-General to pursue his efforts in this respect notably by setting up a commission of outside experts designated by the Director-General with the agreement of the Member States concerned, with a view to:

(a) examining the textbooks used in UNRWA/UNESCO schools, in conformity with resolution 6.8 adopted by the Board at its seventy-seventh session, and keeping in mind the debates of the Board at its seventy-seventh and seventy-eighth sessions, and

(b) making recommendations thereon which the Director-General would submit to the Member States concerned, for their assent and co-operation,

5. *Notes* the intention of the Director-General in response to the wish expressed by the Commissioner-General of UNRWA, to assign a UNESCO official to the post of UNRWA educational services in the West Bank of the Jordan and in the Gaza Strip.

6. *Invites* the Director-General to submit to the Executive Board at its spring session in

1969, or at an earlier session if he deems it appropriate, a report on the implementation of this resolution, with any proposals on which he may consider it necessary or desirable to obtain the approval or authorization of the Board.

*Executive Board
Seventy-eighth session
May June 1968*

ANNEX IV

WHA21.38
23 May 1968

*Twenty-first World Health Assembly
Detailed review of the operating programme*

The Twenty-first World Health Assembly,

Having considered the annual report of the Director of Health of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (1967);

Considering that the World Health Organization should continue to exert all possible efforts in providing effective health assistance to refugees and displaced persons in order to ensure their over-all health protection and care;

Recalling that the Security Council in its resolution No. 237 (1967) of June 1967 has "called upon the Government of Israel to ensure the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the areas where military operations had taken place and to facilitate the return of those inhabitants who had fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities";

Recalling that the General Assembly of the United Nations in its resolution 2252 (ES-V) endorsed "the efforts of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA to provide humanitarian assistance, as far as practicable, on an emergency basis and as a temporary measure, to other persons in the area who are at present displaced and are in serious need of immediate assistance as a result of the recent hostilities",

1. CALLS upon Member States to do everything possible to facilitate the return of displaced persons in order to ameliorate their health conditions;

2. REQUESTS the Director-General of the

World Health Organization to study the health conditions amongst displaced persons in the area and to report to the Twenty-second World Health Assembly; and

3. COMMENDS the Director of the Health Department of UNRWA and his staff for their valuable assistance provided to the refugees.

Seventeenth plenary meeting, 23 May 1968
A21/VR/17

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Resolutions on Assistance to the Palestine Refugees Adopted by the General Assembly, December 19, 1968.¹

A

The General Assembly,

Recalling Security Council resolution 237 (1967) of 14 June 1967,²

Reaffirming its resolution 2252 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967,³

Taking note of the appeal made by the Secretary-General in the Special Political Committee on 11 November 1968,

Convinced that the plight of the displaced persons could best be relieved by their speedy return to their homes and to the camps which they formerly occupied,

Emphasizing, consequently, the requirement for their speedy return,

1. *Calls upon* the Government of Israel to take effective and immediate steps for the return without delay of those inhabitants who have fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to follow the effective implementation of the present resolution and to report thereon to the General Assembly.

B

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949, 393 (V) and 394 (V) of 2 and 14 December 1950, 512 (VI) and 513 (VI) of 26 January 1952, 614 (VII) of 6 November 1952, 720 (VIII) of 27 November 1953, 818 (IX) of 4 December 1954, 916 (X) of 3 December 1955, 1018 (XI) of 28 February 1957, 1191 (XII) of 12 December 1957, 1315 (XIII) of 12 December 1958, 1456 (XIV) of 9 December 1959, 1604 (XV) of 21 April 1961, 1725 (XVI) of 20 December 1961, 1856 (XVII) of 20 December 1962, 1912 (XVIII) of 3 December 1963, 2002 (XIX) of 10 February 1965, 2052 (XX) of 15 December 1965, 2154 (XXI) of 17 November 1966 and 2341 (XXII) of 19 December 1967,⁴

Noting the annual report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, covering the period from 1 July 1967 to 30 June 1968,⁵

1. *Notes with deep regret* that repatriation or compensation of the refugees as provided for in paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) has not been effected, that no substantial progress has been made in the programme endorsed in paragraph 2 of resolution 513 (VI) for the reintegration of refugees either by repatriation or resettlement and that, therefore, the situation of the refugees continues to be a matter of serious concern;

2. *Expresses its thanks* to the Commissioner-General and the staff of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East for their continued faithful efforts to provide essential services for the Palestine

¹ U.N. doc. A/RES/2452 (XXIII). The resolutions were adopted at the 1749th plenary meeting. The vote was as follows:

Resolution A: 100 to 1, with 6 abstentions.

Resolution B: 105 to none, with 3 abstentions.

Resolution C: Unanimously.

² Text in *International Documents on Palestine, 1967*, p. 251.

³ Text *ibid.*, pp. 255-256.

⁴ Text of resolution 2341 (XXII) is reprinted in *ibid.*, pp. 466-468.

⁵ *Supra*.

refugees, and to the specialized agencies and private organizations for their valuable work in assisting the refugees;

3. *Directs* the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East to continue his efforts in taking such measures, including rectification of the relief rolls, as to assure, in co-operation with the Governments concerned, the most equitable distribution of relief based on need;

4. *Notes with regret* that the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine was unable to find a means of achieving progress in the implementation of paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III), and requests the Commission to exert continued efforts towards the implementation thereof;

5. *Directs attention* to the continuing critical financial position of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, as outlined in the Commissioner-General's report;

6. *Notes with concern* that, despite the commendable and successful efforts of the Commissioner-General to collect additional contributions to help relieve the serious budget deficit of the past year, contributions to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East continue to fall short of the funds needed to cover essential budget requirements;

7. *Calls upon* all Governments as a matter of urgency to make the most generous efforts possible to meet the anticipated needs of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, particularly in the light of the budgetary deficit projected in the Commissioner-General's report, and therefore urges non-contributing Governments to contribute and contributing Governments to consider increasing their contributions;

8. *Decides* to extend until 30 June 1972,

without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III), the mandate of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East.

C

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 2252 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967 and 2341 B (XXII) of 19 December 1967,

Taking note of the annual report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, covering the period from 1 July 1967 to 30 June 1968,

Taking note also of the appeal made by the Secretary-General in the Special Political Committee on 11 November 1968,

Concerned about the continued human suffering as a result of the June 1967 hostilities in the Middle East,

1. *Reaffirms* its resolutions 2252 (ES-V) and 2341 B (XXII);

2. *Endorses*, bearing in mind the objectives of those resolutions, the efforts of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East to continue to provide humanitarian assistance, as far as practicable, on an emergency basis and as a temporary measure, to other persons in the area who are at present displaced and are in serious need of continued assistance as a result of the June 1967 hostilities;

3. *Strongly appeals* to all Governments and to organizations and individuals to contribute generously for the above purposes to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and to the other inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations concerned.

PART IV

The Palestine Problem in the General Assembly

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Introduction to the Annual Report of the U.N. Secretary-General U Thant on the Work of the Organization (16 June 1967–15 June 1968), September 24, 1968.¹ [Excerpt]

IV. Peace-keeping

42. The year since the war of early June 1967 has been one of high tension and great frustration in the Middle East. The war came quickly to an end, but the cease-fire demanded by the Security Council has often been broken by a succession of incidents of fighting varying in seriousness. This was especially the case in the Israel-Jordan and the Suez Canal sectors. The machinery of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine, although truncated and dislocated by the events of June 1967, has been an important factor in preventing an escalation of the fighting, especially by limiting the scope of incidents and by securing on-the-spot cease-fires through the cease-fire arrangements in the Syrian and the Suez Canal sectors made after the June war. In the Israel-Jordan cease-fire sector, where because of the lack of agreement by the parties it has not been possible to station United Nations observers, incidents of fighting have tended to be more frequent and serious. Indeed, the Security Council has had to meet on several occasions as a result of such incidents. I have repeatedly urged that observers be stationed in all cease-fire sectors and have stressed that such arrangements of a practical nature, which need not prejudice the claims and positions of the parties, would be in the interest both of the parties and of the United Nations.

43. It must be borne in mind, in considering the background for the many and regrettable breaches of the cease-fire, that on one side the

cease-fire sectors in the Middle East are almost entirely areas under military occupation. History shows that such situations tend to give rise to a more than ordinary incidence of acts of violence.

44. In the light of the situation in the area of the conflict of June 1967 and especially in the occupied territories, I felt that there was a great need for—and had proposed—a second humanitarian mission to the Middle East, in particular for the purpose of meeting my reporting obligations under Security Council resolution 237 (1967)² and General Assembly resolution 2252 (ES-V)³ concerning humanitarian questions. It was with great disappointment, therefore, that I had to report on 31 July 1968 to the Security Council and the General Assembly that my efforts in this regard had thus far been unavailing.

45. The situation of the refugees since the June war has further deteriorated, and the task of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East has become correspondingly more difficult. In particular the shortage of funds, food, supplies and equipment to meet the emergency conditions has on occasion been acute. With this in mind, I addressed two appeals to Governments for special contributions, one on 2 March 1968⁴ for funds and additional tents, and the other for food aid made jointly with the Director-General of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations on 30 April 1968. The response to both these appeals has been disappointingly limited.

46. Hopes for progress towards easing tensions in the Middle East and avoiding conflict through solution of the major issues between the Arab States and Israel have centred on the efforts of my Special Representative to the Middle East, Ambassador Gunnar Jarring. By their very nature, these efforts must be confidential

² Text in *International Documents on Palestine, 1967*, p. 251.

³ Text *ibid.*, pp. 255-256.

⁴ *Ante*, doc. 257.

¹ U.N. doc. A/7201/Add. I, pp. 5-6.

and discreet. It has been Ambassador Jarring's policy to make no public pronouncements or even substantive reports while his efforts continue. It would be equally inadvisable for me at this time to discuss substantive questions relating to the Jarring mission. It may, however, be useful to make some general comments at this stage on that mission in the context of the Middle East situation and also in the larger context of the United Nations involvement in it.

47. Resolution 242 (1967) adopted unanimously by the Security Council on 22 November 1967¹ was in itself a considerable achievement and provided a basis for a constructive and peaceful approach both by the parties and by the international community to the bitter problems of the Middle East. The resolution provided for a special representative "to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement." This was a heavy responsibility for one man to undertake, but in a practical sense it was the wisest of the obviously limited alternatives.

48. The tireless, persistent and understanding efforts of Ambassador Jarring over the past nine months have more than justified the confidence placed in him by me and by the Security Council. No one has ever doubted the extreme difficulty and complexity of the problems with which he has had to grapple, and certainly no reasonable persons could have expected quick or miraculous solutions. I do not find it surprising, although it is disappointing, that despite Ambassador Jarring's unceasing efforts the promise of the 22 November resolution has not yet been fulfilled in any significant degree. The basic situation in the Middle East in relation even to the beginnings of a settlement remains much the same as it was eight months ago. Until now, the one clear point of agreement among all concerned has been that Ambassador Jarring should continue his efforts.

49. This, certainly, is a personal tribute to Ambassador Jarring, and it may be hoped that it is also an expression of a genuine desire of the parties to find a peaceful solution. There is implicit in the Middle East situation, of course,

a very great urgency about achieving a peaceful settlement. No one is more sensitive to this than Ambassador Jarring himself. In the interest of peace, the United Nations cannot tolerate an indefinite lack of progress towards a peaceful settlement in the Middle East.

50. Ambassador Jarring's efforts to promote agreement among the parties to the Middle East dispute have been impeded by the disagreement among them thus far on the procedure to be employed in taking up the substantive questions. One party has insisted upon "direct negotiations" by which is meant, apparently, a face-to-face confrontation of the two sides; the other side has rejected, initially at any rate, the direct procedure, but has been willing to carry on substantive talks concerning the implementation of the resolution indirectly, with Ambassador Jarring as the intermediary. All of his efforts will be unavailing unless he is able to carry on some form of dialogue with the two sides involving matters of substance. Such a dialogue cannot be fruitful if it is substantive on one side but only procedural on the other.

51. The key to a peaceful settlement of issues dividing States and peoples which lead to armed conflict, or threaten to do so, is negotiation. It is often difficult, owing to political and other circumstances, to bring the parties involved in a conflict to the negotiating table, and there is no certainty that, once they are there, agreement can be reached within any reasonable period of time.

52. Negotiations may be undertaken in different ways. There is no fixed formula controlling them. A workable procedure in one set of circumstances may be quite impractical and unsuitable in another. The right road, obviously, is that which will lead to fruitful negotiations, whether direct or indirect. It would seem to me that as a general rule the emphasis should be on the results rather than on the procedure.

53. As this text is being written, three different sets of peace negotiations are under way, each differing from the others in the procedure being followed. These are the preliminary talks in Paris on Viet-Nam, the talks between leaders of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities in Cyprus and the talks on the Middle East being

¹ Text in *International Documents on Palestine, 1967*, pp. 268-269.

undertaken by Ambassador Jarring.

54. These talks differ from each other in the extent of the initiatives taken by the parties involved, or by a third party, in bringing them about, in their direct or indirect nature, and in the extent of assistance given to the parties by a third party as the negotiations proceed. It will be recalled that the successful talks between India and Pakistan at Tashkent in January 1966 were arranged through the good offices of the Soviet Union, whose representatives assisted the two parties in the talks. In this regard, it may also be recalled that the negotiations at Rhodes in 1949, which led to the general armistice agreements between the four Arab States and Israel, were arranged by the United Nations. At Rhodes negotiations as such were basically indirect, the respective parties being brought together in meetings under the chairmanship of the Acting Mediator to formalize agreements reached by indirect talks through him.

55. It is often said, in the Security Council and elsewhere, by parties to conflicts that, while the United Nations has achieved a measure of success in keeping the peace in areas of conflict, it has failed or is failing in its duty to resolve the political problems at the root of these conflicts. Those who hold such views tend to overlook the simple fact that the primary responsibility for peaceful settlement of conflicts must inevitably rest with the parties themselves and that without their co-operation and effort no peace mission of the United Nations, however skilfully conducted or strongly supported, can hope to succeed. On the other hand, given that co-operation, the United Nations can be of inestimable assistance. This is nowhere truer than in the Middle East.

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Address by the Brazilian Foreign Minister de Magalhães Pinto Before the U.N. General Assembly, October 2, 1968.¹ [Excerpt]

As far as the Middle East is concerned, Brazil has expressed its apprehensions as regards the arms race in which the countries of that area are engaged. We would like to reiterate our appeal for the flow of arms and war material to the parties in conflict to be suspended, limited or regulated. If allowed to go on unchecked this arms race can lead to a new conflagration of unpredictable consequences. We still think that resolution 242 (1967) of the Security Council is a fair and reliable basis for the establishment of peace in the Middle East. We ought to spare no efforts to create conditions propitious to the mission that Ambassador Gunnar Jarring has undertaken as Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, a mission that he is discharging with so much patience and tenacity.

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Address by the U.S. Secretary of State Rusk Before the U.N. General Assembly, October 2, 1968.² [Excerpt]

I turn now to the Middle East, which has suffered so much torment and tragedy in this generation.

More than fifteen months have passed since the six-day war of 1967 was halted by the United Nations cease-fire. The essentials of peace have not changed since then. They were succinctly stated in an address by the President of the United States on 19 June 1967,³ in the course of which he said:

¹ U.N. doc. A/PV. 1677 (prov.), p. 11.

² U.N. doc. A/PV. 1677 (prov.) pp. 23-26.

³ See *International Documents on Palestine, 1967*, pp. 116-118.

"Certainly, troops must be withdrawn; but there must also be recognized rights of national life, progress in solving the refugee problem, freedom of innocent maritime passage, limitation of the arms race, and respect for political independence and territorial integrity."

On 22 November of last year, in harmony with these objectives, the Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution establishing realistic and equitable principles for a just and lasting peace, and asking the Secretary-General to appoint a Special Representative

"...to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution." (*resolution 242 (1967)*).

I here reaffirm the complete support of the United States for the 22 November resolution in all its parts. We will do everything we can to help Ambassador Jarring and the parties to achieve its purposes.

Here, as in every conflict, the first prerequisite of progress is that the parties to the conflict summon the will to settle their differences by peaceful means.

If such a will exists, the parties can free themselves from sterile arguments over procedure and begin to exchange views on the issues that divide them. In the flexible spirit of true negotiation, they can find ways to accommodate their respective claims. And, what is equally vital, they can make the necessary efforts, with the help of the United Nations machinery on the spot, to avoid further incidents of violence such as those which have come before the Security Council in recent weeks, which can all too easily pass beyond control and destroy the atmosphere for negotiation.

The inescapable fact is, as President Johnson recently put it:

"The process of peacemaking will not begin until the leaders of the Middle East begin exchanging views on the hard issues through some agreed procedure which could permit active discussions to be pursued."

Therefore I renew the President's urging to the leaders in the Middle East to maintain and accelerate exchanges on the substance of peace.

Today a small but precious momentum

towards peace appears to exist in the diplomacy of the Middle East. Ambassador Jarring and many Foreign Ministers are present here at this General Assembly. All of us should seize this opportunity to encourage the parties to move resolutely towards a settlement. Otherwise the danger is great that the area will slip back once more towards chaos and war.

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Address by the Swedish Foreign Minister Nilson Before the U.N. General Assembly, October 2, 1968.¹ [Excerpt]

In the modern era the use and the threat of force cannot ensure durable peace. That assertion is equally true in the Middle East. The cease-fire which was achieved after the war in June last year is precarious and constantly threatened by serious incidents. It must be replaced by a peaceful solution which respects the principle that military conquest does not establish any right to the territory of another State and which, at the same time, recognizes the right of all States to live in peace and security. It was a remarkable achievement for the Security Council to reach agreement on the guidelines for such a solution. The whole world now expects the parties to collaborate in good faith with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the search for a solution. It is the duty of all other Member States, in particular the great Powers, to do everything they can to facilitate and expedite this search.

¹ U.N. doc. A/PV. 1677 (prov.), p. 57.

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Address by the Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko Before the U.N. General Assembly, October 3, 1968.¹ [Excerpt]

The present session has again before it the question of the situation in the Middle East. Why is it that the consequences of Israel's aggression of last year have not been eliminated up to now? Why, far from relaxing, have tensions there been mounting recently?

The responsibility for the dangerous procrastination in a political settlement in the Middle East rests with those who refuse to comply with the Security Council resolution of 22 November, 1967 and who, in defiance of United Nations appeals, provoke armed clashes and pursue an expansionist policy in the occupied territories. The responsibility lies with Israel.

The Arab States will speak for themselves here. But we are aware that they have repeatedly confirmed, notably to the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General, Mr. Jarring, their consent to comply with the Security Council resolution.

The Government of the United Arab Republic is known to have proposed a schedule for co-ordinated measures to be taken by the parties for the settlement of the Middle East problems. We support this realistic proposal and are ready to assist in the implementation of such a plan to restore peace in a region directly bordering on our southern frontiers and one where the situation directly affects the security of the Soviet Union.

We condemn the position of Israel and those who connive in its belligerence which frustrates the cause of a Middle East settlement.

Now, there are possibilities to achieve a turn towards peace in the Middle East, towards an end to the state of war between Israel and the Arab States, and the ensuring of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of all States of that region and their right to live in conditions of security. The Government of Israel must give up its attempts to retain the occupied Arab territories; otherwise, it will have

to account for a great deal.

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Address by the Japanese Foreign Minister Miki Before the U.N. General Assembly, October 4, 1968.² [Excerpt]

The Middle Eastern conflict was one of the most serious international issues of the last year, and it was one of the major achievements of the United Nations in that year that this Organization, through the Security Council, was able to reach an agreement last November on how the solution of this international conflict should be achieved. We note with deep regret, however, that the Security Council resolution has not so far been implemented, while tensions between the parties persist in the troubled area; armed clashes, though small in scale, still take place from time to time in violation of the cease-fire.

Japan maintains the view that any territorial expansion by force is unacceptable, as it constitutes a violation of the principles of peaceful settlement of disputes and of the non-use of force, and that therefore Israeli armed forces should be withdrawn from the occupied territories. Withdrawal of Israeli forces, however, should be accompanied by solutions of such questions as the termination of the state of belligerency and mutual respect of the rights of the nations concerned to live in peace in the area. Japan's view is that a fair and equitable solution should be reached on the basis of the Security Council resolution of last autumn. It is earnestly hoped that the parties to the conflict will co-operate with Mr. Jarring, Special Representative of the Secretary-General, to establish as soon as possible a basis for an enduring peace in the Middle East. A fair and effective solution which would form the basis for a lasting peace in the area should be one approved in the forum of the United Nations, one for the implementation of which this world Organization should continue to bear responsibility.

¹ U.N. doc. A/PV. 1679 (prov.), pp. 48-51.

² U.N. doc. A/PV. 1683 (prov.), p. 17.

lities. Considering the hardships of more than twenty years which have been borne by the Arab refugees, who, I believe, number more than a million and a half, I should like to point out once again to all nations the urgency of solving the Middle Eastern problem.

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Address by the French Foreign Minister Debré Before the U.N. General Assembly, October 7, 1968.¹ [Excerpt]

There is one serious infraction of international law that presents a very grave danger to that part of the world concerned, if not to the entire world. The solution of the Middle East problem and the establishment of lasting peace in that region have made no real progress. This state of affairs, should it continue, can lead to new conflicts. I say this with all the gravity that is fitting, and fully aware of the difficulties involved in the task.

Last year, from this rostrum, my predecessor indicated the basic principles guiding our action in the face of this anguishing situation, and the way in which France envisaged the problems to be settled.

On the substance, the French Government, which holds it to be established that each of the States in the Middle East has the right to live in security, has already declared that it did not accept, and that no one should accept, any local *fait accompli* as regards the territorial boundaries and the status of citizens. The consequences of the unilateral action undertaken in 1967—that is, the conquest by force of arms—cannot be accepted, for to do so would be the negation of international law. What was said last year I now repeat, and if possible even more strongly, for no progress can be made unless one begins with what is the necessary beginning.

This principle having been established, we stated that the essential problems were, in our view, in addition to that of navigation, the situation of the Palestinian refugees and the neighbourly relations among the States involved. Direct negotiation between the Israeli Government and each of the Arab Governments did not appear to us to stand the slightest chance. The violence of the antagonisms, sharpened by the war and the sequels to the occupation, illustrates the great difficulty involved in this procedure. It was for this reason that the French Government, as early as last year, emphasized that it was up to the United Nations to define the elements of a reasonable solution. Nothing would be possible in this regard, we emphasized, without an agreement between the major Powers, which, had it been reached in May 1967, would have prevented the outbreak of the conflict. Such was, and still is, the indispensable condition for a return to stability.

It is in this direction that our Organization has set out. On 22 November of last year the Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution that seems to us still to be the basis for a realistic settlement resulting in a fair and lasting peace.

For several months the Secretary-General's Special Representative, Ambassador Jarring, has been carrying on patient activities aimed at implementing this resolution—activities that deserve to be pursued, for they appear to us to hold still, today, the best chance, firstly, of ending the coercion exercised by the victor and, secondly, of establishing the conditions of a necessary coexistence of the Arab States and the State of Israel. This mission must now succeed, for it would be dangerous to allow the present situation to continue.

¹ U.N. doc. A/PV. 1683 (prov.), pp. 33-35.

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Address by the Italian Foreign Minister Medici Before the U.N. General Assembly, October 9, 1968.¹ [Excerpt]

We find a confirmation of our anxieties in the latest developments in the Middle East, which have dangerously aggravated the difficulties resulting from the conflict of June 1967.

We are convinced that a solution to those difficulties may be found within the framework of the United Nations. Hence, we shall continue to give our most sincere support to the mission of Mr. Jarring, whose high capacities we fully appreciate. We shall persevere in every possible action which will relax tension and contribute to the success of the mission.

I should like to recall from this rostrum the idea put forward by Italy in order to overcome the difficulties connected with the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967 so as to make it possible for the Jarring mission to come to grips with the substance of the matters involved.

Furthermore, as a result of the conspicuous economic damage caused by the conflict of June 1967, particularly to the countries of the region concerned, we must co-operate in rehabilitating the different economies, so as to prevent irreparable postponements and delays in the development plans which are so vital for the welfare of the people of the area.

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Address by the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs Before the U.N. General Assembly, October 9, 1968.² [Excerpt]

In the Middle East, continuing tension and sporadic fighting between Israel and its neighbours sow the seeds of future conflict. There is a danger

that the escalation of violence in the Middle East could involve outside Powers and thus constitute a grave threat to world peace. Yet we are all conscious that the time and effort devoted to settle this dispute since the end of the fighting in June 1967 has led to no improvement in the situation. Agreement by the Security Council last November to certain basic provisions and principles for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East was an important achievement. But principles are of little use unless the parties accept in good faith the duty of implementing them fully and effectively.

The Canadian Government reaffirms its support of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, in all its parts, and pays a tribute to the patient and tenacious efforts of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Ambassador Jarring, to assist the parties. We give him our full support, and call upon the parties to use his good offices and earnestly seek agreement on a peaceful and accepted settlement based on the principles and provisions of resolution 242 (1967). This is particularly important in the days which lie ahead when Foreign Ministers are in New York and readily available to consult.

The events of June 1967 tragically aggravated the problem of the Palestine refugees. I am sure I speak for all Member countries when I pay a tribute to the work of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency and his staff. In extremely difficult conditions, the Agency, in conjunction with the host Governments, has carried out its responsibilities with perseverance, skill and compassion. In recognition of the vital need for UNRWA to continue its work, my Government during the current fiscal year maintained its voluntary pledge of cash and food aid valued at \$1.2 million and, in addition, contributed to the Agency the equivalent of \$650,000 in special donations.

The Agency can assist in supplying the refugees with the basic requirements for subsistence, and it has done notable work in providing education for thousands of refugee children. For the future, however, what is required is a just settlement which would offer the refugees the opportunity of living in peace and dignity. A solution to the refugee problem will be feasible only in the context of an agreed settlement bet-

¹ U.N. doc. A/PV. 1687 (prov.), pp. 23-26.

² U.N. doc. A/PV. 1687 (prov.), pp. 34-36.

ween the Arab States and Israel. Meanwhile, pending the attainment of such a settlement, this urgent humanitarian problem remains. My Government, therefore, calls upon all Member States to demonstrate the reality of their concern for the refugees by supporting, tangibly and generously, the operations of UNRWA.¹

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Address by the Belgian Foreign Minister Harmel Before the U.N. General Assembly, October 10, 1968.² [Excerpt]

Three international conflicts concerned us last year: Cyprus, the Middle East and South-East Asia. On each of these problems, in the past twelve months, negotiations have at least been started. As far as the delicate problem of Cyprus is concerned, the Greek and Turkish leaders have with wisdom initiated an approach to settlement and they deserve all the more credit for this from us since the passions were highly inflamed. The same applies to the Near East: the authors of the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967 still deserve our gratitude for the course of international justice which they have traced. Unfortunately, that is a course which so far has not been adequately followed, and I would say how disappointed we should be if the countries concerned did not at this session of the General Assembly achieve at least the beginning of an understanding.

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Address by the Nigerian Commissioner for External Affairs Arikpo Before the U.N. General Assembly, October 11, 1968.³ [Excerpt]

The Middle East crisis continues. The tremendous human suffering resulting from the unceasing tension in the area persists. The world still painfully lives with the bitter consequences and grim prospects of the war of last year. That war resulted in tens of thousands more refugees. Nigeria, as a member of the Security Council at the time, made its modest contribution to the resolution which was subsequently unanimously adopted by the Security Council on 22 November 1967. My Government strongly believes that the principles laid down in that resolution as well as the mechanism it provided for promoting a just solution of the problems of the Middle East remain as valid as they were last November. We therefore appeal to all the parties concerned to avail themselves of that resolution. My delegation further calls upon the parties to co-operate fully with Ambassador Jarring, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, in his mission for peace in the Middle East.

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Address by the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Stewart Before the U.N. General Assembly, October 14, 1968.⁴ [Excerpt]

I turn next to the Middle East, where we cannot congratulate ourselves, at least not as much as we might be entitled to in the example of Cyprus. We have not got so far. Last year the United Nations was unable to keep the peace. Nor so far have we succeeded in creating the condi-

¹ See *ante*, doc. 259.

² U.N. doc. A/PV. 1689 (prov.), p. 7.

³ U.N. doc. A/PV. 1692 (prov.), pp. 76-77.

⁴ U.N. doc. A/PV. 1693 (prov.), pp. 36-37.

tions of peace, and when many of us came to New York for this Assembly we were greatly concerned by the outlook. Without greater readiness of the parties to enter into substantial discussions on the basis of the unanimously approved resolution, there seemed no hope of avoiding a further drift to disaster. Dr. Jarring's skill and persistence have earned the admiration of all, but no one would expect him to continue his efforts if there were not a new readiness on all sides to enable him to go forward. Dr. Jarring is in the position of a man asked to solve a jigsaw puzzle—a hard enough thing to do at any time; but if people do not give you the pieces of the puzzle to start on, it becomes harder still.

At this critical point, however, the means for a solution are available. The Security Council resolution deals with everything that must accompany a lasting settlement, and Dr. Jarring is still here to assist in working out how the resolution is to be put into effect.

There are so many complicated matters to be settled that it would be unrealistic to regard that resolution as self-implementing. But it would be equally unrealistic to be dogmatic about the way agreement should be hammered out, and unreasonable and dogmatic to preclude any one method of hammering out agreement.

The parties concerned have accepted the resolution. We understand that they are ready to continue to discuss with Dr. Jarring the means of carrying it out. It is recognized, that all aspects of the resolution must be accepted and that there should be agreement on all of them and on the programme under which all of them will be put into effect. But in the work which will be necessary, I believe much emphasis must be laid on the problem of the refugees. I am glad to note that the Israel Government intends to introduce new measures to hasten the return to their homes of those who fled during the fighting last year. I very much hope those new measures will lead to the speedy return, before the rigours of the winter, of all those who wish to go back.

But the greater task is to help the large body of refugees who have suffered so tragically for the last twenty years; to give them again the opportunity to live in the dignity which should be the right of every human being. The task, in which Her Majesty's Government will be

ready to assist, will inevitably take long to complete. But I believe that if an early agreement could be reached about how this problem should be tackled, this could transform the atmosphere. We cannot see the end of the problem all at once. If we had the conviction that there was going to be a real beginning in solving it, that would transform the atmosphere and we should be in sight of that real, just and lasting peace that all in the Middle East so urgently need. But there must be no more delay. I see no effective alternative to Dr. Jarring's work. It is for the countries directly concerned to move from words to action, to lay proposals before Dr. Jarring and to seek, with him, to bridge the differences between their proposals and to widen the area of the agreement. It is the duty of all Members of the United Nations to use whatever influence they possess, not as partisans of one side or the other, but as partisans of peace and in support of Dr. Jarring's mission. In anything that the British Government has been able to contribute, this has been its consistent purpose.

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Address by the Indian Prime Minister Mrs. Gandhi Before the U.N. General Assembly, October 14, 1968.¹ [Excerpt]

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Another source of anxiety, the West Asian crisis, also needs to be resolved by political means. There is every opportunity for doing so, if it is recognized that the security, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the States in this part of the world cannot be based on the redrawing of State frontiers by force or on the basis of permanent hostility.

Essential for a peaceful settlement is the withdrawal of foreign forces from all Arab territories occupied in June last year. The process of the restoration of peace can begin and Amba-

¹ U.N. doc. A/PV. 1693 (prov.), p. 62.

sador Jarring's mission be fruitful only with the clear affirmation of this.

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**Address by the Senegalese Foreign Minister
Gaye Before the U.N. General Assembly,
October 16, 1968.¹ [Excerpt]**

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However, the international community has already, at the threshold of the twenty-third session of the General Assembly, grave causes for concern: a regrettable situation in the Middle East; hotbeds of tension elsewhere; a growing accumulation of weapons of destruction, with the almost unimaginable spectre of their power of annihilation; the unacceptable pauperization of the non-aligned countries, which in our time are the proletarians of the international community.

In the Middle East, one cannot escape a feeling of apprehension at the disquieting developments in the Israeli-Arab crisis. The violations of the cease-fire by Israel have multiplied; the situation of the refugees, already difficult in the past, has become more critical; the city of Jerusalem is subjected to a *de facto* Israeli annexation; Arab territories are still subjected to occupation by Israeli troops; the mission of Mr. Jarring, to whom we wish to pay tribute, has, by virtue of its faith, become the mission of our Organization.

In this situation which has so many complex and painful aspects, the Government of Senegal has already defined its position. My Government is against any war or resort to violence for the settlement of disputes between nations. It wishes to reaffirm its opposition to any military occupation and to any annexation of the territory of one country by another.

The solution of the Israeli-Arab crisis resides essentially, in our opinion, in respect for the resolutions of the United Nations. These resolutions provide for the withdrawal of the Israeli

forces from the occupied territories; respect for the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of the contending States; a just settlement of the refugee problem; restoration of the international status of the city of Jerusalem; and freedom of navigation in international waterways of the region.

In the view of my Government, the best guarantee for a stable and firm peace in the Middle East must be sought in the guarantee—after the withdrawal of the Israeli troops—of the borders of the States in the region, of Israel and of the Arab countries, by the United Nations in general and by the four great Powers in particular.

My Government thinks that negotiations must be undertaken under the aegis of the United Nations, because it must not be forgotten that it was under the aegis of the United Nations that Israel was created.

Having thus recalled the position of my Government, I must say that we fervently hope for peace in the Middle East, in the area from which have come so many messages for peace and brotherhood. The world has not yet forgotten the atrocities of the Hitler régime and the recent suffering of the Jewish people. The black world can forget it even less, inasmuch as it has shared with the Jews, not, of course, the concentration camps, but the same opprobrium and reprobation of the Nazis.

Our solidarity with the Arab people is even more clear-cut, because the Israeli-Arab problem is neither ethnic nor religious; it is a political problem of peaceful coexistence. The ties that bind us to the Arab people are manifold, at one and the same time geographical, historical and political. It is a fact that 80 million Arabs, out of 100 million, live in Africa. It is also a fact that they form part of the Organization of African Unity. It is a fact also that it is they who today find themselves in a time of trial. For all these reasons, geographical, moral and political, we are today at the side of the Arab people, to achieve with them a just and lasting peace.

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¹ U.N. doc. A/PV. 1697 (prov.), pp. 16-18.

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Address by the Argentine Foreign Minister Costa Mendez Before the U.N. General Assembly, October 16, 1968.¹ [Excerpt]

The problem of the Middle East is still of concern to the Argentine delegation. As we did last year, now again we wish to voice an appeal to the parties directly concerned to make honest efforts to achieve stable coexistence in the region. Therefore we insist on the strict observance of resolution 242 (1967) of the Security Council and also on the need for the entire international community to give all possible support to the mission of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Jarring. The seriousness of this conflict and its repercussions on world peace must make all parties realize that it is their duty to find a solution in view of the bond of solidarity and co-operation they have with the rest of the international community.

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Address by the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Congo Umba di Lutete Before the U.N. General Assembly, October 22, 1968.² [Excerpt]

In the Middle East, the repeated military confrontations are liable at any moment to spoil the prospects for a peaceful settlement of the dispute that sets the parties one against the other.

As we have repeatedly stated, my Government feels that the atmosphere of hostility, which grows worse day by day in that area, is acquiring more explosive proportions which certainly do not work in favour of any possible return to peace. The spirit of good neighbourliness and sovereign equality must inspire the States concerned to work out a fair solution in the greater interest

of stability and the social and economic progress of the inhabitants of that part of the globe.

In the steps taken toward achieving a settlement of that conflict, the Democratic Republic of the Congo wishes particularly to recall the resolution recently adopted at the fifth summit conference of the Organization of African Unity, held at Algiers, the spirit of which is entirely in keeping with that of Security Council resolution 242 (1967), of 22 November 1967.

It is my Government's most eager desire to see the States concerned, as well as the other States Members of our Organization, turn their efforts to the implementation of that resolution by sincerely and actively co-operating with Ambassador Jarring.

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Address by the Rumanian Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs Malitza Before the U.N. General Assembly, October 23, 1968.³ [Excerpt]

Concerned over the persistence of the hot-bed of conflict in the Middle East and over the continued accumulation of elements apt to maintain tensions in the area, Romania has voiced its trust in the possibility of a rational and just solution based on the right of every State to territorial integrity, sovereign existence and security, and is in favour of a settlement which being achieved in such a spirit.

It is true that the problems awaiting solution in the Middle East are complex, but it is our profound belief that there is no way of settling them except by the peaceful means of talks and negotiations.

We consider that the interests of the peoples of the Middle East urgently require that normal relations of coexistence and co-operation should prevail in that area and that the outstanding

¹ U.N. doc. A/PV. 1697 (prov.), p. 58.

² U.N. doc. A/PV. 1703 (prov.), pp. 27-28.

³ U.N. doc. A/PV. 1705 (prov.), pp. 41-42.

issues should be settled, ensuring the withdrawal of troops from the occupied territories and the observance of the security and independence of each state in the region.

We believe that the resolution unanimously adopted by the Security Council on 22 November 1967 as a result of collective efforts establishes the principle of a political settlement in the area. It provides the basis for the mission of the special

Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Gunnar Jarring, to whom representatives have addressed words of encouragement and confidence. We share the view expressed from this rostrum that the present opportunity should not be frittered away. Mediterranean wisdom of antiquity knew that propitious moments are like words: once lost they never come back.

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Arab World

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Petition by Jerusalem Notables to the Israeli Premier Eshkol and Military Governor of the West Bank on the Expropriation of Lands.¹

Jerusalem, January 14, 1968

The Israeli press has recently published reports to the effect that the Israeli occupation authorities have decided to expropriate extensive areas of Arab land in Jerusalem, on which accommodation is to be built for a large number of Jewish families. These reports have been confirmed by official statements made by the Israeli authorities on the subject.

We wish to inform you of our amazement and indignation at this measure, particularly as we had come to believe that the Israeli authorities would refrain from such measures, which are in defiance of world public opinion. We have therefore lost no time in submitting to you this memorandum. Our purpose in doing this is to protect our Arab city and the Arab character which has distinguished it throughout the ages. We also wish to inform you of the extreme anxiety we feel as to the possible effects of such an action on the efforts that are being made to bring about a just peace in the area. We wish to inform you that we condemn this measure for many reasons, including the following.

1. The confiscation of Arab lands in Jerusalem confirms our suspicions that the policy of Israel's leaders is expansionistic and aggressive, and that all their talk about peace is no more than a screen to conceal their dreams of expansion at the expense of Arab rights.

2. This measure will destroy any opportunity that may be offered of achieving the peace which the United Nations is striving for. It will certainly impede the mission of the United Nations delegate in his search for a just solution to the problems of the area, in spite of the statements of Israeli leaders in which they claim such deep concern for the success of his mission.

3. There is no need for us to repeat that this measure constitutes a violation of the United

Nations resolutions on Jerusalem,² and an infringement of the sovereignty of an independent state, which is a member of the international community—the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

The gravity of this measure is by no means diminished by claims to the effect that the new accommodation is to house some Arabs along with a majority of Jews, nor do such claims conceal the real aims of the Israeli authorities. We still hope that wisdom may prevail in the end, and that the Israeli occupation authorities will abandon this arbitrary measure, which constitutes a violation of the principles of the armistice now in force and an attempt to distort the historical character of the city of Jerusalem.

In view of the above we wish to voice the strongest possible protest against this measure, which is incompatible both with the principles of justice and with international law. We hereby declare our opposition to this measure, in the hope that the whole world may hear our protest, as it goes forth from the city of Jerusalem, the cradle of the revealed religions and the source of human values, which it is incumbent on the occupation authorities to respect and defer to.

Signed:

Najib Qub'ain, Hilarion Capucci, Hilmi al-Muhtaseb; Sa'd al-Din al-Alami; Sa'id Sabri; Anwar al-Khatib; Anwar Nusaiba; Sa'id Ala' al-Din, Abd al-Rahim al-Sharif; Kamal al-Dajani; Ruhi al-Khatib; Dr. Ibrahim Talil; Antun Safiya; Nuha Abu Ghuraib; Abd al-Mughni al-Natsha; Musa al-Bitar; Khadr Abu Sawa; Ali al-Tuzaiz, Faiq Barakat; Antun Albina; George Khadr; Faiz Abd al-Nur; George Akra; Abd al-Hamid Asali; Khairi Nasr al-Din; Matia Marum; Emile Safiya; Taisir Kan'an; Muhammad Ishaq Darwish; Dr. As'ad Bishara; Hafez Tahbub; Jamil Nasir; Al-Hajj Umar al-Wa'ri, Dr. Salim Ma'tuk; Rashad al-Shaikh; Yousef Hanna; Dr. Daud al-Husaini; Jawad al-Husaini; Mahmud Uthman; Aziz Shihada; Al-Hajj Tawfiq Abu Zahra; Yusef al-Khuri; Michel Sindaha; Rida al-Kaddumi; Badr Sharif and Faisal Siyam.

¹ *Al-Dustur* (Amman), 24/1/1968.

² U.N. docs. A/RES/2253 and 2254 (ES-V), July 4 and 14, 1967, respectively, texts in *International Documents on Palestine, 1967*, pp. 256, 260. See also *ante*, doc. 238.

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Interview With a Leader of the Palestine National Liberation Movement "Fateh"¹
[Excerpts]

Beirut, January 22, 1968

Q. Let us first discuss the conditions under which Fateh originated and the considerations that led you to establish an independent Palestinian organisation?

A.—Between the years 1954 and 1955, a group of young Palestinians began to look for a new starting point for action, taking into account the situation of the Palestinian people and the Arab peoples at the time—a situation far from conducive to optimism. These young men pooled their resources and began to make mines, which they subsequently exploded in occupied territory. It was during the Tripartite Aggression of 1956 and the occupation of Gaza that the first resistance movement against the occupation was born, led by a group of Palestinians in Gaza. After the occupation, the possibility of continuing Palestinian action took firmer hold in the minds of these young men. In 1958 the first organised cell was established, while early in 1959 the first issue of the publication *Falastinuna* (Our Palestine) appeared in Beirut, voicing the opinions and ideas of the movement. On January 1, 1965 the first *Al-Asifa* communiqué was issued, heralding the new phase of armed action.

The emergence of the movement came as a result of a careful study of the Arab situation at the time, which study made the following points clear to the founders of *Fateh*.

1. It was widely believed by the Arab and Palestinian masses that the 1948 defeat was the result of the attitude of the Arab governments at the time. The reaction to this belief was that people started to seek new ways of establishing sound governments—governments that would strive to recover the occupied territory of Palestine. On this basis, energetic party activity arose in the Arab area, the Palestinian element being the most active, in the belief that the speedy establishment of good governments would automatically lead to speedy engagement in the battle of liberation. When it came to the point, however,

this party activity did not yield the anticipated result; on the contrary the Arab World was torn with internal strife and party animosities. The feeling arose that there was a political vacuum, to the extent that there was no force capable of setting the Arab battle along the right course.

2. After the experience of occupation in Gaza (population: 450,000) in 1956, the fear of Israeli occupation vanished, and people devoted themselves to improving their economic conditions...

Peace of mind, peace with the enemy and the pursuit of material comfort were factors which, if allowed to continue, would result in the plans of the colonialist powers achieving their aim of stifling the Palestinians' will to struggle and of absorbing them into the new communities to which they moved.

In other words, the Palestinian people was divided into two groups: those who lived in camps and were being slowly consumed by the diseases of apathy, dependence and stagnation, and those young people who were being educated and engaged in trying to improve their own personal situation.

Hence, the Palestinian had to be rescued from the stranglehold of Arab tutelage, inter-party discord, and regional Arab policies. He had to be restored to his true status, that of a being who has lost his land and who must strive to recover it. This required that the Palestinians' efforts should be redirected into the path of national action for the recovery of their land, that they should return to the climate of their old revolts and live in a new atmosphere of heroism so that they might form a cohesive vanguard in the battle for liberation.

It was at this point that the movement adopted the slogans of unity of Palestinian effort, rejection of Arab tutelage, an independent Palestinian will, non-interference in the internal affairs of the Arab states, and abstention by Palestinians from involvement in social struggles, since priority should go to armed action for the recovery of the occupied part of their land.

3. Ben Gurion declared in 1958: "Give me

¹ *Al-Ushu' al-Arabi* (Beirut), 22/1/1968.

ten years of peace and I will turn Israel into a state invincible by its neighbours.' Peace is an important condition for the development of all Israel's resources, industrial, agricultural, touristic, military and human. Moreover, continuing peace would strengthen Zionism's links with the new land. Zionists newly arrived in Israel feel alien to the land; they do not feel they belong to it in the national sense...

4. The Arab area enjoys certain strategic assets of decisive international impact: the Suez Canal, Arab oil, the strategic position of the Eastern Mediterranean. These factors were highly significant in the 1956 War. After 1956, it was to be observed that the West sought to divest these assets of their decisive influence on the international situation. It began to construct giant oil tankers with a capacity of 250,000 tons (30,000 tons prior to 1956) to compensate for the time factor which might result from the Suez Canal being closed, so that tankers had to sail round the Cape of Good Hope. At the same time the international oil monopolies started working fast to discover oil to the West of Suez, particularly in North and West Africa, while Britain earmarked vast sums for oil and gas exploration in the North Sea, so that Europe might not again be exposed to pressures resulting from the suspension of the flow of Arab oil. Here the time factor worked against Arab interests in general and the Palestinian cause in particular.

5. The question of Arab unity: is it the way to liberation, or is liberation the way to unity?

We have adopted the second formula—liberation is the way to unity. The reasons for this attitude can be traced back to the roots of the Zionist presence in Palestine.

Much has been written on 'How Israel came into being', and too little on 'Why Israel came into being'...

Then came the year 1907 when the colonialist powers, headed by Britain, held their famous conference presided over by Foreign Secretary Bannerman. He invited the European states to a conference which brought together the best European intellectuals in the fields of politics, economics, history and sociology. Bannerman addressed the gathering, saying: "All civilisations in the world reach a certain level, after which they begin to decline. It is your duty to see a way of

preventing the decline of Europe." After three months of study and deliberation, the delegates issued a report known as the Bannerman Report. The most outstanding feature of the report as regards the Zionist movement was that it recommended that the countries of the Eastern Mediterranean should be prevented from establishing any kind of federation, union or agreement, as these countries constituted the only threat to Europe's future. To achieve this end, a hostile, alien nation was to be established east of the Suez Canal. This was the beginning of the alliance between Europe, as represented by Britain, and the world Zionist movement. In other words, the part that Britain and the other colonialist powers took in creating Israel was not the result of sympathy for the Jews, or of a conviction of their historical right to Palestine—its aim was to disrupt the Eastern Mediterranean area so that it might remain disunited and backward.

6. After the second World War, the concept of military bases and pacts emerged. The West sought to establish pacts and bases, while the East strove to destroy them... Consequently, Israel was the largest military base ever known to history...

7. With the establishment of Israel, the Arab states around her felt obliged to develop and strengthen their armies, with the recovery of Palestine as their slogan. Their governments began spending vast sums in the military field diverting funds from their economic, social and educational development budgets. This confronted Arab governments with two diametrically opposed pressures: the pressure exerted by attrition of the economy for the sake of armament, and that exerted by the masses in their demand for a higher standard of living. This state of affairs, linked as it was to a defensive mentality, gave rise to continued instability in the internal political situation, and to feelings of resentment and confusion in the face of such contradictory obligations. In addition to keeping the "ring" Arab countries busy with Israel, colonialism also kept other Arab countries occupied with a variety of regional problems. (The Kurds in the case of Iraq, resistance to occupation in the case of South Yemen, the separatist movement in the case of Sudan, Buraimi in the case of Saudi Arabia, the conflict between Algeria and Morocco, and so on).

All these considerations made it essential to adopt the slogan: "Return is the way to unity." Priority in action was to go to the elimination of Israel: the economy throughout the Arab area was to be a military economy, precedence was to be given to preparation for the elimination of Israel.

At the same time, attention was called to the time factor and the need for rapid action in the occupied territories to put an end to the peaceful atmosphere inside Israel. In addition, the armistice lines must be made too hot for comfort.

Q.—You are sometimes accused of belonging to this or that party, or to this or that state. What is your attitude to these accusations?

*A.—*The movement accepts as members Palestinians who do not belong to any ideological or political party. This is not to say that a member may not have previously belonged to one party or another, but, once he joins *Fateh*, his other loyalties are at an end... There is no connection between *Fateh* and any other Arab or non-Arab government or party. Indeed, *Fateh* rejects all tutelage, and all attempts to dictate what it shall do or even to make it change its course.

Fateh is a Palestinian movement with its own independent will refusing directives from or subordination to any quarter whatsoever; it does not interfere in the internal affairs of any Arab country, nor is it willing to allow any one to interfere in its affairs. It accepts help or assistance with no strings attached from any Arab source, whether official or popular, and from all international quarters whose sympathies are on the side of the Arab nation.

Q. What is the role of the Arab masses in the Battle of Liberation?

*A.—*The liberation of Palestine is at one and the same time a movement that is national (the Arabs), humanitarian (right and justice), and religious (Muslim and Christian religious sentiments). The real basis of the liberation of Palestine, however, is Arab in character, that is, the liberation of Palestine represents the first line of defence of the existence and destiny of the Arab nation. Moreover, the presence of Israel in the very heart of the Arab homeland

is a reflection of its natural alliance with colonialist monopolistic designs on the Arab homeland. Hence the liberation of Palestine is the decisive step in liberating the Arab World from colonialist interference and exploitation. The duty of liberation is therefore an Arab duty. The land that must be liberated, however, is the land of the Palestinian people; consequently it is the Palestinian people who must be the vanguard of armed struggle in the battle of liberation... The task of liberation, as *Fateh* sees it, is not by any means racist in character; it is a national task closely linked to the liberation of the land, a task in which *Fateh* will be the leader, the Palestinian people the vanguard, and the Arab masses the supporting base...

Q.—What are Fateh's targets inside the occupied territories?

*A.—*Strategic installations (dams, bridges, railways, water installations, arms depots, and oil objectives, as well as military forces and patrols. *Fateh* also takes upon itself the task of resisting the retaliatory operations carried out by the Israeli army against civilians. These operations on the part of *Fateh* aim at the following:

- To prevent immigration and encourage emigration.
- To prevent the stabilisation of capital.
- To destroy tourism.
- To prevent immigrants becoming attached to the land.
- To weaken the Israeli economy and to divert the greater part of it to security requirements.
- To create and maintain an atmosphere of strain and anxiety that will force the Zionists to realise that it is impossible for them to live in Israel.

The gradual achievement of the above objectives will inevitably bring about the disintegration of the enemy state and its eventual dissolution. This is why we insist upon a people's war of liberation, which alone can exhaust the enemy, destroy its stability and pave the way for a quick blow by the regular armies at the right moment.

Q.—How do you see your relations with the Arab governments. And will peaceful settlements affect your activities?

A.—It is high time that the Palestinians should cease to be used as pawns to further personal or regional ends. The Palestinian cause must now emerge on the international scene as a liberation struggle between the Palestinian people and an occupying state. All that we ask of the Arab governments is that they should be able to protect their own frontiers and to permit and support Palestinian action inside the occupied territories.

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**Speech by the Syrian President Al-Atasi
at the Graduation of Army Officers.¹
[Excerpt]**

Homs, January 25, 1968

Since the June defeat, the Zionist authorities have constantly talked of Greater Israel and have taken one measure after another to translate this talk into reality. Thus Zionist talk of peace is merely a means of forcing the Arabs to surrender and propaganda for foreign consumption designed to drug world public opinion and to throw dust in the eyes of decent people. The ultimate aim of the Zionists is to prolong the occupation by talking of peace, thus presenting the world with a *fait accompli* and holding on to the territories they seized after the June aggression. But can Israel achieve this end without American support? This is impossible, not only in our opinion, but also by the admission of many people all over the world. The United States of America, which was behind the June aggression, continues to back Israel in her intention of remaining in the territories she has occupied. Though Johnson may not publicly admit it, it is a fact that Israeli

projects receive his support; indeed, the whole world is aware of the ties binding Israel to his country.

We do not say this because we expect American colonialism to turn over a new leaf, but simply to expose American-Zionist propaganda designed to mislead world public opinion, and to show up the mouthpieces of American propaganda in the Arab World. In the face of this reality, can there be any other way open to us but that of armed struggle?

The world must come to appreciate the true nature of Israeli designs, and peoples must realise that Israel is creating a new form of Nazism. Manifestations of this neo-Nazism have increased since the last aggression against the Arabs. The neo-Nazis believed that by winning the June round they had won final victory, and became intoxicated with their triumph, just as the Nazis did before them. They thought the Arabs had been utterly defeated and were incapable of resistance. So they proceeded to demolish houses, just as the Nazi forces did when they occupied Europe, and to intensify their barbaric treatment of the Arabs even in the camps in which they have been forced to make their homes since the 1948 disaster. Similarly, after the seizure of the new Arab territories, collective intimidation started. Whole villages have been blown up and not a day passes without columns of the inhabitants of the occupied territories being herded into prisons, not a day passes without prisoners being subjected to the cruellest torture and intimidation in the prison camps. It is difficult to estimate how many unjust sentences of hard labor and life imprisonment have been imposed, not to mention death sentences under the guise of 'killed while resisting the authorities', for their numbers are constantly increasing.

The Israeli authorities' treatment of the Arabs has never been equalled for barbarity except by the Nazis. The neo-Nazis must realise, however, that the Palestinian people cannot stand idly by in the face of the occupation of their country, the usurpation of their territory and the violation of their self-respect. Can they not grasp the fact that their occupation will be resisted, like all other occupations, and that their persecution and barbarous actions will meet with resistance, for the Palestinian people, like

¹ *Al-Ba'th* (Damascus), 26/1/1968.

other peoples, have the right to defend themselves against colonialist invaders?

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Statement by the Ninth National Congress of the Ba'th Party.¹ [Excerpt]

January 25, 1968

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The Party and Arab Action

...The Congress considers that the new stage demands that efforts should be concentrated on common national objectives and that attention should not be distracted from the first essential contradiction, which prescribes the basic rules of the conflict at this stage, which is the face to face confrontation of the Arab nation with the Zionist-imperialist peril.

To take as a point of departure the principle of common collective national action demands the emergence of a national popular front grouping national and progressive forces at both regional and pan-Arab level. This will enable the national liberation struggle to cast off its traditional patterns and to adopt revolutionary patterns commensurate with the grave and serious nature of the conflict.

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The task of class struggle can be defined at this stage as the isolation of these classes that are bound by interests to neo-colonialism (the upper bourgeoisie and semi-feudalism), and as the consolidation of the socialist gains and progress achieved by the people's struggle.

These gains must be developed in such a way as to consolidate the national economy as an essential weapon in the national battle of liberation against Zionism and imperialism.

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The ties binding the party to the forces of the Palestinian struggle and the commando organisations must not be restricted to expressions of sympathy and mutual support; they must be made closer and be firmly established on solid and growing foundations which will result in the Palestinian struggle becoming the real point of departure, not simply for the liberation of Palestine, but for the full realisation of the objectives of the Arab revolt.

This congress considers that Arab solidarity is the absolute minimum required as a basis for the present Arab confrontation. Moreover, it asserts that any political settlement leading to any kind of relinquishment of the minimum unanimously agreed upon at the Khartum Summit Conference (rejection of peace, recognition and negotiation) is a betrayal of the Arab cause which the Party will oppose and seek to crush by mobilising all its forces and the forces of the whole of the Arab people.

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Positive neutrality is the correct leftist attitude, since it expresses the interests of the Arab revolution and refuses to bargain over them.

Moreover, it forms a common denominator between the Arab cause and the causes related to the experiences of the Third World, with their national, liberational and socialist content.

Friendship with the Soviet Union and the socialist countries must continue to be the Party's constant policy. The Party must not react towards the Soviet Union whenever it feels that Soviet policy does not accord fully with the needs of the Arab revolution. For the Party must take into consideration the inevitable consequences of the policy of peaceful coexistence, which is a vital necessity if the Soviet Union's economic programme is to be realised.

The formula of peaceful coexistence as currently applied, the formula of equilibrium between the two world powers, the Soviet Union and the United States, creates common ground on which Soviet and American interests meet at certain points and in certain situations. This formula, therefore, must inevitably make revolutionary experiments of recent growth more aware of their own national responsibility within the framework of world struggle, and of the dangers

¹ *Al-Anwar* (Beirut), 23/2/1968. On the basis of information received from "sources close to the party" *Al-Anwar* reported that a 'wing' of the Ba'th Party which had been a target of the February 23, 1966 coup, convened a secret national congress, which issued this statement.

of allowing themselves to be drawn into positions of dependence.

The establishment of serious relations between the Arab revolutionary movement and the Chinese revolution is an essential requisite in this new phase which is a peak point in the conflict of the Arab cause with imperialism and Zionism. The establishment of such relations must be effected, however, entirely outside the framework of the Sino-Soviet conflict; on the contrary it must seek to become a positive factor in promoting world revolution.

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Statement by the U.A.R. Foreign Ministry on the Halting of Operations for the Release of Ships Trapped in the Suez Canal.¹

Cairo, January 30, 1968

During the past few weeks a number of countries which are the owners of ships trapped in the Suez Canal as a result of the Israeli aggression, have contacted the United Arab Republic requesting its help in enabling these ships to leave the Canal. In spite of the expense and effort involved in this operation the United Arab Republic decided to comply with this request and, in fact, proceeded to carry out the necessary technical studies to enable the ships to sail out of the Canal in safety.

The Israeli authorities, however, sought to exploit their aggressive presence on the Canal by engaging in political manoeuvring in their own interests, claiming that there was an agreement prohibiting navigation in the Canal. On the second of this month (January) they sent General Odd Bull, Chairman of the United Nations Supervisory Committee, a letter stating this claim. Faced with this situation, the United Arab Republic lost no time in broadcasting the texts of the letters exchanged with General Odd Bull, which said that it was necessary for the Suez Canal Authority to continue to use boats to ensure the safety of the trapped ships.

When the technical studies were completed, on January 17, the United Arab Republic notified Mr. Gunnar Jarring, special envoy of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, that a survey of the Canal bed, which was essential for the release of the trapped ships, would start on January 27. General Odd Bull was at the same time apprised of the same facts, being presented with a schedule of all details related to the survey operations to be conducted on the Canal bed.

On January 27, the Suez Canal Authority began the survey operations of the Suez Canal bed in accordance with the time schedule which had been handed to General Odd Bull on January 21.

In the early morning of January 30, at 8.15 a.m., while the Suez Canal Authority boats were conducting their operations according to a schedule, the Israeli forces opened fire on them, forcing them to withdraw. Anxious to persist in their efforts to help the trapped ships to leave the Canal, the Suez Canal Authority resumed its survey work in the Canal at 11.20 a.m. The Israeli forces, however, reopened fire, concentrating on the Canal Authority boat, seriously wounding one of the crew, and causing damage to the boat. As a result, the Canal Authority was forced to halt the operations designed to release the trapped ships.

Thus, not content that its aggression of June 5 should result in the closure of the Suez Canal, thereby inflicting serious damage to international navigation and to the economies of the nations of Asia, Africa and Europe, Israel is now using military force to hamper the release of the foreign ships trapped in the Canal as a result of her June aggression.

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Press Release No. 1 by the Palestine National Liberation Movement Fateh.² [Excerpts]

January, 1968

The following press release is issued by the Palestine National Liberation Movement, *Fateh*,

¹ *Al-Ahram* (Cairo), 31/1/1968.

² Archives of the Institute for Palestine Studies.

in order to clarify its attitude vis-à-vis the Israeli occupation forces and enlighten world public opinion as to the extent and significance of its struggle for the liberation of Palestine.

In this first general international communiqué to the world press, the revolutionary movement for the liberation of Palestine *Fateh*, wishes to correct certain misunderstandings concerning its operations and the nature of the struggle now being waged by the Palestinian Arab people against the Israeli invaders.

The Palestine problem is, essentially, the problem of an entire people, the Arab majority in Palestine, uprooted and expelled from their homeland in order to permit the establishment of Israel. As a result, before the June aggression, nearly a million and a half Arab Palestinians were being forced to live as refugees in camps throughout the Arab World, surviving on United Nations subsistence rations. The remaining 300,000 inside Israel have been grossly discriminated against by a regime that has denied them jobs, educational opportunities and all human rights and for two decades Israel has refused the Arab refugees' repeated requests to be allowed to return to their land.

At first the expelled and afflicted Palestinian people looked to the United Nations to resolve their tragedy. However, twenty years have passed, and this international organisation has not yet solved their problem. Moreover, its many resolutions stating that the refugees should be allowed to return to their country or receive compensation have never been implemented. All this time, Israel has continued to elaborate and perfect her expansionist plans. These plans found expression in the 1956 Tripartite Aggression, when Israel occupied Sinai and the Gaza Strip for four months in defiance of the United Nation's admonitions calling on her to withdraw. They were once again disclosed beyond all shadow of doubt after the June aggression, when Israel occupied and boasted of her unlawful annexation of the West Bank of the Jordan River, the Gaza Strip, the southern part of Syria and the holy city of Jerusalem in defiance of all international law and with utter contempt for the Charter of the United Nations, the Geneva Conventions and the Declaration of Human Rights. Today the United Nations has revealed its inability

to impose a just solution of the Palestinian tragedy, by failing to reach agreement concerning the withdrawal of the aggressor from the occupied territories.

The suffering and frustration of the Palestinian People over the years gave rise to a new, truly popular, dynamic Palestinian liberation movement which was an expression of the people's revolt against the Israeli invaders. *Fateh* (the Palestine National Liberation Movement) which had been obliged to operate clandestinely in the occupied territories, began in 1956 to carry out overt guerrilla operations, sabotaging Israeli military and strategic installations in order to weaken and unnerve the oppressor who was threatening our people's very existence as a nation and menacing the entire Arab World. Until the June 1967 aggression, these operations—which immediately received the enthusiastic support of Palestinian Arabs throughout the Arab World—had to be carried on from outside. However, the Six Day War and the catastrophic effects it had on the entire Palestinian population inside and outside Israel, brought about a new situation in their struggle to liberate their homeland. Because of the new frontiers that Israel claims she is entitled to, the Palestinians found themselves confronting a common Zionist enemy entirely within the territorial boundaries of former Palestine. Moreover, the operation of Fascist repression which Israel began to carry out against the Arab inhabitants after the cease-fire, engendered a resistance movement similar to that in Vietnam. Israel herself admits the existence of this popular rebellion against repression, for Israeli spokesmen can no longer deny or ignore its manifestations.

Immediately after the aggression, *Fateh* began clandestinely organising the Arab people in the newly occupied as well as the previously occupied territories, and encouraged them to have confidence in their own ability to liberate their homeland. Led by their vanguard, the Palestine National Liberation Movement *Fateh*, they are now resisting an enemy of vastly superior military strength by every means at their disposal: strikes, non-cooperation, boycotts of Israeli goods, denunciation of repressive measures and annexation etc. In cooperation with *Fateh*, political

and religious personalities have refused to implement the enemy's decrees, teachers have refused to reopen the schools and school-children are staying away from classes so long as their homeland is dominated by this hostile power.

During this post-aggression period, *Fateh's* military armed wing, *Al-Asifa*, has also been intensifying its military and sabotage operations against Israeli installations, including military camps and stores, electric power plants and railways, in order to undermine the enemy's economy and weaken his ability to dominate our people. The Israeli industrial plants, printing-presses, administrative centres and paramilitary kibbutzim that are now being implanted in the newly-occupied areas are also being attacked by *Fateh's* commandos, who are causing severe damage and heavy casualties, and increasing tension in Israel. Our people have realised that no other course is open to them if they are not to live in slavery.

The occupation of all Palestine by Israel has made possible one of *Fateh's* most important long-range objectives—the transference of all its military bases into the occupied homeland. This transfer has now been completed. From these many well-hidden, well-stocked bases, Palestinian commandos—most of them dedicated peasants and students—are now operating dozens of times daily throughout the old and newly occupied areas. No part of Israel, no Israeli installation, no Israeli target is out of their reach, and the Israeli regime may henceforth expect the steadily increasing disruption of its colonialist presence in the weeks and months to come. This undermining of the Zionist-Israeli presence will continue until Palestine has been restored to its rightful owners, the Palestine Arabs, who have lived in this land alongside a Jewish minority uninterruptedly for 4,000 years.

Fateh, the Palestine National Liberation Movement, wishes to point out, however, that its operations—which today enjoy the support of the entire Palestinian people—are in no way aimed at the Jewish people as such, with whom they lived in harmony in the past for so many centuries. Nor does it intend to throw them into the sea. This resistance and the liberation movement that *Fateh* is coordinating is aimed solely at the Zionist-military-Fascist regime which has

usurped our homeland and expelled and repressed our two million people, condemning them to a life of destitution and misery.

Fateh also wishes to correct once and for all the Zionist insinuation that this “terrorist” movement is inspired and directed from outside, by such countries as Syria, Jordan and Algeria. Under the conditions existing in the Middle East today, no such foreign-imposed “movement” could survive, for it would soon be rejected by the people. On the contrary, the Palestinian people's liberation movement has arisen from their desperate frustration and profound aspirations for liberty, justice and dignity in their own historical homeland. To this it owes its strength.

The world should recall that those who have suffered most of all from the existence of Israel for the last two decades are the Palestinian people. And the world should note that those who are today taking up arms to engage wholeheartedly, unitedly and courageously in combating the brutal Israeli oppressor in guerrilla warfare, under the leadership of *Fateh*, are the Palestinian people. Their reaction to the napalm bombings, strafings, evictions, summary executions, plundering, brutality, imprisonment, desecration, violations and countless other crimes of Fascist Israel in recent months, has been this spontaneous people's armed upsurge in defence of their dignity and their usurped rights. The movement *Fateh* is leading is the organised expression of this people's liberation struggle, counterparts of which are to be found throughout the world, wherever Fascist and imperialist aggression is being perpetrated—in Vietnam, South Africa, Angola, Bolivia or elsewhere. In occupied Palestine, as in these countries, ordinary humble, subjugated people are taking up arms in self-defence and for the eventual liberation of their homeland.

Today the Arab people of Palestine have decided to take their destiny into their own hands. Today, with their arms and their courage, they are recovering their own lost dignity. Tomorrow, after a cruel struggle in which many will meet their deaths—a struggle which will undoubtedly have the support of the entire Arab liberation movement and the progressive peoples of the world—they will recover their beloved homeland, Palestine. *Fateh* and the entire Palestinian people believe in their just cause and their ultimate

victory. And they also know that on the day the flag of Palestine is hoisted over their freed, democratic, peaceful land, a new era will begin in which the Palestinian Jews will again live in harmony side by side with the original owners of the land, the Arab Palestinians.

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The Jordanian Communist Party's View on the Requirements of the Present Situation and the Nature of the Conflict.¹ [Excerpts]

February 4, 1968

Certainly the resolution adopted by the Security Council on November 22, 1967 on the situation in the Middle East was not that sought by the Arab countries and the allied and friendly countries. Despite its shortcomings and gaps, however, this resolution is a significant first step, which should not be underestimated, in the battle of the Arab peoples to eliminate the consequences of the colonialist-Israeli aggression...

Although the reservations of the Arab countries and of various national and progressive forces with respect to the Security Council resolution are justifiable, its absolute rejection is unacceptable. Such an attitude would obstruct all the serious and genuine efforts that are being made by the Arab countries themselves and by their friends, particularly the Soviet Union and the other Socialist countries, to make the best use of the United Nations, the Security Council, and world public opinion for ensuring the elimination of the consequences of the aggression as soon as possible and the restoration of peace to the area.

...The conflict with the imperialist Zionist enemy will be long, complex, and many-sided. It would be a grave mistake to believe that milit-

ary action is the one and only means of eliminating the consequences of the aggression. There is nothing the forces hostile to the Arab peoples would like more, at the present juncture, than to drag the Arabs into a new military encounter, which would enable the aggressors to achieve further gains.

The interests of the Arab peoples, their common struggle against imperialism and neo-colonialism to ensure the elimination of the consequences of the aggression, demand that Arab solidarity should be maintained, strengthened and constantly developed, regardless of divergences in social systems and differences of opinion on certain subjects. We must close all doors in the face of forces hostile to the Arab peoples and of the inveterately reactionary Arab forces that are now bestirring themselves to destroy Arab solidarity.

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Memorandum by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine "PFLP" to the Second Conference of the Arab Journalists' Union on the Strategy of Armed Struggle.² [Excerpts]

February 10, 1968

Firstly: ...the PFLP adopts a decisive attitude as regards the principle of peace settlements, which is a euphemism for bargaining and half-solutions. This attitude which, essentially, is an expression of the will of the steadfast Palestinian people throughout a period stretching over half a century, rests upon a profound conviction that popular struggle of whatever shape or form can, if it is steadfast, continuous and constantly escalated, achieve final victory for the just cause of the Palestinian people.

¹ *Al-Akhbar* (Beirut), 4/2/1968. According to the daily *Al-Akhbar*, this political analysis was published in the first issue (Jan. 1968) of the journal *Al-Taqqadum*, mouthpiece of the Central Committee of the Jordanian Communist Party.

² Archives of the Institute for Palestine Studies. The Conference was held in Cairo and opened on February 10, 1968.

Secondly: the Arab people in Palestine expressed their rejection of the Zionist invasion in form and content long before the 1948 disaster and, to defend their cause, for which they have made countless sacrifices, they have fought scores of battles, in which they have resorted to all forms of struggle and political, economic and armed resistance.

However, the long road of Palestinian struggle has always been beset with difficulties, obstacles and reverses, not all of which have resulted from the blows levelled against it by the alliance of Zionism and colonialism. Some were the result of the character of the Palestinian and Arab leaderships at the time and of their political conception of the field and scope of the battle.

This conception, added to the absence of an explicit revolutionary strategy, led to fluctuations and interruptions in the armed struggle most conspicuously during and after the 1936 Revolt. It was also manifested in the notions held regarding the close interdependence of Palestinian and Arab destinies, which caused a series of rifts in the Arab-Palestinian front through which the colonialist-Zionist alliance succeeded in penetrating, to deal repeated violent blows at the advance of the Palestinian people, culminating in the disaster of 1948.

During the period between the signing of the Arab-Israeli Armistice Agreements in 1949 and June 4, 1967, the Palestinian national movement was once more called on to face a new type of challenge—a challenge of the utmost gravity. In addition to the dispersion and fragmentation which had prevailed in Palestinian society for twenty years, the old leaderships collapsed without there being new youthful leaderships to replace them. Palestinian groups trying to work out the new form the struggle was to take were suppressed and dispersed in several Arab countries. The successive developments which have convulsed Arab political life during the last twenty years, have been reflected in the Palestinian groups, many of which have been aware, in one way or another, of the fundamental links between the Palestine problem and other Arab problems, and have therefore always sought to discover a pattern of struggle that would link the task of the Palestinian people to the responsibilities of the Arab nation as regards the Palestine problem.

These elements and others, the details of which it is not the object of this memorandum to enter into, are, in effect, the public expression of the contradictions, pressures and restrictions that the Palestinian national movement has been subject to in its continued attempts to give voice to its aspirations and to realise them in accordance with the dictates of the national conscience.

It was against this background with all the burdens, duties and restrictions it involved, that the June 5 disaster took place, bringing once again in its train untold hardships to the Palestinian people. The whole of the territory of Palestine was now usurped by Israel; the greater portion of the people, dispersed and displaced, now became captives as well. The battle underwent a change both in character and extent at a time when the Palestinian people were still, largely, in a state of helplessness as a result of exile, repression, dispersion and the absence of a unified revolutionary command capable of directing their advance and drawing up clear outlines for their strategy.

Thirdly: Nevertheless, sooner than most people expected, the Palestinian people, through their revolutionary groups, expressed their rejection of submission and occupation, their insistence on the pursuit of their heroic struggle and their determination to achieve their objectives.

This expression assumed the progressive form of struggle, namely armed resistance.

The credit for this initiative belongs to the Palestinian people, whose unshaken steadfastness provided a basis for the unleashing of armed resistance, which has found its expression in its fighting units, and in its martyrs, who, with unequalled self-sacrifice, have mapped out the road of armed struggle.

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Memorandum by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine "PFLP" to the Second Conference of the Arab Journalists' Union on the Tasks of the Arab Press.¹ [Excerpt]

February 10, 1968

7. The Arab press must adopt a firm and clear attitude against "anti-semitism". In our opinion, there is an "unwritten alliance" between "anti-semitism" as a racist movement based on discrimination, and "Zionism" as a Jewish racist movement practising discrimination against the Arabs and committing acts of aggression against their homeland. We need not here recall that it was the persecution of Jews in Europe that led to the great waves of Jewish emigration to Palestine. Without this persecution it would not have been possible for the Zionist movement to secure the immigration of such vast numbers of Jews into Palestine. It speaks well for the Arabs that they are among the very few nations that have not practised any form of pressure or persecution against Judaism as a religion or against the Jews as a people.

In this connection we give warning of the evil consequences of spreading any form of rightist racist propaganda. This can only serve the interests of Zionism by providing it with material for attacking the Arabs and accusing them of joining with the forces of "anti-semitism"—a fact as baseless as it is misleading.

8. We regard it as both essential and advantageous that firm relations should be established with foreign correspondents in the Arab world, and we also feel that foreign reporters should be invited to visit our countries and become acquainted with our problems. While some major world press organisations may be suspicious of contacts obtained through government or embassy channels, they will certainly welcome contacts offered by Arab journalists, since the fact that they are colleagues provides them with common ground.

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Statement by Inhabitants of the West Bank on Attempts to Judaize Jerusalem and Split the Jordanian Entity.²

February 13, 1968

The usurping enemy is persisting in his evil attempts to harvest the fruit of his iniquitous aggression; he is redoubling his efforts to split the unity of Jordan by tearing the West Bank from the East Bank. Furthermore, the danger of the Palestine problem being liquidated, in the interests of imperialism and Zionism, is growing greater. Recent developments of a critical nature in the field of this sacred cause include provocative statements on the way in which the problem can be solved.

In view of the above, we, the undersigned inhabitants of the West Bank of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, regard it as our duty to our beloved country, to the cause of Palestine and to higher Arab interests, to acquaint public opinion with our position on this issue and to speak out frankly on our countrymen's feelings.

1. The Jordanian Entity:

In insisting that the unconditional withdrawal of Jewish forces from the West Bank, the city of Jerusalem and the rest of occupied Arab territory is absolutely imperative, we affirm our absolute adherence to the Jordanian entity and our solicitude for the safety of the unity of its two Banks, the eastern and western, and declare our determination to maintain this unity and to resist all plans designed to sever it.

The enemy's continued attempts to undermine the Jordanian entity and his plans to establish a petty artificial state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip we condemn in the strongest terms, and shall oppose them with all our strength and with true determination.

Our people, who have been burnt by the fire of Zionism and seared by its artifices for half a century, know the enemy and his methods and intentions far better than the other Arabs, so that they can never be taken in by the stratagems that lie behind the enemy's schemes and manoeuvres, by the untruths of his propaganda or by

¹ Archives of the Institute for Palestine Studies.

² *Al-Dustur* (Amman), 13/2/1968.

his deceitful projects. We feel sure that our brothers who, inspired as they are by the noblest patriotic sentiments as they man their posts in the beloved homeland, have provided such a splendid example of steadfastness in the field and of resistance in the face of aggression, as will foil the schemes of the enemy and thwart his policies, and we consider that to cooperate with these policies or to keep silent about them, is a betrayal of the Arabs and their national interests.

2. *Jerusalem:*

As regards Jerusalem, we insist absolutely on its Arab character, and demand that the status it enjoyed before the iniquitous Israeli aggression of June, 1967, be restored. We hereby declare our categorical rejection of, and opposition to any attempt to internationalise it, for in our view the internationalisation of Jerusalem is only another word for its Judaisation.

We feel the utmost indignation at, and protest in the strongest terms against, the attempts the enemy is making and the measures he is taking to "Judaise" the Holy City and to annex it to that illegitimate and alien entity called Israel. We strongly condemn the Jews' continued aggressions against the holy places, Arab lands and Islamic *Waqfs* in the Eternal City. We call upon all believers, and upon all Arabs and Muslims, to start working in earnest to liberate the Holy City, the Aqsa Mosque and all the holy places from Zionist control and Israeli occupation.

3. *The Palestinian Cause:*

We affirm our concern for the safety of the cause of Palestine, our firm support for the known national claims of its people, and our commitment to the objectives of their National Charter, which they formulated of their own free will, and have protected with their hearts and souls and watered with their blood throughout a glorious struggle, the fame of which has spread far and wide. We further declare our determination to continue our resistance to the plan that has been made for the liquidation of the Palestinian cause and our opposition to any project leading to or involving the liquidation of this cause.

Because we believe that the only sound solution for this great and fateful Arab cause is

one that is built on a foundation of right, justice and the principle of self-determination, and that is compatible with real Arab interests—which derive from purely national considerations and are linked to the history of Arabism and Islam—we reject all efforts and attempts to resolve the Palestine problem on the basis of the *fait accompli* or of so-called peaceful coexistence and the myth which maintains that there is a distinction between the alien Jewish entity and the Zionist movement. We affirm our rejection of such efforts and our opposition to their objectives.

4. *The Palestinian Arab People:*

We believe that the ideal course for the liberation of Palestine from foreign occupation is that of authentic struggle. The Palestinian Arab people, wherever they may be, have a natural right to fulfil their sacred duty of defending their homeland and of seeking to recover it in sound and sincere cooperation with all Arabs and all Arab countries, and in accordance with a comprehensive plan of action unanimously approved by the Arabs. We appeal to those who formulate official Arab policy to provide the Palestinian people with opportunities for sound and serious action under the control of a Palestinian organisation, to be established in a genuinely democratic manner, so that it may be the free expression and genuine embodiment of the will of the people. If this is the case Palestinians will be unanimous in recognising it and rallying round it, so that it will be able to perform its task unhampered by dissension and strife and in cooperation with all Arabs and all Arab countries, thereby enabling the Palestine cause to find its proper level.

Since unity of ranks is a source of great strength for Palestinian national action, we call upon all Palestinians, wherever they are living, to cooperate and help one another. We appeal to them to unite in thought and action, and thereby achieve the unity of Palestinian Arab ranks on a basis of national interest alone.

5. *The Muslim World:*

We regard the cause of Palestine—the first and foremost cause of the Arabs—as also being the cause of Islam throughout the world, owing to the ties of history, brotherhood and interest

that bind the Muslims to the Arabs. Moreover, some of the greatest shrines of Islam are in Palestine, not to mention the fact that the enemy is waging against Arabs and Muslims alike a war that is racist and religious as well as political, economic and ideological.

We therefore call upon Muslims everywhere to feel serious concern for the Palestine cause. We appeal to them to redouble their efforts to defend this cause with determination and conviction and to lose no time in taking actions by liberal donations, sacrifice and *jihad*, to liberate the whole of Palestine from Jewish occupation.

As for us, we pledge ourselves before God and man to continue in the performance of our national duties in accordance with the principles outlined above. We shall employ every possible means to get in contact with our fellow citizens in their homeland and in their places of exile with the object of attaining our national objective and realising our aspirations to achieve unanimity and unity of ranks.

In conclusion, we salute His Majesty King Hussein of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, expressing our profound thanks and sincere gratitude for the praiseworthy efforts he has always made, with such sincerity and conviction, such resoluteness and determination, on behalf of the homeland, of Arabism and of Islam, beseeching Almighty God to grant him all success.

Signatures:

Jerusalem District:

Emile al-Ghuri, Deputy, Jerusalem;
Muhy al-Din al-Husaini, Jerusalem;
Jiryis Khalif, Ahmad Ali al-Husaini; Isam
Elias al-Salti and Karim Kamel al-Husaini.

Ramallah District:

Abd al-Salam al-Uri, Deputy, Ramallah.
and
Ali Daud al-Rumhi, Deputy from Ramallah.

Bethlehem District:

Hanna Farah Bannura, Deputy, Bethlehem
and
Hafez Yusuf Khamis, Deputy, Bethlehem

Jericho District:

Mahmud Sa'id and Isa Ahmad Khamis.

Nablus District:

Farid Fakhr al-Din; Fallah Sa'd al-Ursan, Shaikh of the Saqr tribe; Hasan Ibrahim Darwish, Mayor of North Asiran; Ibrahim Beiruti, Mayor of Aqarba; Hasan Musa Mustafa, Mayor of Qublan; Auda Abd al-Qader al-Ashqar, Mayor of Kafr Qudum; Muhammad Hasan Abdullah; Ibrahim Muhammad Hamada; Muhammad Abd al-Hadi Fakhr al-Din; Mahmud Hilu Bakr and Fauzi Saleh Abd al-Rahman.

Jenin District:

Muhammad Taher al-Kailani, Deputy, Jenin; Fariz Mahmud Jarrar and Abd al-Latif Khalil, Mayor of Hujjab.

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Interview Granted by the Moroccan King Hasan II to the French Magazine Paris Match.¹ [Excerpts]

Ifran, February 14, 1968

Q. Allow me, Your Majesty, to present you with some questions of an international nature. Do you believe that we are witnessing at present an important Soviet infiltration into the Mediterranean and the Middle East?

A. Taking into consideration the means a country such as Morocco has to evaluate international problems, our opinion can only be a personal one. With the outbreak of the Bolshevik movement in 1917, Russia managed to break down that kind of fence surrounding her. It has become natural to see her appear in the Mediterranean. It is an important event, if not extraordinary, since it (? has been Russia's) greatest dream to enter the Mediterranean. Will this lead to better or worse? I cannot pass any judgement on this. But in view of the present trend of the socialist States, I do not believe that there is any danger threatening us in the present circumstances.

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¹ Rabat home service in Arabic 13.15 GMT, 14/2/1968. B.B.C. ME/2698/A/1.

Q. How do you view the Soviet Union's Arab policy as a whole?

A. The Soviet Union's Arab policy is the result of the Americans taking the place of Britain, an operation at which the Americans have not excelled. The British withdrew from the Middle East (? while remaining there). This is the chance that Soviet policy seized. It played its role very well. It relied on something that Arab hearts feel, namely, patriotism and dignity. Money is of no value. If I were in the place of the Kremlin leaders, I would have pursued the same policy.

Q. What is Your Majesty's opinion on the US policy towards the Arab States?

A. The USA has followed a policy sometimes very warm and sometimes extremely cool. The US policy needed the continuity for which it had been known for so long. It was a tumultuous policy; on other occasions it was also (? somewhat) sharp. It was not easy for it to pursue one policy because the Middle East experienced several changes. It was enough that one country or another should ask for war equipment, to be given quantities more than needed.

Q. If we may broach the Israeli crisis, do you object to the right of existence of the Israeli State?

A. Not at all, but I am of the opinion that those who created the State of Israel put it in the wrong place. The establishers of Israel had a free field. The British Empire at that time, when the sun never set on it, had the freedom of choice.

Q. If we view the question with some realism, what are the circumstances under which it appears to you that the Arab States should recognise Israel's right to existence?

A. I blame a great number of my brothers, Heads of State of the Arab countries, for taking up the role of advisers without bearing the consequences. As far as I am concerned, I cannot pass an appropriate judgement since I am 4,000 km. from the crisis area; moreover, I have not lost anything. Had I been defeated militarily, I would have reserved the freedom of action to

liberate my country. Morocco's situation has not changed at all. I have no advice to offer. I am on the side of the countries which have been attacked. I do not make myself a judge, to pass laws on events taking place 4,000 kms. from my kingdom.

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Speech by the U.A.R. President Nasser Welcoming Representatives of the Arab Press.¹ [Excerpts]

Cairo, February 15, 1968

We were defeated by Israel and those who are behind Israel. They say that two million Israelis defeated one hundred million Arabs. But in fact this is an exaggeration; two million Israelis does not really mean two million Israelis, for Israel represents both Israel and those who are behind her. Three years ago the American Foreign Minister came to me with a letter from President Johnson, asking me to do several things: we were to suspend atomic research, stop the expansion of our armed forces, bring military programmes to a standstill and give America the right to carry out inspection inside our country to make sure that these demands were being complied with. We were also to stop all activity outside our frontiers. By activity was meant work for the cause of Arab nationalism and Arab freedom—the point in question then being the Yemen. When I refused to comply, I was told that America would arm Israel; she had not entered the arms race, nevertheless America would arm Israel and would not allow the Arabs to gain superiority over Israel. This took place three years ago. I was also told by the Foreign Minister, speaking for Johnson, that if we abused America, America would give Israel more arms. Thus, when we speak of Israel, Israel is not two million Israelis only; Israel is Israel and those who are behind her. And, when we speak of a hundred million Arabs, we do not have at our actual

¹ *Al-Ahram* (Cairo), 16/2/1968.

command a hundred million Arabs; in fact we have not mobilised Arab forces. It is an exaggeration to say that there are a hundred million Arabs against two million Israelis. This is something we have to take into account. The defeat suffered by the Arab nation was inflicted by Israel and those who are behind Israel. In war, it is money and economics that make it possible to get arms, and Israel obtained arms free of charge.

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When the Revolution took place, we were told by America that if we minded our own business inside Egypt and had nothing to do with the Arabs outside, America would help us. We refused because we believe that the Arab nation is one, and that whatever happens in any Arab country affects the whole Arab nation. If any Arab state falls under colonialist influence, the same is bound to happen to the rest of the Arab nation. We have therefore pursued an Arab policy, regarding ourselves as part of the Arab nation. We have not submitted either to threats or bribes, we have not agreed to anything that meant surrendering our principles, and we believe that this is in the interests of Egypt and the interests of the entire Arab world.

And now of course the psychological warfare has the same aims as it had in 1955 and after.

Egypt must mind her own business; she must have nothing to do with Arab policies or affairs. This means that we should all fall into the grip of neo-colonialism, which seeks, by isolating the Arab countries, to dominate them one by one and to draw them into spheres of influence. Of course there are people who say that Egypt and Nasser are responsible for what happened on June 5. We do not deny our responsibility; we simply say that we tried to do our duty, a duty imposed by our Arabism and our national consciousness. It was not we who were threatened before June 5. On May 14 it was Syria that was threatened, when Eshkol said "We shall march on Damascus", and Rabin said "We shall march on Damascus if the commandos are not stopped". We could have kept quiet, and left Syria to face Israel alone. But this was contrary to our principles and contrary to our beliefs, for in our opinion the Arab destiny is one, so that if there is an

attack on Syria, we shall be the next to be attacked, and then some other Arab country. So we did our duty, we did what our principles dictated. It was no disgrace that we lost a battle as long as we did our duty. But it would have been shameful if we had shirked our responsibilities, if we had kept silent, if we had closed our ears and eyes to threats against another Arab country. Now seven months have passed since the reverse, seven months since the defeat, but we have great hopes for the future. Why? Because the people are still holding fast to their principles.

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The will of the Arab nation will prevail. The armies of the Arab nations have sustained defeat, but the Arab will has not. The Israeli leaders have said this.

Today we hear threats from Israel. Israel is receiving arms from the United States of America and raising funds. They have raised the sum of 500 million dollars and bought arms. All this means that we must work and plan for the future, that we must bring the Arab nation together and really pool our resources. So far, there has not been any real pooling of Arab resources.

Shall I have to enter the battle alone in the future? No, for this is the battle of the whole Arab nation. Every man must contribute what he can, like the man who sent five dollars. The Arab countries can contribute by sending one soldier, one gun, one plane, one pound, by sending anything.

This is indeed how we can achieve Arab unanimity and how we can avert defeat and surrender. Some people are for surrender; it's no use, they say; defeat is inevitable; that's what we said long ago; we can do nothing. But this is something we refuse to contemplate in any shape or form.

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290

Letter From the Libyan Premier Al-Bakkush to the Head of the Arab Higher Committee for Palestine Amin al-Husaini on the Internationalisation of Jerusalem.¹ [Excerpt]**Tripoli, February 15, 1968**

... Your Eminence, I do not need to assure you of the Libyan government's determination to make all necessary efforts and to employ all positive means, in the international field and at all levels, to uphold the rights of the Palestinian people and to protect the shrines of Islam in the Holy Land from Zionist domination. There is no need to call attention here to the attitudes adopted by the Libyan Government throughout all the various phases and circumstances of the Palestinian problem. Libya has ever been ready to stand, with all her resources, unreservedly in the ranks of unified action for the achievement of our objective.

The Libyan Government, along with its sister Arab and Muslim states, will persist in its opposition to the idea of the internationalisation of the city of Jerusalem. It will strive with all its energy and resources to thwart and defeat such a step.

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291

Message of King Hussein to the Jordanian People.² [Excerpt]**Amman, February 16, 1968**

Today as we pursue our arduous way, united in action and heart, shaping Arab honour, and, as has ever been our wont, fighting the battle of the entire destiny of the Arab nation, we offer with the utmost readiness unstinted sacrifice on behalf of our nation and our cause, and stand

¹ *Palastin* (Beirut), No. 87, June 1968, p. 9. Mr. Amin al-Husaini is also the Chairman of the Islamic World Congress.

² *Al-Dustur* (Amman), 17/2/1968. The message was delivered following an Israeli attack on Jordan on February 15, 1968. [Ed.]

in the Arab vanguard carrying the heavy burdens it is our lot to bear. Having assumed full responsibility for the command of my country and my people, and being aware of the true nature and import of that responsibility, I will not suffer anyone to provide the enemies of my country and nation with further vain and groundless pretexts, or to supply them with arguments which they can use to confound and mislead the world.

Jordan has never agreed and never will agree to allow anything to take place on its soil which does not conform to Arab higher interests and promote the Arabs' foremost cause: their sacred right to Palestine.

The enemy has been wont to fabricate charges and claims against us, but we shall refuse to afford him opportunities for the continued realisation of his designs and ambitions.

There are none here in this land who can instruct us in patriotism or boast that they are superior to us in loyalty or aspirations, and no one anywhere can claim to have better leadership, a better people or a better army than we have. It would be better for whoever is so inclined to stick to his own walk of life and work in his own field; he will then find that we have outstripped and surpassed him by far.

All action that is loyal and purposeful must emanate from and operate within the framework of what we prescribe, plan and propose.

We call upon all who are anxious to fulfil their obligations sincerely and honestly to advance with us along the road from which we shall never swerve—the road of planned and organised action which will lead us to the recovery of our rights, our lands and our city of Jerusalem, the Jerusalem of the Arabs and the Muslims. All this we have promised to the Arabs and Muslims, and we shall achieve it or perish in the attempt.

We hereby disown all those who ignore this attitude of ours, arrogating to themselves the right to pursue a course other than ours, by passing our door which is ever open to all who sincerely and loyally feel deep concern for the battle, for they do not belong to us, nor we to them; they have not the remotest connection with the cause, and we shall oppose them with all our strength and all our resolution.

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292

Policy Statement by the Lebanese Premier Al-Yafi.¹ [Excerpt]**Beirut, February 16, 1968**

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Lebanon now finds herself on the front lines in the battle that is being fought against an alien racist religious domination which will be remembered by history as one of the most heinous phenomena of the twentieth century in its flouting of justice and its desecration of human rights and dignity. She must perforce declare her resolve to remain true to her obligations to her Arab brethren and to those in the world who join us in the service of the cause of right and justice. In defending the Arabs' rights to Palestine, and in joining hands with the other Arab countries in dislodging the enemy from the territory occupied after June 5, and in the defence of what is not only Arab by right but also sacred in the sight of heaven, Lebanon will also be defending herself and fighting for the cause of justice, freedom and human dignity.

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293

Statement by the Defendant Colonel Abd al-Khaleq on Events Preceding the June War of 1967.² [Excerpt]**Cairo, February 19, 1968**

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*Abd al-Khaleq:*³ He started off by saying that there were rumours going around to the effect that I was sick and had suffered a breakdown; whereas, as you can see, I am neither sick nor have I had a breakdown. He then went on to

the business on hand, saying that we had moved up our forces as a result of the threats against Syria. We had not expected a war, he said, but one event had led to another, and the United Nations peace-keeping force had been withdrawn all of a sudden. This had made the task of the armed forces more difficult, as they weren't sufficiently prepared for an attack. We were then surprised by the fact that the attack did take place, and by the technological superiority of Israel, made possible by the U.S.A. by virtue of which Israel gained control of the battle.

Their objective was to trap our forces in Sinai.

Shafe'i: Naturally you were merely an audience to this.⁴ Nevertheless, in view of the fact that you have brought up what may well be one of the most serious topics to come up in court, or to be recorded in history—this matter, this decision to ask for the withdrawal of the United Nations peace-keeping force, was taken after a meeting with the Field Marshal. The President decided at that meeting that the country which was the host of the United Nations peace-keeping force had the right to withdraw from that capacity at any time on the strength of the fact the territory is Egyptian territory, knowing that the probability of there being a reaction to this was between 50% and 80%. The Field Marshal was at the meeting, and did not comment except to express his full consent. The operation that took place was no surprise.

The decision was taken on the above basis. Had the Field Marshal expressed any objection or made any remark at that meeting, both the measures taken and their consequences could have been avoided.

I only say this as a comment on the gravest topic to be raised in this case.

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¹ *Al-Nahar* (Beirut), 17/2/1968.

² *Al-Ahram* (Cairo), 20/2/1968. Colonel Hilmi Abd al-Khaleq was tried with a group of officers and civilians on the charge of attempting to seize power in the U.A.R. in 1967. See also *post*, doc. 298.

³ "He" refers to Field Marshal Abd al-Hakim Amer, ex-Vice President and Commander-in-Chief of the U.A.R.

⁴ The speaker is Mr. Husain Shafe'i, President of the Court.

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Appeal by the "Save Jerusalem Committee" to World Public Opinion.¹**Amman, February 21, 1968**

The Conference attended by prominent personalities in the fields of thought, politics and opinion, representatives of Islamic and Christian organisations, representatives of the doctors, lawyers and engineers federations, the trades unions, women's organisations, commercial and industrial organisations, industrialists, the Presidents of the Senate and of Parliament, and a number of Jordanian Ministers, which was convened in Amman on 21 February, 1968² having discussed the changes, including construction work, which the Israeli authorities have made, and are still making, with the object of "Judaising" the Arab City of Jerusalem, hereby directs this appeal to world public opinion:

The rulers of Israel have been vociferously and falsely proclaiming to the world, that all they desire is peace, and that they have no intention of further expansion, and that Israel is a free and democratic country. However, they have revealed that what they really intend is further expansion, not only by their persistent refusal to withdraw from the recently occupied Arab territories, but also by their extremely dangerous and criminal policy.

The emergency session of the General Assembly of the United Nations issued two resolutions in July, 1967,³ condemning the annexation of the Arab city of Jerusalem to Israel as illegitimate, and the Security Council has unanimously passed a resolution calling for the withdrawal of Israeli forces.⁴ Moreover, the Charter of the United Nations outlaws annexation. Regardless of all this, the Zionist authorities are now putting into effect their plan to "Judaize" the Arab City of Jerusalem. They have appropriated Arab lands and buildings to provide accommodation

for tens of thousands of Jews. They are proceeding with measures designed to dissolve, abolish or impair all Arab and Islamic institutions in Jerusalem. They have abrogated all civil legislation that was in force before the war and substituted the Israeli laws that were in force in Israel before the war, contrary to the customs and wishes of the international community. They have abolished the municipality of Arab Jerusalem and all Arab government departments, substituting a Jewish municipality and Jewish departments. They have demolished entire quarters of the city and dozens of buildings both inside and outside the city walls. They have dispersed hundreds of Jerusalem families which have lived in Jerusalem for centuries. They have desecrated Muslim and Christian holy places, in particular the Aqsa Mosque and the Church of the Holy Sepulchre. They have demolished mosques and churches, including the Buraq Mosque, the Maghareba Mosque and the Syrian Catholic Church.

The Israeli policy of Judaisation and the outrages it involves knows no bounds. The Zionist authorities are preparing to seize the Haram al-Sharif, on the pretext that it is the site of Solomon's Temple; they have already raised the Israeli flag over the Dome of the Rock. They are planning to place Islamic Sharia Courts and Islamic *Waqfs* in Jerusalem under the jurisdiction and control of the Israeli Ministry for Religious Affairs. They are imposing extremely harsh economic conditions which must inevitably lead to the bankruptcy of Arab business firms in Jerusalem, particularly those engaged in the tourist industry, having already isolated Jerusalem from the other parts of the West Bank by setting up barriers and imposing customs duties.

We therefore appeal to the conscience of the world which has always been moved by human misery and suffering, and which, just as it was revolted by Nazism and Fascism, will never condone occupation, the uprooting of peoples from their homelands, the dispersal of women, children and old people, or the affliction of the human spirit.

We appeal to every Arab who glories in his patriotism, the dignity of his nation and its glorious history of culture and civilisation, who aspires to rebuild a progressive, flourishing, united Arab

¹ *Al-Dustur* (Amman), 24/2/1968.

² This Conference announced the establishment of the "Save Jerusalem Committee."

³ U.N. docs. A/RES/2253 and 2254 (ES-V), July 4 and 14, 1967, respectively, texts in *International Documents on Palestine, 1967*, pp. 256, 260.

⁴ U.N. doc. S/RES/242, November 22, 1967, text *ibid.*, pp. 268-269.

society, so that the Arab nation may work with all peoples of the world in the service of the welfare and prosperity of mankind.

We appeal to every Muslim in the Islamic World, to him who believes in the words of the Quran: "Glory be to Him who caused his servant to go by night from the Holy Mosque in Mecca to the Aqsa Mosque, whose ground we have hallowed", and in the words of the Prophet: "Travel only to three mosques, the Holy Mosque at Mecca, this, my Mosque, and the Aqsa Mosque", and who is grieved at heart to see Jerusalem, the city of the Prophet's Night Journey, and the Aqsa Mosque, the first of the two "qiblas", in the hands of the evil Zionists.

We appeal to the Christian world, which believes in the Message of Peace, and whose faith is centred on the birthplace of Christ, the Apostle of Peace.

We appeal to every country that opposes tyranny and oppression, to all progressive and nationalist bodies and organisations in the world, to all free and honourable men who resist oppression and champion the cause of right and justice, wherever they may be. We appeal to everyone who is ready to fight for the dignity of man to prevent, in every part of the world, such collective massacres as the Zionist invaders of the sacred territory of Arab Palestine have perpetrated in the past and are perpetrating today under the protection of world imperialism. We appeal to all who are prepared to struggle against the rise of the new Nazi movement, which is embodied in the Zionist movement, and in Israel, the child of world imperialism; to all who are opposed to war, and who strive to bring about a just peace based on the right of a people to live with dignity in its homeland; to all who are ready to fight and struggle until the hour of liberation, and to lay down their lives for the sake of the Holy Land.

The Conference appeals to each and every one of you to open your eyes to the true nature of Zionism and of the state built by the Zionists who are the heirs of Nazism and Fascism, and who are implementing the policy of imperialism against the Arab people. We call upon you to come to the aid of the Palestinian Arab people who are being held prisoners, who have been expelled from their homeland, who have been scattered over the face of the earth and who are

threatened with extinction. We call upon you to stand by the Arab nation and help it to repel imperialist-Israeli violations of its liberty, its dignity and its homeland. We urge you to act rapidly and effectively to compel the rulers of Israel to stop the implementation of their plan to "Judaize" the Arab City of Jerusalem.

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Statement by the Kuwaiti Crown Prince and Premier Jaber al-Ahmad al-Jaber al-Sabah.¹

Kuwait, February 22, 1968

Kuwait is shouldering her responsibilities willingly and confidently. We are ready to sacrifice everything for the sake of Arab endurance and for the confrontation of the common enemy.

We do not think of the magnitude of the responsibilities which Kuwait has undertaken for the sake of the great Arab endeavour, whether it was during the stoppage of the flow of oil for several months or the unexpected losses Kuwait suffered afterwards, following the devaluation of sterling. Kuwait has adhered to the responsibilities deriving from her commitments to the Arab battle of endurance and is proceeding along the path of total solidarity with her Arab brethren, who are linked by a common Arab destiny.

¹ *Al-Ahram* (Cairo), 22/2/1968, special supplement on Kuwait.

296

Recommendations of the Third Conference of Arab Ministers for Education.¹ [Excerpts]**Kuwait, February 22, 1968**

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Recommendation No. 30—Education in Occupied Palestine and the West Bank of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan:

In view of the changes effected by the Zionist occupation authorities in Arab curricula and prescribed books in occupied Palestine, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, and their rewording of many passages in these books, especially where religious instruction is concerned, and in the Holy Koran in particular, as well as in the material relating to national and social studies;

And in view of the fact that such actions violate the principles of UNESCO, which state that education must everywhere respect the national, religious and linguistic traditions of the population;

Furthermore, in view of the fact that the Zionist occupation authorities have set out to bring the whole of education in the City of Jerusalem directly under the jurisdiction of the Israeli Ministry of Education, in keeping with Israel's policy of Judaizing the City of Jerusalem in violation of the United Nations General Assembly resolution on the Holy City;²

And in view of the attempts to which Arab students are being subjected in those territories of Palestine occupied prior to the 5th of June, 1967, to isolate them in their upbringing, education and convictions from the Arab Nation and to fuse them with the alien Zionist society;

And inasmuch as the afore-mentioned authorities have brought pressure to bear on educational bodies and on students in occupied Palestine, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan by subjecting them to torture, imprisonment and causing many of them to emigrate;

On the basis of the above, while saluting the endurance of teachers and students in occupied Palestine, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and expressing its appreciation of the noble attitude they have adopted and their steadfastness in the face of the Zionist occupation, the Conference makes the following recommendations:

1. That the Arab countries should make use of their contacts with UNESCO to put an end to these arbitrary measures on the part of the Zionist occupation authorities, which measures are incompatible with the text of the third paragraph of the resolution adopted by the Executive Council of UNESCO on November 3, 1968, which establishes the principle that education must everywhere respect the national, religious and linguistic traditions of the population.

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Recommendation No. 31—Educational aid and facilities for the Palestinian people in the Gaza Strip and the Occupied Territories and Jordanian Citizens in the West Bank of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan:

In view of the difficult circumstances which many Palestinian students are submitted to in the Gaza Strip, the occupied territories and the West Bank of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan as a consequence of the Zionist colonialist occupation of June 5, 1967, circumstances which threaten to interrupt the education of large numbers of their students;

And since it is the Arab countries that are responsible for these members of our people, the Conference makes the following recommendations to the Secretariat General of the League of Arab States (Cultural Administration).

A. That the special fund established within the framework of the League of Arab States for the support of needy Palestinian students in the Gaza Strip and the occupied territories and the Jordanian students in the West Bank of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, be immediately increased.

B. That the Secretariat General of the League of Arab states be called on to undertake,

¹ Arab League Secretariat, *Resolutions of the Arab League Council*, Cairo, 4-7/3/1968, Annex 3, p. 13. The Conference of the Arab Ministers for Education met from 17 to 22 February, 1968.

² U.N. docs. A/RES/2253 and 2254 (ES-V), July 4 and 14, 1967, respectively, texts in *International Documents on Palestine, 1967*, pp. 256, 260.

in coopération with the appropriate organisations in the member countries, comprehensive studies of the requirements of Palestinian students in the Gaza Strip and the occupied territories, and Jordanian students in the West Bank of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan who have been cut off from their families or the sources of income on which they were dependent for their education. The Secretariat General is further called on to submit an estimate of the funds required, as a preliminary step to such sums being made available by the fund in accordance with principles to be decided on later.

C. That the educational aid and facilities provided by each of the member countries to the Palestinian people in the Gaza Strip and the occupied territories, and the Jordanian people in the West Bank of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, be increased, and that these people be accorded the same treatment, as regards the provision of educational services, as the citizens of those countries where UNRWA does not operate.

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Recommendation No. 35—Educational services provided by UNRWA to the Palestinian refugees:

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The Conference makes the following recommendations:

1. To ensure that UNRWA continues to meet its commitments to educate the Palestinian refugees in the host countries, to attempt to improve and raise the standard of the educational services of UNRWA and ensure that this standard is not lowered.

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4. To ensure that UNRWA keeps to the curricula and the prescribed books approved by the host countries in the schools it administers.

5. To ensure that the educational services provided by UNRWA for Palestinian refugees in the host countries are not exploited for political ends liable to impair the Palestine cause and the rights of the Palestinian people.

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Recommendation No. 36—The Palestine problem as an item of instruction at all educational levels in the Arab countries.

In view of the fact that the Palestine problem is a fateful issue for all members of the Arab nation, and in view of the need to provide instruction on the problem at all educational levels in the Arab countries in order to keep national sentiment alive and to safeguard the destiny of the Arab nation, the Conference makes the following recommendations:

1. That the Arab countries decide to provide instruction on the Palestine problem at all educational levels and that this problem be given priority over all subjects related to national and social studies with a view to keeping it constantly in the minds of students.

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Recommendation No. 37—UNRWA's attitude to the teaching of certain subjects in schools it administers in the host countries.

Having reviewed the action taken by UNRWA in prohibiting the use of certain prescribed books in the host countries, thereby shirking its obligation to enforce curricula and textbooks which have been standard for the past fifteen years, also thereby encroaching upon the sovereignty of the host countries, the Conference makes the following recommendations:

1. That the member Arab States at once adopt a decisive attitude on this issue and explain to UNESCO the consequences of such action.

2. That the host countries take immediate measures to ensure that the prescribed books prohibited by UNRWA be once more made available to students, out of regard for their interests and their future.

3. That the Secretariat-General of the United Nations be informed of this grave violation on the part of UNRWA.

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Statement by the Jordanian Premier Al-Talhuni on the Activities of the Arab Resistance Movement.¹ [Excerpt]

Amman, February 23, 1968

Both the domestic and foreign policies of the Jordanian Government are based on the Royal Letter of Appointment and on the Government's statement of policy, on the basis of which it won a unanimous vote of confidence. The statement of the Minister of Internal Affairs in Irbid was made in his capacity as a private individual. On his return to Amman, we explained to him the Government's attitude. We called his attention to the fact that the Government has a different attitude on this matter, an attitude based on its general lines of policy, and perfectly in keeping with the decisions of the Khartum Conference and with overall coordination with the other Arab countries.²

Jordan is resolved to pursue to the very end this policy which led to the Government's winning a new vote of confidence from Parliament during its last session.

The attitude of the Jordanian Government is constant in all things. What appeared to be a difference of opinion was purely temporary.

The Government is doing everything in its power to provide for the needs of displaced persons from the West Bank and to alleviate their suffering.

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Statement by the Defendant the U.A.R. Ex-War Minister Badran on Events Preceding the June War of 1967.³ [Excerpts]

Cairo, February 24, 1968

Badran: We spoke of the trip to Pakistan. I can still remember it for that was the first time the Sharm al-Shaikh idea came up.

The visit took place either in December 1966 or January 1967; the Field Marshal⁴ went to Pakistan and Salah Nasr⁵ and I went with him. Now, it so happened that at the time, the Defence Council of the Arab League was holding a meeting on the recommendation of the Summit Conference and the meeting was being held in Cairo. Meanwhile, the reactionary Arab countries had centred their campaign against us on the idea that we were keeping the United Nations peace-keeping force there to protect us; that was the theme of the frenzied press campaign at the time.

The Field Marshal came up with the idea that we should do something to put an end to this frenzied campaign. He said that we ought to send a message to the President explaining the idea, that we should ask for the withdrawal of the United Nations peace-keeping force and then occupy Sharm al-Shaikh. He said there were troops all set to do so.

A message was sent to the President, but we received no reply; he was not convinced at the time. I told the Field Marshal that there was something else to consider: if we asked for the withdrawal of the United Nations peace-keeping force a blockade of the Gulf would follow and a war might start. He said No, he didn't mean that we should close the Straits to shipping but merely that we should occupy Sharm al-Shaikh so as not to leave room for anyone to talk. I told him that we should then have to consider blockading the Gulf unless we wanted the frenzied campaign to gain momentum.

¹ *Al-Nahar* (Beirut), 24/2/1968.

² Certain papers reported that on February 18 Mr. Hasan al-Kayed, the Jordanian Minister of Internal Affairs, warned the commandos not to launch their operations against the Israeli occupation from bases in Jordan and instructed the internal security forces to attack them relentlessly.

³ *Al-Ahram* (Cairo), 25/2/1968. Mr. Shams al-Din Badran was tried with a group of officers and civilians on the charge of attempting to seize power in the U.A.R. in 1967. See also *ante*, doc. 293.

⁴ Abd al-Hakim Amer, ex-Vice President and Commander-in-Chief of the U.A.R.

⁵ The ex-Head of General Intelligence.

*Shafé'i*¹: Whose idea was it?

Badran: The Field Marshal's. He asked me to send a telegram to the President on the matter. When the President didn't answer, I told him perhaps it was because such a measure would cause us problems we could do without at the time. He replied that we should occupy Sharm al-Shaikh but not blockade the Gulf. I told him no, that would only be a half measure.

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Badran: I'll fill in the whole picture. After our return to Egypt, a message was sent to us by the Syrians to the effect that there were Israeli concentrations around them, and the Field Marshal held a conference.

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All I'm saying is, what was my part in this? Communiqués were sent from Syria concerning the presence of concentrations near Syria. The Field Marshal held a conference and he sent General Fawzi to Syria to coordinate our attitude with theirs.

Shafé'i: On the strength of the fact that the army was set for action—otherwise, he would not have made such a suggestion and sent that message.

Badran: I questioned him. I told him we weren't ready to go to war at the time. I told him that the withdrawal of the United Nations peace-keeping force would lead to war.

Shafé'i: Since he is in charge of the armed forces why did he not send such a message?

Badran: He told me once again that he meant to occupy Sharm al-Shaikh instead of the United Nations peace-keeping force; he also agreed with me not to blockade the Gulf. But that could have been no more than a half measure to end the frenzied campaign.

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Shall I tell you how the blockade on the Gulf came about? It started as an idea in the Field Marshal's mind. Our forces in Sinai were then moved to take up offensive positions in case of an

Israeli attack on Syria. There were plans drawn up for that, but I do not know if they were adequate as I was not directly associated with the war arrangements.

When our forces were moved up, we had to request the withdrawal of the United Nations peace-keeping force in order to be in a position to attack. The withdrawal of the United Nations peace-keeping force entailed the blockading of the Gulf. The blockading of the Gulf entailed certain conditions, the President had to announce it some time—but there is no need for me to go into that.

A visit was made to ensure that there would be no backing down. We felt certain that our army was ready and that Israel was in no position to attack, since, according to the estimates of our intelligence service, we held superiority in armour, artillery and the air force. Our appraisal was that Israel was not about to commit suicide; such was the evaluation of the situation. The Field Marshal went to Sinai—I was with him. He met the men there; they were getting out of hand for they wanted operations to start.

When a date was set for the blockade of the Gulf the President was supposed to announce it in a speech. He chose an air base for that. He went and he met with the officers there—they were all for it, and wanted to fight. The President spoke to them on the purely political aspect and explained the situation to them, but what he said did not match up to the officers' enthusiasm, to the extent that when the President left them at the end of the speech, the Field Marshal, who sensed this, stayed and spoke to the officers; he told them not to worry, they would get a chance to fight. When the President returned, he asked the Marshal about his impressions, the Marshal replied that everything was all right.

Shafé'i: What are you trying to say?

Badran: The President was talking about politics and he wanted to make them understand the situation—he said such things as: if there should be no war, it need not be regretted, for there is the United States to consider, and so on and so forth. I say this now, for afterwards rumours started to the effect that the Field Marshal had wanted to strike the first blow but that the President had not been willing. I mean to say,

¹ Husain Shafé'i, President of the Court.

it wasn't the case that the President didn't want us to fight, but he didn't want us to strike the first blow, as it came out from what he said, for in that case the United States would have thrown its weight on the side of Israel. As a matter of fact, the Field Marshal was convinced that we should not strike the first blow; he actually said as much to Sidqi Mahmud.¹

Shafe'i: What is the point of all this?

Badran: I mean to show something by it; it throws light on my own position. This is not an affair of paper documents, conducting hearings and words.

Shafe'i: As a matter of fact, the speech at Inshas is on tape and has been transcribed. I was present that day, and it so happens that the political decision was taken on the basis of the military situation. The decision was taken at a special meeting to discuss the closure of the Gulf of Aqaba which was attended by all members of the Executive Committee.

Badran: I've read about that.

Shafe'i: And it was therefore decided to make certain of our military readiness.

Shafe'i: . . . All right then, tell us about striking the first blow. You've already spoken about it, but clarify what you said.

Badran: In the name of the people, and in the name of what is due to them from the Revolution, the people must know—and I am not defending any one person, although that person is dead and has no one to stand up for him—I am merely saying what happened. A date was set for blockading the Gulf, but it was much too early, so early that it was impossible to meet it. The Field Marshal was forced to bring in paratroop units and other light units; and they went ahead and occupied. In other words, he was forced to carry out a hasty operation involving many difficulties and he was severely taxed. I asked him why he had agreed to do it and he said that he had found himself in a fix. I told him that was not right and that he should have

talked it over with the President first.

The President asked the Field Marshal if he could set up a blockade within such and such a time limit and he said that he could, although it would be very difficult.

Shafe'i: I never heard this from anyone else. Did anyone else hear of it?

Badran: That was what I told him. I told him, so long as you couldn't do it, why didn't you tell the President about it and get a little more leeway?

Shafe'i: If that was how things were, and no one felt responsible for what he said in matters concerning this country, you can't be surprised at what happened.

Badran: I am only telling your Excellency what happened.

Shafe'i: Unfortunately there are no witnesses for what you say.

Badran: The court is free to make any assessment it sees fit. It can either accept what I say or reject it. The President is there, your Excellency can ask him, and I am ready to submit to his judgement.

Well then, the Gulf was closed, the troops took up their positions in Sinai and the President sent me on a mission to the Soviet Union. We had negotiations there and, when I returned from there, I found the President at the military headquarters and a conference in session. I told him of what had happened in the Soviet Union.

I assure you, I say what I say for the sake of history, so that the people may come to know it. The President told me then that the probabilities had risen from 80% to 100% and that he had information to the effect that the Jews were going to attack. I say these things in the interest of truth and history.

Naturally no one believed it. The President could not disclose his source of information—it was an American source.

Moreover, the political situation dictated that we should not strike the first blow, to avoid American intervention. At this point—also in

¹ The ex-Commander of the U.A.R. Air Forces.

the interest of history—Sidqi Mahmud objected. He said he couldn't do it, it would incapacitate him, paralyse him. The Field Marshal asked him whether he preferred to strike the first blow and have to cope with the United States or to receive the first blow and have to cope with Israel alone. He replied that that settled it, he was in agreement. The Field Marshal asked him what losses could be expected, and he said 20%.

Shafe'i: At the army officers' conference he said 10%.

Badran: He said 20%. Sidqi Mahmud agreed and the Field Marshal naturally also agreed.

Regarding the question of the first blow, the Field Marshal consented. He had wanted to strike the first blow, because he was afraid for the morale of the men, but then he realised that it was in our interest not to strike the first blow.

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Interview Granted by the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jaber al-Sabah to the Egyptian Daily "Al-Ahram".¹[Excerpts]

Kuwait, February 24, 1968

It is regrettable that certain countries which have unconditionally declared their categorical rejection of armed aggression still do not apply that general principle in the case of the Middle East crisis. These countries either oppose the withdrawal of the aggressor from the occupied territories, or link the issue of withdrawal with that of general settlements, based on bargaining over the gains made by the aggressor.

To these countries we say that such an attitude is clearly and flagrantly incompatible with the Charter of the United Nations and the interests of the international community. We

say, moreover, that to deplore the use of force in principle, to proclaim that as a matter of general principle the aggressor should not be rewarded for the aggression, and to issue declarations guaranteeing the territorial integrity of all nations—the repeated invocations of such general principles cannot be truthful or sincere unless they be accompanied by their application in the case of the so-called Middle East crisis.

Remissness in efforts to secure the withdrawal of the Israeli forces of aggression from all occupied Arab territories not only constitutes a flagrant violation of the fundamental principles of the United Nations, it also entails certain serious practical consequences, the most outstanding of which are:

1. It is a piece of naive self-deception to believe that the Arab countries concerned and the entire Arab nation will continue indefinitely to accept the occupation of any part of it and will acquiesce in the continued presence of the forces of aggression in Arab territory.

As far as we are concerned, I wish to state that Kuwait is fully prepared to bring all her resources and potentialities into play in order to secure victory for Arab rights and the principles in which all Arabs believe. Kuwait is prepared to make any sacrifice, no matter how great, in order to arrive at that objective, whole and unimpaired.

2. To be remiss in efforts to ensure an Israeli withdrawal is to encourage Israel to resort once again to armed aggression as the means to further territorial expansion in the future.

Had the United Nations done its duty in 1948 and translated its words into deeds, the latest aggression, which was but an extension and a repetition—but on a larger scale—of those previous acts of aggression, would never have taken place.

Similarly, if the international community and its organisations, at the forefront of which is the United Nations, does not take a decisive and just stand on the Middle East problem, they will in effect be sowing the seeds of a new Israeli aggression with their own hands—and the seeds will fall on fertile soil, that of the Zionist move-

¹ *Al-Ahram* (Cairo), 24/2/1968, special supplement on Kuwait.

ment, a movement ever covetous of expansion, with its faith deeply rooted in force and violence, which daily violates the sanctity of international law and the United Nations Collective Security system.

Even if we take the frontiers defined in its memorandum to the Peace Conference in February, 1919, as constituting the Zionist movement's maximum territorial aspirations, it is obvious that there are further territories in Lebanon, Syria and Jordan which are definitely targets for future Israeli expansion. What then, if we regard the demands of the more extreme Zionists—"from the Nile to the Euphrates"—as being the movement's real objective?

3. So far I have only mentioned Arab and Zionist reactions but, if the international community fails to impose an Israeli withdrawal, the consequences, far from being restricted to such reactions, will affect the whole world.

The choice facing the international community lies between maintaining peace or sowing the seeds of confusion and unrest in the Middle East and the whole world. The choice is also between being true to the principles of the United Nations and cementing its foundations or relinquishing every justification for its existence.

The Arab nation is the sincere friend of all who understand its sentiments and respond to its just aspirations, and esteems them for doing so. But it is not prepared to disregard the attitude of those countries which pursue unjust policies incompatible with vital Arab interests or legitimate Arab rights.

The state of Kuwait, and all Arab countries, appreciate the attitude of those countries which have supported Arab rights and showed their conviction of the justice of the Arab cause. At the forefront of these countries stand the Soviet Union, the states of the Eastern Bloc, the French Fifth Republic, and all other countries which believe in world peace and freedom.

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**Speech by the U.A.R. President Nasser
Before the General Federation of Workers.¹
[Excerpts]**

Helwan, March 3, 1968

In the circumstances which followed the setback, we were not on firm ground, everything shook beneath our feet, it was like a great earthquake. We had no room for practical action. The people refused to submit to defeat and determined to endure; they did not surrender their will but preserved it and, through it, made continued endurance inevitable, whatever the cost. The will to endure is not merely a feeling; it must be strengthened by developing a capacity for endurance. The first step we had to take was to reconstruct the Armed Forces. We had to employ our Arab resources and show our friends, and the whole world, that we were ready for a political solution. At the same time we had to take into consideration the fact that what is taken by force can only be recovered by force. We therefore had to reconstruct our Armed Forces. What did we do to reconstruct our Armed Forces? To reconstruct our Armed Forces we were going to need arms, first and foremost, and many other things as well, and this meant political action and endless political contacts.

It also required military action, the organisation of army units and training. All this had to be faced while the army were still in their trenches on the battle-front.

This is an example of the difficulties to be faced, the difficulty of withdrawing the forces from the front for manoeuvres or training.

In this field, we have achieved results which I consider more than satisfactory, I may even say miraculous, considering the short time in which they have been achieved. I shall say no more.

The second step was economic endurance. After the closure of the Suez Canal, we faced a critical period which started in December last year. We had to reorganise our resources, obtain additional ones and increase our great production potential which we built up with our sweat and

¹ *Al-Ahram* (Cairo), 4/3/1968.

blood in earlier years of our struggle. As we all know, at that time electricity from the High Dam reached Cairo and Alexandria. We had to mobilise our production resources for a long, bitter and difficult battle, a sacred battle, which we shall fight with undaunted courage and unswerving determination, and in which we shall accept nothing less than a just and honourable victory.

In the economic field we had to obtain our requirements from foreign countries. These were not unimportant, they were vital requirements. We know that our most important import from abroad is wheat; the bread which we eat daily. Our enemies thought that we would find ourselves with no wheat, no bread. This was our major concern. We also had to build up a currency reserve on which we could draw in time of necessity. Several meetings of the Higher Executive Committee were held to study the economic position, to provide for our future requirements and our endurance.

Money is the sinews of war. How can we fight without economic endurance? How can we liberate our territory without food for our people? How can we obtain arms without providing the money to buy them?

The third step was to organise our home front. We proceeded to re-organise the official and popular Arab resistance front. We played a positive part in reshaping certain Arab situations, our main concern always being our principles and the national interest. At the Khartum Conference I spoke in detail about all these matters. We then withdrew from Yemen, leaving the Yemeni Revolution capable of protecting itself and defending the principles of the Yemeni people and their aspirations to a better future. Imperialism withdrew from South Yemen, where an independent state was born. We also followed the conspiracies against the Arab character of the Gulf, and its independence. We informed King Faisal that we supported every step he took to defend the Arab character and the independence of the Gulf. We shall do everything in our power in connection with this problem without diverting our attention from our main problem: the unity of Arab destiny, our aspirations to freedom and the national ambitions of our Arab nation. We shall encourage all Arab resistance forces working against imperialism and Zionism

by every means, in every field and under all circumstances.

These major steps: the rebuilding of our Armed Forces, providing the possibilities for economic endurance and organisation of the nationalist Arab front, were actually a preparation of the ground for endurance. Continued resistance is not a mere emotion or a vague hope unrelated to reality. We had to prepare the ground so as to render it solid and extensive, and so that we may be able to conduct the double battle demanded by the popular Revolution of June 9 and 10. There is the battle to eliminate the consequences of aggression, political and military action to achieve this lofty object, and the battle for internal action which will rejuvenate the Revolution, giving it unlimited possibilities for upsurge and development.

Without solid and extensive ground for this double battle all our action will hang in mid-air.

Brethren, in the course of these events, there were side issues which, though of secondary importance, could have affected the course of the struggle and impeded the preparation of the ground for the double battle which we have already mentioned. The first of these battles was with the old centres of power. I have told you that I do not accept compromise; this, however, did not mean the use of unnecessary violence, particularly in our present circumstances. I said that the old centres of power represented a class of military politicians, some of whom had played a role in the Revolution, but the Revolution had outstripped their capacities, their interests and their willingness to develop. They wanted power and I have, for some time, noticed some signs of deviation. To tackle these we had to take into consideration various conditions and situations. As I have said, this military political class had come to consider itself the legitimate heir of the Revolution, or, to be precise, the heir to power. Power, according to their ideas, meant prestige and privileges. After the setback, after the events of June 9 and 10, this class realised that it was facing a choice between life and death. On June 11, when I issued a decree changing all the leaderships in the Armed Forces, this class discovered that it was going to lose everything. It exploited all that was sacred, even the friendship that exists between brothers. They went so

far as to think of usurping the power of the Armed Forces High Command.

All they thought of was power and the centres of power. For me this was an extremely burdensome and grievous side issue. This was a battle in which all the elements of the former High Command of the Armed Forces played their part, in addition to certain elements of the old General Intelligence before it was reformed. We had to face the elements which circumstances had proved to be corrupt. Steps were taken to strike at the conspiracy and to re-organise the Intelligence Service so that it might perform its natural function against the enemies of the homeland, not to be an instrument of domination in the country.

There is one more subject which I must mention before concluding my speech, a subject which causes you concern and preoccupation. I mean Israel's measures as regards the occupied Arab territories—the West bank of the Jordan, the Syrian heights and the Sinai desert. The decree does not change the situation as far as we are concerned, though it may change things for other parties. Let us hope it will change the outlook of member states of the Security Council who are responsible for the Council's resolution calling upon countries of the area to cooperate in finding a political solution for the crisis. Let us hope it will change the attitude taken by certain great powers, that it will show them that the Arabs' attitude in their struggle is a sound one.

Let us hope it will provide the countries of Asia and Africa which, like us, are subject to the encroachments of neo-colonialism, with incontrovertible evidence. Let us hope it will serve as an unmistakable sign for our friends and enemies alike. For us, this decree changes nothing; this is territory under enemy military occupation, regardless of what legal label is attached to it. This land must be purged of occupation, however it is described in legal terms.

Our first task is not to engage in a legal dispute about how aggression is to be defined. Our task must be that of liberation and purification. This we promise God and ourselves to achieve. To us, this decision constitutes a new incentive, a new warning. Here and now we

promise to liberate our territory inch by inch, no matter the cost, and whatever the sacrifices involved. We shall stand in one united front, the army and the people, for the struggle, for freedom, for the liberation of the occupied territory.

Brethren, we shall advance as one man, both on our front on the firing line and on the home front. Israel will learn that this decision, which she has taken in her arrogance and obstinacy, will cost her dear. Israel is committing a fatal error if she imagines that the Arab nationalist front is weak. It would be a fatal error on her part to believe that the home front of the people of the Arab nation who suffered directly from Israeli aggression, supported by the forces of imperialism, will waver or weaken, or that the Arab nation is frightened by the terrorist actions or the arrogance of those who act with the knowledge that imperialism stands behind them to support and protect them.

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Memorandum by Inhabitants of Jerusalem to the Director of the Land Registration and Settlement Office Protesting the Expropriation of Lands in Jerusalem.¹

Jerusalem, March 4, 1968

To the Director of the Land Registration and Settlement Office, Jerusalem,

With reference to the announcement published in the Israeli *Official Gazette*, No. 1425, dated January 1968, on the seizure and immediate expropriation of tracts of land situated in the north east of Jerusalem, in accordance with map no. h b-111-322 referred to in the above-mentioned notice of seizure, we, the undersigned, being residents of Lafta-Jerusalem, and in our capacity as proprietors of a large portion of the tracts of land designated on the above-mentioned map, which lands comprise about 1000 dunums, hereby object to the above-mentioned seizure

¹ Archives of the Institute for Palestine Studies.

and immediate expropriation decree for the following reasons:

1. We do not acknowledge the above-mentioned decision, nor do we consent to the expropriation of these tracts of land, or any part of them, by the authorities concerned, as being incompatible with international law and custom.

2. The tracts of land, to the expropriation of which under the above-mentioned decree we object, were under arbitration. The legal proceedings are on file in the office concerned in Amman.

3. We object most vehemently to the decision to seize and expropriate on the part of any authority whatever; we regard this decision as being most injurious to us, in our capacity as the proprietors of the above-mentioned tracts of land, and as being in violation of international laws and regulations.

4. While holding on to our full rights, we would like to point out that we, the residents of Lafta, have previously lost our lands and houses which were situated to the west of Jerusalem, following the 1948 war, which lands exceed 13,000 dunums in area.

5. The tracts of land which are the subject of objection and referred to above are our only source of income and are all that we have left.

Partial list of signatories:

Yusuf Qasem
Hajj Yasin Abu Ta'a
Hajj Mustafa Ali Salama
Hajj Yusuf Salama
Yusuf Muhammad Abu Ta'a
Isa Mustafa al-Abidi
Muhammad Saleh Muhammad al-Hajj
Sulaiman Darwish Hijazi
Mahmud Saleh Qasem
Ali Sa'id Mustafa
Isma'il Ahmad
Khalil Isa Akl
Mustafa Saleh Abu Lail
Ahmad Saleh Id
Jamil Ali Hasan
Muhammad Saleh Qasem
Hasan Ali Husain
Ali Taha Abd al-Qader
Umar Khalil Tarsha
Salim Muhammad Abu Lail
Hajj Ali Muhammad Humaidan Nasra

Hajj Shihada Ahmad
Abd Sa'id Mustafa
Ibrahim Sa'id
Ibrahim al-Abidi
Mahmud Abdullah Muhammad al-Hajj
Musa Muhammad Abu Lail
Ali Sulaiman Abu Lail
Ahmad al-Hajj Muhammad Umar
Jamil Isa Yasin 'Akl

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Petition by West Bank Notables to the Israeli Military Governor Protesting the Decrees Declaring the West Bank to be Territory Not Subject to the Enemy.¹

Jerusalem, March 5, 1968

We were amazed to hear from Israel radio, the Israeli press and foreign radio stations, of four decrees issued by the Israeli Minister of Internal Affairs providing for a new status for the West Bank and the other occupied territories.

As regards the West Bank, the above-mentioned decrees stipulate that the Allenby Bridge is to be a point of entry to and departure from Israel; that a checkpoint and a customs post are to be set up at the Bridge; and they legalise the entry of Israelis to the West Bank and stipulate that West Bank names are to be replaced by Jewish names.

These decrees further state that the inhabitants of the Gaza Strip and the City of Jerusalem are to be issued Israeli identity cards. What is worse, and a cause for greater bitterness, is that the occupied territories, according to these decrees, are no longer to be considered as "territory subject to the enemy!"

Despite assurances from the Israeli Minister of Internal Affairs that these are intended as purely administrative measures, and despite the statement by a spokesman for the Israeli Ministry of Justice to the *Jerusalem Post* to the effect that these decrees do not alter the present status of the occupied territories in international law, we cannot but see these decrees as a clear indic-

¹ *Al-Dustur* (Amman), 12/3/1968.

ation of suspect motives whose full scope we cannot judge. Nor is the gravity of the situation mitigated by the assurances of Israeli officials for, to give an example from past history, assurances by the Israeli delegate to the United Nations that Israeli measures affecting Jerusalem had been instigated by purely administrative reasons, were followed by measures on the part of the occupation authorities in Jerusalem directly contradicting these assurances.

We object most strongly to these illegitimate measures and call attention to the following points:

1. The Charter of the United Nations states unequivocally that no one may derive territorial gains from war.

2. The United Nations has reaffirmed the above principle by issuing two resolutions on the City of Jerusalem,¹ in which it states that all measures undertaken and legislation passed by the occupation authorities relating to that city is null and void.

3. Moreover, the well-known Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967 on the Middle East crisis constitutes a further reaffirmation of that principle.

4. The right of every people to self-determination is one of the most elementary principles of the United Nations and of international law. No people is to be driven to a destiny unacceptable to it. Moreover, the above decrees violate the territorial integrity of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the United Arab Republic and the Syrian Arab Republic.

5. Furthermore, according to the Geneva Convention of 1949, occupation authorities do not have the right to take any action or measures contrary to the national sentiments of the inhabitants of occupied territories, including such measures as changing the name of the West Bank, its cities and districts.

It is surprising that such measures should be taken at the time that the United Nations delegation headed by Dr. Gunnar Jarring is engaged in implementing the above Security Council resolution. These measures will bring

his efforts to nothing and undermine his mission once and for all. Above all, they are an indication of Israel's unwillingness to implement the above resolution. What is even more surprising is that Israel should continue to reaffirm, at every opportunity, and at international level, that she desires peace in the Middle East, while at the same time translating "peace" into actions directly opposed to peace. The least that can be said of such measures is that they imply expansionist intentions that are completely inimical to peace.

While affirming our desire for peace based on right and justice, we repeat our opposition to all these decrees and measures and affirm our insistence on the Arab character of the occupied territories, which constitute an inseparable part of the Arab countries concerned.

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Speech by the Syrian Premier Zu'ayyen at the Celebration of the Inauguration of Work on the Euphrates Dam.¹ [Excerpts]

Al-Tabaqa, March 6, 1968

The primary objective, then, was farther reaching than that. The objective that lay behind the attempt of imperialism and Zionism to paralyse the Arab revolutionary movement was to bring the Arab nation to despair, to break its will and to bring it to surrender to the *fait accompli* as a result of this despair.

The aim of imperialism was to consolidate the presence of Israel in Arab territory by this means and to realise a new stage in the plans of world Zionism to set up a greater Israel. The aim of imperialism was also to nullify the achievements of the Arab masses which were won through arduous and bitter struggle and to bring the Arab nations back into spheres of influence.

These two interdependent objectives clearly point to the hard and fast connection that exists between imperialism, under the direction of the United States, and Israel, which was set up by colonialism to take the place of military bases

¹ U.N. docs. A/RES/2253 and 2254 (ES-V), July 4 and 14, 1967, respectively, texts in *International Documents on Palestine, 1967*, pp. 256, 260. See also *ante*, doc. 238.

¹ *Al-Thawra* (Damascus), 7/3/1968.

which had been established throughout this area but which were destined to vanish in the face of popular struggle.

Brothers and Fellow Citizens,

The objectives of the aggression plan are no longer hidden. Israel, having occupied sections of the Arab homeland, is attempting to consolidate her presence in the occupied regions, or, alternatively, to make these territories an object of bargaining with the object of making the original aggression she perpetrated against a section of Arab Palestine into a permanent reality. It seems to the Zionist invaders to be a simple operation: first the occupation of land, followed by the setting up of military posts and new kibbutzim, then further expansion on the pretext of defending these posts and kibbutzim, to be followed by the setting up of new posts and new kibbutzim. The expansion is then renewed on the same pretext.

The Arab people will not stand idly by in the face of this underhand plan. It will not allow its land to be occupied piecemeal. The logical consequence of occupation is resistance. Our people, in resisting the invaders, are merely practising a natural right and not instituting a new trend.

The statements by the Israeli authorities have revealed, beyond any doubt, that this act of aggression was a new stage in the Zionist plan to absorb new human resources in occupied Palestinian territory, as a step towards the creation of the State of Greater Israel, from the Euphrates to the Nile.

Consequently, if, for the sake of argument, the Arabs were to give up even the newly occupied territories, which, in itself, would be an act of treason, this would not lead to a solution of the problem; it would merely constitute a passing phase which Zionism would exploit to implement its well known expansionist designs.

Striving as we are with all our resources and to the limit of our abilities to eliminate the consequences of the aggression and to liberate the Arab territories occupied by Israel in June 1967, we shall not allow either occupation by the enemy of further sections of Arab territory, nor his

conduct as regards these territories, to divert our attention from the essence of the issue. This occupation will remain but a branch of the original issue, which is that of Palestine.

The aggression of June 5 disclosed the true nature of Israel and laid it bare to many of the peoples of Asia, Africa, Europe and Latin America who had previously been taken in by that artificial state. . . . They now understand that the Arab nation draws a distinction between Judaism as a religion and Zionism as a misleading colonialist ideology. Most progressive peoples and forces have come to realise that racist ideas and chauvinist fanaticism have been conspicuous by their absence from Arab history, and that, on the contrary, the Arab homeland was the cradle of the three revealed religions and is still today, as it has always been, the land of tolerance and love. Jewish citizens lived side by side with the members of our people in brotherhood, harmony and full equality until they were exploited by colonialism and world Zionism with the object of dispersing our people and invading our homeland with foreign elements under the banner of historical Judaism. This, we believe, in addition to having brought disaster upon the Arab nation has also rendered a disservice to the Jews themselves all over the world.

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Speech by the Syrian President Al-Atasi on the Fifth Anniversary of the March 8th Revolution.¹ [Excerpt]

Damascus, March 7, 1968

Nine months after the June 1967 aggression, world public opinion began to sense that there was a people whose rights had been thrust aside and that Zionism was in fact subjecting the people of Palestine to colonialist rule. The number of those who condemn the acts of repression and

¹ *Al-Thawra* (Damascus), 8/3/1968.

terrorism practised by the occupation authorities continues to rise. The credit for all this goes first and foremost to the armed struggle launched by the vanguard of the Palestinian Arab people.

It was quite natural that the uninterrupted continuation of this struggle should give rise to fears among the Zionists and their allies, for it is in the nature of this struggle to strike persistent terror in the hearts of the enemy and to strike a stunning blow to their psychological warfare directed against the Arabs.

The Zionists realised that the escalation of Arab resistance entails, among other things, the undermining of their plans for imposing their conditions on the Arabs. They therefore stepped up their acts of violence and repression against Arab citizens on the one hand and threatened reprisals against the neighbouring Arab countries on the other. This was accompanied by a venomous campaign intended to portray the futility of resistance.

Once again the Israeli threats met with a positive response from defeatists and reactionary circles in the Arab homeland, who prepared themselves to accept the conditions of the invading Zionist forces. These groups, however, found themselves face to face with the Arab masses which refuse to acquiesce in the consequences of the setback and reject the enemy's terms. What is far more important than this, however, is that the Palestinian Arab people declared their rejection of any bargaining at the price of their rights and any interference in their affairs with the intention of sacrificing their territory and their homeland.

We in the Syrian Arab Republic are decisively opposed to any bargaining over the rights of our Arab people in Palestine. The Arab masses demand involvement, but only in terms of extending moral and material aid to the Palestinian fighters and giving support to the Palestinian Arab people in their just struggle to regain their usurped rights. We also warn against the consequences of playing with fire and playing fast and loose with the rights of the Palestinians; we similarly give warning of the consequences of a defeatist attitude in the face of the forces of invasion and aggression. The Palestinian Arab people will no longer stand idle in the face of bargaining over their rights. Moreover, the

lessons learned by our Arab people after the disaster of 1948 should act as a deterrent to all who would stoop to following in the footsteps of those deserters and conspirators who lost the cause twenty years ago.

Brothers and Fellow Citizens:

All indications point to the fact that political measures will never succeed in forcing Israel to withdraw from the territories she has occupied. Jarring's mission has not given us a single glimpse of hope, despite the fact that it has been nine months since the Zionist invasion. The Arab masses are therefore entitled to inquire further into the usefulness of the United Nations delegate's mission. The United Nations delegate will not be able to move the Zionist authorities from their previous position on major issues, for Israel still insists on direct negotiations with the Arabs, still insists on concluding a peace treaty with them and continues to consolidate her occupation of the territories she has usurped. The latest measure taken by Israel implies that she regards the cease-fire lines as her frontiers.

How long, we ask, are international organisations going to remain silent about the Israeli occupation of Arab lands? How long are these international organisations going to remain silent about the Nazi crimes being committed by the Zionist authorities in the occupied territories? We fear that Israel may use the silence of international organisations as a pretext for prolonging the occupation. We also fear that this silence may encourage Israel to maintain her aggressive attitude, or lead her to defy the United Nations and its Charter once more, as was the case after 1948.

We declare to world public opinion and to international organisations that the Arab masses refuse to submit. To submit would mean to acquiesce in colonialism and to encourage Israel to further expansion. Israel, that racist state, cannot but be an aggressive state, and, consequently, there can be no end to her expansionist projects. Recent history has shown that every racist state is at once an aggressive and an expansionist state.

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Resolution of the Arab League Council on Israel's Policy in the Occupied Territories.¹

Cairo, March 7, 1968

The Council endorses the following recommendation of the Political Affairs Committee:

The Political Affairs Committee has studied the question of Israeli acts of aggression in the occupied Arab territories with the deepest concern. These acts include the declaration of the annexation of these territories, the persecution of their remaining Arab inhabitants, and the imposing of the Hebrew language and Israeli curricula on Arab schools. These acts make a mockery of the principles of the United Nations, United Nations resolutions and international law and custom, and are symbolic of Israel's determination to pursue her present expansionist policy. Furthermore, this situation confronts the Arab countries with the responsibility for undertaking joint Arab action, mobilising all available resources and potentials in the Arab struggle to liberate the occupied territory and eliminate all consequences of the aggression and to support the Palestine Liberation Organisation to enable it to perform its national duty.

Having studied the memoranda of the Secretariat General, the Syrian Arab Republic and the Palestine Liberation Organisation on this matter, the Committee makes the following recommendations:

1. That the governments of the member states be called upon to speed up the process of deciding on a plan for joint Arab action at this fateful stage.

2. That the Arab League issue a declaration explaining the full extent of the Israeli aggression and its colonialist objectives, and that this declaration be made available to the United Nations, the Organisation of African Unity, the Afro-Asian countries and all other countries which support the principles of world peace, calling on them to take decisive action to check continued Israeli acts of aggression.

(Resolution 2380/Session 49/Meeting 4)

¹ The Arab League Secretariat, *Resolutions of the Arab League Council*, Cairo, 4-7/3/1968.

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News Conference Remark by the Syrian Foreign Minister Makhus.² [Excerpt]

Damascus, March 12, 1968

... There are some people who accuse us of being extremists. In this respect, we should like to refer all who are concerned with the issue to the statements of Israeli officials, both in the case of the recent Zionist congress held in Basle and the statements of Eshkol, Dayan, Allon and other officials, and more particularly to the recent official decision annexing the new territories to Israel and, in the process, expanding the territory of Israel to five times the area allowed to her by the Partition Plan.

At the same time, we hereby declare that we would welcome the efforts of anyone in the world who could secure the unconditional withdrawal of Israeli forces to behind the previous armistice lines. Unfortunately, such a thing is not possible—there has not been a single comparable incident in the whole of history, as we have pointed out.

When I took part in the activities of the General Assembly of the United Nations for the first time, I said in a speech that we should not be living up to our principles or moral obligations unless we condemned the aggression. I imagined then that once the members became aware of the facts of the case and realised that territory belonging to three members of the United Nations had come under occupation, we should get a unanimous and undisputed condemnation.

However, this is not what happened. Even condemnation of the aggression was made impossible by the pressures and the threats brought to bear by the United States of America on many members of the United Nations. It was clear that the United States was leading the battle both over here, through the aggression, and there, at the United Nations. For the Arabs to be accepted as 'reasonable' and 'politically versatile', they were expected to tear up the Charter of the United Nations and to present the invaders with bouquets.

² *Al-Thawra* (Damascus), 14/3/1968.

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Speech by the U.A.R. President Nasser at a Military Position Manned by Egyptian, Iraqi and Kuwaiti Troops.¹ [Excerpts]

Cairo, March 13, 1968

... Today I want to draw your attention to the considerable significance of this get-together, and of the presence of these Arab forces at our side at the front: forces of the Egyptian, Iraqi and Kuwaiti armies. The significance of this is great; if anything, it points to the fact that the battle being fought by all Arabs is the same and their destiny is the same. Arab nationalism has always been, and will always be, a target for attacks by its enemies.

We hope, at this difficult hour, that the efforts of the Arab leaders will meet with success, so that the Arab armies may have a single, well coordinated plan of action and a single well defined aim.

The fact is, we are a hundred million Arabs, yet, on our own, our strength is not sufficient to allow us to stand up to the enemies of Arab nationalism, or to the attacks of two and a half million Israelis.

Yet the stock in trade of these two and a half million Israelis is reinforced by vast forces. In the United States of America and in other countries there are forces that back up Israel with financial, military and moral support. These same forces then turn around and train the guns of their psychological and economic warfare on us.

In view of this fact, we need to think seriously and along new lines, of uniting all the forces which the Arabs have at their disposal.

In fact, it may well be that there has never been a more urgent and decisive need for the unification of Arab forces than there is now. We are now at the crossroads and we are engaged in a battle that will be decisive in the history of the entire Arab nation. One alternative before us is success and victory in this battle, God willing, which would spare the entire Arab nation the humiliation intended for it by imperialism and

Zionism. The other alternative is failure, which God forbid, for it would mean the subjugation of the entire Arab nation to degradation at the hands of imperialism and Zionism. The latter would mean that we resigned ourselves to whatever they chose to impose on us.

We have fought many battles in every Arab country to gain our independence, to liberate ourselves from imperialism and to liberate ourselves from foreign influence. In every Arab country we scored great victories which set us at the beginning of the road towards the creation of the Arab society we hope for, the Arab individual of whom we used to dream in the past and the realisation of the goals of Arab nationalism.

But did imperialism and Zionism leave us alone to fulfill our aspirations? No, imperialism wouldn't let us and Zionism wouldn't let us. They lay in hiding for us. They don't want to see a developed Arab individual, they don't want there to be an Arab homeland and they don't want there to be this vital sentiment of Arab nationalism which every Arab feels anywhere in the Arab nation. We met with disaster and a military defeat. We did in fact fall into a political trap, and another thing was that our enemy was provided with all the arms and the money he wanted, which gave him the superiority in the air and on the ground that he needed to fight on three separate fronts at the same time.

This defeat constitutes a turning point for us. Our duty is to carry on the struggle, to make the most strenuous efforts, seek knowledge and train hard. The Arab people stood fast after the defeat and resolved that its will should remain free, it resolved to thwart the aims of imperialism and Zionism, and it resolved to do the impossible in order to get rid of the traces of the setback, to nullify the aggression and to strive for the realisation of the just aspirations of the people.

It is our duty to transform this defeat into victory in order to satisfy the expectations of the Arab nation, in order to satisfy the expectations of the Arab people and to realise the aspirations of our forefathers and of our children in each and every Arab country.

The truth of the matter is that Arab solidarity was a necessity in the past. As things stand now,

¹ *Al-Ahram* (Cairo), 13/3/1968.

Arab solidarity and unified Arab action are pressing necessities, for this war will not only affect the countries bordering on Israel, it will have repercussions all over the Arab nation. Either we shall be victorious, and the whole Arab nation will be victorious, or we shall be defeated, and the whole Arab nation will be defeated. I say that we have no choice but to win, with God's grace, for this battle will seal the fate of the entire Arab nation, and it is a just battle.

This means that every Arab country has vast responsibilities from the military aspect of the case as well as from the various economic aspects. Every Arab country will have to make financial contributions to create an Arab army that can do its part in the battle when the moment is ripe. It is precisely at this time, under these circumstances, that all Arab countries must plan for the future.

I wish to tell you frankly—I don't want to conceal the fact from you—that there is no unified Arab plan for the Arab countries whether from the political or the military aspects of the case. Yet I cannot think of a more critical stage than the one through which we are passing now, one which has a bearing on the fate of the entire Arab nation. We call on all Arab leaders, all Arabs in all Arab countries, to have the determination at this stage to formulate a unified political strategy to be followed by all Arab states, and a unified military strategy, a plan that would enlist one hundred million Arabs, along with their potential, in coming to grips with the colonialist Israeli invasion to which we are being subjected.

Our responsibilities dictate that this should be done. I called for an Arab summit conference in November to come to grips with the responsibilities facing us. I believe we held three summit conferences prior to the aggression to coordinate our policies; I believe now that we should have constant meetings, for time is passing. Months have gone by since the setback, and we are embarking on a stage in which we shall have to take critical decisions to eliminate the traces of the aggression. How are we to attain our objective—the objective of the entire Arab Nation? Is each Arab state to act alone politically and militarily? Or are we to enlist all the efforts of the Arab nation, politically and militarily?

What are we doing here at this time? Who are we doing it for? To what end?

We are fighting for Arab nationalism, we are fighting for Arab territory, we are fighting for the Arab homeland and we are fighting for the Arab individual.

What is happening to the Arab individual at present? What is Israel doing to the Palestinian individual? What is Israel doing in order to do away with Arab nationalism? This is going on before the eyes of all of us, and we all know it. The Palestine issue is not the province of any one Arab country, the issue belongs to the entire Arab nation, it is the issue facing Arab nationalism, for if Israel has been successful over the past twenty years in overcoming Arab nationalism in certain parts of the Arab homeland, that fact will serve to encourage her to expand outwards and do away with Arab nationalism in other parts of the Arab homeland. Always, since 1948 and even before 1948, Israel's objective has, as we know, been expansion which would allow her to establish her dominion from the Nile to the Euphrates; she has designs on every Arab country. Israel will not be able to realise this objective in a year, not even in ten. Nevertheless, the objective can be realised, given a few decades. Under what conditions? If the Arab nation wavers, if it is divided and broken up. That way Israel could succeed, and this success would serve as her justification for going on with the execution of her designs, in the search for further successes. It would do away with Arab nationalism and set up a different nationalism in its place.

At present, Israel is razing the Arab sectors of Jerusalem and setting up Jewish sectors in their place. It is a racist and colonialist operation, the eradication of indigenous Arab nationalism and the setting up of a new nationalism. The area they took over yesterday alone comes to 800 hectares. Yet what are these 800 hectares? They are the prelude to 80 thousand hectares, 800 thousand hectares, etc. until the most distant objectives in the plans of the Zionists are reached. The process is initiated by the attainment of a minor objective, to be followed by other and bigger objectives.

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Interview Granted by the U.A.R. President Nasser to the Editor-in-Chief of the American Magazine "Look".¹ [Excerpts]

Cairo, March 19, 1968

Q.—Looking ahead, what is the chief obstacle to normalising diplomatic relations between our two countries?

A.—Your support of Israel in the United Nations. It makes Arabs think the U.S. always sides with Israel. No one is taking the initiative now on either side to normalise relations. Isn't it true that no new initiatives of this sort are ever taken in America during an election year?

Q.—It was you who broke diplomatic relations with us on the grounds that our planes participated in the Israeli attack last June. This unfounded accusation angered a lot of Americans. Why did you make it?

A. By June we had become very suspicious of you. Ten days before, our ambassador in Washington had been advised by the State Department to exercise restraint—even though we had no intention of attacking Israel. And then there were so many planes coming in from the sea—where your carriers were—more than we thought the Israelis had. And you remember the time before, in 1956, they had not attacked alone. Nevertheless, we refused to issue any statement without proof. But on June sixth, at five a.m., I received a phone call from King Hussein, who said he was being subjected to heavy air attack from the sea—400 planes against Jordan alone. So then we issued a statement. We did not say Egypt was attacked by American planes. We said: "The General High Command have indications that the U.S. and Britain are participating in Israeli aggression with carrier-based planes flying air cover over Israel to free Israeli planes for attacks. Jordanians say radar indicates U.S. and British planes were helping. King Hussein called to say U.S. and British planes were involved." Later, Johnson called Kosygin on the hot line to say only two of your reconnaissance planes were flying to investigate the sinking of your ship by the Israeli Navy. He told Kosygin to inform us, and he did.

Q.—In other words, your accusation resulted from a misunderstanding based on suspicion and faulty information?

A.—You could say that, yes.

Q.—I hope you realise that peace—even more than friends and allies—is what we want above all in the Middle East. You yourself told me in 1957: "The world cannot afford any war that might turn into World War III." Would you agree that President Johnson's Five Principles of June nineteenth—the recognised right of national life, justice for the refugees, innocent maritime passage, limits on the arms race and political independence and territorial integrity for all—provide the foundation for a durable peace in the area?

A.—It is all right as far as it goes, but it is too vague, and the main issue—the withdrawal of Israeli troops from our territory—is not included.

Q.—We are often accused of favoritism toward Israel. Yet in the ten years between January 1957 and 1967, total U.S. Government aid to the UAR alone was more than a billion dollars, and to Israel, less than half a billion. Don't you feel we have treated you fairly—at least since the time Dulles abruptly withdrew our offer to help build the Aswan Dam?

A.—It's not just a question of dollars. Friendship consists of other things too. Also, you suddenly stopped wheat shipments last year, which created a serious problem in our foreign currency balance. We had based our future plans on continuing shipments, we needed 60 million pounds sterling.

Q.—Of course, that happened after our USIS library in Cairo was ransacked and burned, which certainly had an adverse effect on American public opinion. But why do Arabs keep saying we are so pro-Israel?

A.—Because there is hardly ever a good word in America about the Arab point of view. And because you supply arms to Israel. In 1960, you arranged for Israel to get free arms from Germany. They were, in fact, sent by you through Germany as a gift. French arms to Israel? Yes, but they are purchased. You put pressure on Germany to give compensation to Israel. All told, Israel has received at least seven billion dollars from America in one way or another.

Q.—Looking back for a moment: In the current issue of "Foreign Affairs" (former Deputy Permanent

¹ ,Look 19/3/1968, p. 61.

Rep. to the U.N.) Charles W. Yost writes, "There is no evidence... that either Nasser or the Israeli Government or even the Syrian Government wanted and sought a major war" last June. He says the war was the result of everyone miscalculating and overreacting. Would you agree with this analysis?

A.—Not entirely. Eshkol spoke of Syrian threats in May and said Israel would march against Syria—though he made no threats against the UAR itself. We received information about the Israeli mobilisation against Syria. That is why we sent forces into the Sinai to deter them. It has been apparent for a long time that Israel has been trying to "force" a settlement on the Arabs. They have been looking for an opportunity to use this force, and so I think they were interested in having war last June.

Q.—Try putting yourself in the shoes of the Israeli leaders, Mr. President. You would have been responsible for the safety and survival of your country and your people. Would you not have reacted as they did in June to offensive troop movements by their Arab neighbours and verbal threats—such as Cairo Radio's pledge to "wipe Israel off the map"?

A.—I'm sorry that only Israeli charges are remembered. I'm not responsible for what may have been said by a radio announcer or by the Syrians. All I can tell you is that we Arabs did not plan or desire war against Israel. That was the consensus in all the discussions of our military committees. And don't forget, when you speak of Israeli apprehensions, that they are the ones who launched attacks on us in 1955, 1956 and 1967.

Q.—Didn't you anticipate that the numerous terrorist raids from Syria, starting in 1966, followed by your blockade of the Straits of Tiran would provoke an Israeli response?

A.—Don't forget the Israelis were conducting raids too. As for the Straits, we were just restoring the situation as it had been—we never had any agreement with Israel about the Straits. And our troop movements into the Sinai, as I said, were simply to deter a possible attack on Syria.

Q.—Did you expect the Soviet Union to play a more direct role in the conflict?

A.—If you mean military intervention, no.

We never expected that the Soviets would come in and fight on our side.

Q.—In 1957, you told me, "The problem of Israel is essentially the problem of people driven out of their homes—expelled from Palestine. They must be compensated and allowed to return. This is the main problem." Would you still describe this as "the main problem" today?

A.—Yes—after the withdrawal of the Israeli forces from the territory they took last year. As long as the Palestinians are neglected and live in camps, the question of peace is very difficult.

Q.—Would you welcome a Palestinian initiative to negotiate with Israel in order to create a Palestinian state that could live in peace and cooperation with Israel?

A.—That's impossible. The Palestinians could not agree. They know such a state would be very weak and under the domination of Israel.

Q.—Turning to your country's economic problems, you are now heavily subsidised financially by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Libya, as well as by the Soviet Union. What plans are you making to get the UAR back on its feet?

A.—These Arab states agreed to give us compensation for our losses in Sinai—so far, we have received about 100 million pounds sterling—but this assistance is only temporary until we finish the situation we face and effect an Israeli withdrawal. Meanwhile, we are readjusting our budget to our financial circumstances. Yes there will be some austerity, and we must tighten our belts. But the people accept it—they are not even hoarding scarce goods.

Q.—What proportion of your budget is devoted to military expenditures?

A.—About 200 million pounds—roughly 15 percent. That's a good deal less than your proportion.

Q.—The magazine "Jeune Afrique", published in Paris, recently printed an article saying the Arab states had spent ten billion dollars on arms since 1950—half of this by the UAR. Wouldn't you all be better off today if this money had been spent on economic development?

A.—That figure is much too high. Where

could we have found the money? That magazine, you know, is not especially sympathetic to us. But you must remember that having arms is like having a fire brigade. Up until 1955, I personally was against a big military budget. Then the Israelis attacked us, and I saw I had been wrong. We needed the fire brigade.

Q.—Most impartial observers agree that despite the hardships and setbacks of the past decade, you have retained the affection and loyalty of the Egyptian people. Why?

A.—I confess I was surprised by the reaction of the people when I offered to resign on June ninth. I felt we had failed, and we had to go. But our people are very good people. They had suffered a lot before the revolution, and they had benefited from it.

Q.—You mean you symbolized the revolution for them?

A.—Perhaps, but there was something else too—a moral aspect. The people, by their insistence that I stay, were trying to explain that we might have lost our army but not our will.

Q.—How about internal security now? Are the 54 people, including army officers, now on trial for treasonable activity, linked to any foreign power?

A.—No they conspired only to retain the power they would lose in the reorganisation of the army and government after June.

Q.—What is the status of Egyptian Jews? How many remain and how many are still in detention?

A.—There are about 3,400 Jews in Egypt. In June, we arrested about 300 as suspected Israeli agents. Now, there are only 150 still in detention. The others are quite free.

Q.—You have long advocated non-alignment in foreign policy. Don't you now consider yourself "aligned" with the Russians, at least in the sense that your freedom of action is limited by your dependence on them?

A.—We certainly feel more friendly with the Russians than with the West, but we are still nonaligned. There is no coordination of policy, as among the NATO countries. It is just that the Russians support us in the UN, and also economically and in other ways. We appreciate this help, but we don't feel it limits our freedom at all.

Q.—Yet isn't the number of Soviet military advisers in your army today—published estimates range from 1,500 to 7,000—far greater than the number of British advisers in your army back in the forties?

A.—Yes, but the difference is that the British forced their advisers on us by treaty. In the present case, I begged the Soviets to send officers in to help retrain our army after Sinai. I decided to bring them in, and I will decide to send them out. And they have no command functions. As for those published figures, even 1,000 would be an exaggeration.

Q.—Will you grant the Russians naval bases?

A.—That question has never been brought up by their side or ours.

Q.—Will you allow Soviet pilots to fly your planes, as they evidently are in Yemen?

A.—There have never been any Soviet pilots in Yemen, and that question would not arise here.

Q.—The Russians have expended a good deal of money and effort in the Middle East since 1955. What in your opinion is their interest in this area, since they already have plenty of oil?

A.—I don't think they are spending so much money. They sell us things—their military equipment is not a gift, you know—and they buy from us. They also extend credits to us, much as they do all over the world—for instance, in India.

Q.—So you think their motives are primarily commercial?

A.—Their motives are also political, of course. They want to reduce Western influence and domination in the Middle East. Formerly, the West had been our sole supplier of goods, including arms. And that's another thing—America and Britain attached conditions to their arms deliveries. The Russians do not.

Q.—We happen to think the Russians are more interested in ferment and discord than in peace and stability. But assuming that peace is in the Arab interest, what practical steps can now be taken in this direction? For example, you said in November that the British Resolution adopted in the Security Council was "not enough for the settlement of the Middle East crisis." Why not?

A.—This resolution is neither accurate nor decisive about the main question of withdrawal. There will be no progress because the resolution is vague, and everyone can give his own interpretation. The Israelis interpret it as giving them the right to stay on our territory.

Q.—*In 1953, after visiting this part of the world, Adlai Stevenson wrote in "Look": "Perhaps it is too much to expect that solutions will be worked out—as they should have been long ago—by the Arabs and the Jews sitting down together. But they might welcome reasonable solutions imposed by outsiders willing to be damned by both sides." Do you see any merit in this approach today?*

A.—I don't like the word "impose." We all feel there is a lack of justice. The biggest power is the U.S., and it is felt they would do the imposing and that they are pro-Israel.

Q.—*But what if the U.S. and the Soviet Union could agree on a formula for peace?*

A.—The U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. cannot agree on anything in the U.N. How could they agree on what to impose?

Q.—*Last fall, in a talk with Sir Dingle Foot [Former British Solicitor General] you spoke of "non-belligerency" as an alternative to "peace" with Israel—by reviving the Armistice Commission. How would this work? Would this be one way of satisfying Israeli demands for face-to-face talks that you now reject?*

A.—You raise the question of sitting down with Israel. They say they want to, but they know that no Arab leader would dare to. That's why they say it all the time. Of course, if the Israelis suddenly decide to recognise the armistice agreement of 1949, we could attend meetings with them on the commission relating to the agreement. They would have to start with the problems of aggression and withdrawal. What took place last June, for example, was in violation of the agreement.

Q.—*Is a prior Israeli withdrawal from all Arab territory occupied in June still one of your conditions for discussing a permanent settlement with them?*

A.—Yes, We are having discussions with Gunnar Jarring, the U.N. representative, as you know; but we insist that withdrawal must be the first step before any kind of meetings.

Q.—*Suppose Israel did agree to withdraw its troops from your territory. Would you immediately move your army back into the Sinai along with the reestablishment of civil administration?*

A.—That might be one of the things we could discuss after the Israelis pulled back.

Q.—*As time goes by, and as Arab guerrilla activities continue, isn't the chance they will withdraw less and less likely?*

A.—It is not only our objective, but our duty to get the Israelis out of our country. And it is the right of the Palestinians to resist—just as people resisted the German occupation in Europe. It is only human that the inhabitants of any occupied territory have the right to resist.

Q.—*What if Mr. Jarring fails in his mission to seek a peaceful settlement? Do you expect fighting will resume?*

A.—There is not only the Palestinian question. We have a duty, as I said, to liberate our own territory. If it can't be done peacefully, we have to fight. Of course, we are rebuilding the army—we lost 80 percent of our army in June.

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Q.—*In your judgment, what should be the main elements of U.S. policy in the Middle East—bearing in mind that peace, stability and economic progress are our principal aims?*

A.—As a big power, America has to be fair. That means not taking sides. We lost all our air force in June. It is our right to replace it and regain a balance. The Israelis had and have air supremacy. Yet, in America, you are planning to give them *Skyhawks* and maybe *Phantoms*—more than they had before. To be effective here, you must not take sides.

Q.—*What about a limitation on arms deliveries to both sides?*

A.—It's not fair to speak of limitations when a part of our country is occupied and our army and air force were destroyed. The Israelis are reluctant to settle things and will be willing only when they feel we have an effective fighting force.

Q.—*Still looking ahead, do you now intend to concentrate your efforts more on internal than external*

affairs? In other words, do you now regard the war against poverty as more important than the war against Israel?

A.—There was no question of war against Israel—only defense. Of course, we have to concentrate on internal problems, but it is difficult when you face external threats.

Q.—*An American clergyman, A. Powell Davies [late pastor of All Souls Unitarian Church in Washington, D.C.] once said: "The world has become too small for anything less than brotherhood and too dangerous for anything less than the truth". Wouldn't you agree that the Middle East is a part of the world where this advice is especially appropriate today?*

A.—Yes, but truth must come before brotherhood, and these ideas must be accepted by all sides. Brotherhood means no fear and no threats. Look at the Palestinian refugees—is this brotherhood? You also speak of truth. Have you read the things printed about me in your press? I read them every night in bed. I am pictured as sick, mad, a crazy gambler who has lost and so forth. Fortunately, I have become inoculated against these articles. In fact, when I see the file getting smaller, I get nervous. I feel perhaps they are no longer paying attention to us. But don't misunderstand me. I am inoculated, as I say, and I want to emphasize that it has never been our intention to be hostile to the United States. It is Israel that has always been the obstacle to our friendship.

Q.—*One thing I've gathered from our talk is that the prospects of a peaceful settlement with Israel just now are not very bright.*

A. Not at the moment, no. How peaceful would you feel if foreign troops were occupying a part of the United States?

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Jordanian Military Communiqués on the Israeli Attack on Southern Jordan.¹

Amman, March 21, 1968

COMMUNIQUE NO. 1:

At 0530 hours this morning the enemy launched an attack along the southern section of the Jordan river. Enemy forces crossed to the east bank of the river in the neighbourhood of the Prince Muhammad Bridge and the King Hussein Bridge. Our forces engaged the enemy, utilising all available fire power, and the engagement is still in progress.

Enemy helicopters took part in the operation. Up to the time of the release of this communiqué the enemy had lost four tanks, a number of half-track personnel carriers and other vehicles. The battle between our forces and the forces of the enemy is still in progress.

COMMUNIQUE NO. 4: (0945 hours)

1. Fighting between our forces and the forces of the enemy is still in progress. We are fully in control of the situation.

2. Visible and estimated losses of the enemy to date are as follows:

a) Three Mystère fighter planes have been brought down. One of them was sighted coming down in flames west of the Prince Muhammad Bridge, the other two caught fire and came down in the area between the king Hussein Bridge and Jericho.

b) 25 tanks and armoured vehicles have been destroyed in the southern Shuna area.

Initial enemy casualties are estimated at two hundred, dead and wounded.

COMMUNIQUE NO. 7: (1400 hours)

Enemy forces have begun to withdraw all along the firing line as a result of the concentrated fire power they have encountered from our forces and the heavy losses of equipment and personnel they have suffered. Jordanian forces are at present giving chase to the scattered forces of the enemy which are falling back towards the river.

¹ *Al-Hayat* (Beirut), 23/3/1968. See *infra*.

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The Jordanian Government's Statement on the Israeli Attack on Southern Jordan.¹**Amman, March 21, 1968**

The Israeli authorities' attempt to find justifications for their new barefaced aggression against Jordanian territory is doomed to failure, for it is characterised by military arrogance and aggression. The Jordanian authorities gave notice of the armed Israeli attack before it ever took place and notified the Security Council, the highest authorities in the United Nations, the major powers and friendly nations to that effect in advance.

Israel's false allegations, which were conveyed in the statements and releases by Israeli officials in which they addressed their threats to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, have been refuted and shown to be invalid. The Jordanian government has shown in its reply to Israeli allegations that it bears no responsibility for events which Israel claims are taking place in Arab territories that are under military occupation.

It is clear, moreover, that the Israeli authorities, in their conviction that the use of armed force will bring the prospects of peace closer or will force the Arab national will into submission, are in fact pursuing a futile course.

This unproductive technique only serves to strengthen the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the various regular and popular forces within it and increase their determination to bring about that peace which can only be established on the basis of right, justice, and victory over aggression.

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Telegram From the Saudi King Faisal to the Jordanian King Hussein on Convening an Arab Summit Conference.² [Excerpt]**Riyadh, March 22, 1968**

...Along with our brethren at the Khartum

¹ *Ibid.* See also *ante*, docs. 224-228.

² *Al-Hayat* (Beirut), 23/3/1968.

Conference, we support the idea of a political solution as the first step towards the elimination of the consequences of the Israeli aggression against the Arab countries.³ We left it to the discretion of our brethren whose lands were under enemy occupation to conduct themselves with full freedom within the limits defined by the decisions taken at Khartum. If they inform us of their failure to arrive at a political solution, the Arab nation will have no alternative before it but to fight the battle for its destiny as one man, regardless of the consequences or the sacrifice involved, if the Arab nation is to recover its dignity and if it and its future are to be kept safe. The Arab nation will then have to place its trust in God, and think nothing of death, to ensure that the word of God and the true religion may prevail, and to liberate the usurped Arab homeland and the sanctuaries of Islam. In this it will have the backing of its Muslim brethren all over the world. May God grant success.

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News Conference Remarks by the Jordanian King Hussein Following the Israeli Attack on Jordan.⁴ [Excerpts]**Amman, March 23, 1968**

...As far as the question of Palestine, and what is right and what is wrong are concerned, I do not believe that any people in this world, at any time or place, could possibly have a stronger case than ours. The unfortunate thing is that we have relied too heavily on the strength of our case and have been persistently negligent in presenting it to the world.

I say this because I wish to make it clear that whereas we are constantly intent on decreasing the possibility of friction in this world, and work to that end, it would appear that Israel's objectives lie in the opposite direction. Whereas the Arab attitude has been an attempt to encour-

³ See *International Documents on Palestine, 1967*, pp. 655-657.

⁴ *Al-Dustur* (Amman), 24/3/1968. See *ante*, docs. 309-310.

age the major powers to work together in providing a basis for a just and lasting peace in the area, Israel would like to see the opposite come true. We became aware of this quite a long time ago; Israel has always been intent on transforming the Arab-Israeli conflict from a question of legitimate rights as against illegitimate claims into an international problem liable to involve even the major powers.

. . . I am trying to make it clear to you that we are not warmongers nor are we the type to rattle our sabres out of enjoyment for the game of war. We had to stand up to aggression from the very start, when our rights were denied to us after a people was expelled from its land and after that people was denied the right of self-determination, as the aggressor has continued his territorial expansion even to this day. We were forced to take the stand we did and take up arms. However, the real point is that if justice were done in this area, then our cares and concerns would be restricted to problems worthy of our attention and our effort.

In keeping with this attitude, we did our best to establish a basis for peace, and as a consequence the Security Council of the United Nations unanimously adopted a resolution, laying the broad outlines for what might prove to be the prelude to the establishment of a just and lasting peace, for which we are striving.

Another side of the case is that Israel became extremely arrogant as a result of the victory she won in June. Israel was blinded by victory into imagining that if she were to adopt the course of aggression, and aggression alone, coupled with blind force, then she might be able to win further victories in the best possible conditions. However, I assure you that she will not be able to secure a lasting and total victory.

Israel does not realise that the present Arab attitude constitutes the one and only chance for a just and lasting peace in this area. Israel has continued to expel people from their homes and their lands, she has done her best to make life difficult for them; she has defied the world and done all she could to increase the extent of the tragedy and of the human suffering it involves.

In spite of world public opinion they are doing nothing to alleviate the suffering of our people, even to the smallest extent, or to allow those who left their homes and lands as a result of the aggression to return. Instead of permitting these displaced people to return, Israel intends to do everything to encourage people to leave their lands. People are still leaving the West Bank of Jordan and the other occupied areas as a result of the vast difficulties facing them. This state of affairs is particularly true of Jerusalem, since Israel has not been content with expelling the inhabitants; she has gone so far as to defy the United Nations resolution and has considered herself to be in a position to conduct herself in a totally inadmissible manner. Israel has, and still is demolishing many sites. She is altering the character of the city, a city which belongs to the entire world. Israel is conducting herself in such a fashion as to drive peace away. She is placing obstacles in the way of anyone who is searching for peace.

The winter, which was severe, forced us to move large numbers of displaced persons living in tents, which with time have become their homes, from mountainous regions to the Jordan valley where they might find shelter from the hardships of winter and of nature. This, however, did not end their suffering, for they became the prey to repeated Israeli attacks and targets for the Israel air force and artillery. Many of them, as you know, still have to contend with that. It is this that causes me to believe that Israel must be exposed at a political level as the party responsible for the lack of progress towards a just and lasting peace in the area. Her conduct in this regard does not encourage us in the least to believe that she cares for peace. This is where the tragedy lies, and where it will remain, unless the world comes to appreciate the facts fully.

I think it was on the eighteenth of this month that Israel claimed that a bus had been blown up by a mine in the south. This was a much publicised affair. We expected a military operation against us immediately afterwards. However, concerning this matter, I would like to assure you, as I have done in the past, that neither I nor

my government nor our armed forces bear responsibility for the safety and security of the Israel forces of occupation stationed in the occupied section of Jordan, i.e., the West Bank, or the other occupied areas. We are neither in a position, nor can we possibly ever be in a position, where anyone in the world could hold us responsible for the safety and security of Israeli forces. These forces are staying on regardless of the fundamental concept that aggression does not pay, and these forces must be withdrawn.

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It is easy to find a pretext. The Israelis did so in 1956, in 1967, and once again in the present case.

I believe that this was their objective and that it still is, for the present, and unless the world tries to find a way to realise world hopes for peace in this region, then world peace as a whole will be rendered difficult.

With regard to what happened, and might yet happen again, this is our home territory and we are in the right. That is our conviction and from it we derive comfort. We know our capabilities, we know what happened on Thursday, and we know that Israel has the equipment and the resources. We also know, however, that this is where we live and where we shall die. Should it be our fate to die, we shall try to make the price high for those who have followed one act of aggression with another and those responsible for the wide-spread injury done to the Arab people and to the distinction between right and wrong in this world, and to all that we believe in.

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Q.—What are your comments on the recent Israeli military operation against Jordan?

A. I believe that nothing could have done so little either to lessen the tension or to strike fear in the hearts of everyone. They contributed to the growth of bitterness and resentment and they betrayed their alleged objectives.

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Q.—Some of us went to Karameh, but when we got there the commandos would not let us into the district!

A. I am very sorry that that particular incident took place; however, I would like to ask

you one question: What do you expect from a man who has lost everything he had, his home and his land, and has been driven out time and again, a man who is bitter and wants to do something.

Actually we do appreciate this and we are doing our best to preserve these potentialities for use at a better time. But do you expect us to kill them and destroy their resources? How would you like us to handle such a problem? The problem is there, and will grow, unless something is done to bring about a lasting peace.

Q.—May I ask a technical question: What was the objective of the Israeli attack on the Ghor al-Safi area, where there are no commandos?

A.—I do not know. What they succeeded in doing was to penetrate into certain areas, kill some women and children and commit some ugly crimes against the peaceful citizens there.

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Q.—Two questions, Your Majesty: Do you believe that if the United Nations Security Council resolution were to be implemented, the activities of the commandos would come to an end? And the second question: How do you view the fact that Israeli planes are able to dominate Jordanian air-space, and why have you not asked for help in defending your air-space from other Arab countries which support Jordan?

A.—As regards the first question, events, past and present, provide the answer to it. I believe that Israel's agreement to implement the United Nations Security Council resolution, which provides for her withdrawal from the territories occupied by force of arms, would solve a major aspect of the problem.

As far as the recent battle is concerned, we take a practical view of things, and we know our potentialities and the potentialities of our brethren around us. The question of the air force is serious; however, our evaluation is that Israel's intention was to escalate the battle to the point where she could once again get the Arabs into a corner, at a time not of their choosing, particularly as they are still attempting to reorganise their ranks following the June war.

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Q.—What might the Arabs accept for the sake of a peaceful solution to the problem?

A.—I do not think the Arab position can differ very much from what it is now. I do not think moreover, that we could possibly adopt a more positive attitude than the one we have now; certainly there are limits beyond which we cannot go. Nor are we prepared to go beyond the dedicated attempt we have made to arrive at a lasting and just peace in the area, which provided ample evidence of our willingness to cooperate with the international community in the search for that objective.

Q.—Does the number of civilian casualties given for the Karameh battle include the commandos who were killed?

A.—Perhaps. The fact is, the inhabitants of Karameh resisted bravely, and it is difficult to draw a line between who was a commando, and who was not. The day may come when we are all commandos and that day may not be so far off.

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Message From the Tunisian President Bourghiba to the Jordanian King Hussein on Convening an Arab Summit Conference.¹ [Excerpt]

Tunis, March 29, 1968

The emergence of a popular movement of resistance to Zionist occupation, which is coming more and more to the forefront, is the one ray of hope that lightens the gloomy prospect. We cannot but take pride in and salute this initiative, regardless of the great sacrifices it demands of neighbouring peoples and countries.

Yet, no matter how proud we are of this courageous resistance movement, we are of the opinion that a well-defined Arab plan is the only sure way to final victory. It is possible to

arrive at such a plan through wide-scale and comprehensive consultations at all ordinary levels as a preliminary step towards agreement and in an endeavour to unify our ranks, until such time as the Arab heads of state feel that it is possible for them to arrive at positive decisions.

We believe that unless such a course be followed, no meeting at summit level in the present situation can meet with success and may, on the contrary, have consequences which none of us would welcome.

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Programme of Action Announced by the U.A.R. President Nasser.² [Excerpt]

Cairo, March 30, 1968

Fellow-Countrymen—It was the heroic and loyal stand taken by the Egyptian masses on 9 and 10 June, and nothing else, that brought about a number of major changes which enabled us to withdraw from the edge of the precipice to which the setback had brought us. This meant that we stood on firmer ground, from which we could look to wider horizons and move towards

² U.A.R. Documents and Research Centre, *Nashrat al-Wathe'q*, January-June 1968, pp. 29-31.

This Programme was put to a plebiscite on May 2, 1968. On May 3, the U.A.R. Interior Minister announced the following results:

1. The number of those eligible to vote, being all those whose names are registered at the electoral bureaus in accordance with the provisions of the law: 7,450,478.
2. The number of those who came out to the polls: 7,317,419.
3. The number of valid ballots: 7,316,536.
4. The number of invalid ballots: 887.
5. The number of votes in favour: 7,315,734.
6. The number of votes against: 798.
7. Percentage of those in favour out of all registered voters: 98.2%.
8. Percentage of those in favour out of all valid ballots cast: 99.989%.

These figures include the votes of members of the armed forces stationed along the front lines. The percentage of votes in favour there was 100%, while there were 140 invalid ballots. [As published in *Al-Ahram*, 4/5/1968.]

¹ *Al-Amal* (Tunis), 29/3/1968.

the achievement of our exalted and cherished objectives. The most important of these changes are the following:

First: We have been able to re-build our Armed Forces. This was an essential and indispensable first step if we truly desired to redress the impact of the setback, eliminate the aggression and recover what we had lost by it. Without the rebuilding of our Armed Forces there was only one course open to us: to accept defeat irrespective of our hopes and our faith. For it is a fact in this present age, and perhaps in every age, that right without might is unavailing, that to hope for peace without being able to defend it amounts to submission, and that principles unsupported by the ability to defend them are idealistic dreams that belong to a higher sphere and have no place on earth.

Secondly: We have been able to meet the requirements of economic endurance at a time when everything was conspiring to make it impossible. This was made possible by the people's readiness to make more sacrifices, by the genuinely Arab stand at the Khartum Conference and by our friends all over the world whom we had supported and who naturally reciprocated. It was imperative that economic endurance should go hand in hand with the rebuilding of our Armed Forces. Without a sound economy, we could not provide for the possibility of war, nor was there any use in our standing on the firing lines while our production capacity was paralysed and while the spectre of hunger was a more immediate menace to us than the threats of the enemy.

Thirdly: We succeeded in liquidating the centres of power which had emerged, as it was in the nature of things and of human beings that they should emerge in the various stages of our struggle. Political action is not undertaken by angels but by human beings, and political leadership is not a sharp sword but a process of balance, a process of choice following that of balance, and a constant balance between various possibilities and in many cases, the choice between palpable risks. After the setback, the situation was intolerable, because the centres of power were impeding the process of rectification for fear of losing their influence and of their misconduct being brought to light. Had the situation been left as it then stood, it would have threatened the

popular resistance front. It was, therefore, necessary to liquidate the centres of power regardless of any other consideration. This was no easy task in view of the positions which these centres occupied and of the critical situation in which the homeland then found itself.

Fourthly: This is an ethical and moral question to which I attach great value—we have succeeded in providing the masses, by holding the trials in public, with a full picture of the aberrations and faults of the previous stage. My opinion on the subject was that this was a responsibility which must be shouldered honestly and courageously by the revolutionary regime. It was also my view that the national conscience, which had perceived that these aberrations and errors had taken place, was entitled to know the truth and would benefit from knowing it by getting rid of the burdens and deposits of the past, so that it may enter the future with a clean sheet.

Despite all the personal suffering which I felt and the people felt with me during this process, I believed it was necessary, just as I believe in surgery, which cuts to cleanse and amputates to save.

Fifthly: We have been able to make extensive political efforts on broad fronts, Arab and international. Our efforts have been varied and diversified on these fronts, through direct contact with friends in socialist countries, especially the Soviet Union. The conditions of the setback proved to us beyond doubt how genuine is the friendship of the Soviet Union, how sincere its cooperation and how firm its stand on the front of international revolution against imperialism. We have also had direct contacts with non-aligned countries, with Afro-Asian countries, with Islamic countries and with all peoples that desire peace based on justice, and with such world politicians as are farsighted enough to see beyond a temporary setback in the life of a nation that has played a great part in history and will play a great role in the field of human destiny.

All these changes were initiated and supported by the profound sense of duty felt by so many of our citizens in all fields of responsibility: members of the Armed Forces, economic experts, workers in production units, those committed to the aims of the popular struggle and capable of serving such aims, people engaged in politics,

diplomacy and thought. All these contributed to the miraculous consolidation of these changes which have led us today to a position where we can say that we are able to look forward to the future.

Now, as we look forward to the future, it is my firm belief that the best way to arm ourselves to face our future responsibilities is to have a well-defined programme of action which we all study together and all agree on. Such a programme of action will enable us to achieve the immediate aims of our struggle, in addition to bringing us closer to the day when we can achieve its ultimate aims. It must be a programme of action on which there is no difference of views or opinions, which ensures that there is no clash of powers; a programme of action which we can act on immediately, once we have agreed on it. This will enable us to advance along the long road of struggle with a map of the vast horizon before us, and a plan of action for our advance towards that horizon. It must be a programme of change responding to the great hopes which led the masses of our people to adopt their splendid stand of June 9 and 10. I shall always, until my last breath, believe that this stand constituted the rebirth of the Revolution, a renewal of its youth, an unfailing inspiration, and an unextinguishable beacon to light our road to the future.

I initiated this change, as you know, by reconstituting the Cabinet. The important thing about the new Cabinet is that it brought to ministerial posts the cream of this nation's youth, none of whom owed his post to any consideration other than his knowledge and his experience in political activity. It cannot be denied that they represent a new generation that is marching forward to the summit of responsibility.

In addition there are other changes coming which will affect the leaderships of production, the diplomatic corps, governors, and heads of town councils. Many of those who occupy those posts have performed their duties with distinction and merit, but some of them were not up to standard, either because of their political views or their lack of efficiency, and we must make room for others more capable.

However, the change after that must be more than just a question of persons: the change we desire must be more far-reaching and profound

than the mere replacing of one person by another.

The change we have to bring about must be a change in conditions, in atmosphere, otherwise any new persons in the same conditions and atmosphere will be obliged to tread the same path that others have trodden before them. The change which we have to bring about must consist of clear thinking, more forceful mobilisation and more precise planning. In this way our determination will have a meaning, and the will of the people will be able to surmount all obstacles and barriers to forge ahead and reach its goals.

Brethren, the historical responsibility for the critical and glorious days in which we are living and for which we live demands a programme of action covering two aspects. The first is the mobilisation of all our military, economic and ideological forces on our front with the enemy for the liberation of our territory and the achievement of victory.

The second is the full mobilisation of the resources and capacities of the masses for the task of liberation and victory and to meet the aspirations of the stage that will come after liberation and victory.

Brethren, I shall start with the first aspect of our proposed programme of action, namely mobilisation. I hope we are in full agreement on the fact that, at present, there is not, nor can there be, a louder voice or a call more sacred than that of the battle. Any thinking or calculation which does not place the necessity for battle first and foremost does not deserve to be so called, and is worse than useless.

The battle takes priority over everything else, and where the battle and the achievement of victory are concerned, no price is too high, and no sacrifice too great, be it in money, effort or blood. Whatever road we follow towards the liberation of our land and the achievement of victory, it can only lead to an impasse without adequate preparation for the battle. Whether we accept the road of political action and follow it up, or despair of political action and relinquish it, to face our destiny in the battlefield, the result depends on our readiness for the battle.

We have shown, and are still showing, our willingness to resort to political action through the United Nations or other channels and, along with our Arab brethren, we are prepared to make

every effort in this field, either through the convening of summit conferences or through direct bilateral coordination.

We are co-operating with all Arab popular forces for the sake of armed resistance to the enemy and all other forms of resistance. Our relations with the whole world are based on the line of thinking that we have followed throughout our long struggle, namely that we are friends with those who are friendly to us and hostile to those who are our enemies. In all this we are well aware of the present and possible future consequences, but we must be prepared for the battle, whatever it may cost us, and even if we have to fight it alone.

The land is ours, the right is ours and the destiny is ours. For our own sake, for the sake of the Arab nation, for the sake of coming generations—our children and our grandchildren—we cannot hesitate, be slack or shift the responsibility onto others, whatever this may cost us in terms of resources, nerves or lives.

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Message From the Jordanian King Hussein to the Saudi King Faisal on Convening an Arab Summit Conference.¹ [Excerpt]

Amman, March 31, 1968

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The resolutions of the Khartum Conference,² Your Majesty, as we have said more than once, served its purpose at the beginning of the stage during which the unanimous Security Council resolution was adopted. The situation in which the Arab world now finds itself makes it necessary for Arab leaders to get together to discuss the new situation and to decide on a unified attitude to it, particularly now that new complications have appeared. There are innumerable dangers in the situation as a result of Israel's persistent recourse to aggression, her unyielding military arrogance, her determination to break the spirit of

Arab resistance in the occupied territories and the aspirations she harbours for further territorial expansion through military adventure. The purpose behind this is to break the encirclement of Israel—which Israel is attempting to achieve, starting with this country and its faithful, striving people—and then to consolidate her occupation of our territory which serves her as a garrison from which she every now and then launches yet another of her repeated military adventures.

We do not imagine Your Majesty believes that the measures taken at the Khartum Conference are sufficient to account for the strength and the defensive capacity we require, or to provide for the organisation and coordination necessary for the Arab encirclement of Israel. The Conference succeeded only in ensuring the economic endurance of the countries directly affected by the aggression in the situation prevailing at the time. We do not believe that what was done was a match for what the enemy already possesses, or what he is constantly receiving from outside, which can outstrip the greatest possible achievements of 'economic endurance'.

In addition, we are trying to do all we can with whatever lies in our power to make it possible for our brethren and fellow citizens in the occupied territories to hold their ground and endure the calamity that has befallen them. We are trying to provide for the needs of those who were forced to leave their land, to remedy the situation that arose from the June disaster, and to heal the wounds caused by repeated Israeli attacks. We are trying to attend to our armed forces which are standing fast in the very jaws of death and to make up for the losses they suffered during the war, so that they may be at a level of preparedness that will enable them to fulfill their sacred historic task and to fight that battle in the future which our enemies will force upon us, should the mission of the United Nations delegate end in failure, or should they succeed in concealing their real attitude to that mission and hiding the true nature of that attitude from world public opinion. Moreover, it is our duty in the first place to make preparations for recovering our afflicted land, that land which is the home of our people, and is the site of the holy places of the Arabs and the Muslims.

If Your Majesty is of the opinion that the

¹ *Al-Dustur* (Amman), 1/4/1968. See *ante*, doc. 311.

² See *International Documents on Palestine, 1967*, pp. 655-657.

achievements of our nation to date are adequate to cope with all this, or that the Khartum Conference was an end in itself and was all that we could hope for, that its decisions provide the answer for every situation, circumstance or occasion; if you are of the opinion that our brethren have given all that they ought to give, that they have taken precautions against every eventuality and provided themselves with the wherewithal to stave off the danger and fend off all challenges, then, and only then, Your Majesty, would our constantly repeated call for a reappraisal of the situation and for an immediate admission of the responsibility for so doing be out of place, in which case we should have to apologise for causing such inconvenience to all concerned.

As for the United Nations envoy, we believe that it is he who should decide whether his mission has succeeded or failed, for he could then also decide on where the responsibility for his failure lay, and allot it to the proper quarters. Quite frankly, we do not see how it can be in any way in the Arabs' interest for us to announce that the mission has failed and to bring about a confrontation with the United Nations and world public opinion; nor do we see how it can be in the Arabs' interest for us to discontinue our contacts with him after all we have suffered since June. Quite the contrary, we feel that the common Arab interest demands that we follow the road to the very end, in order that the world may realise the fact that the Arab nation was in no way responsible for the failure of the United Nations delegate's attempt to bring about peace on the basis of justice, but that it was our enemies alone who were to blame.

Taking that for our starting point, we do not feel, Your Majesty, that a meeting of Arab leaders will greatly benefit our nation if it comes in the wake of a declaration that the United Nations delegate's mission has failed, for such a meeting could not, at such short notice, perform the miracle of providing for the preparedness necessary for confronting the consequences of that failure.

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Phased Plan of Action Adopted by the Save Jerusalem Committee.¹

Amman, April 7, 1968

A. Objectives

1. To strengthen Arab endurance in the Holy City and to employ all available means to secure its liberation.

2. To inform world public opinion, and Muslim and Christian opinion in particular, what the Zionists are doing to change the character of the Holy City by "Judaising" it and of the pressure and intimidation to which its population is being subjected.

3. To maintain the Arab character of the City and to protect its holy places.

B. Procedure

1. To mount propaganda campaigns at all levels employing all available information media, including press, radio, television, speeches, pamphlets etc.

2. To send delegations to world capitals, particularly to those of Arab, Islamic and friendly countries, to explain the situation in the Holy City, and to expose the methods being employed by the Zionists in their "Judaisation" of it, and to take action to oppose them.

3. To form permanent committees in Arab and Islamic capitals.

4. To seek the support of Arab émigrés and student unions abroad, urging them to publicise the problem of Jerusalem in all fields.

5. To set up permanent committees to solicit contributions which shall be sent to the Save Jerusalem Committee to be used to strengthen Arab endurance in the Holy City and for whatever may be required for action to rescue the City.

6. To establish permanent communications with the people of the Holy City.

7. To collect information about everything that happens in the City and about measures taken by the Zionists against its population.

8. To distribute this information regularly to all quarters concerned, to all permanent com-

¹ *Al-Dustur* (Amman), 10/4/1968.

mittees and to other organisations.

9. To formulate solutions and remedies in memoranda to be distributed to the quarters concerned.

10. To maintain close links with the Jordanian government, and national bodies, the representatives of friendly nations and international organisations that provide aid to the City and its Arab population.

11. To make June 5 as "Jerusalem Day" and wherever possible to hold rallies in aid of Jerusalem in Arab, Islamic and other capitals on that date.

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Speech by the U.A.R. President Nasser Before a Delegation from the Permanent Office of the Conference of Arab Lawyers.¹ [Excerpts]

Cairo, April 10, 1968

We thought, after the defeat of June 5, that the entire Arab Nation would mobilise all its forces, economic, military, moral and material, in order to take part in the battle. Why? Because the battle is not for the destiny of one Arab country alone; the battle will decide the destiny of the entire Arab nation. That is why we called for a summit conference and why we called for peaceful coexistence among Arab governments throughout the Arab nation. We said that we were prepared to speak of one thing only: the battle for the destiny of the Arab nation and the future of that nation. But so far we have been unable to unify our efforts for the sake of that battle.

The stage we are at is therefore a most delicate, complicated and critical stage, one in which the enemy could concentrate all his forces against one Arab country alone. We have our eyes on the future of the Arab nation at this stage; you too have a heavy responsibility to face; the whole Arab people, which stood its ground and refused to be defeated, has a heavy responsibility to face.

This responsibility is to unite the efforts and the forces of the entire Arab nation, to unite the potential of the entire Arab nation in the quest for victory in the battle; to pool and mobilise all our forces in the economic, military, moral and material fields, in the service of a single objective that every single Arab throughout the Arab nation is aware of—victory. This is a heavy responsibility, it is a serious task; but it seems to me to be still a most critical and complicated affair, as you described the stage in which we find ourselves.

However, the situation is not as black as all that. Certain positive factors have appeared since the time of the setback. Foremost among these positive factors is the Palestine resistance movement which has arisen to defend the rights of the Palestinian people and to regain the usurped territory. This movement—you argued that it was a legitimate movement in the resolutions you passed, and I believe as you do that it is a legitimate movement, for it is a movement that has arisen in every country that has been invaded, in every country that has come under colonial rule, in every country that has been occupied and in every country that has suffered from racial discrimination. It is a movement that has earned the praise of the whole world and the entire body of world public opinion... Thus the Palestine resistance movement that arose following the setback we suffered in June 5 is a positive movement, it is a legitimate movement, just as all these movements that arose during the Second World War were positive and legitimate movements.

I agree with you that the Palestine resistance movement should have our support, in the name of the rights of the Palestinian people and in the quest for victory.

Moreover, I wish to tell you that the United Arab Republic is fully prepared to support and to arm the Palestine resistance movement, for that movement is part and parcel of the battle of destiny, the battle for the destiny of the entire Arab nation.

The entire Arab nation was able to stand fast after it had been defeated, and to resolve that it

¹ *Al-Ahram* (Cairo), 11/4/1968.

will pursue the course of struggle. In this way, it refused to be defeated and in this way the Israeli foe, and world Zionism and imperialism which supports it, failed to realise their major objective, which was the downfall of the Arab nation.

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Joint Communiqué on the Saudi King Faisal's Visit to Kuwait, 8-11 April.¹ [Excerpt]

Kuwait, April 11, 1968

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The two rulers also reviewed the present Arab situation and the continued Zionist aggression against the Arab nation and the threat that it constitutes to peace in the area and in the whole world. The two rulers affirmed their conviction that the responsibility for the elimination of the consequences of the aggression falls to the lot of the Arab nation in its entirety and requires that all Arab efforts and potentials be channelled to that end...

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Press Statement by the Mayor of Arab Jerusalem Ruhi al-Khatib on Israel's Plan to Alter the Arab Character of the City.²

Amman, April 13, 1968

Ladies and Gentlemen,

1. Allow me to give each of you photocopies of two new Israeli plans, taken from an Israeli booklet circulated by the Israeli authorities in Jerusalem at the beginning of March this year, of which I received a copy this week.

2. The first photograph shows a survey plan for the northern sector of the city of Jerusalem. At the centre of the photograph is an area

in black outlining the first parcels of land picked by the Israeli authorities for the creation of the first Israeli quarter in the recently expropriated Arab territories.

3. The second photograph shows a zoning plan for the parcels referred to above, in the form of a complete partition plan laying out streets and courtyards and distinctly showing the units of land to be distributed and the area of each.

4. The booklet from which this picture was taken, which is in Hebrew—I could not obtain copies either in English or in Arabic, for the matter really concerns Jews only—provides details of the plan for the distribution of these parcels of land, and shows how easily Israelis can obtain them, at nominal prices, and the means by which long term loans can be obtained at reasonable interest rates. For building, the booklet further shows the conditions that must be satisfied, gives specimen application forms, and refers to the possibility of making a start before the end of the month.

5. These lands, ladies and gentlemen, form part of Arab lands in Arab Jerusalem which were appropriated on January 11, 1968, in accordance with an expropriation decree issued by the Israeli government. Here is a copy of the decree which will serve as a third illustration of what I have to say to you today.

6. The area of the expropriated lands is 3354 dunums or 818 feddans. The Israeli authorities claim that one third of these lands is Jewish-owned, that another third belongs to the Jordanian government and that only the remaining third is the private property of Arab individuals and companies.

Most regrettably, this claim is absolutely false; official records at the land registry office in Jerusalem, copies of which are available in Amman, show that no more than 250 dunums of the lands under discussion are Jewish owned, that the Jordanian government owns no more than 50 dunums and that the rest of this land—a total of more than three thousand dunums—is Arab property, belonging to Arab individuals and families in Jerusalem.

7. These lands, ladies and gentlemen, were expropriated by Israel to be used in Jewish housing projects. The project we are discussing today is for the first Jewish quarter to be set up. The area

¹ Saudi Embassy Press Release, Beirut, 12/4/1968.

² *Al-Dustur* (Amman), 14/4/1968.

of the lands covered by the project is about 600 dunums, on which about 2500 housing units are to be constructed. The project is expected to start at the end of this month.

8. This new quarter is part of an expansionist Jewish plan in Arab Jerusalem, the purpose of which is to build a chain of Israeli owned buildings extending from the outermost point of the Jewish quarters in Jerusalem north-east into the heart of Arab lands, which is to constitute a barrier in the form of buildings and housing units which will cut off the Arabs of Jerusalem from the Arabs of the villages and towns lying to the north. The new quarter will moreover freeze the outward growth of Arab real estate development for which the Arabs of Jerusalem had been preparing during the last few years. The barrier will confine the Arabs within a fixed area, and this will lead to a gradual decrease in their numbers, while at the same time leaving room for new buildings to absorb more Jewish immigrants who, in the not too distant future, will constitute an absolute majority in the city.

9. The construction of the new quarter, along with other quarters to follow on the remainder of the expropriated lands—I attach a general picture of these as a fourth appendix—supports apprehensions that the aim of Israel's leaders is expansion and that the "peace" of which they are forever speaking is no more than a mask to cover their actual expansionist intentions. Such arbitrary measures on their part will undermine the efforts of more than one well-intentioned party to bring about peace; they will even put an end to the United Nations delegate's attempts to find just solutions for the problems of the area. Such measures, furthermore, make it evident that Israel means to frustrate the quest for just solutions, despite the repeated claims of the Israeli authorities that they are cooperating with the United Nations delegate and that they are in favour of his mission.

10. The Arabs of Jerusalem have registered a strongly worded complaint against the expropriation of these lands and regard such a measure as a flagrant violation of the United Nations resolution,¹ international law and the Geneva

Convention. They submitted a memorandum to the Israeli authorities on January 14, 1968, objecting to the expropriation of these lands and demanding that it be halted.² Copies of this memorandum were also sent to the representatives of foreign governments resident in Jerusalem, the Secretary General of the United Nations and his representative, Dr. Gunnar Jarring. I enclose a copy of this memorandum as a fifth item.

11. The proprietors of these lands lodged a similar protest and their categorical rejection of the appropriation in a handwritten memorandum they conveyed to the Israeli authorities. I enclose a photographic copy of the memorandum as a sixth item.

12. In our view the Israelis' proposal of the project for a new quarter and their insistence on its speedy implementation is a flagrant defiance of the United Nations resolutions, a violation of civil rights and an encroachment on the rights of a sovereign state that is a member of the United Nations.

13. We also regard the project as evidence of a determined Israeli plan to alter the map of Jerusalem and acquire territorial gains for Israel of an expansionistic nature. This offends the sensibilities of adherents of two major religions: Christianity and Islam. It is of particular interest to note the precise timing of the disclosure of the project and the time it comes into effect—its presentation to the Arab inhabitants of Jerusalem coincides with the celebration of Passion Week and the commemoration of the crucifixion of Our Lord Jesus. Such timing cannot be purely coincidental, for the Jews have brought it home to us that they are a calculating and precise people who are careful in their timing and wait for suitable circumstances. This project, ladies and gentlemen, must be viewed as a new blow to the cause of peace in the land of peace.

14. In the face of this persistent and barefaced challenge and this unjust encroachment on Arab rights in full view and hearing of the United Nations, of the followers of Jesus and Muhammad, in Christian and Islamic countries, and of the leaders of Arab peoples and countries, I, as a son of Jerusalem, feel myself obliged to call on world

¹ U.N. docs. A/RES/2253 and 2254 (ES-V), July 4 and 14, 1967, respectively, texts, in *International Documents on Palestine, 1967*, pp. 256, 260. See also *ante*, doc. 238.

² See *ante*, doc. 278.

public opinion, in the name of the Save Jerusalem Committee, to realise how expansionist and aggressive is Israel and what obstacles she is placing in the way of establishing peace in the Holy Land. I also call on the United Nations to show the world a decisive stand towards such nation or nations as refuse to implement its decisions. I appeal, moreover, to the Christian and Islamic worlds to act with speed and in close cooperation in order to foil the plans of the Israeli authorities, and to protect Jerusalem and its holy places.

From Amman, where I have taken up temporary residence—exiled from Jerusalem by the Israeli authorities, exiled from the land where I was born and raised, Jerusalem, where I had the honour to serve as its mayor—I call on the leaders and peoples of the Arab nation to unite and mobilise all their resources so that they may confront the aggressors as one man. Either let justice be done and give us dignity, or let us resort to that which we, and the whole world, abhor.

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Speech by the U.A.R. President Nasser Before Members of the Central Office of the Inter-Arab Workers Unions.¹ [Excerpt]
Cairo, April 15, 1968

Now that we have passed through the stage of endurance and are embarking on the stage that will lead to victory, all Arab forces throughout the Arab nation must be forged into one instrument.

Our intention, in talking of this, is to be practical, for when we speak of the 'Arab nation', we must take into consideration the fact that the expression has a wide range of application, covering:

1. Arab governments.
2. Arab popular forces, forces belonging to the Arab masses, to the workers, the farmers and the intellectuals, in addition to Arab armed forces

and popular armies.

It is our duty to take action and to harness our forces in all these fields, nor do I find it in any way contradictory that we should take action in all these fields, for the issue before us today is the issue of the entire Arab homeland. Every Arab nationalist must join the advance of the Arab nation so that we may be able to move from the stage of endurance to that of victory. Furthermore, when we speak of Arab nationalism at this stage, we must put a number of irrelevant ideas out of our minds,—a right wing nationalist is no different from a left wing nationalist, for Israel did not make any distinction between right wing nationalists and left wing nationalists when she occupied the West Bank of Jordan—for her they were all just nationalists. There is a difference, however, as we all know, between a nationalist and a traitor; a traitor is one who hands over his country or who makes concessions in the affairs of his country.

Israel, in occupying Arab territories, and in the threats that she made, did not make any distinction between Arab governments, Arab peoples or Arab masses. Therefore, when we take action we must not allow any conflicts to arise, and I feel that there are conflicts in the things I have been speaking about. We shall take action through Arab governments and we shall take action through the Arab masses in every sphere of activity, for the issue before us is whether the Arab nation is to be or not to be.

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Statement by the Palestine National Liberation Movement "Fateh" on Israel's Treatment of Arab Guerrilla Prisoners.²

April 17, 1968

In view of the statement broadcast by Zionist occupation authorities to the effect that one of our comrades who was taken prisoner has been found dead in his prison cell, claiming that his death was due to suicide, *Fateh* wishes to bring

¹ *Al-Ahram* (Cairo), 16/4/1968.

² *Al-Hayat* (Beirut), 18/4/1968.

to light the following facts:

1. *Fateh's* internal information section has ascertained that the Nazi Zionist enemy who claims that his laws do not provide for capital punishment is now liquidating our comrades who are prisoners, by killing them and then claiming that they were found dead in their cells as a result of suicide, as happened in the cases of Captain Umar Abu Laila, "Mujahid", Muhammad Samara, and others. Our information section assures us that the most odious methods of physical liquidation are practised in enemy prisons and that blood is taken from our revolutionaries who are being held prisoner at regular intervals, so that they are under the threat of slow death.

2. Our fighters who fall into the hands of the enemy are prisoners of war, and thus entitled to benefit from all the laws for the protection of such prisoners, in view of the fact that they are members of a revolutionary movement that is directing the legitimate struggle of the Palestinian Arab people to recover their usurped rights. We therefore ask: Why this hesitation on the part of the International Red Cross and other international organisations? Why do they not investigate the odious criminal acts which are being perpetrated against our people with such unparalleled hatred and malice? It is for this reason that we call on all free men in the world and on the conscience of the world to take action to set in motion the organisations which have closed their eyes to the actions of this form of neo-Nazism.

3. We request that a neutral international commission be set up to investigate all the odious crimes that are being perpetrated in prisons belonging to the enemy, and that the same commission should publish its findings throughout the whole world, so that world public opinion may come to know what sort of criminal gang is in power in Tel Aviv and what sort of crimes that gang is committing, thereby challenging all human sentiments. Our movement is prepared to place all documents in our possession which prove the guilt of the Zionist occupation authorities at the disposal of such a neutral commission.

4. *Fateh*, which is painstakingly following up the cases of Palestinian prisoners in the prisons of the invaders, wishes to make it clear that whatever is taking place in the prison cells of the

enemy serves only to increase our determination to proceed with the legitimate struggle which all international laws agree is our right. The day is not far off when war criminals will be tried for all the barbaric acts and crimes committed at their sinful hands, from the massacre of Deir Yasin to the acts of terrorism and torture being perpetrated today.

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Speech by the Saudi King Faisal at a Banquet in Honour of the Moroccan King Hasan II.¹ [Excerpt]

Riyadh, April 20, 1968

...

We stand in need, Your Majesty, of such contacts and of such meetings between brothers so that we may look into our affairs and coordinate our policies, and unify our efforts in the service of God, our cause and the problems we face as Muslims and as Arabs, which problems are not one but many. We find ourselves faced with many problems today, although the most prominent problem that Arabs and Muslims face today is that of Palestine, the homeland of our brethren, which has fallen prey to unjust aggression, blatant treachery, and deception on the part of imperialists and of those who claim to be our friends and to be faithful to us even as they conspire with our enemies and devise their machinations against us. . . .

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Monthly Report on the Palestine Refugees in Jordan During April 1968.² [Excerpts]

Amman, April 23, 1968

The problem of displaced persons has grown more serious recently since the 42,000 pre-June

¹ *Al-Bilad* (Jiddah), 21/4/1968.

² Archives of the Institute for Palestine Studies. The report was prepared by the Jordanian Higher Ministerial Committee for the Relief of the Palestine Refugees.

War refugees living in the Jordan Valley have been subjected to repeated Israeli attacks on villages and refugee camps in the area. These people are in urgent need of emergency relief, as the homes of many of them have been destroyed. It is clear, moreover, that the objective of these premeditated Israeli attacks is to cause the total paralysis of economic life in this important agricultural area. The aid reaching these displaced persons is intended to enable them to reconstruct their houses and to fortify their villages and camps and go on with the ordinary business of life.

While this is going on, the Israeli authorities are proceeding with their programme of driving out the inhabitants of the occupied Arab territories, through terrorism and all forms of economic and psychological pressure. Thus, in the field of economic life, the occupation authorities are imposing cruelly harsh taxation by methods no longer in use in modern states. As regards acts of bloodthirsty terrorism, Israeli soldiers and civilians alike take part in the crimes that are being committed against the Arabs of the occupied territories. Furthermore, the testimony of some of the young men who have been expelled by the Israeli authorities across the King Hussein Bridge, shows that they were subjected to brutal treatment in Israeli places of detention. The stories they tell remind one of the crimes of the Gestapo during the second World War and of the barbarous treatment meted out to prisoners in the Middle Ages.

No one is any longer deceived by Israel's attempts to deceive world public opinion and to avoid implementing the Security Council resolution of June 14, 1967,¹ which called on Israel to facilitate the return of displaced persons to their homes. Moreover, despite the extensive propaganda on behalf of the programme for the reuniting of families, the facts show that Israel is making no serious attempt to implement it, inasmuch as six months after it came into effect no more than 1336 persons have benefited from it, including the 651 who returned last March. It is regrettable that Israeli government employees have set up a black market for return permits

for purposes of extortion, so that many people have been forced to pay bribes of as much as 2000 Israeli pounds to obtain a return permit for their relatives.

Furthermore, while the occupation authorities are refusing to allow displaced persons to return to their places of residence, these same authorities are expropriating property and money belonging to these people on the pretext that they are absentees. They have gone so far in the implementation of these devious measures as to expropriate part of the property belonging to dispersed families while refusing permission to the owners of these properties to rejoin their families, on the ground that they were not in the West Bank at the time of the outbreak of the June war.

Nor is it any longer a secret that, after the June war, many inhabitants of the West Bank attempted to return to their homes by fording the river secretly. Unfortunately they were always met with traps set for them by the Israeli forces who became proficient in hunting "human game" and who carried out the operation with enthusiasm so as to get hold of the money in the possession of these luckless individuals. The Israeli authorities have put the finishing touch to this series of crimes by issuing a decree stipulating that all who attempt to return to their homes without permission from these authorities are liable to up to fifteen years imprisonment.

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Address by the U.A.R. President Nasser to Intellectuals in the Auditorium of Cairo University.² [Excerpt]

Cairo, April 25, 1968

When the Programme of March 30 and the referendum were announced,³ many people asked: Why a referendum? Others wondered why the first part of the Programme should be referred to the people, the part that deals with

¹ U.N. doc. S/RES/237, text in *International Documents on Palestine, 1967*, p. 251.

² *Al-Ahram* (Cairo), 26/4/1968.

³ See *ante*, doc. 314.

the continuation of the battle and the liberation of the occupied territory. Is this a subject people disagree on? I think that intellectuals do understand the aim of this and do understand why a referendum is to be held on this point. They know that the battle of liberation is not a simple one. Everybody who thinks scientifically realises that it will be a long battle and a bitter one. We shall not be able to get the Jews out in a day or two. We shall not be able to liberate the occupied territory quickly. Perhaps every one of us goes to sleep and wonders in his dreams how it is that the Jews came to be only hundred kilometres away from Cairo. When we entered the battle of June 5, we had been building up our Armed Forces for years, and obtaining arms for years. In four days everything was lost. We lost the military battle and 80 per cent of our equipment. Then we started to build up our Armed Forces all over again. We found out where there had been faults and learned our lesson. We obtained arms, started to train, to build new units, and to get ready to liberate the territory. But we cannot build a new army overnight. We cannot train in the use of the arms which we have obtained overnight, nor can we build new units, train new officers and pilots in a matter of days.

There is one thing I would like to point out. The Soviet Union has done its utmost to help us. We have replaced the arms we lost and decided to establish new units so that Israel may not have supremacy over us either on land or in the air. But we have no money to buy arms with. Even if we had the money, the West would not supply us with arms. In 1955 we had the money and they refused to sell us arms. But the Soviet Union has provided us with the arms and we have not paid a single millieme. Some we have received as a first instalment from the Soviet Union without paying for them. They have sent us planes, tanks and arms free, and this, as I have said, has put our minds at rest.

As I told you before, there were times when we lived in a nightmare. We were afraid that the Israelis might cross the Canal. These times are over. To-day we are in a better position.

When we enter the battle, it will be a decisive one. When I address intellectuals, I know they are aware of the difficulties involved. They

calculate scientifically and they know it will be a long and bitter battle. There have been countries before us which have refused to accept defeat. They were determined to achieve victory and their will prevailed. When I address the intellectuals, they must realise that this battle entails great sacrifices and heavy burdens. The referendum will be a measure of how determined the people are.

Are we to stick to political action alone? The results of political action are limited; political action while a part of our territory is still occupied can never achieve the results we all want. For, as long as Israel occupies Arab territories, she will certainly impose her own terms, the terms of a victorious enemy.

Well, the referendum will show whether we are prepared to surrender to Israel and those who are backing Israel. This is why the referendum is so important. It will show whether the political solution, with its limited results, is the only course and whether we should confine ourselves to political action alone or work for the battle.

Are we to enter an all-out battle? If we have no other alternative, we shall do so, irrespective of all difficulties and of all sacrifices. The problem of eliminating the traces of aggression has many consequences. The question is not limited to the evacuation of Sinai alone. Perhaps if this was the case, it could have been achieved by making certain concessions.

I repeat that intellectuals think without being overcome by emotion. If it was a question of Sinai alone, it would be easy. But it is a question of our destiny and of Arab destiny. If we just wanted to recover Sinai, we could make a few concessions, accept the conditions of the United States and Israel, throw over our commitment to the Arabs and let Israel have the upper hand in Jerusalem, the West Bank and any other Arab country. We could let Israel realise her dream of expanding from the Nile to the Euphrates. We could let Israeli shipping pass through the Suez Canal and fly the Israeli flag in the Canal. They would then withdraw from Sinai. The question is whether we, as a nation, are to survive or perish.

The question of eliminating the consequences of aggression involves much more than Israel's

withdrawal from Sinai. Are we to remain the same independent state, that preserved its independence and sovereignty and refused to be drawn into spheres of influence? Or shall we abandon this? We are stricken and part of our territory is occupied. Shall we, on account of this, throw over our Arab commitments, our ideals, our rights, and agree to sit down at the same table with Israel for negotiations in order to reach a solution? This is what is being advocated by Israel and by the United States.

Israel says that the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967 is no more than an agenda, subject to negotiation between the Arabs and Israel. But can we accept this view? We have said that we would try to reach a political solution and that we would rebuild our military strength, but we have never said that we would surrender.

When we speak of the elimination of the consequences of aggression, we should try to understand the dimensions of the question. It is a matter of great magnitude and of the utmost gravity, in view of the fact that the United States has supported Israel at the United Nations, and provided her with armaments and financial aid.

The sacrifices required of us are commensurate with the magnitude and gravity of the matter. We have achieved great victories in the past and it may be the first time in the past sixteen years in which we are faced with a problem of the utmost seriousness and complexity. There were 80,000 British troops stationed in Egypt, there was occupation, there was the Tripartite Aggression, there was the battle of the High Dam, there was the battle of the nationalisation of the Suez Canal, there were many battles which we won and we tasted the sweetness of victory in every one of them. To-day we are faced with a great and serious problem which requires great sacrifice and patience. As we have tasted the sweetness of victory several times, it may be our lot to taste the bitter cup for a period of time, and we must be patient.

This is why the Programme of March 30 provided for a referendum, so that we may know whether we are ready to hold out and struggle, whether we are ready to sacrifice and pay the costs in the first real battle that has confronted

us in 16 years, a battle in which victory will not be easy. The question is not that of solving the Middle East problem. The important thing is the manner in which it is solved, whether it is an honourable solution—our honour, our future, our destiny are involved.

When I made this, among other matters, the subject of a referendum, I wanted to see how far the people are ready to go. Although I already knew that the people are ready to go to any lengths regardless of the costs, regardless of the burdens, I felt that I must let the people's voice be heard. Even more than I wanted to hear it myself, I wanted others to hear the people's voice on this matter; I wanted the Arab nations to hear it, to hear how strong and unanimous it was, how free from hesitation and reservations. I also wanted the outside world which is concerned with Middle East affairs to hear it, so that it may realise unmistakably that there is no question of bargaining and that there is no road to peace except that of justice. I wanted the enemy to hear it so that he might realise that he cannot break the people's will to resist.

The people's upsurge of June 9 and 10 could easily be portrayed as an emotional reaction, but I believe that it was an expression of the will to endure, to continue the battle to the end, to reject surrender. This is why I say that the voice which will be proclaimed by the referendum will not be one that is swayed by emotion. The referendum will take place more than ten months after the defeat, after the full extent of the defeat and its causes have become known, and after the efforts and the sacrifices required by the battle have been disclosed. The referendum will take place ten months after the defeat, and people will express their opinions after reasoning, thought and reflection. In the course of these ten months people have exchanged views and seen the situation as it actually is. The referendum will be a declaration to us, a declaration to the Arab nation and a declaration to the whole world; it will be a declaration of our will and our determination.

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News Conference Remark by the Tunisian President Bourghiba.¹ [Excerpt]

Carthage, April 26, 1968

Q.—In the course of your visit to West Germany two years ago you spoke of the possibility of peaceful coexistence between the Arab countries and Israel. Have the events of last summer caused you to alter your attitude?

A.—Up to last summer, it was purely a question of relations between the Arab countries and Israel. Since last June, however, the situation has changed. One of the new factors—the most important one, in fact, has been the emergence of Palestinian resistance. The Palestinian people, who used always to depend on the Arab countries, has started to rely on itself, in other words, has started to exercise control over its own destiny.

The most important thing to be considered today is what the Palestinians think of in terms of a solution to the problem. It is their concern, first and foremost, to arrive at a formula governing relations between them and the Jews living in that land, whether this takes the form of a state, a federal union, a confederation etc. After a period of struggle, those concerned will know how to arrive at a solution. The problem today, more than at any time in the past, is how to get rid of a classic form of colonialism such as Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Kenya and other countries have experienced.

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Joint Communiqué on the Moroccan King Hasan II's Visit to Tunisia.² [Excerpt]

Carthage, April 28, 1968

The heads of both states express full support for the struggle of the Palestinian people. They

¹ *Al-Amal* (Tunis), 27/4/1968.² *Al-Amal* (Tunis), 30/4/1968.

take pride in the growth and development of the Palestinian resistance movement and emphasise the need for serious and comprehensive discussions to be held between all Arab countries at all levels in preparation for drawing up a carefully thought out plan designed to emphasise the colonialist aspect of the issue and to place it in its true context, as is being done in the case of other liberation movements in different parts of the world.

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Speech by the U.A.R. President Nasser to the Armed Forces.³ [Excerpts]

April 29, 1968

It was not any lack of courage on our men's part that caused the setback. In fact, the books which I have read on the battle show that the men fought and died bravely whenever they had the chance. In the course of the battle of last June, not all our Armed Forces encountered the Israeli forces face to face. Only part of the Armed Forces did so, while the bulk of our forces did not encounter the Israeli forces. Those who did face the Israelis fought bravely and courageously, and inflicted heavy losses on the enemy. It is only that our circumstances did not enable us to fight, because the enemy enjoyed air superiority as a result of the first surprise air strike.

The result of the battle, naturally, made it impossible for anyone to dwell long on the glorious pages of history which so many of our men inscribed with their blood and their sacrifices. Many died valiantly for their country, although we lost the battle as a whole. But in the side-battles which took place, and in which we did face Israel, our forces inflicted heavy losses on Israel.

I have brought with me the translation of the latest book on the strategy of war. This book, entitled *The Strategy of War*, by Liddel Hart, was published in February 1968. Although he adopts the Israeli point of view and is biased against us, and though he calls for the inter-

³ *Al-Ahram* (Cairo), 30/4/1968.

nationalisation of the Canal, and for Israel to be given part of Sinai, he writes that in an engagement between an Israeli tank brigade and Egyptian tanks, the Israeli losses were so great that they had to wait for reinforcements. Again, despite his biased position, Liddel Hart, speaking of the advance on the second day, says that the initial advance of the Centurion tanks armed with 105mm guns had not faced any serious resistance on the first day as they took an unexpected route through sand dunes. However, the losses were heavy in the second day's fighting, as they engaged the division of General Tell in the battle for Al-Arish. Despite this bias nobody can deny that in the battles in which we encountered the enemy face to face there were those who fought valiantly, died and inflicted heavy losses on the enemy.

Why am I talking about this? It is because of the psychological warfare which has been launched against us to make the people lose confidence in the Armed Forces.

The smear campaigns have not been able to affect or reduce the significance of these events. The psychological warfare against the Egyptian army in particular has been continuous. Its history dates back to before the June war and to before the Suez war in 1956. The idea has always been to make people believe that Egypt has no military strength worth mentioning.

But we are a sensible people, and there is no chance of this psychological warfare making the people doubt their Armed Forces, or making the Armed Forces lose their self-confidence, or creating feelings of despair or defeatism.

Despite the difficult circumstances we have been through and the defeat of last June, despite all the propaganda and psychological warfare, the people of Egypt and the whole of the Arab people have been unaffected. The evidence of this lies in the fact that the people have not surrendered and are determined to resist, and they place their confidence in the Armed Forces for they are the instrument that enables the people to endure, to persist, to reject and repel aggression, and to liquidate the occupation of Arab territories.

Nor will it have any effect on the Armed Forces, as is indicated by the great efforts that are now being made in training and in preparations for any challenge you may be respon-

sible for standing up to. This is an effort as great as the battle itself.

We all know our enemy and his character; we know the tenacity and the ferocity of our enemy. We must therefore benefit from the lesson of the defeat, for we have not surrendered and we shall fight and resist; we shall not give up our rights. Therefore, the efforts made in training, the work, the long hours, the sweat, are no less important than the efforts we shall have to make in the battle itself. The harder the training, the easier the battle itself will be.

The people are making every effort to give us all an opportunity for equal work, in production and in political action. The attitude of the people has given us a great opportunity to mobilise great forces—economic forces, national forces and Arab forces.

The Arab attitude has also made it possible for us to endure. It was expected that we would lose our equilibrium, despair and surrender, as a result of the crushing military blow we sustained. The people's stand has given us the determination to hold out, in spite of the blow dealt to us, the closure of the Suez Canal and the loss of about L.E. 180 million of revenue. Our enemy, backed by all the might of imperialism, expected us to yield as a result of economic difficulties and pressures. But the people have held out and have been able to face the situation and accept the measures that have been taken to enable us to bring about the economic build-up. At the same time, the people, who represent the working forces in this country, have worked hand-in-hand and united politically to prevent our enemy from achieving his goal by breaching our home front. Wherever you go you find a solid front determined to stand firm, to endure, to repel aggression and to liquidate imperialism.

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We have of course been able to obtain arms. We have obtained, to offset our losses, arms from the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has done everything possible to supply us with the arms necessary for our forces, and it is our duty not to let the enemy drag us into a battle before we are ready, before we are confident that we are really fit, before we have remedied our defects and benefited from the lessons we have learned.

Our friends in the Soviet Union have stood by us in times of adversity. Otherwise, we could not have replaced the arms we have lost, nor could we feel such confidence as we do today, here in this camp.

What I want to say is that during the months of June, July and August you, the Armed Forces, and I who was responsible for this country, were perturbed, we all felt worried and insecure after the blow that our Armed Forces had sustained.

Today, the picture is very different. Tomorrow, God willing, the picture will be even more different and much brighter than today. Time is on our side.

The friendship of our friends has played its part in many fields. The non-aligned countries supported us on political action at the United Nations. The Asian and the African countries also backed us in the United Nations. World public opinion today thinks quite differently from last June.

All these aspects, the political and economic aspects, the friendship of our friends, and the action taken by the non-aligned countries, will be of service in the battle, when the time comes.

The course of events proves that the battle must inevitably take place. Why? We have accepted political action and a political solution. But what is happening in this respect? Dr. Jarring's contacts have not achieved any result so far. We have accepted the implementation of the United Nations resolutions, but Israel has not, for she is determined to implement her strategy, which we have long been familiar with—her strategy of achieving peace by force. But the achievement of peace by force, or the reaching of an agreement by force, means that they want to force us by war to sign a document with them. They took action to implement this strategy, and they have succeeded in occupying parts of the Arab territories of Egypt, the West Bank of the River Jordan and parts of Syria. But our will to endure has prevented the implementation of this strategy and frustrated their attempts to make us sit down with them for negotiations. They say that they want negotiations for peace, but of course their words are specious and fraudulent.

For, if I were to sit down for negotiations with the enemy who is occupying part of my land today, I should be sitting down so that the

enemy might dictate to me a conqueror's terms. It would not be any kind of peace, but surrender to the enemy after he had occupied a part of our territory. This we have categorically rejected.

It is evident that Israel has not respected the United Nations resolutions in any sphere since 1948. They are using the United Nations resolution of November 22 [1967] as a pretext, interpreting it to mean that we should negotiate on the provisions of the resolution and reach agreement. Has Israel ever accepted United Nations resolutions?

No, Israel has never either accepted or implemented them. The latest was the resolution calling on Israel not to hold a military parade in Jerusalem. Israel has refused,¹ thus defying the conscience of the world, the international community, and the resolution of the Security Council and has launched a concentrated campaign against the world organisation and U Thant, the United Nations Secretary General. This provides us with an example of how Israel does not heed the United Nations or its resolutions. It is clear from Israeli statements on the question of Jerusalem that she will continue to defy the world and hold the military parade.

But we Arabs say that Israel will pay the price of this defiance.

As regards Jerusalem, as regards those who have been talking about the political solution, the countries of the world which hope for a political solution, the member-states of the United Nations and the members of the Security Council, we ask them, we beg them to consider the implications of the attitude adopted by Israel towards the Jerusalem crisis. This crisis is not our crisis alone. It is also a crisis for the whole world, since the resolution adopted by the Security Council was passed unanimously. Naturally all the member-states of the Security Council—with the exception of two—denounced Israel's action. Of course one of the two countries was the United States. There was also another country in South America. However, the overwhelming majority of countries denounced Israel's action.

Well, Israel's attitude of unheeding defiance means that Israel is not ready to implement anything unless it is in accordance with her plans

¹ *Ante*, doc. 235.

of aggression and in conformity with her objectives and those of world imperialism.

We Arabs must prove to Israel that we are capable of repelling aggression. This is what our nation has been trying to do since the start of the Israeli challenge. I say this because no matter what resolutions are issued by the United Nations, the battle will undoubtedly take place. When Israel speaks of peace, it is only to deceive. She wants the Arabs to surrender. The countries which fought the Second World War have still not signed a peace treaty with Germany.

Similarly, when Israel talks about negotiations, she also wants to cover up her main objective, which is expansion at the expense of Arab territory. We Arabs must prove to Israel and those who back her that we are capable of repelling aggression. That is your responsibility. It was your responsibility in the past, it is at present, and it will be in the future.

The whole Arab nation is now trying by every means to get together and achieve political, military and economic agreement. Great efforts have been made and greater efforts will be made, while we try our utmost to muster the resources of the Arab nation. But I still tell you that we may possibly enter the battle alone, for there is no Arab military or political plan. The enemy is still able to deal with each front separately, whether in the north or the south. I have dealt with this subject on several occasions. I talked about it when I visited your brethren in other units during the Feast. But I still say that we must not despair.

We must understand, and every one must understand, that this phase is the most difficult phase in the history of the Arab nation and that it will affect the destiny of the whole Arab nation for many years. Thus, it is necessary to mobilise all the potentialities of the Arab nation politically and militarily so that Israel may not be able to deal with each Arab country separately. We have not yet achieved this end, but we have not despaired and we shall continue to try to muster these potentialities in order to be able to face Israel.

By reading the latest Israeli budget, we find that the allocations for the Israeli armed forces

are 650 million dollars, or some 300 million Egyptian pounds. This is in addition to items which are not declared.

Therefore, the Arab nation must mobilise all her potentialities in order to face Israel, and world Zionism which provides her with political and economic support.

I shall never give up hope of my call to the Arab nation to rally its political and military potentialities in order to face Israel and those behind her being successful. But I must also tell you, as members of the Armed Forces, that in our strategic planning we do not rule out the possibility that we may have to face Israel alone. If we are not able to rally the potentialities of the Arab nation, then the Armed Forces and the commanders of the Armed Forces must, as I have told the Minister of War, work on the basis of the possibility that Israel may, at any time, gather all her strength against us in a desperate attack. So far Israel has won a military battle, but not the political battle; nor has she been able to achieve her objective of forcing us to surrender.

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Speech by the Syrian Premier Zu'ayyen at the Opening of a Pipeline.¹ [Excerpts]

Tell Adas, May 1, 1968

There are certain clear and well defined criteria by which participation in the battle can be judged. These are known to the people, who judge their rulers by them.

Since Israel expanded through her occupation of new Arab territories in June, 1967 the distinction between Arab countries on the front line and those which are distant from it has become obsolete. The field of battle is vast and comprehensive and the ambitions of the enemy are known to be boundless. We shall tighten our belts and abandon the life of luxury. We shall lead a life of austerity, and make the slogan "everything for the battle" really significant.

¹ *Al-Ba'th* (Damascus), 2/5/1968.

Should there be anyone still labouring under the illusion that life can go on as before, he will soon discover that he is mistaken and fall into line.

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We have only to think of the legacy of humiliation we shall bequeath to future generations of Arabs if we shirk our duty now or are grudging of sacrifice, to realise the magnitude of the danger facing us.

None of this is a secret to our generation, which has the honour to be chosen to make the sacrifices and pay the price that will allow future Arab generations to lead a life of dignity.

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Our people knows that the enemy we face is not Zionism alone, but Zionism and imperialism, first and foremost, American imperialism—that supports it. Our people knows that America is supplying Israel with modern arms.

Without aid from imperialism Israel could not last; she would collapse and lose her ability to serve as a base from which to mount acts of aggression without the financial, economic, military and political backing she receives from the imperialist countries.

Yet, our Arab people also knows its own capabilities which are large indeed; they are the capabilities of a great nation and a vast homeland rich in its resources and potentials.

Had these vast resources and potentials, only a negligible portion of which was brought into play in the battle, been harnessed in their totality, they could have tipped the scales of war and had amazing consequences.

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Press Statement by the Syrian Foreign Minister Makhus.¹ [Excerpts]

Damascus, May 6, 1968

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We, who are a developing and divided nation, cannot match the material power of Zionism and imperialism. This being the case, every Arab must be armed with clear-sighted revolutionary ideology, for that must be our weapon, as it is in Vietnam.

Anything that tends to blur the clarity of revolutionary vision and to keep the Arab masses in the dark can only constitute a setback for the Arab people. We, for our part, refuse to take part in any such measure, no matter what accusations are levelled against us by the imperialist press. We are concerned lest the Arab individual should lose his way, and we want him always to possess a scientific mentality and the power of analytic thought as well as the ability to discover radical revolutionary solutions for the problems of Arab society and the challenges facing the Arab nation.

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It appears that we are expected to be the Red Indians of the twentieth century and that a western colonial state is to be established in our territory under the guise of Judaism; in other words, there is to be an organic extension of imperialism in this part of the world.

The issue is not at all an issue of 'Jews'; the Zionists actually control the focal points of the economies and information media of most Western countries and it has become clear, moreover, since the time of the June 5 aggression, that Zionists in Poland and Czechoslovakia serve the interests of American imperialism through acts detrimental to the socialist regime. So it is not a matter of Judaism as a religion, but of Zionism, which embodies the fallacious ideology of imperialism and is itself embodied in Israel. This is not sufficiently well known to world public opinion. This is why, despite the cruelty of the war in Vietnam, our war is even more complicated because it is less clear in its outlines from the point of view of world revolution.

¹ *Al-Ba'th* (Damascus), 7/5/1968.

The latest unanimous Security Council resolution—in itself a rare enough phenomenon—calling for the Israeli military parade not to be held in Jerusalem,¹ coupled with the Israeli delegate's contempt for the Security Council and for the whole world and his outright rejection of the resolution, bring to mind the scores or rather the hundreds of other resolutions that are slowly mouldering in drawers at the United Nations, and convinces us that Israel would not have dared to challenge world public opinion and the United Nations in this manner were it not for the unqualified encouragement and support she receives from the United States of America. These things also bring to mind the fact that it was Hitler and Nazism that brought about the downfall of the League of Nations, and make us believe that Neo-Nazism, which is Zionism, will also sooner or later bring about the downfall of the United Nations.

The whole of the Arab people, throughout the Arab world, believe quite simply that they are the victims of a colonialist Zionist invasion designed to complete a stage in Zionist expansion leading to the establishment of a state of Israel stretching from the Nile to the Euphrates, in other words, this new aggression is but a stage in Zionist expansion. This is one side of the coin.

The other side is that it was the objective of the aggression to thwart the will of the revolutionary masses in the Arab homeland and bring that homeland back into the closed spheres of influence of imperialism.

Any average human being in the Arab homeland is of the opinion that any Arab meeting, at whatever level, must take for its broad lines the question of how to formulate plans and coordinate Arab efforts to uproot the colonialist Zionist presence, and all manifestations of it, whether political, economic or military, from the Arab homeland. Any other possible agenda or terms of reference for such conferences, leading us to believe that we can solve the problem of aggression through recognition of the imperialist *fait accompli* in the region, will beyond doubt lead us to concessions in order to please America. This the masses refuse.

Our one fundamental condition, if we are

to attend an Arab summit conference or any other conference, is that we should define quite clearly who is the enemy of the Arab people. This is in order to make things properly clear to the Arab citizen and, in turn, to direct all Arab efforts against that enemy.

We declare to you now, as we have always declared, that we in this country are willing to be faithful soldiers and followers of any Arab leader, regardless of the complexion of his regime, as long as he is willing to define the enemy in this way.

But to be friends with America and enemies of Zionism at one and the same time is something we have never been able to understand, nor have the Arab masses.

The masses, armed with a unified socialist revolutionary ideology and acting in total solidarity throughout the Arab homeland, are capable of engaging in armed struggle and waging a battle of popular liberation against the aggression or against all other manifestations of imperialist presence.

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Joint Communiqué on the Libyan Premier Al-Bakkush's Visit to Kuwait.² [Excerpt]

Kuwait, May 9, 1968

Both sides reviewed the continued Zionist aggression against the Arab Nation and stressed that there can be no stability in the area unless peace is made on a basis of justice, taking into account the legitimate right of the people of Palestine to their nation and homeland. Both sides, moreover, expressed their conviction of the necessity for unity of Arab ranks and the direction of all efforts to the elimination of the consequences of the aggression. They commended Palestinian commando action and affirmed their support for it...

¹ *Ante*, doc. 235.

² *Al-Ray al-Amm*, (Kuwait), 10/5/1968.

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Letter From the U.A.R. Foreign Minister Riyad to the U.N. Middle East Envoy Jarring.¹**Cairo, May 9, 1968**

With reference to the wish you expressed to meet with a representative of the United Arab Republic in New York, I wish to reaffirm that our permanent delegate to the United Nations in New York is prepared to meet with you to resume the contacts you have established with the parties concerned in view of the November 22, 1967 Security Council resolution, and with a view to its implementation.

During previous meetings between us, I pointed out the importance of formulating a time-table for the implementation of the Security Council resolution; I also made several suggestions on how this objective could be attained, including the possibility that you should propose a time-table of your own for the implementation of the resolution. These suggestions stem from the fact that the United Arab Republic, as she has informed you, is ready and willing to implement the above-mentioned resolution.

I wish to reiterate our willingness to cooperate with you, in your capacity as the special representative of the Secretary General, in discharging the tasks with which you have been entrusted as defined by the November 22, 1967 resolution.

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News Conference Remarks by the U.A.R. Foreign Minister Riyad Concerning the U.N. Envoy Jarring's Mission.²**Cairo, May 9, 1968**

Q.—There are persistent rumours to the effect that the United Arab Republic turned down the suggestions put forward by Dr. Gunnar Jarring before your meeting with him last Thursday.

¹ U.A.R. Documents and Research Centre, *Nashrat al-Watha'eq* (Cairo), January-June, 1968, p. 142.

² *Al-Nida* (Beirut), 12/5/1968.

A.—Contrary to certain rumours and statements, the representative of U Thant, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, had not officially put any positive proposals before us before last Thursday. We do not know, however if he had done so with Jordan or with Israel, nor do we know if he had received an answer from these two countries. In the course of our meeting last Thursday Dr. Jarring did request, in an official letter dated May 9, that we should maintain our contacts with him while he was in New York in order to facilitate his mission and in view of the demands of the situation. We agreed to his request and asked our permanent representative at the United Nations to get in touch with Dr. Jarring. Your agency has my permission to publish the contents of that letter.

Q.—To the best of your knowledge, have the governments of Jordan and Israel agreed to Dr. Jarring's proposals?

A.—The United Arab Republic and Jordan have agreed, following contacts between them, on a formula altogether different from the one accepted by Israel. It is our opinion that the implementation of the Security Council resolution is of fundamental importance and is in fact essential. However, the public statements of Israeli officials which are being circulated by the press do not indicate that they have agreed that Israel should implement the provisions of the Security Council resolution. It is evident from the statements of the Israeli Prime Minister and members of the Israeli cabinet that Israel intends to annex the City of Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip once and for all, whereas the statements of other Israeli officials indicate that they would like to hold on to all the Arab territories occupied by Israel since June 5 [1967].

If Israel is really sincere, she must do the following two things:

1. Declare her intention of implementing the Security Council resolution.
2. Implement the provisions of that resolution, and agree that the United Nations Security Council should guarantee her acceptance.

You are aware that we give no credence whatever to Israel's signature to any document as such. In the past we had negotiations with Israel on two occasions, which led to the signing

of documents which Israel later disowned and declared to be null and void. Experience has shown that Tel Aviv never honours its own signature, and it is therefore crucial for world peace, particularly in the Middle East area, that the Security Council, particularly the great power members of the Council, should guarantee that Israel will honour her signature.

Q.—You hinted in the past that Dr. Jarring's mission was faced with grave difficulties. Are you of the same opinion today on this point?

*A.—*Dr. Gunnar Jarring's mission will keep running up against the same difficulties so long as Israel refuses to declare her willingness to implement the provisions of the November 22 [1967] Security Council resolution. It is in our interest that Dr. Jarring's mission should succeed, for that would mean that the Security Council resolution would be implemented and that Israeli forces would be withdrawn from the Arab territories they are occupying. As far as Israel is concerned, on the other hand, it is important for her that all efforts to make Dr. Jarring's mission successful should fail and that the responsibility for that failure should be assigned to the Arab countries. We feel that it is our duty to do all in our power to ensure that Dr. Jarring's mission be given a chance to achieve all that is expected of it. This no doubt requires that great diplomatic pressure be brought to bear on the Israelis to put an end to their attacks. We are of the opinion that the great powers could contribute to the success of the United Nations if they were to take a decisive attitude towards Israeli aggression.

Q.—You of course brought this up during your discussions in Moscow?

*A.—*The matter did come up in the course of the discussions I had during my visit to the Soviet capital; however, the discussions we held there centred on what action should be taken to eliminate the consequences of the aggression. The attitude of the Soviet Union on the matter is quite clear, as is the attitude of France, whose President enjoys our unqualified respect and appreciation. Were the other great powers to take an attitude similar to that of Moscow and Paris, there would soon be peace in the Middle East.

Q.—Do you insist on the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Arab territories occupied since June 5 as a precondition?

*A.—*We make no condition; we have accepted the Security Council resolution as a whole, and we proposed to Dr. Jarring in the letter we handed him last Thursday that he should prepare an agenda, and we also informed him that we are prepared to discuss any suggestions he may make in accordance with that agenda. If he likes, Dr. Jarring can put forward a list of the different articles in the Security Council resolution in sequence, along with proposed means for their implementation. It is difficult to elaborate on such an agenda or on the time that the implementation of the Security Council resolution may require; however, we on our part, are prepared to meet all the obligations that the resolution entails.

Q.—Are you prepared to discuss the possibility of modifying the pre-June 5 frontiers through Dr. Jarring's mediation?

*A.—*We cannot give up any of the Arab territories occupied by Israel since June 5. This is a matter of principle which it is absolutely impossible for us to discuss. We would, however, agree to demilitarised zones being established along both sides of the frontier. We insist that Jerusalem be returned to Jordan, but as far as the internationalisation of Jerusalem is concerned i.e., the whole city and the areas surrounding it, that is another matter.

Q.—Are you prepared to allow Israeli ships, flying the Israeli flag, to pass through the Suez Canal?

*A.—*We have already announced that we accept the Security Council resolution of November 22, including freedom of navigation in the Suez Canal. In return, Israel must discharge her own obligations and must satisfy whatever is required of her, including the withdrawal of her forces from the occupied Arab territories and settling the refugee problem. If Israel meets her obligations we shall meet ours, and in doing so we shall have consolidated peace in the Middle East area.

Q.—Why do you reject direct negotiations with Israel?

A.—Because we do not trust her at all, and for many other reasons. We negotiated with Israel twice before; I myself took part in the Rhodes talks which led to the signing of the Armistice Agreement [1949] and I was the head of the Egyptian delegation to the Joint Armistice Commission for three years—the whole affair was a miserable failure, for any agreement that Israel signs one day she breaches the next. Israel trampled the Armistice Agreement under foot and repudiated the Lausanne Agreement [1949] for the settlement of the refugee problem; we therefore fail to see the point of going through the experience once again. Israel attacked us in 1956 and again in 1967—she may very well do so again in another ten years time. Moreover we refuse to negotiate with Israel in the presence of an international mediator because we have no confidence in Israel or in her signature on any document. That is why we prefer to arrive at a solution for the problem through the good offices of Dr. Jarring, along with a guarantee from the Security Council.

Q.—Do you think that there is any likelihood of the resumption of diplomatic relations between you and the United States in the near future?

A.—Relations between us have not made any progress because of America's hostile attitude to the Arabs. There has been no progress because the United States government is quite openly on the side of the Israeli aggression; this is the case despite Israel's persistent refusal to put an end to her aggression. The United States provides Israel with immense economic and military aid, thereby encouraging her to continue in her policy of aggression—we sincerely wish that the United States had followed the example of France and adopted a similar attitude towards the Middle East crisis and refrained from supplying Israel with planes which are being used in the destruction of Arab refugee camps in Jordan. The whole world knows that Washington's attitude does not serve the cause of peace in the Middle East in the least; were the United States to adopt a different attitude on the matter, it would have very far-reaching consequences as far as the establishment of peace in the region is concerned, and the United States would not only succeed in resuming her relations with Egypt, she would also succeed in establishing strong friendly ties

with all the Arab countries.

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News Conference Remark by the Tunisian President Bourghiba at the Canadian National Press Club.¹ [Excerpt]

Ottawa, May 10, 1968

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Q.—What are your views on Soviet influence in the Middle East?

A.—I am not sure that the Soviets are exerting any influence on the governments and countries of the Middle East. Tunisia does not lie on the eastern coast of the Mediterranean. Moreover, if it is established that the Soviets do have an influence on these countries, I do not know if this influence is coupled with pressure in the cases of Egypt, Lebanon, Iraq or Syria. What we do know at present is that a Soviet fleet of a large number of ships is stationed in the eastern Mediterranean off the coasts of Alexandria and Port Said. Nor can I say whether the presence of that fleet in that area means that the Soviets have imposed a certain policy upon the Cairo government or that the presence of the fleet has impaired the Cairo government's freedom of action or choice. It is generally assumed that the balance of power in the Mediterranean has started to shift, but this may not have taken place so far. Be that as it may, it is clear that a shift in the balance of power in the world of today, a world in which peace is based on the balance of opposing or potentially opposing forces, would pose a definite threat. Has this threat been sufficient to invite intervention from other states to compensate for the imbalance and restore the old state of affairs? At any rate, nothing of the sort has been attempted and there have been no reported movements or efforts to restore the balance or to avoid a shift in the balance between the American Sixth Fleet and the Soviet fleet. This is why I am not sure that peace is threatened, or that there is an arms race or that things are being done to restore the balance of power or

¹ *Al-Ahval* (Tunis), 11/5/1968.

anything else which could lead to an armed conflict or threatens to do so.

I do not think that the situation is at a point where such an eventuality need be feared. Even countries directly concerned with the balance of power in the Mediterranean, namely NATO members, do not seem to be greatly concerned over the situation. This leads me to think that there is no present threat to peace.

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Letter From the Algerian President of the Revolutionary Council Boumedienne to the Jordanian King Hussein on the Palestinian Resistance.¹ [Excerpts]

Algiers, May 10, 1968

We in Algeria are deeply conscious of the true dimensions of the June 5 [1967] aggression. We are fully aware of the magnitude of the threat to the Arab nation constituted by the Zionist presence in Palestine, especially in view of the fact that the methods so far followed in combating this inescapable danger are the same today as they were twenty years ago. These methods have dominated our thinking and have been adhered to in the formulation of plans for the future, in total disregard of the failure that has persistently attended them and of the alarming consequences they have led to in all fields.

Our view, which is in keeping with our analysis of the whole of the Palestine issue and the Arab situation as a whole, has always been that the Arabs have not made use, in the fight with the enemy, of all their resources and potentials which are so vast that they cannot be compared with those at the disposal of others. The Arabs have failed even to make an adequate assessment of their nation's power to endure and to withstand the long and bitter struggle, without which there can be no victory and no liberation of Arab territory from Zionist occupation and imperialist influence.

The battle, then, is for the destiny and the future existence of an entire nation. Consequently, the battle today has been removed from the context in which it had been set until June 5, 1967, into a different sphere, where political overbidding can no longer be tolerated and where it is no good hinting at the possibility of diplomatic or compromise solutions. The battle now requires different ways of doing things, unlike anything before, the first step being to encourage Palestinian resistance and support it with everything in our power, then to bring about the total mobilisation of all Arab resources as rapidly as possible and throw them into the battle we have to fight until the bitter end.

This is the line of action which, we have always thought, would succeed in putting an end to the aggression, and liberating Jordan. This, we have always thought, would enable us to put an end to the enemy's designs on our territory. It would restore to us our standing as a nation worthy of respect and deserving to live.

On the other hand, to expect the aggression and the consequences of the aggression to be eliminated through the agency of solutions which are formulated in the Security Council to safeguard Arab rights and preserve Arab dignity, is a form of naive optimism which events will no longer bear out, if not an actually demoralising factor and a means of consolidating and perpetuating aggression, occupation, dishonour and humiliation.

Nevertheless, in spite of our opinion of the effectiveness of summit conferences and their meagre results, we do not wish to stand in the way of those countries more directly concerned with the issue, and we wish to leave the opportunity open before them to try their hand with the political approach, which time has nevertheless proved to be of no avail, unless backed by overwhelming military strength, which is within our reach.

¹ Algerian *Ahdath wa Watha'eq*, 10/5/1968, pp. 13-14.

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Speech by the Tunisian President Bourghiba at a Banquet in his Honour Given by the U.S. President Johnson.¹ [Excerpt]

Washington, May 15, 1968

Mr. President, the other problem² which is of concern to us is that of the Middle East and that strikes even closer to home, if such a thing is possible. The United States are not directly involved in those problems, but still, the United States has the obligation, as well as the means, to help in finding a solution, and this, through an understanding with the other great powers, and also taking into consideration the interests of the countries concerned.

This tragedy that we are witnessing in the Middle East presents three aspects which should cause deep concern on any straight-thinking man and also should make such straight-thinking men try to act.

The first aspect of that is something that, as far as I know, is without precedent in history. As a matter of fact, even since the Balfour Declaration of 1917 we have been witnessing an action which consisted, on the part of a government, that of Great Britain, to offer to the persecuted people, namely the Jewish people, the land belonging to another people, the Palestinian people.

The second aspect is something that has lasted since 1948 and has become worse in 1967, that is, the spectacle of a million men and women who were thrown out of their country, of their homes, of their lands and are living in camps and are fed and clothed and housed by international charity.

The third aspect, finally, is the occupation by Israel, first in 1956, and then in 1967, of new Arab territory through the force of arms as well as the fact that they tend to maintain to keep themselves in these territories or to appropriate certain of them.

When we think about the situation and when we go beyond the rather superficial analysis which

dawn from day to day, we realise that there are other elements in this problem which make it extremely complex and of a rather difficult solution.

The Balfour Declaration to which I made reference a while ago, and through which the British Government committed itself to give a part of Palestine to the leaders of the Zionist movement, so as to found a homeland for the Jews is something, when we think of it, rather along the lines of the Congress of Berlin and the other conferences through which the European powers have cut up in pieces and divided among themselves the countries of Africa and Asia.

But in the case of the Balfour Declaration, it was not a matter of giving a country to a nation which would send its nationals, regardless of their denomination; it was rather a matter of putting into Palestine people from a single denomination regardless of their nationality. But that is not the most important thing.

What seems to me very important and basic, is the fact that this decision made by the British which is unfair for the Arabs of Palestine, which is unjustifiable from the point of view of the rights of people—this decision has nevertheless become legitimate as a result of the action of the international community on two occasions.

The first time, right after the First World War at the San Remo conference [1920], and the second time it was made legitimate in 1947 by the United Nations.

Myself, as a man of principle, I deeply regret that the League of Nations in so doing have ignored the 14 points of President Wilson, and I also regret that the organisation of the United Nations, with an overwhelming majority, including the five great powers, have taken a decision which was not in conformity with its own charter, a charter based on the right of people to self-determination.

As a statesman, while I feel very deeply the tremendous injustice which strikes at this small people, while I understand that we should protest against the consequences of this injustice, I still have been recommending year after year, in the Arab conferences, in all my statements and all my writings, that we take into full account all those different factors, particularly the fact that the community of nations as a whole has approved

¹ Reproduced verbatim from U.S. *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, 20/5/1968, pp. 800-801.

² The first problem that President Bourghiba spoke about was Vietnam. [Ed.]

the creation of Israel, and has, beyond any doubt, given to it an international stamp of legality.

Now, starting from the premise that the Arabs do not have on their side neither military force or international law, I have pleaded that the Arabs should accept the frontiers that were established by the United Nations in 1947, frontiers which should have been guaranteed by the great powers.

Within those frontiers, with borders established by the United Nations, Israel would have attained peace and security that it is trying to reach. As for the Arabs, they would have bowed before an accomplished fact, though it may have been unjust, but at the same time, by accepting the legality given by the United Nations, the Arabs would no longer have been alone, as they have always been, as a matter of fact, since 1948.

They could have saved a good portion of Palestine. They would not have to make so many military expenses that were excessive as well as useless. And they would have avoided the humiliating defeat of 1967.

In other words, the Arabs, having abandoned the idea of rejecting the other party beyond the sea, could have arrived at the containment and would have thus regained the support of world opinion.

Unfortunately, I was not heard by the Arab leaders of the Middle East because they did not want to listen to me, even though the people themselves seemed to have some understanding for the points of view and the reasoning that I used.

The war of June, 1967, was not avoided. This war brought a new element into the situation, and now I want to say that this element has a decided influence on the evolution of this country, that is in the years to come, and therefore, it also affects the solution of the conflict.

The new fact that we are witnessing in this part of the world is the appearance on this stage of the Palestinians themselves since last June. This fact is something that I have been wishing for for several years. It is something which is emerging stronger and stronger from day to day.

I pleaded to the responsible heads of state and the responsible statesmen to take into account this fact, unless they want to continue to reason on the basis of premises that are no longer valid

because the fact is that today it is the Palestinian people themselves which is going to take, day by day, an ever greater measure of responsibility in the struggle to regain its rights on its land and responsibility for the type of compromise that may put an end to that struggle.

The outcome of this political-military struggle, which the other Arab countries are no longer qualified to lead, but which they have to support, will depend on the willingness of the Palestinian people to make sacrifices, to organise itself, and particularly to display a high degree of maturity.

I don't think that I could be accused of being an extremist, but I want to say that we in Tunisia are going to give our support to that struggle because it is a just struggle and because we have a firm conviction that it will lead to a durable solution which can only be a compromise between the aspirations and the likes of one side and the other, all of this based on the will to resist and the will to survive shown by each of the two communities.

What there is today between Palestinians and Israelis is fear and particularly a mutual contempt. From this struggle will emerge the esteem of the one for the other, and therefore, the assertion by each of the parties of the right of the other party to live, the right to security and the right to development. Then, there will be a valid solution because it has been accepted and not imposed.

Therefore, there will be peace and then there will be cooperation. Such is, Mr. President, my opinion about the problem of the Middle East. This is something which I have explained to the politicians themselves, in Jericho in 1965, when I told them: "That is what I would have done if I had been in your place."

I want to add that the last word will belong to those who are directly concerned with this matter, that is, the Palestinians themselves.

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Speech by the Tunisian President Bourghiba at a Reception for Arab Ambassadors in Washington.¹ [Excerpts]**Washington, May 15, 1968**

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Judging by our own experience in our country, there is a sound method by which a weak people can win victory over more powerful, better equipped and more industrially developed countries; this is the method of direct action, of guerrilla warfare, in which tanks, planes and huge forces have no scope to finish off the enemy. This has been our experience in Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco.

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Now that these disasters have taken place, there is no alternative but to resort to other methods, by which I mean that the Palestinian people must take control of the struggle. In this way the situation will be made clear and the fight will be the natural and legitimate struggle of a people that has been victimised by colonialism and has had to resort to armed struggle, or what is termed national resistance. This involves attack and retreat, requiring versatility at one point and inflexibility at another, based on an extremist and a moderate faction at one and the same time. It may be a good thing for the Arab countries not to get embroiled in this struggle, for they have their own duties and obligations and their own special set of circumstances. This is my opinion; and I have made it clear that I do not wish to impose it on others. It is the fruit of a struggle that lasted for thirty years, so that perhaps the Palestinian people may see fit to act on it. However, if they have a different plan, I am prepared to aid it and support it with all my power, whatever it is, for that will be my duty.

This is what I have told the Americans, what I have stated to the press, what I have included in my speeches and the talks I have had on the question, and it is what I have wanted to say to you too. It is no good just talking to relieve your consciences, and then wash our hands of the affair,

contenting ourselves with demanding the implementation of the November 22 [1967] Security Council resolution that will get us nowhere. What we must do is to get to the bottom of the problem and eliminate the roots of the conflict, not merely the aftermath of the last aggression.

The cause of Palestine has been presented to the world in an irrational way; this has cast us in the role of aggressor and made it appear that the Jews are putting up a legitimate defence—this, while the mere fact of their presence in Palestine and the establishment of their state there is in itself a blatant form of aggression.

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It is therefore our duty to get out of this embarrassing situation and accept the original frontiers,² even though we believe Israel will not accept them. This is where the role of armed resistance comes in. The objective of this resistance must not be to throw the Jews into the sea, which world public opinion finds hard to accept, and which could turn the world against us. The objective must be to compel the Jews to accept a solution which will not give them all they want, and which, of course, they will find hard to accept. In this way, we shall find countries to back up our position, for there are those who say that the crux of the matter is to create a national home for the Jews, even if it be small, where they can be secure from persecution and threats, so it is not an affair of frontiers. Even the Jews themselves are making statements to the effect that they occupied the neighbouring territories not with the intention of holding on to them but to safeguard their security, their very existence, which is threatened, supporting their claim with references to threats of annihilation made by Arabs in broadcasts from Arab radio stations.

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¹ *Al-Amal* (Tunis), 18/5/1968.² As defined by the United Nations in 1947 [Ed.].

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Statement of Policy by the Algerian National Liberation Front on "The Solution of the Palestine Problem".¹ [Excerpts]

Algiers, May 15, 1968

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Insofar as Zionism is a religious and ethnic concept, which advocates the establishment of a state on the basis of religion and ethnic identity, it is integrally connected, both fundamentally and formally, with the imperialist phenomenon which emerged during the era of industrialisation and colonial expansion in Europe.

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It is certain that the artificial creation of the Zionist state in Palestine was arranged by the imperialist will, which first appeared on the scene at the turn of the century but did not find circumstances favourable to its realisation until after the last World War; in fact, it was the consequences of the last World War which made the realisation of the Balfour Declaration [1917] possible.

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Therefore, since the Palestine problem is the result of a colonialist-imperialist plot, it must be seen in its proper context, that of the struggle for national liberation in which the Palestinian people is engaged. The Palestinian people has undertaken that struggle for the sake of the Palestinian people within the context of all-out political and military warfare. Commando action and political action among the popular masses are, in practice, always inseparable from one another. The Palestinian people is no exception to this rule and has the right to strong support from the Arab countries, from the revolutionaries in the Third World, and from all the forces of progress which are struggling against all forms of persecution throughout the world.

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In view of the above, the attitude of the National Liberation Front towards a solution of the Palestinian problem is as follows:

1. Armed popular struggle is the only course that will lead the Palestinian people to the recovery of its homeland, its liberty and its dignity.

2. The armed popular struggle should draw its inspiration from the experience acquired in wars of popular liberation fought by oppressed peoples. It should also aim to unify all Palestinian forces of liberation which represent the nationalist forces inside Palestine. Such unification is essential if the conflicts and obstacles hindering the Palestinian cause are to be overcome.

3. Popular armed resistance must be carried on by the Palestinians themselves, for it is their affair first and foremost; however, all Arab nations are concerned, particularly those which have territories under enemy occupation, so that all may be allowed to harness all their resources, without exception, and bring them into play in different fields of action.

4. The Arab masses, particularly the deprived masses, must become aware of the fact that their development or liberation will always be dependent on the liberation of Palestine. This is why it is essential that they should mobilise themselves to achieve this objective. Under all circumstances, these masses must be ready to counter the ploys of imperialism intended to cause disunity and defeatism.

5. It is the duty of the vanguard progressive forces, whose antagonism to the bourgeois coalition is increasing daily, not only to counter the immense resources of the Zionist propaganda media, but also to condemn and combat the policy of bringing European Jews to occupied Palestine.

6. Neither Muslims nor Christians, nor anyone who still has a conscience, can remain passive when faced with the fact that Jerusalem has been occupied and desecrated; all efforts must be devoted to the liberation and retention of the holy places. As believers they must coordinate their activities and take the initiative in organising conferences on a wide scale, to prevent historical events of this kind taking place in the future.

The National Liberation Front believes that the mobilisation of the Islamic world cannot take the form of an alliance based on religion, which in fact would be playing into the hands of imperialism and its agents, particularly world Zionism.

7. The struggle of the Palestinian people,

¹ Algerian *Ahdath wa Watha'eq*, 10/6/1968, pp. 7-11.

which is an inseparable part of the world-wide movement for the liberation of peoples, requires that all anti-imperialist revolutionary forces, and progressive forces in the world, left wing youth throughout the world and all those who believe in liberty and justice should take part in the battle for the liberation of Palestine.

8. The Arab countries must decide on an information policy based on the scientific analysis of facts that will fully explain to the world the justice of the cause of Palestine. They must also bring the Palestinian cause into line with the all-out struggle by the forces of revolution against imperialism and its allies.

9. Committees must be set up throughout the world, similar to the "Vietnam Committees", to give aid and support and to inform world public opinion and press it into the service of the liberation of occupied Palestine.

10. World public opinion which aspires to peace, brotherhood and justice for man, and is the champion of justice in the world, should compel the United Nations to observe its own principles and breathe new life into them, by ensuring right and justice for all peoples, and not the law of the stronger.

World public opinion should compel the United Nations to remedy the injustice it committed in Palestine on May 15, 1948.

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News Conference Remarks by the Tunisian President Bourghiba at the American National Press Club.¹ [Excerpts]

Washington, May 16, 1968

Q.—Mr. President, would you tell us your views on the situation in the Middle East and on whether Abdel Nasser might be prepared to accept a compromise with Israel? What would make peace between the Arabs and Israel possible?

A.—

As to what would make peace between the Arabs and Israel possible, I think that the question is not appropriately framed, and that, in fact, the whole problem has been put on an unnatural basis. What I mean is that, for twenty years, the world has seen the Palestine problem as a trial of strength between two antagonists; it has been presented as a war between the Arabs and Israel, but in fact we have to go back to the origins of the problem. The Arab world is composed of independent sovereign states extending from the Arab-Persian Gulf to the Atlantic Ocean. In this vast area is situated the territory of Palestine which, at one time, in conformity with a decision of the San Remo Conference [1920] was placed under British tutelage by the League of Nations, just as Syria and Lebanon were placed under French mandate. . . .

Among these territories that were partitioned and divided was the homeland of the Palestinians, which was no different from any of the neighbouring territories, such as Syria, Trans-Jordan, Iraq or Egypt. Its population was made up of Christians, Muslims and Jews who had lived and found shelter there for centuries. But the Balfour Declaration [1917] required that the mandate given to Great Britain for the administration of Palestine should include a clause concerning the establishment of a national home for the Jews in that land. This home, or place of refuge, was intended to allow the Jews of the world to feel at home and secure from the persecution to which they had so often been subjected, particularly in Eastern Europe.

The prevailing view was that full justice had been done by this decision, particularly if one took into consideration the historic ties of the Jews with that land, ties going back to ancient times. Jerusalem, however, was to have a special status because it was a holy city for Muslims, Christians and Jews alike. The prevailing view at the time was that a successful compromise solution for the problem had been reached. But the violence caused by the flood of Jewish immigration and the usurpation of lands by Jews which took place with Britain's consent; and, later, the new persecution to which the Jews were subjected in certain countries in Europe, particularly in Nazi Germany—all these things, most regrettably

¹ *Al-Amal* (Tunis), 17/5/1968.

gave rise to a tidal wave of immigrants who descended upon Palestine. This upset the balance which had existed before. The Arabs who had been building up the country over the course of centuries felt that their homeland had slipped from their grasp and been taken over by others, whereas their Middle Eastern neighbours, such as Trans-Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and other countries which were under a mandate had made progress along the road toward emancipation, autonomy and independence. A struggle ensued between two different national ideologies and became a trial of strength between them: one, the Zionist national ideology, aspired to resurrect the state of David and Solomon in the city of Jerusalem and to restore the temple destroyed by Titus in 70 A.D.; the other, Palestinian nationalism, was upheld by those who had been settled in the land for two thousand years. It was the clash between these two nationalist ideologies on the soil of one country that brought about the calamity which developed into the present day situation with which you are familiar.

Q.—Is Arab public opinion in favour of or against the United States?

A.—

It was the belief that the Jews in Palestine were under threat of death and extinction that mainly influenced the Americans and set them against the Arabs. But that belief was groundless; the propaganda used by certain Arab countries missed its mark and provided our enemies with an effective weapon. The fact is that, unlike certain highly civilised European nations, the Arabs never used gas ovens to commit genocide against the Jews—they never even attempted it. On the contrary, they were often the victims of torture themselves, on an equal footing with the Jews.

The issue is not that of persecution, but of the right of Arabs and of Jews to life, dignity and comfort.

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Interview Granted by the Tunisian President Bourghiba to an American Television Network.¹ [Excerpts]

Washington, May 19, 1968

Q.—Israel states that direct negotiations with the Arab countries is the only way which will lead to a solution. Do you object, Mr. President, to the opening of direct negotiations between the two sides?

*A.—*In making such a proposal Israel wants consultations with the Arab countries which are in a state of war with her. These countries, for reasons of their own, do not want to enter into direct consultations with Israel, because they know that when they agreed to do this in 1949, it did not lead to permanent results.

However, by war I do not mean the one existing between the state of Israel and the Arab states, which has exacerbated the original problem, the real problem, by which I mean the planting of two groups of peoples in one land: the Arab group which has been settled there for two thousand years, and the Jewish group whose existence in Palestine is the result of recent wide-scale immigration.

To solve their problem—the existence of two national movements disputing one country—a solution must be found that is acceptable to both sides. The dispute between Israel and the Arab countries will then become much less important, if it does not pass away altogether.

Q.—I know, Mr. President, that you cannot speak on behalf of the other Arab countries, but you can speak on behalf of Tunisia. Under what conditions would Your Excellency, as President of Tunisia, be prepared to recognise Israel?

A. If there is ever to be peace between the Israelis and the Palestinian Arabs, who are the people most concerned with the issue and who were the first victims of the unjust Jewish immigration and the establishment of an alien state in their homeland, and if an honourable compromise

¹ *Al-Amal* (Tunis), 21/5/1968.

solution can be brought about and proves acceptable to both sides, then there will be nothing to keep me from recognising an Arab state and an Israeli state or rather a federal state or one which combines the two, which may be the result of such a solution, once it has been accepted by those concerned: the Arabs of Palestine and the Jews.

Q.—Do you believe, Mr. President, that if the problem between Israel and the Arabs of Palestine is solved, this would lead to a solution of the problem between Israel and Abdel Nasser?

A.—I believe that the problem between Israel and Abdel Nasser is the product of the Palestine problem. For the Palestinians believed that Abdel Nasser, the President of a country which appeared more powerful than others and which possessed the most important striking force in the Arab East, was capable of helping and assisting them in liberating their homeland. Then, after a number of experiences, especially after the recent defeat, it became clear that the Palestinians were beginning to rely on themselves. They are attempting to resist Zionist imperialism which is similar to the settling colonialism which we have experienced in Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and several other parts of Africa. Their struggle is today acquiring the traditional character of the struggle of all peoples striving to rid themselves of colonialism. I believe that this country will undoubtedly rid itself of its afflictions if the problem is set in its right context, the context of colonialism. I believe that the two human groups can coexist in that land. Will it be under the sovereignty of one state or two separate states? I cannot answer that question. Events—the Palestinian resistance and the degree of maturity attained by both the Palestinian people and the Zionists, who today are intoxicated with their victory—all this may well lead both groups to accept a solution which will guarantee their existence, safeguard their dignity and ensure their growth and development in that country.

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Petition by Inhabitants of Arab Jerusalem to the Israeli Military Governor Protesting the Enforcement of the Israeli Tax Laws.¹

Jerusalem, May 22, 1968

The Arab inhabitants of occupied Arab Jerusalem have received various notices to pay government and municipal taxes and dues, including the following: income tax, customs duties, sales tax, excise tax, national insurance tax, property tax, municipal tax on rents, industries, business and the professions, and fees for car and radio licenses.

The levy of these taxes and fees in accordance with Israeli laws and regulations violates the most elementary principles of the Declaration of Human Rights and the resolutions adopted unanimously by the General Assembly of the United Nations on July 4, 1967 and July 14, 1967,² and the resolution adopted by the Security Council on 21 May, 1967,³ all of which express United Nations opposition to the measures taken by the Israeli authorities for the annexation of occupied Arab Jerusalem. The United Nations does not recognise this annexation and has persistently demanded that there should be no changes in the status of that city.

Moreover, the levying of these taxes violates international law, which stipulates that military occupation forces should abide by and administer the laws and regulations that were in force before the occupation. We therefore object to the levying of these taxes in accordance with Israeli laws and regulations, and demand that Jordanian laws and regulations be administered in occupied Arab Jerusalem, which is part of the occupied West Bank of Jordan.

Signatories:

Sa'd al-Din al-Alami, Mufti of Jerusalem;
Dr. Ibrahim Khalil, Deputy Mayor of Jerusalem;
Shaikh Hilmi al-Muhtaseb; Fu'ad Abd al-Hadi;
Abd al-Muhsin Abu-Maizar; George Abu al-Hajj;

¹ Archives of the Institute for Palestine Studies. See also *post*, doc. 359.

² U.N. docs. A/RES/2253 and 2254 (ES-V), respectively, texts in *International Documents on Palestine, 1967*, pp. 256, 260.

³ U.N. doc. S/RES/252, *ante*, doc. 238.

Sa'd al-Din Dajani; Hafez Tahbub; Nuhad Abu Ghuraiba; Taher Barakat; Mahmud Yusuf al-Khatib; Na'im al-Ashhab; Jiryis al-Khuri; Muhammad AbuAmr; Faez Abd al-Nur; Farid Sulaiman; Abd al-Mughni al-Natsha; Ma'ruf al-Masri; Id Abdin; Faeq Barakat; Dr. Rashid al-Nashashibi; Dr. Amin Majaj; Taufiq Abdin; Shaikh Sa'id Sabri; Dr. Amin al-Khatib; Hanna Qurut; Ibrahim al-Husaini; Muhammad Ali al-Muhtaseb, Antun Safiya; Daud al-Husaini; Anwar al-Khatib; Zulaikha al-Shahabi, Faeq Abdullah Dajani, Mahmud Daud Sulaiman; Marwan al-Asali; Abd al-Athim al-Sha'rawi; Muhammad Ishaq Darwish, and others.

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Interview Remarks by the U.A.R. Foreign Minister Riyad on the Prospects for a Political Settlement in the Middle East.¹ [Excerpt]

Cairo, May 25, 1968

Q.—What is the situation?

A.—The situation, as world public opinion is beginning to realise, is simply this: that we want Jarring's mission to succeed. However, what we want is one thing and the facts another.

Q.—Does "the facts" mean that there is little hope of Jarring's arriving at an adequate practical implementation of the Security Council resolution?

A.—I should say there is no hope at all, so long as Israel refuses to implement the Security Council resolution. The resolution requires Israel to withdraw from the territories she occupied, i.e. to return to the positions she held on June 5, and to find a solution for the refugee problem. Israel's attitude to the resolution, however, is the exact opposite. One section of the Israeli Cabinet is demanding the annexation of all Arab territories occupied by Israel. The other section of the cabinet, comprising those who are called "moderates," is demanding that

Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip and parts of the West Bank should be annexed, that Sinai and the Golan Heights should become demilitarised zones and that there should be free passage for Israeli shipping through the Canal. It refuses to allow the refugees to return and makes the Arab countries and the international community responsible for solving the refugee problem.

Q.—What is our attitude?

A.—We have informed Ambassador Jarring that we accept the implementation of the Security Council resolution but that we will not give up an inch of Arab territory. We emphasised to him that Israel is responsible first and foremost for the problem of the refugees, for it was Israel that drove them out of their homeland and usurped their lands. Next in order of responsibility comes the United Nations which has, to date, adopted about twenty resolutions, all calling for the return of the refugees.

Q.—Does this mean that Ambassador Jarring is caught in a vicious circle?

A.—Exactly. To move forward he must have a point of departure, which, as we pointed out to Jarring, would have to be a declaration on the part of Israel of her acceptance of the Security Council resolution and her willingness to implement it, as we have done. Jarring could then start to formulate a time schedule for the implementation of the resolution.

Q.—Could Jarring's presence in New York contribute to that end? What I mean is, what is to be gained from his visit to New York, what end can it serve?

A.—The establishment of further contacts with the permanent delegates—all part of the vicious circle.

Q.—What then is the "Jarring Formula" as it is called by some, or the "Jarring Proposals" by others?

A.—These were simply ideas put forward by Jarring at the beginning of March, for he believed that they might provide him with a point of departure which would allow him to move forward. With this in mind, he devised a formula which implies acceptance of the Security

¹ U.A.R. Documents and Research Centre, *Nashrat al-Watha'eq* January-June 1968, pp. 144-146. The interview was granted to the Cairo daily *Al-Jumhuriyya*.

Council resolution by the parties concerned, without explicitly mentioning the implementation of the resolution.

We explained to Jarring that the problem was too big to be solved by words or formulas. The facts had to be faced, and it was imperative not to deviate from the Security Council resolution. Israel in fact accepted the text on March 10, because of its obscurity, but refused to allow that a sentence stipulating that the resolution be implemented should be added to the text.

Israel thought that we should reject Jarring's formula. In the May 3 issue of the French paper *Le Monde*, Abba Eban announced that Israel accepted the Security Council resolution and Jarring's formula, adding that it was Egypt that rejected the Jarring proposals.

Eban's intention was to deceive and mislead world public opinion and to lay the blame for Jarring's failure on Cairo.

When Jarring officially submitted his proposals on May 9, we accepted them on the spot and published our reply in the press.

Israel then found herself in a fix. She had no alternative but to expose herself and expose the lies of her officials. After the cabinet meeting of May 21, the Israeli Minister responsible for information announced that Israel refused to implement the Security Council resolution and that she was not bound by the Jarring proposals.

Q.—What bearing does that have on Jarring's mission?

A.—By adopting this attitude, Israel has brought Jarring's mission to an end. We have told the Security Council so and asked it to intervene to rescue Jarring's mission by forcing Israel to accept and implement the Security Council resolution.

Q.—But do you expect the members of the Security Council to take positive steps as a result of this notification, now that Israel's attitude has been disclosed in this manner?

A.—Since the day they came into being, the United Nations, and the Security Council in particular, have never been confronted with such a flagrantly arrogant and overwhelming challenge to the resolutions of the Security Council. This categorical rejection on Israel's part of

the Council's resolutions is a threat to the very existence of the United Nations; it puts an end to the role played by the Security Council as guardian of world peace and security.

So it is the duty of the member nations of the Council, and the major powers in particular, which have special responsibilities to the peoples of the world, to force Israel to respect and implement the resolutions of the Security Council not only to rescue the United Nations, but also to bring about peace in the Middle East.

Q.—What do you think is the attitude of world public opinion to all this? Is there really a change that is adverse to Israel? What bearing does this change have on developments in the situation?

A.—No doubt there has been a big change in world public opinion. We all know that, before June 5, Israel succeeded in convincing most peoples of the world that she was surrounded by Arab countries which wanted to destroy her and kill her inhabitants. However, the world really began to discover Israel's true nature when it observed the Israeli aggression against the Arab countries. World conscience was shaken when Arabs were killed, their homes demolished and they were driven out of their lands. It was further shaken when it saw how Israel defied all resolutions adopted by the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations. We must help bring about this change in world opinion and win it to our side.

Q.—How can we do that?

A.—By continuing to address ourselves to the intellects of these peoples, which cannot be won over by emotional displays.

The proof of this change in world public opinion is to be found in the attitudes of many countries which have placed embargos on the export to arms of Israel, such as France, which branded Israel as an aggressor state. Furthermore many countries make a point of denying reports that they are shipping arms to Israel, and of informing us officially that they are not doing so.

It is up to us to isolate Israel internationally by showing that she is an aggressive and expansionist state.

Q.—Arab public opinion understands why we refuse to negotiate with Israel or sign an agreement

with her. But are we not finding it difficult to convince the outside world, which has long been influenced by Israeli propaganda and by our refusal to negotiate with Israel?

A.—Many ambassadors of foreign countries have asked me to explain our attitude on this point. Recently I was questioned on the subject by the French press. I replied, in effect, that the Arabs twice negotiated with Israel under United Nations auspices in 1949. The first time was in Rhodes, to sign the armistice agreements, and the second in Lausanne, where the so called Lausanne Protocol, which is an attempted solution for the refugee problem, was signed. However, as usual, Israel signed the agreement only to be accepted as a member of the United Nations. Once that was done, the signature faded away and Israel disowned the agreement. As for the Armistice Agreement—and my interviewer took part in the negotiations for the agreement which were held in Rhodes—Ben Gurion declared it null and void in 1956, for it stood in the way of Israel's expansionist aims.

It is clear from the above that Israel respects no agreement, and that her signature is valueless.

Q.—I gather from the gist of your reply, sir, that prospects for a political solution are less than nil.

A.—In Israel's eyes, a political solution means that we should sign a document which Israel terms a peace treaty according to which we would waive our rights to the Arab lands she has chosen for itself, and which would place the refugee problem in the lap of the Arabs, stipulate free passage for Israeli vessels through the Suez Canal and turn Sinai and the Golan Heights into demilitarised zones.

Naturally, we feel that this is not a political solution, but total surrender to Israel.

Also, we constantly bear in mind that Israel's aim is to prepare for her next expansionist leap forward towards the realisation of her dream, which she makes no attempt to disguise, of a state "from the Nile to the Euphrates" and the domination of the economies of the Arab peoples.

We refuse to surrender, and insist that Israel withdraw to the pre-June 5, 1967, lines.

Q.—So this is our attitude. But would Your Excellency care to elaborate on the attitudes of the Soviet

Union, France, Britain and the United States towards a political solution, particularly with respect to Israeli withdrawal from the Arab territories?

A.—Everyone knows of the aid and support which the Soviet Union has given and her total support for the Arabs against the Israeli aggression. Indeed, it is not too much to say that had it not been for the help of the Soviet Union we could never have attained our capacity for military endurance in such a short time.

As for France, she considers Israel to be the aggressor and insists on Israeli withdrawal from Arab territories. France has stopped the shipment of Mirage planes to Israel.

As regards Britain, the British Minister of Foreign Affairs has declared in the General Assembly that it is imperative for Israel to withdraw from all Arab territories.

Q.—You made no reference to the United States in your answer, although it has declared its willingness to resume relations with Cairo.

A.—I cannot say that there has been any progress in relations between Egypt and the United States. The United States is providing Israel with vast support in the military, economic and political fields. This constitutes an encouragement to Israel to continue her aggression against the Arabs.

We had hoped that the United States would stop the shipment of arms to Israel until such time as Israeli forces withdraw from Arab territories. However, unfortunately, the United States government has insisted on supplying Israel with Sky Hawk planes. The United States refuses even now to say that Israel attacked the Arabs.

Q.—Then it is not true that the United States is exerting some pressure on Israel, as is being suggested for propaganda purposes?

A.—I have yet to hear of any form of pressure being exerted on Israel by the United States. On the contrary, we hear that it is Israel that is exerting pressure, and successfully, so it seems.

Q.—From time to time we hear of definite proposals being made by certain circles as regards the Arab-Israeli conflict? Is this true?

A.—No definite proposals, or solutions, have

been submitted to us by any party whatsoever.

Q.—If this is so, and the situation is that no political solution will succeed in view of the attitude of the United States, why do we not discount the possibility of a political solution from now on, as we have gone along with it far enough to know it will not work?

*A.—*For us to discount the possibility of a political solution at this moment is precisely what Israel wants. She has mobilised the full force of her propaganda machine and her psychological warfare to this end. This is why we are anxious to make it clear to the whole world that we are not standing in the way of a political solution, though, at the same time, we are preparing ourselves for the liberation of our territory. There can be no difference of opinion on this, and no country could object to our doing this, even if it is one hundred per cent with Israel, like the United States.

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Press Statement by the Mayor of Arab Jerusalem Ruhi al-Khatib on Israeli Measures to Expropriate Arab Properties.¹

Amman, June 1, 1968

The Israeli Government has issued a second order for the expropriation of new areas of Arab lands and real estate, this time inside the walls of Jerusalem. This order was published in the *Israeli Official Gazette*, No. 143 dated April 18, 1968.

These properties lie between the south-western wall of the Haram al-Sharif, and the American quarter inside the wall. They include the site of al-Buraq al-Sharif, the "Wailing Wall", which is an Islamic *Waqf*, and that part of the Maghareba quarter which the Israelis demolished in June 1967. They also include the remaining properties in the Maghareba quarter, the Gate of the Chain quarter, and the Al-Sharaf quarter, all of which are one hundred per cent Arab quarters and properties. They also include some

Jewish properties in the Jewish quarter, "and most of its Arab properties". They include, too, the mat market, and a part of the Syrian quarter where all the real estate is Arab-owned.

These expropriations cover an area of 116 dunums, and include 700 stone houses of two, three and sometimes four storeys, built during various Arab periods and with historic architectural features. The Arabs own 595 of these and the remaining 105 are registered in the name of Jewish *Waqfs* and individuals.

The seized Arab property is as follows: 12 properties owned by Islamic *Waqfs*, 99 *Waqf* properties owned by the Maghareba *Waqf* called the Abu Madyan al-Ghauth *Waqf*, 354 family *Waqf* properties owned by the Jerusalem Arab families, and 160 properties owned by Arab individuals and families in Jerusalem.

The seized property comprises 1,048 dwelling houses and 439 places of work or Arab commercial warehouses. About 7,000 Arabs live in these houses, and 700 employers and employees work in the warehouses and places of work; some of them are property owners and beneficiaries of *Waqfs* whose families have lived there for generations, the properties having been handed down from father to son. Others are ordinary tenants, and others again pilgrims living in the vicinity of the Haram al-Sharif in *zawiyas* and *Waqf* houses; most of them are from Morocco, Algeria Tunisia and Libya.

These properties also include two small *zawiyas* which are Islamic *Waqf* property:

The *zawiya* of the North African Muslims, called the Abu Madyan al-Ghauth *zawiya* and the Fakhriya *zawiya*, attached to the Aqsa Mosque; it is known as the Al Abu al-Sa'ud *zawiya*, and the Omari Mosque is in it. At the beginning of the week the Israeli authorities started to demolish this *zawiya* and the houses adjacent to it; they may well follow this up by demolishing the Aqsa Mosque as well.

These properties also include a number of historic buildings of the Mamluk era, the most important being the Tushtumur *madrassa*, the Gate of the Chain, the Imam's palace in the middle of the market between the Gate of the Chain and the Bazaar market, which is known as the Palace of al-Zahir Baybars, and a famous historic market called the *Suq-al-Bashwa*.

¹ *Al-Dustur* (Amman), 2/6/1968. See also *post*, doc. 345.

These properties also include a girls' school which accommodated more than 300 Arab girls. It is Islamic *Waqf* property and was rented to the Municipality of Arab Jerusalem. The Israeli authorities closed the school after the occupation in June 1967, and are now using the building for the Jewish Religious Court of Appeals.

These new expropriations will deprive the Arabs of the City of property that has been in their possession for hundreds of years. They will evict more than 6,000 Arabs from the City and disperse them as thousands before them have been dispersed. They will deprive over 700 employers and workers of their means of livelihood, so that they will be forced to swell the ranks of displaced persons thereby diminishing the number of Arabs in the City. These new expropriations will also deprive landlords and *Waqf* beneficiaries—who used to live on the rents from their properties and *Waqfs*—of their means of livelihood, and will result in their swelling the ranks of the indigent, if not of the displaced persons. These expropriations will provide opportunities for thousands of Jews to live on these properties and those that will be added to them. We have heard that the first batch of Jews, belonging to a pioneer group known as the *Nahal*, will be sent there within the next few days.

This is certainly one of the gravest measures of expropriation to be taken in Arab Jerusalem. It is the latest in the series of Israeli violations in defiance of resolutions adopted by the United Nations and Security Council resolutions last year and this year,¹ which do not recognise Israel's right to annex Jerusalem and do not approve the measures she has taken, and demand their abrogation and a total Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territory in Jerusalem.

This undisguised and flagrant violation, and similar previous violations, must be regarded as a deliberate defiance of the United Nations. It will undoubtedly increase the difficulties of the mission of Dr. Gunnar Jarring, which we still hope will succeed.

The Arabs of Jerusalem in general, and landlords in particular, have opposed these expropriations and have denounced these mea-

sures. On their behalf, I call upon the United Nations and the Security Council to lose no time in putting a stop to such acts of aggression and provocation, and, at the same time I call upon the Arab and Muslim countries to unite their efforts to ward off this calamity.

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Statement by the Syrian Communist Party on the Anniversary of the 5th of June, 1967.² [Excerpts]

June, 1968

Israel, with the backing of imperialism, has attempted to achieve a number of aims by her criminal aggression. The most important of these are:

— To deal a mortal blow to the Arab national liberation movement by overthrowing the progressive regimes in the United Arab Republic and the Syrian Arab Republic, thus bringing the Arab peoples once more under the yoke of colonialism, and safeguarding the vast profit plundered by the monopoly oil companies which control Arab oil.

— To deal a blow to the sound trends towards the development of an industrial and agricultural economy and towards the economic independence of the progressive Arab countries, especially Egypt and Syria, thereby keeping them poor and undeveloped.

— To deal a blow to Arab-Soviet friendship, which is becoming daily stronger and more solid, and which is embodied in economic projects and major development works which contribute to supporting the progressive regimes and to achieving their economic independence, and in cultural agreements.

— To occupy large new areas of Arab territory, driving out their inhabitants, replacing them by waves of Jewish immigrants and proceeding along the path towards the establishment of Greater Israel, the dream of the Zionists and the

¹ U.N. docs. A/RES/2253 and 2254 (ES-V), July 4 and 14, 1967, respectively, texts in *International Documents on Palestine, 1967*, pp. 256, 260; and *ante*, doc. 238.

² *Al-Akhbar* (Beirut), 16/6/1968. According to *Al-Akhbar* the statement was issued at the beginning of June, 1968.

ambition of their imperialist masters.

Most of these objectives have not been achieved. Despite all appearances Israel is today in a difficult position. For the progressive regimes in Egypt and Syria are still in existence. They are overcoming difficulties and are advancing on the road towards achieving vast development projects. The ability of the two countries to defend themselves and to stand fast is improving, while at the same time the hatred for American, British and West German imperialism is becoming stronger and deeper in all parts of the Arab world, and the spirit of resistance is becoming stronger and gaining more adherents.

The bonds of Arab-Soviet friendship are becoming firmer too, and will provide the basis of every new advance.

In the occupied territories, the flames of resistance are spreading and rising every day, amid the admiration of the entire world for the high standard of fighting and the readiness to give and sacrifice for the sake of expelling the occupying invaders and liberating the territories of the homeland.

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This past year has witnessed the intensification of Arab resistance in the occupied territories. Besides the comprehensive political resistance which is developing and escalating, as evidenced by the strikes and heroic demonstrations in Gaza, an Arab commando movement has grown and developed, proving, by its acts of dedication and self-sacrifice, that it is impossible that Israel should be sure of staying in the usurped territories. It also shows Israel and her imperialist masters that they are today further than ever before from achieving their criminal aims, and that the Arab masses will never accept the yoke of occupation.

World Zionist and imperialist circles try to make it appear that this is a terrorist movement, as a pretext for ever-increasing acts involving the torture of Arab citizens and the destruction of their property, and to justify aggression against the neighbouring Arab countries. World public opinion, however, has begun to realise that the Palestinian resistance movement is a natural response to occupation.

The activities of the various Arab commando

units must be coordinated and they must be provided with the capable and experienced leadership, ready to work and sacrifice, they require. If necessary their activities must also be brought into line with Arab plans to eliminate the consequences of aggression and to force the aggressor to withdraw his forces to the points which he started out from before his aggression. Such a course must be followed if the best possible results are to be achieved.

The developing commando movement and the other resistance movements affirm that it is impossible to defeat a people determined to defend their land, their freedom and their national dignity and honour.

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Speech by the Iraqi Premier Yahya on the Anniversary of the 5th of June, 1967.¹ [Excerpt]

Baghdad, June 4, 1968

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Aware as it is of the nature and dimensions of the battle, the Iraqi government declares its determined and resolute rejection of settlements intended to confirm the invasion by the forces of settling colonialism. It adheres to the resolutions of the Khartum Conference: No negotiations, no peace, and no recognition of Israel.² It believes, with full consciousness and awareness, in the war of popular liberation. It therefore supports commando action.

The Revolution absolutely rejects the principle of bargaining and half solutions. As revolutionaries we believe in the logic of the Revolution and abide by its principles and aims.

Our faith in the justice of our cause imposes upon us the obligation to strike with an iron hand at those destructive elements which aim at placing obstacles in the course of our advance towards liberation and our readiness to fight the battle

¹ *Al-Anwar* (Beirut), 8/6/1968.

² See *International Documents on Palestine, 1967*, pp. 655-657.

of honour against Zionism and imperialism.

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Press Statement by the Mufti of Arab Jerusalem Sa'd al-Din al-Alami on the Expropriation of Arab Properties.¹

Jerusalem, June 4, 1968

On April 18, 1968, the [Israeli] Minister of Finance issued a decision for the expropriation and immediate acquisition of 116 dunums of land located inside the city of Jerusalem. The expropriated area lies in the heart of the Holy City and includes five mosques and four *madrasas*.

The mosques are:

- 1) The Al-Maghareba Mosque.
- 2) The Uthman ibn Affan Mosque.
- 3) The Omari Mosque.
- 4) The Mosque of the Fakhriya Khanqah.
- 5) The Shaikh Omar al-Mujarrad Mosque.

The four *madrasas* are:

1) The Tushtamur *madrasa* built by the Amir Tushtamur in 1382 A.D. It has a cemetery in which the Amir Muhammad and his son Ibrahim are buried.

2) The Dar al-Hadith, built by the Amir Sharaf al-Din in 1267 A.D.

3) The Dar al Qurra.

4) The Fakhriya Khanqah *madrasa*, built by the Qadi Fakhr al-Din in 1331 A.D.

There is also the *zawiya* of Abu Madyan al-Ghauth containing the mosque and tomb of Shaikh Omar al-Mujarrad.

The area in which these expropriated lands and properties are situated is a densely populated one. With the exception of the churches and monasteries located there, most of it is, and has been for hundreds of years, Islamic *Waqf* property. It includes more than 1038 homes inhabited by about fifteen thousand persons. The area also includes more than 438 shops and stores.

In the Holy City is the Aqsa Mosque, which is one of the holiest places of the Islamic world, and also one of the holiest places in the Christian world. The eviction of the Arab inhabitants from their homes and their replacement by Israeli settlers is an attempt to change the character and features of Arab Jerusalem. This is inconsistent with the Israeli authorities' undertakings to the United Nations representative, Mr. Thalmann, which appear in his report to the United Nations Secretary General No. 6793, dated September 12, 1967.²

In the case of the evacuation of the population of the area, no less than fifteen thousand persons will be left without shelter and the number of destitute refugees will be increased. The adoption and implementation of such a decision by the Israeli authorities is conclusive evidence of Israel's expansionist intentions which will lead to the reduction of the numbers of the inhabitants of Arab Jerusalem and their replacement by Israeli settlers in violation of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the Declaration of Human Rights, international law, and United Nations resolutions.³ We hope that the Israeli authorities will allow wiser counsels to prevail, abrogate all the expropriation decisions in accordance with the last Security Council resolution;⁴ and allow the owners of these properties to do as they please with them without interference or obstruction.

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Message of King Hussein to the Jordanian People on the Anniversary of the 5th of June, 1967.⁵ [Excerpts]

Amman, June 5, 1968

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It is true that I have the impression that the world is in agreement that the Jewish people has a right to exist, but nowhere in any of the four

² See *International Documents on Palestine, 1967*, pp. 295-331.

³ U.N. docs. A/RES/2253 and 2254 (ES-V), July 4 and 14, 1967, respectively, texts *ibid.*, pp. 256, 260.

⁴ *Ante*, doc. 238.

⁵ *Al-Dustur* (Amman), 6/6/1968.

¹ *Al-Ittihad* (Haifa), 18/6/1968. See also *ante*, doc. 342.

corners of the world have I come across the sincere belief that Israel has the right to commit injustice and aggression.

It was against this background and within the context of the unified Arab stand that emerged in Khartum that we received the Security Council resolution, so that we admitted a political solution to be the means through which to put an end to the aggression and to eliminate its consequences. We accepted a peaceful solution for the problem and our only condition for its implementation was that our enemies should accept it and express their willingness to implement it. But our enemies, who pretend to be advocates of peace, having for several years now made the world believe that they seek peace, after their military victory, started imposing conditions for the peace they claim to desire. The result is that, this peace can now be seen in its true perspective and the world has come to recognise it for what it really is: a peace to be concluded with slaves, with the meek and the submissive.

The Security Council resolution [November 22, 1967] served to define the limits of the peace that we accept and that we are willing to commit ourselves to. Has Israel the right to tell us, and tell the world which has listened to it credulously for so long, what are the limits of the peace and the solution it desires? It is only too probable, in view of the ambiguous attitude they have maintained till now, that they themselves do not know what they want. The June War put them in a position that strangely contradicts several previous long-standing claims of theirs. In the past they had much to say about peace and they succeeded in making the world believe that it was the same 'peace' that the rest of the peoples and nations of the world had in mind and accepted. After June, they started talking about a new kind of peace, one that the world is not familiar with and has never heard of before—one that has perhaps never occurred even to the rulers of Israel before. They had better reconsider the peace they talk about, for we in this country are prepared to die rather than make any further concessions.

Although the world has submitted to this arrogant way of doing things from Israel so far, I am sure that it will not tolerate it much longer. Many people, even those who are Israel's friends

—even many Israelis—are going to realise that Israel's rulers have surpassed all previous records in man's dealings with his fellow man, and that they have turned their backs on that long series of claims and allegations on which they used to base their former arguments when they deluded the world into believing that they are a weak nation who want only to be allowed to live in peace and security within their frontiers.

We know that the question which people in a number of countries have been asking is now being asked by the people of Israel themselves: What is it that the Israeli leaders really want and what are they advocating? If there are grounds for hoping that the asking of this question may lead many countries and governments to take serious steps to rescue peace in this area and snatch it from the edge of the abyss towards which the logic and conduct of the Israeli leaders is driving it, then the day may not be far off when the tide of resentment may lead even the Jews of Israel to turn against their rulers and when these rulers may lose the greater part of the support they still enjoy both in the ranks of world Jewry and elsewhere.

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The [1967] aggression is no longer a secret to anyone, but there is one act in the drama which the enemy has written with the utmost cunning and which he conceals from the world with even greater cunning. There is an area in Jordan that is one of the most fertile and productive areas in the world. . . . That area, the Jordan River Valley, was a source of livelihood for thousands of our citizens until the Zionists poured out the vials of their resentment on to it in an endless stream of daily attacks, having years ago drawn off and stolen the water of the river from that valley. Once highly developed, the area has become poor, once verdant and flourishing it is now deserted. The area has become a theatre for Israeli military attacks that sow their harvest of death and destruction hour after hour. These attacks have increased and grown more intense with the approach of the harvest season; the rulers of Israel make sure that those who escape their bullets and napalm shall die of hunger and deprivation. But I am aware that the world knows nothing of this particular act in the drama of

Israeli attacks on this country.

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I know there is a question you all have in mind and that you must be asking each other with anxiety and hope: How do we stand with respect to where we were a year ago today? Have we gone forward or fallen back? Or have we stood still?

The road before us has been hard from the start, and we have had to chart two parallel courses along that road out of loyalty to our country and our nation, each of which is a full time job. On the one hand, we are cooperating with the United Nations, and in so doing we also affirm our Arab nature by working toward peace based on justice. It is up to the United Nations, under whose auspices the problem was born, to arrive at a just solution to that problem under the same auspices. On the other hand we are working and making ready; we are building, we are depending on the unflagging determination of our people.

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Statement by the Palestine National Liberation Movement "Fateh" on the Assassination of the U.S. Senator Robert Kennedy.¹
[Excerpts]

Algiers, June 6, 1968

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We announce to public opinion that the Palestine National Liberation Movement *Fateh*, which is today leading the noblest, most honourable and fiercest of battles against the Zionist enemy in Palestine, condemns in the strongest terms any person using such a weapon in a foreign country against a foreign citizen because of political differences. Let it also be known that despite the violent persecution to which the Palestinian people are being submitted by the Zionists in occupied Palestine, our movement has issued statements affirming that we do not endan-

ger the lives of enemy civilians as a means of retaliation. Our battle of liberation and our bullets are directed against the enemy represented by the Zionist military clique now ruling our occupied land and all its military and economic bases. A few years ago the late President John Kennedy was killed. Today, his brother, Robert Kennedy has been killed. Is it reasonable to suppose that one individual alone can perform such a momentous role? The problem is more serious than that.

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We draw attention to the fact that if investigations prove that the assassin is an Arab citizen then he must undoubtedly have been a tool employed by world Zionism, by persons having political, personal or capitalistic interests, and by the American Central Intelligence Agency with its power and might, wealth of funds and authority, in the service of base political motives.

In affirming this, we call the attention of world public opinion to the fact that treacherous world Zionism, and all who are influential in perpetuating the presence of the occupying enemy in our land, will employ all the despicable means at their command to exploit this incident in order to confuse world public opinion, in an attempt to divert its sympathy from our cause and our just and historic revolution.

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Radio Interview With the President of the Municipal Council of Nablus Hamdi Kan'an on the Strike Called on the Anniversary of the 5th of June, 1967.¹ [Excerpt]

Nablus, June 6, 1968

Q.—Why did you go on strike?

A.—After a year of Israeli occupation people thought they should express their feelings of grief and dissatisfaction with it.

Q.—Who asked you to go on strike? And what are your motives?

¹ *Al-Mujahed* (Algiers), 9/6/1968.

¹ *Al-Ittihad* (Haifa), 14/6/1968. The interview was originally broadcast in English by Israel radio.

A.—Peoples' realisation of the occupation impels them to show their feelings spontaneously and express them by means of the strike. They don't need to be asked by anyone to do this. People have enough awareness of this bitter reality.

I should like to take this opportunity to comment on a statement broadcast by Israel radio at 5:45 on Tuesday afternoon attributing the strike to hired agents of the Amman government. I reject this ridiculous suggestion and attach no importance to it. It is sufficient to say that the Palestinians who resisted Zionism and British occupation for fifty years, know what they must do on the anniversary of June 5.

Q.—What do you mean by the strike?

A.—We do not deny that we suffered a military defeat, but we reject this defeat and do not accept that it should lead us to surrender. This is what we want to express by the strike.

Q.—Is the strike against the authorities?

A.—In fact the strike is against the occupation and the character of this occupation.

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Monthly Report on the Palestine Refugees in Jordan During May 1968.¹ [Excerpt]

Amman, June 13, 1968

A whole year having passed since the refugee problem began, it is now clear that, not content with ignoring the Security Council resolution adopted on June 14, 1967² calling for the return of the refugees to their former places of residence to be facilitated, the Israeli authorities have aggravated this problem by continuing to implement and stepping up their programmes for driving Arabs out of the occupied territories.

The number of refugees has approximately doubled since the adoption of this United Nations resolution, but in spite of this we see no prospect of an international initiative to force Israel to respect the Security Council resolutions on the refugees and to stop the implementation of programmes for driving Arabs out of the occupied territories.

In August 1967 Israel made a show of complying with the Security Council resolution on the return of the refugees. During the three days assigned for registration, 170,000 refugees applied to return through the International Red Cross. Due to the short time given for registration tens of thousands were unable to register their names.

Israel's propaganda motives in this dubious show of compliance are very clear, for she knew that three days were not enough for the registration of all the refugees wanting to return. She gave further indication of her bad intentions by agreeing to the return of only 14,027 persons out of all those who applied.

However, many even of this small number of persons allowed to return were soon forced to come back to the East Bank of the Jordan. This sad fact is unknown to world public opinion. The reason for it was the fact that the Israeli authorities insisted on separating the return permits of adult males from those of the rest of their families, and not allowing the males to return, despite the fact that it is they who support the families which return to the West Bank. This was a mean way of forcing these families to go back to the East Bank again, so that they might be with their male relations who had been refused entry to the West Bank by the Israeli authorities. There are many families that are still separated as a result of the return operation carried out in August 1967. This is another grievous tragedy worthy of consideration by the Security Council and world public opinion. It is an example of the devious methods employed by Israel to throw dust in the eyes of world public opinion and make a show of applying international resolutions while at the same time continuing to humiliate the refugees.

Those who benefited from the programme for the reuniting of families which Israeli propaganda made such a world-wide fuss about, in the pretence that she was cooperating with the United

¹ Archives of the Institute for Palestine Studies. The report was prepared by the Jordanian Higher Ministerial Committee for the Relief of the Palestine Refugees. See also *ante*, doc. 323.

² U.N. doc. S/RES/237, text in *International Documents on Palestine, 1967*, p. 251.

Nations, are very few indeed. This is because the Israeli authorities only allow very few refugees to return, and then only under specific conditions, and to specified areas only, not to the whole West Bank. During the first seven months of the return programme supervised by the Red Cross, the members of separated families who returned to the West Bank totalled only 1,847. Of these 286 returned during the month of May 1968.

How low this figure is, becomes evident once we realise that 30,817 persons emigrated from the West Bank during the same period. This shows to what extent Israel is making a mockery of Security Council resolutions, and continuing to persecute the Arabs in the occupied territories in order to force them to leave.

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Speech by the Algerian President of the Revolutionary Council Boumedienne on the Third Anniversary of the 19th of June, 1965 Take-over.¹ [Excerpts]

Algiers, June 19, 1968

There is yet another matter that is close to the heart of Algeria, although, geographically, we are far away from it—the cause of the Palestinian people. This is a painful problem which leaves no Algerian unmoved. Nor do we think that we can speak of the Palestine problem in isolation, for it is the cause of a people that has been driven off its land as a consequence of plots that were hatched against the Arab homeland in the days when that homeland was in deep slumber and was rent by dissension. It was under these circumstances that an alien state was established on a basis of religious sectarianism and Zionism. We therefore affirm that this problem must be settled, no matter how long it takes, even if it takes centuries, for the cause is just—it is the cause of a people that has been expelled from its homeland to make room for

another, an alien people.

In spite of the claims of world Zionism that the Jews are going to be exterminated and thrown into the sea, the sacred battle for the liberation of Palestine and the recovery of stolen territory cannot be separated from the battle to put an end to colonialism and to liquidate the spheres of influence of imperialism in the Arab homeland, for this Zionist phenomenon is in fact a military base set up by colonialism to impede the development of the Arab homeland and thereby protect its own interests.

The method followed by Arab leaders over the past twenty years in presenting the Palestine issue is at fault. We shall fall into the same error unless we change our methods and set the problem in a new context.

In view of this, it is our duty to base our efforts and our struggle on the policy which we believe in. Most regrettably, however, the solidarity that has been displayed by Arab governments and leaders in supporting this cause has been merely formal and superficial; at times, in fact, has been no more than a display of emotion.

Before, during and after the setback, we maintained that it was essential to adopt a plan of all-out struggle against Israel and the makers of Israel. We pointed out that it is not possible to reconcile fighting against Israel with cooperation with those who gave her aid, money and arms till she matured and prospered.

The merest child could not have such an illogical idea. During the setback we stressed the need to make use of all weapons at our disposal to avoid losing the war. We pointed out that, inasmuch as the problem is not localised but is the problem of all Arabs, the battle must be an all-embracing battle against the Zionist presence in Palestine and against the bases of imperialism, particularly the well-entrenched supporters it has in this area, such as the oil companies, which have control of vital installations in this part of the world and are therefore actually more dangerous than the Zionist presence in Palestine.

We ask ourselves at this point whether we were right, once hostilities got under way, to restrict the field of battle to any one part of the wide Arab world. Is it a question of Aqaba, or the Canal or the Golan Heights alone? Is

¹ Algerian *Ahdath wa Watha'eq*, 10/7/1968, pp. 15-18.

the problem restricted to the occupation of Jerusalem, or would it have been better if we had seen the battle in its wider context?

Events have borne out our analysis and our view that we must carry on the fight and that the battle must be all-embracing. It was absolutely impossible, once the enemy had won a battle, to accept defeat. This would have meant that by winning a battle he had won the whole war—we said then that we would rather have the enemy occupy Damascus, Amman or Cairo...

This is the policy which we believe in and which we clearly announced. We said that it was not possible to accept a cease-fire in the shadow of defeat and that the battle must go on and its scope must be expanded so that it was no longer restricted to specific areas.

The Arab people everywhere was ready to expand the scope of the battle. Had this taken place, it would have brought about a genuine revolution which would have provided a basis for a renaissance of the Arab nation.

As for accepting the *fait accompli*, the defeat and continued occupation, that would place the existence of the Arab nation and its renaissance in danger.

This is our objective analysis, which derives from the will of a people that has confidence in itself and its ability, a people that has been through a unique experience that has shaped its destiny. Bitter experience has proved that our view was correct despite criticisms to the effect that it was unrealistic.

Today, one year after the setback, the situation has not changed. Israel is still occupying the Arab territories and she is attempting to consolidate her presence by setting up kibbutzim. The whole of the City of Jerusalem is now under Zionist control. In brief, Israel now has the upper hand and time is in her favour. We, on our part, are not against peaceful solutions in principle; the fact of the matter is that it is not a choice between a peaceful solution and a military solution, but between an honourable solution and a dishonourable one.

The situation, then, is as it was at the beginning, although a year has passed since the setback. We say this only to reaffirm our policy as regards

issues of justice and liberation which can only succeed through struggle, strife and sacrifice.

On this occasion it is appropriate that we should call the attention of our Palestinian brothers to the crucial national function they must fulfill. They must stay in their land and be prepared to die for it, regardless of dangers and difficulties. Those who live in Jerusalem must stay there and die, not flee to the refugee camps. They must abandon the facile policy they have followed so far to avoid a repetition of the story of the Children of Israel who said to Moses "Go you with your Lord and fight, we shall stay here." What was the result when the Palestinian people waited for twenty years for the Arab armies to fight Israel on its behalf? Another setback.

It is true that the Arabs have a national obligation to Palestine, but it is up to the Palestinians themselves to fulfil their national obligation to liberate their homeland and to reject once and for all any idea of emigration.

As far as revolutionary Algeria is concerned, she is determined to continue on her revolutionary course. Since the setback, Algeria has shown that she is meeting her responsibilities in this direction by the decisions she has taken against foreign interests. In our opinion, the Arabs will have to use all the weapons at their disposal if they are to win the war. To put it briefly, it is a matter of their making use of these weapons within the framework of a realistic and practical policy that will lead to the recovery of their dignity. But at the same time the Arabs must be ready to pay the price of recovering their dignity.

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Interview Granted by Yasser Arafat, Spokesman for the Palestine National Liberation Movement Fateh, to the West German Magazine "Der Spiegel".¹ [Excerpts]

June 23, 1968

Q.—You despise the Jews, don't you? Let us suppose that your revolution succeeds, what will be the fate of the Jews then? Will you follow in the footsteps of Al-Shuqairi and throw them into the sea?

*A.—*Muslims and Christians live side by side in the Arab countries. I believe that the same option will be open to the Jews. The Jews have lived in Arab Palestine in the past in peace without experiencing racial or religious discrimination. The situation continued until the emergence of Zionism. We want to build up our country regardless of racial or religious discrimination.

Q.—But a state called Israel has been known to history for twenty years?

*A.—*The Palestinian people have been driven out of their country, homes and lands. This is what history says. We have had enough of United Nations resolutions and recommendations. This is why our people have taken up arms and have come to realise that a revolutionary war of liberation is the only way to achieve their aims.

Q.—But you will be doing harm to another people by taking such a course?

*A.—*When Britain and the United States created an alien state in our land at the expense of our people, when we were driven out of our homes and our property and when the Zionists used the ugliest and most brutal methods in their attempts to kill and disperse us, we raised our voices asking that at least our lives be saved. But the conscience of the world did not move to condemn this brutal aggression or cry out that such injustice must not occur. The conscience of the world was asleep.

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Statement by the Lebanese Foreign Minister Butros Before the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee.² [Excerpt]

Beirut, June 25, 1968

As for our own problems, and by them I mean the Israeli provocations on our southern borders and the possible intentions and plans that lie behind these provocations, we know very well that they are a part of the greater problem and that the best way of putting an end to them and ensuring the security of Lebanon is to put an end to Israeli designs on the Arab countries in general. In spite of this, however, our problem with Israel has special features worthy of mention and consideration. The legal status on our southern frontier before the Israeli aggression in June last year was based officially on the Armistice Agreement signed on March 23, 1949 under the supervision of the United Nations. The provisions of this agreement—and it is similar to the other agreements signed with Egypt, Jordan and Syria—call for the cessation of warlike activities and the establishment of a Mixed Commission with a United Nations chairman to investigate violations and such disputes as might arise and report to the international authorities concerned. The agreement also stipulated that it could not be unilaterally abrogated.

It was abrogated by Israel after the aggression. The Secretary General of the United Nations announced in the report which he submitted to the General Assembly on September 19, 1967 that the abrogation was illegal and that it was in violation of the provisions of the agreement and of international law. A consequence of this abrogation was that the Mixed Armistice Commission was no longer able to carry out its task and undertake the investigations required of it. This was due to Israel's attitude. Under no circumstances can Israel be permitted to engage in acts of aggression against peaceable citizens, especially since her negative attitude to the Armistice Commission makes it impossible to investigate even those acts of aggression which Israel uses as an excuse.

¹ *Al-Anwar* (Beirut), 23/6/1968.

² *Al-Nahar* (Beirut), 26/6/1968.

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Statement by the U.A.R. Prime Minister Sulaiman on the Budget for the Year 1968-1969.¹**Cairo, July 4, 1968**

I would like to point out that the budget for the new year is not an ordinary budget drafted in normal circumstances. It must be an extraordinary budget as regards both revenues and expenditures, in view of the fact that a year of military and economic endurance has passed, since the military setback. It requires of us as citizens exceptional effort and a willingness for serious productive work.

Among the economic consequences of the aggression were diminished revenues and heavier burdens in the field of expenditure. As regards revenues, the deficit is 150 million Egyptian pounds as a result of the closure of the Suez Canal and losses in mineral, tourist, maritime and other revenues.

It has proved possible to meet a large part of this deficit in revenues through the price adjustments and the increased taxes and dues which were approved with last year's budget and which amounted to 97 million Egyptian pounds. The Egyptian people have accepted these sacrifices in their desire to play their part in bearing the burdens of the battle.

As regards additional burdens in the field of expenditure, these consist mainly of increased expenditure on the armed forces so that they may be prepared to repulse the enemy and purge the occupied territory. For this, we have allocated all the Arab aid we have received in accordance with the resolutions of the Khartoum Conference.² We are also receiving aid from friendly countries, first and foremost the Soviet Union, in the form of credit facilities or economic aid to replace the arms and equipment of our armed forces.

Other additional burdens in the field of expenditure include funds for the reconstruction of what the enemy forces destroyed, completion of civil defence projects, the evacuation of citizens from the Canal towns and the assistance being

given to the evacuees or to those whose incomes have diminished since the closure of the Suez Canal.

We owe it to these citizens to provide them with a feeling of social solidarity, by all of us, in one way or another, paying our share of the expenses required to help those citizens of the Canal Zone who were directly exposed to aggression against their lives, their homes and their farms and who have therefore lost their means of livelihood.

It was also necessary in the new budget to resume our efforts in the field of economic development by increasing investments. This is essential if we are to become more capable of economic endurance. The investments budget, totalling 336 million Egyptian pounds, has been directed to the completion of projects which have reached various stages of implementation so that we may receive revenues from them as soon as possible and thereby improve our balance of payments, increase our export capability and meet our foreign obligations. If we compare this investment budget with the target investment budget for the implementation plan for the same year, we find that the latter covered investments estimated at about 430 million Egyptian pounds. It is only natural that the aggression and the additional expense burdens which we have mentioned should affect our ability to proceed with the development programme with the same speed as before.

It is also natural that the increased expenditure in the proposed budget should lead to a noticeable improvement in the economic situation and provide new opportunities of employment.

Additional revenues will be provided. The increased expenditure will be met by extraordinary revenues obtained through new loans and credit facilities from friendly foreign countries, totalling about 60 million Egyptian pounds. We shall also postpone the meeting of a great part of our obligations due for repayment this year.

My colleague Dr. Hejazi will tell how he has been able to secure additional local revenues and what additional burdens this is expected to impose on our people. I should like to point out, however, that, well aware as we are of the difficulties the citizen is facing, we have decided to limit the use of this revenue as strictly as possible,

¹ *Al-Ahram* (Cairo), 5/7/1968.

² See *International Documents on Palestine, 1967*, pp. 655-657.

and have depended basically on the citizen as producer and on the production unit to raise production capacity, increase returns and develop exports. We have also depended on the good sense of the citizen as a consumer to limit his consumption, increase his savings and meet his commitments, regarding this as the basic task of every citizen as producer and consumer playing his part in the battle of destiny.

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Speech by the U.A.R. President Nasser at a Luncheon Given in His Honour by Soviet Leaders.¹ [Excerpt]

Moscow, July 5, 1968

The principles and objectives which the Arab revolution has decided to achieve and the great progress made towards their achievement have created, as they were certain to create, intense animosity between the Revolution and the forces opposed to progress, the forces of colonialism, imperialism, and racialism, and of Zionism which is in collusion with them to the extent of being their client. The recent sad and bloody events in the Middle East since the violent crisis there last year have confirmed everything we have said and proclaimed.

We have said and proclaimed that imperialism and colonialism, because of their greed, malice and aggressive nature, can never stop conspiring, both overtly and covertly, against the peoples of the Arab nation, their liberty and their resources.

We have said and proclaimed that Israel, in the service of imperialism and colonialism, is acting as a base and an outpost, as an artificial barrier to prevent the Arab nation uniting, and to threaten it whenever it makes a move, and as an instrument to dissipate its efforts to build and plan for the future and to sap its resources one after the other. This is what we have constantly said and proclaimed. In doing so, we have not been inspired by any kind of fanaticism, for we

are the first to reject anti-semitic racialism and to call for tolerance as regards religious convictions. We have done so only after a thorough study of affairs, and a profound analysis of the course of events. We have done so, too, in the light of our own experience since the beginning of this century, when Zionism first began to exploit a fictitious religious myth as a basis for the creation of a racist homeland stolen and usurped from the land of another people who had lived and dwelt in it, letting fall their sweat and tears on its soil throughout a rich and glorious history.

Zionist racialism sold itself to the imperialism which used to dominate the Arab world. But perhaps there was no need for a new stand; for Zionist racialism, by virtue of its reactionary nature, is fundamentally opposed to liberty. The aggression of which the Arab nation was the victim on June 5 1967 was but one more link in the continuous chain of conspiracies against the aspirations and interests of the Arab nation, its legitimate rights to its homeland and the security and safety of this homeland. If the circumstances of this ugly conspiracy are today making the situation even more grave in those parts of the three Arab countries which are under occupation in addition to the land of Palestine itself, which is the basis and origin of the conflict, there are certain facts which cannot be doubted, and which we do not hesitate to believe in:

First: The Arab nation, including the Egyptian people, will neither accept nor tolerate aggression and will assemble all its forces and resources to purge and liberate Arab territory. Dear friends, this is something that you, too, understand, for racist Nazi aggression once reached the very gates of this glorious capital. But your faith enabled you to stem the tide, seize the initiative and deal the aggressors a crushing defeat. This is a great and worthy example for all peoples who have faith and a will to live.

Secondly: We have all done everything in our power to make it possible to achieve a peaceful settlement on the basis of the Security Council resolution adopted on November 22, 1967. Although the resolution, in our opinion, was inadequate and obscure, we nevertheless accepted it out of faith in our commitment to peace. We have made it possible for the envoy of the United Nations Secretary General to seek a way out of

¹ *Al-Ahram* (Cairo), 6/7/1968.

the crisis on the basis of this resolution.

Thirdly: The basic and primary aim of the peoples of the Arab nation is the elimination of the consequences of aggression, whatever the difficulties and whatever the sacrifices involved. A nation has an incontestable right to such an aim, and we are sure that all peace loving peoples appreciate our attitude, share our feelings and realise that our struggle to achieve this aim is something far more important and comprehensive than a mere matter of self interest. For, if aggression is allowed to go unpunished, then no nation will be secure and no people's liberty will be safe.

Freedom is indivisible, and the struggle for freedom is of world-wide application. This perhaps is the reason for our strong and deep sympathy for the heroic and legendary struggle of the Vietnamese people.

Dear brothers and friends,

Our people rejected defeat and determined to endure, aware of all the consequences even at the time when the storm of aggression swept over our land in all its terror and ferocity.

In shouldering responsibility, rejecting defeat and deciding to resist, our people moved beyond mere wishful thinking and vague hopes. Our people have based their actions, as have the other Arab peoples, as far as circumstances have permitted, on a conscious and practical appreciation of responsibility. In addition to the political will, which is the natural starting point, this stand has had real and practical effects. What is worthy of attention, dear friends, is the fact that the entire Arab nation, regardless of different social systems, has joined hands in confronting the adverse consequences of the battle in accordance with the resolutions of the Khartum Conference of the heads of the Arab states.¹

However, in view of the historical responsibility of the Egyptian people, we must take note of the following:

First: The Egyptian people, in a critical period of their struggle, have armed themselves with a great awareness—an awareness that has enabled them to uncover the imperialist Zionist plan. In this way they have come to realise the importance of their home front and have proceed-

ed, under battle conditions, to reorganise themselves under the sovereignty of a great alliance of the popular forces represented in the Socialist Union. All this has been accompanied by extensive and thorough changes affecting many aspects of national action, all aimed, in the first degree, at releasing the nation's creative capacities and putting them at the disposal of the will to endure.

Secondly: Despite the lessons of the battle, the Egyptian people have set new records in agricultural and industrial production. The people have clearly realised that endurance is not an empty word, but a potential, which must be protected and fostered.

Thirdly: Great efforts are now being made to rebuild the armed forces of the Egyptian people so that they may become an effective instrument in the service of the people's struggle and a safeguard to protect its aims and aspirations.

Dear brothers,

In all that we have undertaken and all that we have achieved we must realise and appreciate to the full the great moral and material assistance we have received from the Soviet Union.

Your support for us, in all fields, political, economic and military, has had and will have a lasting effect on what we have achieved and what we are determined to achieve in the interests of freedom and peace. This is the outstanding role played by the Soviet Union as vanguard in the contemporary human struggle. Like all the peoples of the world we desire peace, and we have development programmes requiring all our resources—requiring in fact, even more if we are to realise our aspirations. But peace is not simply the *status quo*. Peace based on the *status quo* is surrender. The claim that peace lies in the acceptance of the *status quo* is a falsehood that has been repeated to justify aggression in every era, from the age of slavery, through the darkness of the Middle Ages, to the establishment of colonialism and the domination of imperialism. It is a claim which has always been rejected by all who believe in freedom and by all who believe in true peace.

Dear brothers,

We are proud that you should stand by our side in support of a peace based on justice, we

¹ See *International Documents on Palestine, 1967*, pp. 655-657.

are proud of your friendship in our struggle and of the unique role sustained by the great Soviet Union.

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Interview Granted by the Jordanian King Hussein to the U.A.R. Television.¹ [Excerpts]

Amman, July 9, 1968

Q.—Your Majesty, our reason for asking for an interview with you is the news, which the whole Arab World is following closely, that there are at this moment concentrations of Israeli troops in the West Bank ready for action against Jordan. We would like to ask you whether the news of this build-up is in line with repeated Israeli acts of aggression and the repeated threats of Israeli leaders. The question which we put to your Majesty is: What do you think are the aims and possible results of the build-up?

A.—

Ever since the June War last year—the so-called Six Day War—Israel has been trying to deal with the situation by a variety of means: she has tried to demoralise our people and our brethren in the occupied areas. She has tried to offer them inducements to cooperate with her. She has tried to deceive them by telling them that the problem is a Palestinian-Israeli problem and that the Arabs are in no way connected with it except insofar as they are brothers of the people of Palestine. She has tried to offer them inducements and has told them that it was necessary to cooperate with her, or to cooperate with her through a puny entity which would be completely under Israeli control. Our people have constantly resisted these attempts and told Israel that they are part of the Arab nation whose cause they are defending, and that their connection with Jordan is that they are a part of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. In the implementation of Israeli policy we can see three aspects of Israel. There is an extremist aspect, probably tied up with the basic problem, religious motivation, and the

extremist situation in Israel itself, which not only aims at controlling territories which Israel has occupied, but has designs on other parts of the Arab homeland. Another aspect, one which I have mentioned, attempts to solve the problem in one way or another at the Palestinian-Israeli level. Then there is a third aspect, which is moderate to a certain extent, although we do not know to what extent, and says that Israel must be a religious state and as such must withdraw and relinquish a lot of the land which she occupied and still does. The extremists who are trying to solve the problem on a Palestinian-Israeli level are discovering that the peoples of both the East Bank and the West Bank are a single people, who are resisting their continual efforts to break their steadfastness, to demoralise them, to force them into some form of cooperation with Israel to carry out her plans. It has become obvious that they cannot achieve this unless they can destroy us in Jordan itself. Thus, the East Bank has become the target of their repeated attacks, their psychological warfare and their attempts to destroy it by any means. Naturally, what concerns us more than anything else now is to avert this, by our determination to stand in this land and defend our rights and every inch of our territory...

Q.—As Your Majesty has just said: Israel is attempting to create a puny statelet, or a Palestinian entity, within the framework of Israel. How can the Arab nation, particularly the people of the West Bank, confront this Israeli scheme?

*A.—*In fact, the people of the West Bank, our people and brethren, have taken an honourable stand of which we are proud. We consider it a heroic stand. They are standing firmly, with determination and awareness, resisting, in every sense of the word, Israel's attempts to achieve her goals...

Q.—Your Majesty, through their commando activity our brethren in the occupied territory have been able to make their voices heard in the world, to such an extent that even France has said that their movement resembles the French Resistance during the days of Nazi rule. In your Majesty's estimation, to what extent can commando action contribute to ridding the territory of Israeli occupation?

*A.—*We are certainly very proud of the

¹ *Al-Dustur* (Amman), 10/7/1968.

continuous resistance, both passive and active, of our people in the occupied territories of our homeland to the occupation and the occupying forces. In fact there is sympathy throughout the world for a people who exercise their legitimate right to resist occupation. I believe that in order to arrive at results such action must continue. However, we have said on more than one occasion that we cannot be considered by any single party anywhere in the world to be in any way responsible for the acts of resistance in our occupied territory. Nevertheless, if commando action is to be really effective we must prepare ourselves in the appropriate manner and have coordination and cooperation among all the elements and groups in our nation who share the same aim and purpose of serving the nation's cause and defending its rights until the consequences of aggression are eliminated and we recover our full rights.

I imagine that the resistance is at present increasing, and that it will become more organised and consequently more effective after a certain period of time.

Q.—Your Majesty, since we are still dealing with the military and political fields, you can certainly imagine how the phrases “a political solution” and “a military solution” are preoccupying the entire Arab nation—all of us, both the Arab peoples and their leaders. What is Your Majesty’s opinion of the prospects of a political solution and the prospects of a military solution?

*A.—*The question of a political solution which can be acceptable is undoubtedly foremost in the minds of many of our people in both Banks, and of the Arab people as a whole. The world is also asking us about it. Our answer is that we are striving to restore peace to the land of peace. But if peace is to be restored and if it is to be a real and lasting peace, then there must be a just and honourable solution which will ensure the full restoration of our rights and which, consequently, will be accepted by the generations that live in this part of our homeland after us. So we cannot give up an inch of our land or renounce any fraction of our rights. There is another fact connected with the political solution which must be clear to the Arab nation: the whole world will sympathise with us and support us if we go along with it in adopting a political solution—the

Security Council resolution adopted last year [November 22, 1967] clearly deals with the question of withdrawal and the elimination of the consequences of aggression. However, if the problem is going to develop and if we are going to prepare ourselves fully so that we shall have no choice left to us but the use of force, after our failure to recover our rights and save our people and brethren in any other way—then it must also be clear to us that we must try harder to secure world backing and support. The world is saying that it is on our side as regards our recovering our land and saving our people and eliminating the consequences of aggression, but it is also saying that Israel is there to stay. This is what we have heard from the East, from the West, from everywhere. In other words, the next battle may very well be imposed upon us by the enemy, and it will be a battle indeed. For we may have to fight it until we rescue our land, our people and our brethren, and recover our rights. We must prepare ourselves for this battle in the proper manner. We must enter it from the positions where we are at present and we must go on until we have saved our homeland, and our people and brethren, knowing that, in the end, if we go further than that there is the probability that the whole world will stand against us. We must prepare ourselves for the worst. Moreover, we must have the determination to prepare ourselves to work either by politics or by force to achieve the same goal.

Q.—Clearly, Your Majesty, the Israelis are being very obstinate on the question of Jerusalem. This is evident in their repeated statements of their determination to stay there even if they intend to accept a political settlement for withdrawal from all occupied territories.

*A.—*We too are adamant. We cannot give up our right to Jerusalem no matter what the results or the circumstances. We do not consider Jerusalem to be our property. Our position in Jerusalem is the continuation of a situation which has existed there for more than 1200 years. In Jerusalem we represent our Arab brothers and Muslims throughout the world. So if they have rights in Jerusalem we too have rights there and we cannot in any way forgo these rights. Israel must know that this is our position, and I imagine

that the whole world can understand this position and understand that there can be no peace as long as Jerusalem is not fully restored to us. This is what we say to all in these circumstances.

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Memorandum by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine ("PFLP") to the Fourth Palestine National Assembly.¹ [Excerpt]

July 10, 1968

In our estimation, without a keen awareness of certain basic facts, the Palestinian struggle may become incomplete, limited and defective, and many of the problems and obstacles that the struggle has faced so far are really and essentially symptoms of ignorance of some of the facts, the undervaluing of these facts or the preoccupation with form rather than substance. The most important of the facts are:

The Dimensions of the Battle:

1. Zionism is a usurping racist movement spread throughout the world. Most of its resources and capabilities are in the United States. Therefore the link between Zionism and United States imperialism is an organic one which it is extremely difficult to sever. The sequence of events has proved that the United States has provided and is still providing Israel with all means of subsistence and that the Israeli economy is an unviable and artificial entity which cannot last without infusions of American assistance which include funds, arms, and all the means of subsistence. In fact, the United States has exerted pressure on many countries to give Israel moral and national support. Even at the time when most of the countries of the world condemned the June aggression, the United States obstinately insisted on justifying the aggression and on providing

Israel with the financial and military resources that enabled her to enjoy the fruits of her aggression.

This organic and fateful relationship between Zionism and American imperialism is an important factor in the Palestine problem. If it does not understand this relationship and its consequences, and if it does not vigilantly keep track of the moves of American policy in this part of the world, the Palestinian struggle will never succeed in achieving the full understanding of the character of the enemy which is essential if he is to be resisted and defeated.

2. Zionist designs do not stop at the frontiers of Palestine, but extend to the territories of the neighbouring Arab countries. Israel's denial of her expansionist ambitions is an ingenious technique employed at the present stage to paralyse the Arab will and to create conflicts which will prevent the Arabs from uniting their forces to confront the menace.

The battle the Arab nation is engaged in is a fateful and decisive one, and because of the nature of the danger, it will be a long drawn-out battle requiring much patience and many sacrifices.

3. In view of the vast dimensions of the Israeli menace, the nature of Israel's expansionist ambitions and her organic connection with imperialism, decisive confrontation of the Israeli menace can only be achieved by the mobilisation of all Arab resources and forces throughout the entire Arab homeland.

Moreover, the material, military and moral support and assistance offered to us by countries of the socialist camp and a number of countries of the Third World, is a main factor in our battle against Zionism and its allies. This material and moral support has been given, quite naturally, only because the countries of the Eastern Camp and the Third World understand that the Palestinian resistance is a national liberation movement with legitimate aims that is entitled to full, absolute, and unqualified support.

4. The Palestinian resistance, past, present and future, is the vanguard of Arab opposition and resistance to the Zionist menace. It is an "alarm bell" keeping the Arab nation in a state of constant alert and preparing it to mobilise its resources for the decisive battle of destiny.

¹ *Al-Hurriyya* (Beirut), 22/7/1968, p. 6. The Fourth Palestine National Assembly was held in Cairo from 10 to 17 July, 1968.

Strategy in Confronting the Menace:

1. In spite of successive military defeats and setbacks, Arab mobilisation against the Israeli menace has not attained the necessary degree of effectiveness required for the confrontation of a menace of such magnitude and gravity. Consequently, real and serious confrontation of this menace can only be achieved by providing the necessary material and military capacity, and by concentrating exclusively on the Arab masses, mobilising them psychologically and training them to fight, and releasing their unlimited resources so that they may win a decisive victory in the battle.

2. The responsibilities of the Palestinian resistance in the field of battle and the sacrifices required of it, cannot be and must not be regarded as a substitute for full Arab mobilisation against the menace. The battle of destiny against the Zionist menace is the battle of the entire Arab nation, involving all the Arab masses, and all Arab material and moral resources. The Palestinian people are the "vanguard" in this confrontation.

3. It follows, therefore, that the Arab countries cannot be exempted, under any circumstances, from their responsibilities in confronting the Israeli menace. Financial support, or support in the information field, or even support in arms and experience for the armed struggle cannot be a substitute for actual participation in the battle.

4. The logical conclusion is that for any Arab regime to be prepared to bear the consequences of its support for the Palestinian armed struggle, it must have the necessary military capacity to defend its territories, and that any support which is not based on a country's ability to defend itself is only temporary support, as it might well collapse under the blows of Israeli retaliation.

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Palestinian Action and Arab Action:

1. In view of the particular circumstances of the Palestinian people, living as they do in a number of Arab countries; in view of the requirements of armed action and the conditions in which it has to be carried on; and in view of the fact that the enemy carries out retaliatory raids

against the Arab countries which are Palestine's neighbours—in view of all this, the success of the Palestinian resistance depends to a great extent on the backing and support it receives from the Arab countries, especially those surrounding Israel.

2. For the Palestinian resistance movement to be really protected the Arab countries must be really and effectively prepared for the battle. The real danger to the Palestinian resistance movement lies in continued Arab military weakness, while Israel has a military force capable of undertaking retaliatory and punitive action and in some cases military destruction.

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The Strategy of the Resistance and its Requirements:

1. There is an indissoluble organic link between the political and the military aspects of resistance. For without political mobilisation there can be no arming and mobilisation of the masses.

Concentration on one aspect of resistance to the exclusion of the other aspect is a dangerous pitfall which must be avoided by the resistance movement.

2. The masses groaning under the yoke of occupation in Palestine are the material and the fuel of resistance. The organisation of the masses and the release of their tremendous potential is a basic condition for the escalation of the resistance movement. Similarly, failure to organise these masses, lack of attention to the material and psychological conditions in which they live, and leaving them to live disunited and at a loss, is a real danger which threatens the future of the resistance movement.

3. It must be continually reiterated that Israel's constant and permanent aim is to evict the Arab population from the soil of Palestine by creating circumstances that will lead to this. Therefore, one of the most essential duties of the resistance movement is to concern itself with the general conditions of our people in the occupied territory, the creation of conditions for resistance to occupation, and refusal in any way to leave the land, while at the same time paying attention to the need to provide the minimum

living requirements to ensure that those who are out of work do not leave.

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Replies by the U.A.R. Foreign Minister Riyad to Questions on His Statements During His Visit to the Scandinavian Countries.¹ [Excerpts]

Brioni (Yugoslavia), July 11, 1968

Q.—Radio stations all over the world are daily broadcasting reports and commentaries either welcoming statements attributed to you or making a major issue out of such statements. What are the facts of the case?

A.—The present crisis comes as no surprise to me. I was expecting it before the start of my visit to the countries of Northern Europe. I could feel the approach of the crisis with the intensification of questions at press conferences, all centring on the refusal of the United Arab Republic to negotiate with Israel or on reasons for its refusal to sign a peace treaty with her. . .

Q.—Which statement do you feel has been distorted and has led to this crisis?

A.—During the press conference I held in Copenhagen on July 3, at the end of my visit to Denmark, I was asked why the United Arab Republic refuses to negotiate with Israel or to sign a peace treaty with her. My answer to that question was as follows, word for word:

"The Arab countries surrounding Israel have already signed an Armistice Agreement with her. This was in 1949. Israel ignored that agreement and in 1956 declared that it no longer existed. This was to serve her expansionist designs, and in fact she proceeded to occupy the Al-Auja district. Ben Gurion, who was the Israeli Prime Minister at the time, declared that the agreement was null and void and had been buried—he also announced the annexation of Sinai to Israel.

"In 1949 Israel signed the Lausanne Protocol which was an attempt to solve the refugee prob-

lem. However, Israel rejected the Protocol after her admission to the United Nations.

"Israel is always declaring her categorical rejection of all United Nations resolutions. This is confirmed by the statements of Israeli officials declaring the annexation of Arab territories, in defiance of the whole series of resolutions adopted by the General Assembly and the Security Council.

"These facts make it clear that negotiating with Israel or signing an agreement with her means submitting to her will. It does not mean peace, as the nations of the world understand and desire it, in the Middle East. On our side we want peace, but we very strongly reject surrender.

"The peace that Israel desires is a guarantee of her security that will allow her to mount further aggressions. Under no circumstances will we agree to waive our right to a single inch of Arab territory."

Another member of the press asked me what sort of political solution the Arab countries wanted. I replied that "it is a solution based on respect by all countries for the United Nations Charter and the Security Council resolution [November 22, 1967] as its point of departure. This is what Israel refuses to do."

It is this attitude that puts Israel in a vulnerable position vis-à-vis public opinion in the Scandinavian countries. Israel is aware that this change has taken place.

Q.—What is the situation now that you have met Jarring in Sweden?

A.—I emphasised that our cooperation with him in his mission and our readiness to implement the Security Council resolution, and consequently the success of his mission, depends on Israel's implementation of the resolution and withdrawal from all Arab territories.

I once again emphasised the fact to Jarring in an official capacity that the United Arab Republic refuses to negotiate with Israel, that we will not waive our rights to a single inch of Arab territory, and that we insist on the withdrawal of Israel forces to the June 4 frontiers.

Q.—Has Israel informed Jarring that she accepts the Security Council resolution?

¹ *Al-Ahram* (Cairo), 12/7/1968.

A.—No, nor has she shown any readiness to implement it. In fact, Moshe Dayan, the Minister of Defence, has declared that Israel has no intention of accepting the resolution that calls for her withdrawal.

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Letter From the President of the Islamic Association in Jerusalem Hilmi Al-Muh-taseb to the Israeli Premier Eshkol on the Excavations Outside the Walls of the Haram al-Sharif.¹

Jerusalem, July 11, 1968

Excavations are still in progress outside the western and southern walls of the Haram al-Sharif, protests of Muslim officials having been ignored.

These excavations are being carried out within sight of the Muslim population in a manner that is both painful and provocative. The rights of Muslims and the sanctity of their religious places are being flagrantly violated by these actions.

Muslims have already expressed their view on the matter, which is in complete agreement with the resolutions adopted by the International Commission. Our view, which has been submitted in several letters and statements, is to the effect that the Western wall of the Aqsa Mosque, with its surrounding buildings, is an Islamic *Waqf* and exclusively Muslim property. The only right Jews have in this area is the right of visit.

The continuation of these excavations on land which is Islamic *Waqf* property, and the continued demolition of Islamic property, beneath the walls of the Haram al-Sharif, constitute a continued violation of the sanctity of this place and a provocative defiance of the feelings of Muslims, in utter disregard of their age-old rights.

I therefore place this strong protest on record for the second time, affirming that Muslims protest against these actions and will never accept them.

¹ *Al-Dustur* (Amman), 10/7/1968. See also *ante*, docs. 342, 345 and *post*, doc. 373.

I hope that these actions will be checked and that you will abide by your statements to the effect that the Holy Places will be protected and that there will be no encroachment on them.

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Appeal by the Higher Committee for National Guidance in Jerusalem to the Arab Inhabitants to Refuse to Pay Israeli Taxes.²
[Excerpt]

Jerusalem, July 1968

Fellow Citizens,
Inhabitants of the Holy City,

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The Zionists, not content with the Arab money and property they plundered in 1948, not content with the killing and dispersal of our people in the past, still shamelessly coveting what little land and property is left to us, are condemning what is left of our people to dispersal, hunger and exile.

We call upon our people to be patient, for patience is the requisite for success in life, the source of all human virtues; it is the one way in which all difficulties may be overcome. We mean the patience that refuses to submit without resistance, the patience to fight and struggle against injustice and to stand up to the oppressor. We therefore address the following appeal to the people of Jerusalem who possess the will to resist and to endure, calling on them:

1. To refuse to pay any taxes whatsoever to the occupying forces, as there is no legal right that either obliges us to pay or permits the enemy to levy such taxes.

2. To hold fast to our land and to build for the future with faith and endurance; to resist all attempts to seduce or to terrorise us, and above all to stand up to the robbers who are in the service of Zionism. This is the least we can do under present circumstances.

3. To refuse to co-operate with the occupying forces and to stop any form of collaboration,

² *Al-Dustur* (Amman), 16/7/1968. See also *ante*, doc. 340.

such as leasing land or property to the enemy, entering into partnerships with him or accepting his invitations, for the enemy exploits all such actions in an attempt to convince world public opinion that we are reconciled to the occupation of our land and are cooperating with him.

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The Palestine National Charter Adopted by the Fourth Palestine National Assembly.¹

Cairo, July 17, 1968

1. This Charter shall be known as "the Palestine National Charter."

Articles of the Charter:

Article 1. Palestine, the homeland of the Palestinian Arab people, is an inseparable part of the greater Arab homeland, and the Palestinian people are a part of the Arab Nation.

Article 2. Palestine, within the frontiers that existed under the British Mandate, is an indivisible territorial unit.

Article 3. The Palestinian Arab people alone have legitimate rights to their homeland, and shall exercise the right of self-determination after the liberation of their homeland, in keeping with their wishes and entirely of their own accord.

Article 4. The Palestinian identity is an authentic, intrinsic and indissoluble quality that is transmitted from father to son. Neither the Zionist occupation nor the dispersal of the Palestinian Arab people as a result of the afflictions they have suffered can efface this Palestinian identity.

Article 5. Palestinians are Arab citizens who were normally resident in Palestine until 1947. This includes both those who were forced to leave or who stayed in Palestine. Anyone born to a Palestinian father after that date, whether inside

or outside Palestine, is a Palestinian.

Article 6. Jews who were normally resident in Palestine up to the beginning of the Zionist invasion are Palestinians.

Article 7. Palestinian identity, and material, spiritual and historical links with Palestine are immutable realities. It is a national obligation to provide every Palestinian with a revolutionary Arab upbringing, and to instil in him a profound spiritual and material familiarity with his homeland and a readiness both for armed struggle and for the sacrifice of his material possessions and his life, for the recovery of his homeland. All available educational means and means of guidance must be enlisted to that end, until liberation is achieved.

Article 8. The Palestinian people is at the stage of national struggle for the liberation of its homeland. For that reason, differences between Palestinian national forces must give way to the fundamental difference that exists between Zionism and imperialism on the one hand and the Palestinian Arab people on the other. On that basis, the Palestinian masses, both as organisations and as individuals, whether in the homeland or in such places as they now live as refugees, constitute a single national front working for the recovery and liberation of Palestine through armed struggle.

Article 9. Armed struggle is the only way of liberating Palestine, and is thus strategic, not tactical. The Palestinian Arab people hereby affirm their unwavering determination to carry on the armed struggle and to press on towards popular revolution for the liberation of and return to their homeland. They also affirm their right to a normal life in their homeland, to the exercise of their right of self-determination therein and to sovereignty over it.

Article 10. Commando action constitutes the nucleus of the Palestinian popular war of liberation. This requires that commando action should be escalated, expanded and protected and that all the resources of the Palestinian masses and all scientific potentials available to them should be mobilised and organised to play their part in the armed Palestinian revolution. It also requires solidarity in national struggle among the different groups within the Palestinian people and between that people and the Arab

¹ Archives of the Institute for Palestine Studies. The Fourth Palestine National Assembly, held in Cairo from July 10 to 17, formed a committee to revise the Palestine National Charter adopted by the First Palestine National Conference in Jerusalem in 1964. The committee completed its task on July 15.

masses, to ensure the continuity of the escalation and victory of the revolution.

Article 11. Palestinians shall have three slogans: national unity, national mobilisation and liberation.

Article 12. The Palestinian Arab people believe in Arab unity. To fulfil their role in the achievement of that objective, they must, at the present stage in their national struggle, retain their Palestinian identity and all that it involves, work for increased awareness of it and oppose all measures liable to weaken or dissolve it.

Article 13. Arab unity and the liberation of Palestine are complementary objectives; each leads to the achievement of the other. Arab unity will lead to the liberation of Palestine, and the liberation of Palestine will lead to Arab unity. To work for one is to work for both.

Article 14. The destiny of the Arab nation, indeed the continued existence of the Arabs, depends on the fate of the Palestinian cause. This interrelationship is the point of departure of the Arab endeavour to liberate Palestine. The Palestinian people are the vanguard of the movement to achieve this sacred national objective.

Article 15. The liberation of Palestine is a national obligation for the Arabs. It is their duty to repel the Zionist and imperialist invasion of the greater Arab homeland and to liquidate the Zionist presence in Palestine. The full responsibility for this belongs to the peoples and governments of the Arab nation and to the Palestinian people first and foremost.

For this reason, the task of the Arab nation is to enlist all the military, human, moral and material resources at its command to play an effective part, along with the Palestinian people, in the liberation of Palestine. Moreover, it is the task of the Arab nation, particularly at the present stage of the Palestinian armed revolution, to offer the Palestinian people all possible aid, material and manpower support, and to place at their disposal all the means and opportunities that will enable them to continue to perform their role as the vanguard of their armed revolution until the liberation of their homeland is achieved.

Article 16. On the spiritual plane, the liberation of Palestine will establish in the Holy Land an atmosphere of peace and tranquility in which

all religious institutions will be safeguarded and freedom of worship and the right of visit guaranteed to all without discrimination or distinction of race, colour, language or creed. For this reason, the people of Palestine look to all spiritual forces in the world for support.

Article 17. On the human plane, the liberation of Palestine will restore to the Palestinians their dignity, integrity and freedom. For this reason, the Palestinian Arab people look to all those who believe in the dignity and freedom of man for support.

Article 18. On the international plane, the liberation of Palestine is a defensive measure dictated by the requirements of self-defence. This is why the Palestinian people, who seek to win the friendship of all peoples, look for the support of all freedom, justice and peace-loving countries in restoring the legitimate state of affairs in Palestine, establishing security and peace in it and enabling its people to exercise national sovereignty and freedom.

Article 19. The partition of Palestine, which took place in 1947, and the establishment of Israel, are fundamentally invalid, however long they last, for they contravene the will of the people of Palestine and their natural right to their homeland and contradict the principles of the United Nations Charter, foremost among which is the right of self-determination.

Article 20. The Balfour Declaration, the Mandate Instrument, and all their consequences, are hereby declared null and void. The claim of historical or spiritual links between the Jews and Palestine is neither in conformity with historical fact nor does it satisfy the requirements for statehood. Judaism is a revealed religion; it is not a separate nationality, nor are the Jews a single people with a separate identity; they are citizens of their respective countries.

Article 21. The Palestinian Arab people, expressing themselves through the Palestinian armed revolution, reject all alternatives to the total liberation of Palestine. They also reject all proposals for the liquidation or internationalisation of the Palestine problem.

Article 22. Zionism is a political movement that is organically linked with world imperialism and is opposed to all liberation movements or movements for progress in the world. The Zionist

movement is essentially fanatical and racist; its objectives involve aggression, expansion and the establishment of colonial settlements, and its methods are those of the Fascists and the Nazis. Israel acts as cat's paw for the Zionist movement, a geographic and manpower base for world imperialism and a springboard for its thrust into the Arab homeland to frustrate the aspirations of the Arab nation to liberation, unity and progress. Israel is a constant threat to peace in the Middle East and the whole world. Inasmuch as the liberation of Palestine will eliminate the Zionist and imperialist presence in that country and bring peace to the Middle East, the Palestinian people look for support to all liberals and to all forces of good, peace and progress in the world, and call on them, whatever their political convictions, for all possible aid and support in their just and legitimate struggle to liberate their homeland.

Article 23. The demands of peace and security and the exigencies of right and justice require that all nations should regard Zionism as an illegal movement and outlaw it and its activities, out of consideration for the ties of friendship between peoples and for the loyalty of citizens to their homelands.

Article 24. The Palestinian Arab people believe in justice, freedom, sovereignty, self-determination, human dignity and the right of peoples to enjoy them.

Article 25. In pursuance of the objectives set out in this charter, the Palestine Liberation Organisation shall perform its proper role in the liberation of Palestine to the full.

Article 26. The Palestine Liberation Organisation, as the representative of the forces of the Palestinian revolution, is responsible for the struggle of the Palestinian Arab people to regain, liberate and return to their homeland and to exercise the right of self-determination in that homeland, in the military, political and financial fields, and for all else that the Palestinian cause may demand, both at Arab and international levels.

Article 27. The Palestine Liberation Organisation shall cooperate with all Arab countries, each according to its means, maintaining a neutral attitude vis-à-vis these countries in accordance with the requirements of the battle of liberation, and on the basis of that factor. The Organisation

shall not interfere in the internal affairs of any Arab country.

Article 28. The Palestinian Arab people hereby affirm the authenticity and independence of their national revolution and reject all forms of interference, tutelage or dependency.

Article 29. The Palestinian Arab people have the legitimate and prior right to liberate and recover their homeland, and shall define their attitude to all countries and forces in accordance with the attitude adopted by such countries and forces to the cause of the Palestinian people and with the extent of their support for that people in their revolution to achieve their objectives.

Article 30. Those who fight or bear arms in the battle of liberation form the nucleus of the popular army which will shield the achievements of the Palestinian Arab people.

Article 31. The Organisation shall have a flag, an oath of allegiance and an anthem, to be decided in accordance with appropriate regulations.

Article 32. Regulations, to be known as Basic Regulations for the Palestine Liberation Organisation, shall be appended to this Charter. These regulations shall define the structure of the Organisation, its bodies and institutions, and the powers, duties and obligations of each of them, in accordance with this Charter.

Article 33. This Charter may only be amended with a majority of two thirds of the total number of members of the National Assembly of the Palestine Liberation Organisation at a special meeting called for that purpose.

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Constitution of the Palestine Liberation Organisation.¹

Cairo, July 17, 1968

*Chapter I**General Principles*

Article 1. The Palestinians, in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution, form themselves into an organisation to be known as the Palestine Liberation Organisation.

Article 2. The Palestine Liberation Organisation shall exercise its responsibilities in accordance with the principles of the National Charter, the provisions of this Constitution, and such rules, provisions and resolutions as may be issued in conformity with these principles and provisions.

Article 3. Relationships within the Organisation shall be based on commitment to struggle and to national action, the different levels of the Organisation, from its base up to its collective leadership, being closely linked together on a basis of the following principles: the minority shall defer to the will of the majority, confidence of the people shall be won through persuasion, the movement of Palestinian struggle shall be continued, the armed Palestinian revolution shall be supported, and every possible effort shall be made to ensure that it continues and escalates, so that the impetus of the masses towards liberation may take its course until victory is achieved.

In implementation of this principle, the Executive Committee shall draft constitutions for the Organisation's subsidiary bodies, due regard being paid to the circumstances of Palestinians in all places where they are concentrated, to the circumstances of the Palestinian revolution, and to the realisation of the objectives of the Charter and the Constitution.

Article 4. All Palestinians are natural members of the Palestine Liberation Organisation, performing their duty to liberate their country in accordance with their abilities and qualifications.

The Palestinian people is the base of this Organisation.

*Chapter II**The National Assembly*

Article 5. The members of the National Assembly shall be elected by the Palestinian people by direct ballot, in accordance with a system to be devised for this purpose by the Executive Committee.

Article 6. (a) Should it be impossible to hold an election to the Assembly, the National Assembly shall continue to sit until circumstances permit of the holding of elections.

(b) If, for some reason, one or more seats in the National Assembly fall vacant, the Assembly shall appoint a member or members to fill the vacant seats.

Article 7. (a) The National Assembly is the supreme authority of the Liberation Organisation. It drafts the policy, planning and programmes of the Organisation.

(b) Jerusalem is the seat of the Palestine Liberation Organisation.

Article 8. The National Assembly is elected for three years, and it shall be convened in regular session once every six months by its President or, should extraordinary sessions be necessary, by the President at the request of the Executive Committee, or of a quarter of its members. It shall meet in Jerusalem, Gaza, or any other place, depending on circumstances. Should the President not call such a session, the session shall convene automatically in such place and at such time as are designated in the request submitted by its members or by the Executive Committee.

Article 9. The National Assembly shall have a President's Office, consisting of the President, two Vice-Presidents, and a Secretary, elected by the National Assembly when it first meets.

Article 10. The National Assembly in ordinary session shall consider:

(a) The annual report submitted by the Executive Committee on the achievements of the Organisation and its subsidiary bodies.

(b) The annual report of the National Fund and budget allocations.

(c) Proposals submitted by the Executive

¹ Archives of the Institute for Palestine Studies.

The Fourth Palestine National Assembly, held in Cairo from 10 to 17 July, studied the constitution for the Palestine Liberation Organisation and the regulations related to its structure, and introduced certain amendments.

Committee and recommendations of Assembly committees.

(d) Any other questions submitted to it.

Article 11. The National Assembly shall form such committees as it deems necessary to assist it in the performance of its duties.

These committees shall submit their reports and recommendations to the National Assembly, which shall debate them and issue its decisions as regards them.

Article 12. Attendance by two-thirds of the members of the Assembly shall constitute a quorum. Decisions shall be taken by a majority vote of those present.

Chapter III

The Executive Committee

Article 13 (a) All members of the Executive Committee shall be elected by the National Assembly.

(b) The Chairman of the Executive Committee shall be elected by the Committee itself.

(c) The Executive Committee shall be elected from the National Assembly.

Article 14. The Executive Committee shall consist of eleven members, including the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Palestine National Fund.

Should vacancies occur on the Executive Committee, for any reason, when the National Assembly is not sitting, they shall be filled as follows:

(a) If the vacancies are less than a third of the total membership, they shall not be filled until the first session of the National Assembly.

(b) If the vacancies amount to a third or more of the total membership of the Executive Committee, the National Assembly shall fill them at a session convened for the purpose in not more than thirty days.

(c) Should it be impossible, for valid reasons, to convene the National Assembly in extraordinary session, vacancies arising in either of the above cases shall be filled by the Executive Committee, the Assembly's Bureau and such members of the Assembly as are able to attend, at a joint assembly formed for this purpose. The new members shall be chosen by majority vote of those present.

Article 15. The Executive Committee is the highest executive authority of the Organisation. It shall remain in permanent session, its members devoting themselves exclusively to their work. It shall be responsible for executing the policy, programmes and planning approved by the National Assembly, to which it shall be responsible, collectively and individually.

Article 16. The Executive Committee shall assume responsibility for:

(a) Representing the Palestinian people.

(b) Supervising the Organisation's subsidiary bodies.

(c) Issuing regulations and instructions, and taking decisions on the Organisation's activities, provided these are not incompatible with the Charter or the Constitution.

(d) Implementing the Organisation's financial policy and drafting its budget.

In general, the Executive Committee shall assume all the responsibilities of the Liberation Organisation, in accordance with the general policies and resolutions adopted by the National Assembly.

Article 17. The permanent headquarters of the Executive Committee shall be in Jerusalem. It shall also be entitled to hold its meetings in any other place it sees fit.

Article 18. The Executive Committee shall establish the following departments:

(a) A Military Department.

(b) A Department for Political and Information Affairs.

(c) A Palestine National Fund Department.

(d) A Department for Research and Specialised Institutes.

(e) A Department for Administrative Affairs.

(f) Any other department the Committee considers necessary.

Each department shall have a Director-General and the requisite staff. The authority of each department shall be defined by special regulations drawn up by the Executive Committee.

Article 19. The Executive Committee shall establish close relations and coordinate activities between the Organisation and all Arab and international organisations, federations and insti-

tutions which agree with its aims, or which help it in the realisation of the Organisation's objectives.

Article 20. The Executive Committee shall continue to exercise its prerogatives as long as it enjoys the confidence of the National Assembly. The Executive Committee shall submit its resignation to the new National Assembly at its first session. It is subject to re-election.

Article 21. Attendances of two thirds of its members shall constitute a quorum, and its resolutions shall be adopted by majority vote of those present.

Chapter IV

General Rules

Article 22. The Palestine Liberation Organisation shall form an army of Palestinians, to be known as the Palestine Liberation Army, with an independent command which shall operate under the supervision of the Executive Committee, and carry out its instructions and decisions, both general and particular. Its national duty is to become the vanguard in the battle for the liberation of Palestine.

Article 23. The Executive Committee shall make every effort to enroll Palestinians in Arab military colleges and institutes for military training, to mobilise the potentials and resources of the Palestinians, and to prepare them for the battle of liberation.

Article 22. A fund, to be known as the Palestine National Fund, shall be established to finance the activities of the Organisation, which Fund shall be administered by a board of directors to be formed in accordance with special regulations for the Fund issued by the National Assembly.

Article 25. The Fund's sources of revenue shall be:

(a) An impost on Palestinians imposed and collected in accordance with a special system.

(b) Financial assistance provided by Arab governments and the Arab nation.

(c) The sale of "liberation stamps" which the Arab states will issue for use in postal and other transactions.

(d) Contributions and donations.

(e) Arab loans and aid from Arab countries and friendly peoples.

(f) Any other sources of revenue approved by the Assembly.

Article 26. Committees to be known as 'Committees for the Support of Palestine' shall be formed in Arab and friendly countries to collect contributions and support the organisation in its national endeavours.

Article 27. The level at which the Palestinian people is represented in Arab organisations and conferences shall be determined by the Executive Committee. The Executive Committee shall appoint a representative for Palestine to the League of Arab States.

Article 28. The Executive Committee shall be entitled to make such regulations as are necessary for the implementation of the provisions of this constitution.

Article 29. The Organisation's National Assembly shall be empowered to amend, alter, or add to this Constitution by a two thirds majority of its members.

Chapter V

Transitional Provisions

Article 30. On July 10, 1968, the National Assembly convened in Cairo shall replace the former Provisional National Assembly of the Palestine Liberation Organisation, and exercise all the prerogatives allotted to it by this Constitution.

Article 31. The National Assembly shall sit for two years as from July 10, 1968. Should it prove impossible to hold elections for its successor, it shall meet and decide either to extend its term for another period or to form a new Assembly in such manner as it may approve.

Article 32. The National Assembly alone is entitled to co-opt new members from time to time, as it sees fit, should this be desirable in view of the requirements of the battle for liberation and the need to strengthen national unity, in conformity with the provisions of the National Charter, in accordance with regulations to be drafted by the Executive Committee in the coming session.

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Resolutions of the Fourth Palestine National Assembly.¹ [Excerpts]

Cairo, July 17, 1968

II. Political Decisions:

(A) The Palestinian Cause at Palestinian Level:

Inasmuch as a definition of the objectives of the Palestinian struggle, the methods it adopts and the instruments it employs, is essential for the unification of that struggle under one leadership, the Assembly, having debated the matter, endorses the following definitions:

First—Objectives:

1. The liberation of the entire territory of Palestine, over which the Palestinian Arab people shall exercise their sovereignty.

2. That the Palestinian Arab people have the right to establish the form of society they desire in their own land and to decide on their natural place in Arab unity.

3. The affirmation of the Palestinian Arab identity, and rejection of any attempt to establish tutelage over it.

Second—Methods:

1. The Palestinian Arab people have chosen the course of armed struggle in the fight to recover their usurped territories and rights. The current phase in their armed struggle started before the defeat of June, 1967 and has endured and escalated ever since. Moreover, despite the fact that this struggle renders a service to the entire Arab nation at the present stage, insofar as it prevents the enemy from laying claim to a *status quo* based on surrender, and insofar as it keeps the flame of resistance alive and maintains a climate of war, preoccupies the enemy and is an object of concern to the entire world community, that struggle is nevertheless a true and distinct expression of the aspirations of the Palestinian Arab people and is inspired by their objectives. In addition, we feel bound to declare quite frankly that this struggle goes beyond the scope of what it has become

customary to call “the elimination of the consequences of the aggression”, and all other such slogans, for the objectives of this struggle are those of the Palestinian Arab people, as set out in the preceding paragraph. The fight will not cease; it will continue, escalate and expand until final victory is won, no matter how long this takes and regardless of the sacrifices involved.

2. The enemy has chosen *Blitzkrieg* as the form of combat most suitable to him, in view of the tactical mobility at his command which enabled him, at the moment of battle, to unleash forces superior to those deployed by the Arabs. The enemy chose this method in the belief that a lightning victory would lead to surrender, according to the pattern of 1948, and not to Arab armed resistance. In dealing with it, we must adopt a method derived from elements of strength in ourselves and elements of weakness in the enemy.

3. The enemy consists of three interdependent forces:

a) Israel.

b) World Zionism.

c) World imperialism, under the direction of the United States of America.

Moreover, it is incontestable that world imperialism makes use of the forces of reaction linked with colonialism.

If we are to achieve victory and gain our objectives, we shall have to strike at the enemy wherever he may be, and at the nerve centres of his power. This is to be achieved through the use of military, political and economic weapons and information media, as part of a unified and comprehensive plan designed to sap his strength, scatter his forces, destroy the links between them and undermine their common objectives.

4. A long-drawn out battle has the advantage of allowing us to expose world Zionism, its activities, conspiracies, and its complicity with world imperialism and to point out the damage and complications it causes to the interests and the security of many countries, and the threat it constitutes to world peace. This will eventually unmask it, bringing to light the grotesque facts of its true nature, and will isolate it from the

¹ Archives of the Institute for Palestine Studies. The Fourth National Assembly was held in Cairo from July 10 to 17, 1968.

centres of power and establish safeguards against its ever reaching them. . .

5. An information campaign must be launched that will throw light on the following facts:

a) The true nature of the Palestinian war is that of a battle between a small people, which is the Palestinian people, and Israel, which has the backing of world Zionism and world imperialism.

b) This war will have its effect on the interests of any country that supports Israel or world Zionism.

c) The hallmark of the Palestinian Arab people is resistance, struggle and liberation, that of the enemy, aggression, usurpation and the disavowal of all values governing decent human relations.

6. A comprehensive plan must be drawn up to fuse the Arab struggle and the Palestinian struggle into a single battle. This requires concentrated ideological, information and political effort that will make it clear to the Arab nation that it can never enjoy peace or security until the tide of Zionist invasion is stemmed, and that its territory will be occupied piecemeal unless it deploys its resources in the battle, not to mention the extent to which the Zionist presence constitutes a drain on its resources and an impediment to the development of its society.

Palestinian action regards the Arab nation as a reserve fund of political, financial and human resources on which it can draw, and whose support and participation will make it possible to fight the successive stages in the battle.

7. The peoples and governments of the Arab nation must be made to understand that they are under an obligation to protect the Palestinian struggle so that it may be able to confront the enemy on firm ground and direct all its forces and capabilities to this confrontation, fully assured of its own safety and security. This obligation is not only a national duty, it is a necessity deriving from the fact that the Palestinian struggle is the vanguard in the defence of all Arab countries, Arab territories and Arab aspirations.

8. Any objective study of the enemy will reveal that his potential for endurance, except where a brief engagement is concerned, is limited. The drain on this potential that can be brought about by a long-drawn out engagement will

inevitably provide the opportunity for a decisive confrontation in which the entire Arab nation can take part and emerge victorious.

It is the duty of Palestinians everywhere to devote themselves to making the Arab nation aware of these facts, and to propagating the will to struggle. It is also their duty to endure, sacrifice and take part in the struggle.

Third—Instruments:

Theoretical Definitions:

1. The instrument through which the revolution will be brought about is the Palestinian Arab masses, whether inside or outside the occupied territory, acting in close-knit solidarity, rallied around the Charter of the Palestinian revolution, and expressing their will through a united Palestinian command. This command enjoys the support of the Arab masses which share in the Palestinian struggle, from their firm conviction that the revolution of the Palestinian Arab people is the true expression of the liberated Arab will. The Arab masses have fought for liberty, unity and social justice since the beginning of this century and are now convinced that there can be neither unity, liberty nor social justice unless the usurped territory is liberated. In addition, there are the forces of world liberation which reject the control by Zionist Western imperialism over the destinies of peoples. These forces believe that the liberation of Palestine is an aspect of the world revolution against world imperialism and its conspiracies.

2. Palestinian armed struggle for the liberation of our usurped homeland is incomplete unless there is political action to complement it. This political action is the foundation of armed struggle, defines its aims and explains to the masses why it adopts specific attitudes, setting its individual actions in their proper perspective. In affirming this fact, the Assembly calls on all forces and elements taking part in the struggle to act in conformity with this political action and to be guided by it.

3. The Palestinian Arab masses form the material of the armed struggle. Dedicated resistance to usurpation and aggression cannot attain its objectives unless it relies on the Palestinian masses, particularly on the masses in the occupied territory. A comprehensive resistance movement which draws its support from the largest possible

popular basis is the only guarantee for the realisation of our objectives.

Practical Application in the Field of Armed Struggle:

1. The Palestine Liberation Organisation is a grouping of Palestinian forces in one national front for the liberation of the territory of Palestine through armed revolution.

2. This Organisation has its Charter which defines its objectives, directs its course and organises its activities. The Organisation also has a National Assembly and an Executive Command chosen by the National Assembly, which Command forms the supreme executive authority of the Organisation, as defined by its constitution.

The Executive Committee shall draw up a unified general plan for Palestinian action at all levels and in all fields. This plan is to be implemented through the instruments of the revolution gathered in this Council, each of which must abide by the role assigned to it by this plan and by the decisions of the Command.

Proposals for the Creation of a Spurious Palestinian Entity:

The Zionist movement along with imperialism and its tool, Israel, is seeking to consolidate Zionist aggression against Palestine and the military victories won by Israel in 1948 and 1967, by establishing a Palestinian entity in the territories occupied during the June, 1967 aggression. This entity would owe its existence to the legitimisation and perpetuation of the state of Israel, which is absolutely incompatible with the Palestinian Arab people's right to the whole of Palestine, their homeland. Such a spurious entity would in fact be an Israeli colony and would lead to the liquidation of the Palestinian cause once and for all to the benefit of Israel. The creation of such an entity would, moreover, constitute an interim stage during which Zionism could evacuate the territory of Palestine occupied during the June 5 war of its Arab inhabitants, as a preliminary step to incorporating it in the Israeli entity. In addition, this would lead to the creation of a subservient Palestinian Arab administration in the territories occupied during the June 5 war on which Israel could rely in combating the Palestinian revolution. Also to be considered in this

context are imperialist and Zionist schemes to place the Palestinian territories occupied since June 5 under international administration and protection. For these reasons, the National Assembly hereby declares its categorical rejection of the idea of establishing a spurious Palestinian entity in the territory of Palestine occupied since June 5, and of any form of international protection. The Assembly hereby declares, moreover, that any individual or party, Palestinian Arab or non-Palestinian, who advocates or supports the creation of such a subservient entity is the enemy of the Palestinian Arab people and the Arab nation.

(B) Palestinian Struggle in the Arab Field:

1. The battle for Palestine is a battle for the destiny of the whole Arab nation. It has been called the "battle for Palestine", but this arose from the false impression that the affair was restricted to a battle for the territory of Palestine alone, to the exclusion of all other parts of the Arab homeland, or that it was for the people of Palestine alone, to the exclusion of all the other peoples that make up the Arab nation. But the self-evident truth, as the enemy himself avows, is that it is a Zionist invasion of the Arab homeland, involving several Arab countries and vast areas of Arab territory in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Egypt, Iraq, the Hejaz and the states of the Arab Gulf. The invasion of Palestine was intended only to establish a bridgehead for this vast invasion, and the June 1967 war was only the first wave of the thrust from this bridgehead into Arab territories beyond the confines of Palestine. This means that, occupying as he now does territories belonging to Syria and Egypt, the enemy has already gone beyond the purely Palestinian framework and moved into the wider Arab framework on which he has designs. This completely undermines the inviolability formerly enjoyed by internationally recognised frontiers and makes them subject to bargaining.

The slogan now being voiced publicly in Israel is that of the so-called "Greater Israel." This indicates that a new stage, involving a phased thrust for the usurpation of further Arab territories, has in fact begun. No Arab country can afford not to take part in the battle with all

its resources, forces and potentials; if it does not, its territories will fall to the enemy piecemeal, or its turn will come once the enemy has finished with the others.

The only way to repel the invasion is for the entire Arab nation to confront it with all the potential at its disposal in popular as well as conventional warfare.

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3. The Arabs of Palestine hereby declare that, as regards the battle they are now fighting and the course they are pursuing, their total preoccupation with that battle into which all their resources will be channelled requires that they should not interfere in the internal affairs of any Arab country, as long as there is no interference in their struggle.

4. The Arab people must mobilise itself to strike at the interests in the Arab homeland of countries that support Israel and world Zionism, and frankly declare their hostility to such interests, to make it clear to these countries that their interests cannot escape actual harm as a result of their support of Israel. . .

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(C)—Palestinian Struggle in the International Field:

The Security Council Resolution and the Peaceful Solution:

1. The Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967 is hereby rejected for the following reasons:

a) The resolution calls for the cessation of the state of hostility between the Arab nations and Israel. This entails the cessation of the state of hostility, free passage for Israeli shipping through Arab waterways, and an Arab commitment to put an end to the boycott of Israel, including the abrogation of all Arab legislation regulating that boycott. The cessation of the state of hostility also entails the relaxation of economic pressure on Israel, so that the door would be opened to an invasion of all Arab markets by Israeli goods, inasmuch as such goods could circulate, be traded in and flood the market regardless of whether or not economic agreements were concluded.

b) The resolution calls for the establishment of secure frontiers to be agreed upon with Israel. Apart from the fact that secure and mutually agreed frontiers involves the de facto recognition of Israel, and an encroachment on the unconditional right of the Palestinian Arab people to the whole of Palestine, which is totally unacceptable to the Arab countries, if the Arab countries agreed to secure frontiers for Israel, they would be committed to protecting Israel's security, after having first suppressed commando action, put an end to the Palestinian revolution and prevented the Palestinian Arab people and the Arab masses from discharging their sacred national duty to liberate and recover Palestine and to terminate the Zionist and imperialist presence there.

c) The resolution calls for the establishment of permanent peace between the Arab nations and Israel. This would have the following injurious consequences:

1. It would provide Israel with security and stability at domestic, Arab and international levels. This would throw the doors wide open to the Zionist movement, allowing it to entice large sections of Jewish communities in Western Europe and America into immigrating and settling in Israel. These communities have held back from so doing for the past twenty years because of misgivings about the security, future and continued existence of Israel.

2. It would eliminate the reasons, including Arab influence, for which friendly nations have so far not allowed their Jewish citizens to immigrate to Israel, notably in the case of the millions of Jews in the Soviet Union.

3. It would eliminate all reasons for which many countries friendly to the Arabs have refrained from recognising Israel or from dealing with Israel at all levels.

4. It would strengthen the human and geographic barrier that separates the Arab homeland into east and west. This would be extremely injurious, as it would prevent the achievement of even partial, not to mention total, Arab unity.

5. It would be a severe blow to the Palestinian armed struggle and to the Arab liberation movement whose objectives are liberation, social progress and unity. The consequence of this would be increased imperialist influence in the Arab

homeland, accompanied by increased Zionist influence, in view of the organic political, economic, and other ties linking Zionism to imperialism. Arab policy would, as a result, be forced away from the line of neutrality and non-alignment.

6. The resolution ignores the Palestine problem, which it does not even mention by name, and ignores the rights of the Arabs of Palestine to their territories and their homeland, referring to both as if the problem was merely a problem of refugees. This presages the final liquidation of the issue of Palestine as an issue of a land and of a homeland.

7. It was not only territory that the Arab nation lost in June, 1967. Arab dignity and self-confidence were also involved. A peaceful solution might restore some, or even all of those territories to the Arabs, but it would not restore their dignity and self-confidence.

8. The Arab nation must come to realise that it is under an inescapable obligation to defend its homeland, and not to rely on others for its protection or for the recovery of its territories and its rights. If the Arab countries accept a peaceful solution they will be renouncing the Arab will and agreeing that their destiny should be under the control of the Great Powers.

9. A peaceful solution might lead the Arab countries to imagine themselves to be secure. Israel would certainly exploit this illusion to strike again, after creating a political situation more to her liking, and thus realise her expansionist designs on the territories of the Arab countries.

For these reasons the National Assembly calls on the newly elected Executive Committee to draft a comprehensive plan operative at Arab popular, official and international levels, designed to frustrate any political solution of the Palestine problem.

The Assembly affirms, moreover, that the aggression against the Arab nation, and the territories of that nation, began with the Zionist invasion of Palestine in 1917, and that, as a consequence, "the elimination of the consequences of the aggression" must signify the elimination of all such consequences since the beginning of the Zionist invasion and not merely since the June, 1967 war. The slogan "the elimination of the consequences of the aggression" is therefore rejected in its present form, and must be replaced

by the slogan, "the destruction of the instrument of aggression." Thus, and thus alone, will "peace based on justice" be established.

(D) Palestinian Struggle at the Level of the World Struggle for Liberation:

i) The Assembly wishes to convey to the government and people of the People's Republic of China its appreciation of their support for the Palestinian struggle, their outspoken hostility to Israel and their refusal to recognise Israel or to agree that her usurpation of the land of Palestine is legitimate. The Assembly further declares that the Palestinian Arab people are confident of continued Chinese support and backing in view of the objectives which are common to the Palestinian Arab people and the great Chinese people, in the fight against world imperialism, under the leadership of the United States of America, and in view of their common duty to support all liberation movements all over the world.

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Address by the U.A.R. President Nasser to the National Congress of the Arab Socialist Union.¹ [Excerpts]

Cairo, July 23, 1968

I do not want to go back to the conditions which led to the Middle East crisis, the details of which are well known: Israel's intentions to attack Arab territories, the imperialist collusion with the Israeli enemy, the defeat of June 5 [1967] and its grave and sad consequences for our Arab nation. We lost, as you know, the greater part of our armed forces. We agreed to try for a political solution for many reasons. At that time we had no other alternative to a political solution. We had no armed forces to depend on. At the same time, we are not war-mongers. If we can get our

¹ *Al-Ahram* (Cairo), 24/7/1968.

rights through political action, as we did in 1957, well and good; if not, there is no other way but to struggle in order to obtain our rights and liberate our land. Another reason is that we want world public opinion to be on our side and to learn the truth about our position. Moreover, we have to take into consideration our present friends and our would-be friends before we consider our enemies. To a great extent, the battle is taking place on an international level and in the sight of world public opinion. The whole world wants to live in peace. We realised from the beginning, when we tried the path of the political solution, that it was a hard and thorny path because the enemy was drunk with victory. Meanwhile, we realise that the dictum: "whatever is taken by force can only be restored by force" is a sound one under all circumstances. Yet, we tried sincerely—and we are still trying—to reach a political solution in conformity with certain principles from which we shall never deviate.

These principles constitute a clear and firm basis for the policy of the United Arab Republic: no negotiations with Israel; no peace treaty with Israel, no recognition of Israel and no deals at the expense of Palestinian territory or the Palestinian people.

These are the principles which we followed in the hope of reaching a peaceful solution for the Middle East crisis. Since November 23, we have maintained a dialogue with the United Nations envoy, but we have attained nothing. We have cooperated to the greatest possible extent with the representative of the United Nations Secretary-General. We accepted the Security Council resolution, while Israel did not. There are at present no plans for a peaceful solution; and I do not see before me now, or in the future, any plans for a peaceful solution. We listen to what the representative of the United Nations Secretary-General has to say, and then tell him our opinion of what he says. Our views are also clear on the political solution; we absolutely refuse to give up an inch of any Arab territory in any Arab country. It is clear that Israel wants to have direct negotiations and to conclude a peace treaty—and this we refuse. Clearly, Israel, which has rejected the Security Council resolution, has several objectives, the first being to achieve her political objective because she has won a military

victory, but not achieved her political objective—the signing of a peace treaty with the Arab countries that surround her. So Israel does not withdraw. Why should she withdraw from territories she occupied after achieving an overwhelming military victory? Israel will remain, as they themselves say, in the hope that circumstances or regimes may change and other regimes may come and be ready to sign a peace treaty with Israel.

How can circumstances change? Israel knows that the occupation weighs heavily on every individual man and woman in the Arab nation. Occupation is shattering; it is something unnatural, a nightmare for all of us. Israel believes that this will affect our home fronts so that she, and the imperialist, colonialist forces working behind her, will be able to influence our home fronts, change our regimes and bring into existence other regimes which will agree to conclude peace treaties with Israel. As long as Israel knows that we have not yet attained overwhelming offensive military power, she will remain in her positions in the hope of attaining a political victory by bringing about a change of regimes. That is why Israel rejects the Security Council resolution; she will not even discuss this resolution. Israel says that she will remain just where she is on the cease-fire lines until we agree to sit down and negotiate with her and sign a peace treaty.

Naturally, we are coping with this situation by building up our armed forces. After the defeat, a year ago, we had no armed forces. Now we have armed forces which are perhaps superior to those we had before the battle. We are developing these armed forces to achieve superiority over the enemy, since our enemy is cunning and is backed by powers that give him everything—money and arms.

I want to speak about the prospects of peaceful and military solutions. This crisis, by its very nature, cannot go on very long. A year has gone by. The area we live in is a sensitive one. The present situation is unacceptable, for it is incompatible with the nature of things and may at any time create a situation which can be inflammable and explosive.

We have one basic and fundamental obligation, which is a matter of life and death—the liberation of occupied territory inch by inch, even

if it means that a man must fall for every inch we recover. This is quite clear.

War for the sake of gaining one's rights is legitimate. But we shall not let anybody provoke us. We shall decide, prepare ourselves and arrange matters. This is a lengthy business which needs patience and steadfastness until we achieve victory, until we achieve superiority over the enemy and then triumph.

But until every inch of Arab territory is liberated we shall not know the taste and value of life. To us, the freedom of Arab territory is indivisible. There is no alternative to the evacuation of all occupation forces from all occupied territories. Without this, there can be no peace in the Middle East, under any circumstances, and if there is no peace in the Middle East it is to be doubted whether the repercussions will be confined to the Middle East.

We do not say this to Israel, but to the world. To Israel, we have nothing to say. Her role as an agent of world imperialism and colonialism has been unveiled.

The words we say today are addressed to the world which is anxious to preserve peace. We add that peace in this part of the world cannot be achieved merely by the elimination of the consequences of the June 5 aggression. Real peace is tied up with the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.

The third question is that of the armed forces. If we study the causes of the defeat, as I have done, by attending the meetings of the Military Command to discuss all that happened, we realise that there was no shortcoming on the part of the officers and men. This is a fact we should fully realise. There were shortcomings. It is painful to go into details again. Four fifths of our forces had no opportunity to engage the enemy. They were put in an extremely unfavourable situation. It is useless to talk of the past except insofar as it is necessary to benefit from the lessons of the battle.

Our soldiers and officers who went to the battle have proved that they are capable of standing up to the enemy, and of dying. The Egyptian soldier is a fighter who is not intimidated by death. I fought, in 1948, side by side with the Egyptian soldier, the fellah, and I saw how he faced death. We should be doing our soldiers and officers an

injustice if we judged them in the light of what happened. What happened was that a great part of the army did not enter the battle. We all know how, during the withdrawal, the enemy forces were able to inflict upon us heavy losses in the passes.

The fourth topic is my recent visit to the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.

I went to the Soviet Union primarily to thank the Soviet leaders and the Soviet people for all the help they have given us, and to discuss the situation. And this is a fact which we must realise: Had it not been for the Soviet Union, we should now have been facing the enemy without weapons and compelled to accept his conditions.

America would not have given us a single bullet. She has never given us anything, nor will she do so. But she gives Israel anything from guns to planes and rockets. We have got these weapons from the Soviet Union and equipped our forces with them. The truth is that we have not so far paid a thing for these weapons, and if the question had been one of payment, we should have found that we had no funds to buy arms. We all know the situation. We received part of these weapons as a gift from the Soviet Union. The other part we received under contract providing for future payment on a long-term instalment basis. Had it not been for the Soviet Union and its agreement to supply us with arms, we should not have moved from our position of one year ago. We should not have had any arms, and, faced with Israeli threats, we should have been compelled to accept Israel's terms. There is one question we should examine carefully and be profoundly aware of. Why should the Soviet Union give us all this? The reason is that the Soviet Union and we have one object in common, namely, to combat imperialism. We want no foreign influence in our area of the world, and the Soviet Union, on its part, is most concerned with combating imperialism and liquidating the imperialist concentration on its southern frontiers.

We have an ideological and nationalist interest in combating imperialism, and the Soviet Union also has an ideological and strategic interest in doing so. I wish to tell you frankly and clearly that the Soviet Union has at no time—even when

we were most embarrassed—tried to impose its terms on us or ask anything of us. On the contrary, it was always we who asked.

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There is another point: the fact of the Soviet fleet's presence in the Mediterranean. I say that all the countries of the area, all the liberated countries of the area, welcome the presence of the Soviet Fleet in the Mediterranean to balance the presence of the American Sixth Fleet which wanted to turn the Mediterranean into an American lake. The Soviet fleet did not threaten us, whereas the Sixth Fleet, according to the Israeli Prime Minister himself, is a strategic reserve for Israel. It is only when the American fleet leaves the Mediterranean that those who are talking about the danger of the Soviet fleet will be entitled to speak and to be heard.

In this connection, I should like to refer briefly to our attitude towards the United States. American policy in this area has completely failed. Nowadays only those who are frankly American agents can declare that they are friends of the United States. The whole Arab world knows what America has done. We had expected something different from the United States, or at least we did not expect all this. This is the business of the United States, but giving arms to Israel while she is still occupying Arab territories means that the United States supports Israel's occupation of these territories; and supplying Israel with aircraft means that the United States supports and backs Israel in her occupation of these lands. The full American support of Israel at the United Nations and the adoption by America of the Israeli point of view mean that America supports the Israeli occupation of Arab territories, and the refusal of the United States to make any statements on the necessity for the Israeli forces to withdraw to their pre-June 5 positions is evidence that the United States supports Israel and even of American connivance with what Israel has done and is doing. All this is known to every member of the Arab nation.

The position is not restricted to the Arab nation; it covers other countries as well. Last year it was evident that CENTO's member-states wanted to free themselves from that pact, formerly called the "Baghdad Pact." Yesterday

we read that Turkish students took Sixth Fleet sailors and threw them into the sea. Why is this so? Is there no one in the United States wise enough to ask the question: "Why is this happening in the Arab world and in other countries?"

America, the country which is now stronger than any other country at any time in history, or in our own time, would be well advised to ask herself what people want of her.

People want America to adopt an attitude based on justice, on equality, for they believe that, as a great power, she should also uphold great principles. She should reject aggression. She should not accept occupation, nor should she agree to support the aggressor and supply him with arms.

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The next point I want to discuss is Arab action. The battle with the enemy has priority over everything else. The battle demands a single Arab nation. We have been using every means at our disposal to achieve this objective.

There was the conference in Khartoum,¹ to which I have already referred. I called for another summit conference, but we do not insist on it. We have used bilateral coordination as a substitute for such a conference. We are not prepared to be sidetracked. Some have tried to draw us into side-issues but we are not prepared to be distracted from the main issue. There is only one battle, our battle with the enemy, and preparations for this absorb all our effort. We have no time for any other.

Our attitude towards any Arab country is based on its attitude towards the battle. Some countries have sent us contingents of their armed forces, such as Sudan, Algeria, Iraq and Kuwait. Others, such as Saudi Arabia, Libya and Kuwait, have given us economic aid, and stood by their commitments under the Arab Solidarity Agreement. I think that Arab action will progress, day after day, but such progress may be slow.

The next point is Palestinian resistance action. We are totally committed to provide Palestinian resistance action with every assistance. We consider that the Palestinian struggle in the past year has been a great turning point in the

¹ See *International Documents on Palestine*, 1967, pp. 655-657.

whole Arab situation. This is felt not only by us, but also by the world at large. The Palestinian people have decided to take up their cause and defend their rights themselves.

The ninth point is psychological warfare. Psychological warfare is an attempt to cast doubt on everything. It also aims at striking the home front. But attempts to cast doubt are nothing new to us. As I said, in 1957 there were eleven clandestine radio stations operating against us. Attempts to cast doubt are not effective against the Arab nation.

The attempts to cast doubt are made in different directions: first, to misrepresent the United Arab Republic's wide-scale diplomatic activity and to depict it as indicating our acceptance of suspect projects.

Of course it is our duty to launch a diplomatic offensive and expose Israel before the world. Of course psychological warfare tries to depict this diplomatic offensive as an indication of our acceptance of suspect projects.

Psychological warfare has also been directed against our relations with the Soviet Union, maintaining that these relations have grown so strong that we shall be drawn into communism and subservience. We all know these points. There is no need for me to repeat them.

There is a great difference between cooperation and subservience. When we concluded the arms deal with the Soviet Union in 1955, they said that it was dangerous, for it would draw us in to subservience. When we concluded the High Dam agreement with the Soviet Union they said that experts would come from the Soviet Union and this would mean that there would be interference and some degree of subservience.

More than 5,000 Russian experts came to work on the High Dam, but not one of them ever interfered in our internal affairs; none of them ever attempted to convert one of the inhabitants of Aswan to communism. Today they are saying the same thing. For example, they say that there are Soviet experts in the army, which means the domination of the army and its subservience. I have already said that we asked for those experts from the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union did not agree to the idea of sending us experts, arguing that we should be exposed to attack. But the fact is that after what happened on June 5,

we had to evaluate things and weigh them up. It was obvious that we needed training. We needed to learn many things about warfare. So we asked for military experts and they were sent to us. They are helping us and we have benefited and are still benefiting from them in all fields. Thus, it was possible to repeat the tale which was told when we received the arms in 1955 and when we started the construction of the High Dam in 1960. The same operation is being repeated in the field of psychological warfare.

We feel that the whole Arab nation is grateful to the Soviet Union. Had it not been for the Soviet Union, we should have found ourselves completely unarmed in the face of Israeli militarism, which is blinded by the victory it won last June. Egypt's independence, I say to everyone, cannot be bought, sold, or put in pawn. This is a constant line of our policy. Indeed, it is this line which brought upon us the difficult situation in which we now find ourselves.

If we had chosen subservience, we should have done so long ago; we should have agreed, for example, to join the Baghdad Pact when they told us to do so, and threatened us with the consequences if we did not. If we had chosen subservience we should not have needed to fight all the battles we have fought. But we have never accepted subservience, and we shall never accept it. We have struggled for freedom, for independence and for the creation of the free Arab homeland and the free Arab citizen.

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Speech by the Syrian Prime Minister Zu'ayyen.¹ [Excerpts]

Tartus, July 27, 1968

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In any reckoning the opinion of the Palestinian people must be given priority. Their opinion cannot be ignored. If it is, as the twenty

¹ *Al-Ba'th* (Damascus), 28/7/1968. The Syrian Premier Yusuf Zu'ayyen delivered this speech on the occasion of the completion of a number of development projects.

years since the usurpation of Palestine have proved, it can only lead to continued turmoil in the Middle East, to world peace being exposed to the gravest peril. There can be no peace as long as the Palestinian people remain dispersed, and as long as the barbarian invaders continue to occupy any part of the Arab homeland.

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Palestinian commando action, which is supported by the Arab people in all Arab countries, is increasingly acquiring the understanding, sympathy, and support of world public opinion. During the last year it has been able to win over large sections of world public opinion, especially in progressive circles.

The strategy of world Zionism and America has been revealed for what it really is. For what American imperialism hoped to attain through aggression has not been achieved, and the imperialist Zionist invasion has not been able to bring about the downfall of the Revolution. The aggressors have been convinced that they are not facing a transient regime which rules merely to remain in power, but that they are confronted with a deep-rooted revolution embodying the will of the toiling masses who are ready to defend, to the very last, their revolution, their homeland and all that they hold sacred.

The aggressors expected to see the downfall of the Arab revolution, but they were disappointed. So they established their new strategy of instigating agents and remaining in the occupied territory in the hope of achieving by coups d'état what they had failed to achieve by direct aggression.

The enemy indulges in the hope that a new series of coups d'état in the Arab world will crush the revolution and the progressive forces, that conspiratorial elements will be restored to power to cooperate with him in completing the liquidation of the Palestinian problem, that what he calls the final comprehensive solution of the Middle East problem will be enforced, and that the political map of the area will be re-drawn. All this means in practice an affirmation of the legitimacy of the Zionist occupation of Palestine, the perpetuation of this usurpation and the return of the Arab homeland to spheres of imperialist influence.

This has not happened, for the revolution is firm and strong. Millions of peasants are the new masters of the land, and millions of toiling workers are the masters of socialist production and the owners of the means of production. They stand solidly alongside the army which is armed with the ideology of the toiling masses and is the faithful guardian of their hopes, aspirations and gains. They stand alongside the revolutionary intellectuals and all self-respecting producers, including professional men, wage-earners, members of the petty bourgeoisie and all the genuinely progressive elements who are loyal to the interests of the masses. All of these stand today in complete unison with their sons, brothers and colleagues, the active members of the Party, in a vast popular battlefield, ready to crush the plots of the imperialists and the agents of Zionist intelligence. The eternal river of the masses flows on towards victory.

The strategy of the enemy will fail and his dreams of peace and recognition will evaporate. The Arab people will not sign their own death warrant, or the instrument granting recognition to the usurpation of their homeland. They will not allow their land to become a counter in bargaining over the rights of the nation, nor will they recognise the invaders and robbers of their land.

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Brothers,

Our relations with the socialist and friendly countries which have understood and supported the cause of the Arab people, and with the progressive forces in all of the world, are becoming stronger. We are working constantly to develop friendly and cooperative relations with all these countries because they are relations based on mutual interests.

Our criterion of friendship is still the attitude others take to our causes, especially the Palestinian cause. We never forget a good turn and we are grateful for all help and support from any country in the world which understands and supports the rights of the Arabs.

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Statement by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) on the Seizure of an "El Al" Aeroplane.¹

July 29, 1968

In seizing an Israeli El Al Boeing 707 aircraft in flight outside the air space of any country the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine was exercising a legitimate right to which the Palestinian resistance movement regards itself as entitled, and the exercise of which, in the service of a sacred cause of liberation, is regarded as legitimate by all recognised international legislation.

The Israeli company El Al and its pilots have been performing military duties that place it outside the category of normal civilian companies, and make it a natural target for the activities of Palestinian commandos.

Zionist quarters and pro-Zionist sympathisers are trying their best to disregard this point, and to stress that El Al planes operate within the limits of civil aviation only. This is an entirely false claim.

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, which is concerned to make this point absolutely clear, places at the disposal of Arab and world information media and of the delegation of the International Aviation Federation which is visiting Algeria, the following documents, which prove beyond all doubt the hostile and aggressive nature of the El Al company and its pilots:

First: On page 14 of its issue of January 1968 (Vol. 23 No. 1) *Flying Review*, which deals with international aviation affairs, states that:

"The role played by El Al during the June War shows how quickly a commercial aircraft can be converted to meet military requirements. . . Many of the El Al pilots were in reality air force reserve pilots who were immediately transferred to "Fouga-Magister" planes, and when the war broke out they flew on military strike missions. El Al actually lost four of its pilots during raids carried out by Israeli "Mystère" planes in the June War."²

This publication also confirmed that:

"El Al has undertaken the transport of military shipments to Israel, and it has been stated that El Al planes have transported military equipment for the Israeli Air Force from the airports of the French Dessault company."

Second: The following appeared in *Foreign Report*, issued secretly by the British weekly *The Economist*, on July 13, 1967:

"On the night of May 29 observers at a small airport near Bordeaux noticed Israeli Boeing-B 720 aircraft loading infra-red interceptor equipment, "Matra 550-551 missiles." Israel sources later admitted that this equipment had been effective in the surprise attack on Mig planes and other equipment on the ground and had allowed the Israeli missiles to hit their targets with deadly precision."

Third: In its issue of June 22, 1967 the London magazine *Flight International* (No. 3041, p. 1035) stated:

"Israel feels that she has been abandoned by her former friends, in spite of the five Boeing 707 planes which transported spare parts from the Dessault plant and which flew out of Bordeaux before the war broke out."

Fourth: On page 3 of its issue No. 949, issued on June 17 1967, the French weekly *Paris-Match* stated that:

"At 10 p.m. on the night of May 29 1967 three Boeing—B707 aircraft of the Israeli airline "El Al" landed at Bordeaux airport. These are Boeings which normally transport passengers, but after certain changes have been made each of these planes can carry 30 tons of cargo. At dawn on May 30 two of the El Al Boeings took off from the airport, after having remained there for six hours. The third plane took off a short while later, with full loads in the passenger space as well as the cargo space. Close up photographs were taken of these planes. One of the pictures clearly shows the outlines of missile containers covered with netting. People in Bordeaux are asking if this is electronic equipment from Dessault, and cannot help thinking of a nearby factory that manufactures engines with infra-red interception equipment. Otherwise, why should the Israeli planes have arrived in Bordeaux for loading? Four days later the Israelis announced that the

¹ *Al-Anwar* (Beirut), 30/7/1968.

² This quotation and the following ones are translated from *Al-Anwar's* Arabic translation. (Ed.)

"Matra 550 and 551" had replaced the "Matra 530" which is normally fitted on Mirage and Mystère fighters".

This evidence proves beyond all shadow of doubt the military and aggressive nature of Israeli El Al planes and pilots, and places the planes and the pilots of El Al outside the category of civil aviation, and consequently entitles the Palestinian armed struggle to regard these planes as a target for its operations directed against the Israeli war effort. In publishing these documents, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine is aware that there are very numerous other documents which prove that the Arabs have a clear and indisputable right to hold the plane and its passengers as spoils of war. The Front therefore reaffirms that the plane has become the property of the Palestinian people and of the sacred cause of liberation for which they are fighting against an enemy who has for twenty years continued undeterred to flout the most elementary principles of law and humanity, and that the passengers of the captured plane will be held as prisoners of war as surety for all the commando prisoners in occupied Palestine.

In placing this evidence at the disposal of the Algerian government and of the delegation of the International Aviation Federation, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine reaffirms its determination to continue its struggle against the enemy everywhere and strike at him wherever he may be.

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Statement by the Communist and Workers' Parties in the Arab Countries on the Urgent Tasks of the Arab National Liberation Movement.¹ [Excerpts]

July 1968

What happened in the Middle East was essentially a confrontation between the forces of imperialism, which were attempting to destroy the Arab national liberation movement, and Arab

forces of independence, democracy and progress, which were striving to defend their existence, increase the gains of the Arab peoples, liquidate the remaining imperialist positions in their territories and recover their plundered resources.

In addition to the organic and historical link between Zionism and imperialism, Israel's own ambitions of achieving regional expansion, creating a "greater Israel" at the expense of the Jordanian entity, the Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights and other parts of the neighbouring Arab countries, and solving the Palestinian problem to her own advantage and to the disadvantage of Palestinian Arab people and all the Arab peoples—all these Israeli ambitions are in line with the imperialist plot. By her aggression in June 1967 and by the policy she is now following, Israel has once again confirmed her aggressive nature and the fact that she is an instrument in the service of imperialism, as has been the case throughout her history. In 1948, not satisfied with the territory she had acquired under the 1947 United Nations Partition resolution, she seized by aggression and violence other vast areas of Palestine, evicting about one million of the Arab population from their homes and lands. Those Arabs who stayed in their homeland became victims of persecution and discrimination. They are being treated like the coloured people in South Africa...

The Consequences of the Aggression and the Failure of the Aggression Plan:

Despite the fact that imperialist Israeli aggression has led to grave negative results for the Arab countries, where new large areas of Arab lands fell into the grip of the invaders, where severe blows were dealt to Arab armies, and where vast material and moral losses were incurred by the Arab countries, leading to the emergence of economic and social problems, the aggressors have not achieved the main goal of their aggression: the downfall of the progressive regimes. The vital factor in this has been the major role played by the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries in curbing the arrogance of the aggressors. This role was clear to the popular Arab masses from the start, despite all the efforts of imperialist, Zionist and reactionary information media to distort and misrepresent it. The tre-

¹ *Al-Akhbar* (Beirut), 4/8/1968.

menhous upsurge of the masses against Zionism and imperialism also played a crucial role in maintaining the progressive regimes and checking the attempts of the forces of reaction, especially in the United Arab Republic, to introduce changes in the system of government and its domestic and foreign policies to the advantage of imperialism and its agents.

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A Year's Achievements: the Isolation of Israel and Arab Endurance:

The rulers of Israel and their imperialist masters thought that the military victory they had achieved would be followed by victories in other fields. However, their dreams soon faded. For the setback, which came as such a bitter disappointment to the Arab peoples, and which has been and is still being used by their enemies to drive these peoples to despair, has not only failed to break their will but has increased their determination to resist and endure, and to fight until the consequences of the aggression are eliminated.

In the occupied territories all efforts by the Israeli rulers to evict Arab citizens as they did in 1948, and to create a widespread tendency to surrender, are failing, as are the violence and persecution which they are employing to prevent the expansion and escalation of popular resistance to the invasion and the occupation. This resistance is becoming more highly organised under the leadership of the National Front, to whose activities the Jordanian Communist party is effectively contributing. Every attempt to destroy this resistance will meet with failure, for it is the resistance of a people whose land has been usurped and who are now resorting to their legitimate right to use all the means available to them, in conformity with the needs of the present situation, to resist the invaders who have occupied their country and to liberate their homeland.

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Two Serious Trends in the Arab National Liberation Movement:

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The setback and its effects constituted a new and important factor in the process of political

and social differentiation in the Arab world. In the context of this process two serious trends have emerged in the progressive national movement. The success of either of them will lead to the miscarriage of the popular movement and the obliteration of its progressive national and social aims.

The first of these two serious trends is the adventurist emotional trend advocated by nationalist and progressive elements in the petty bourgeoisie. Appalled by the setback, these elements lost their clear vision of the future, because they are not supported by a scientific theory of social development and of the disintegration of their political systems, and because of their lack of confidence in the strength of the masses and their revolutionary activity. They therefore started using slogans advocating organised mass struggle, and calling for the use of one method of struggle in the place of the broad political struggle employing all forms and methods of struggle. Certain suspect circles, deeply imbued in reaction, are giving material and moral encouragement to this adventurist trend, in the hope of frustrating the sound development of the movement of mass struggle. The Maoist faction is making every effort to foster this dangerous adventurist trend.

But this trend, although the nationalist slogans which inspire the vast majority of its supporters can be appreciated, does not take into consideration, as it should, the battle which imperialism and Israel are fighting against all the Arab peoples, or accord the Palestine problem the prominent position in the context of this battle that it is entitled to. Therefore, to advocate the isolation of the Palestinian problem from the movement of Arab national liberation as a whole, as do certain supporters of this adventurist trend, is not right, either from the point of view of the general interests of the national revolutionary movement in the Arab world or from that of the Palestine problem itself. Consequently, the slogans advocating that the struggle be restricted to the Palestinians on the pretext that Palestinian movements must be "independent" and reject all forms of "tutelage", are also wrong. For the Palestine problem, although it is of primary concern to the Palestinian Arabs, also concerns all the Arab peoples, and it is part of their common

struggle against imperialism and Zionism.

On the other hand, by insisting on one form of struggle and one method of fighting to the exclusion of all others, and by refusing to take a realistic view of circumstances and of the present ratio of forces especially since the setback, this trend is giving the imperialists, the rulers of Israel and the agents of reaction the opportunity of destroying the progressive regimes and striking at the whole Arab national liberation movement after it has been saved by the awareness and the struggle of masses, world support and the material and political backing of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. The period that has passed since the June 1967 aggression has shown that the forms and methods of political struggle have not only not been exhausted, but that they have achieved and are still capable of achieving many advantages for the Arab national liberation movement, either through the economic and military support of the progressive regimes, or through the isolation of Israel and her protectors at international level and gaining the support of the widest possible circle of democratic world opinion for the just causes of the Arabs.

The second of the two serious trends is the rightist trend towards surrender which, on the pretext of safeguarding the "national entity", calls for a halt to the measures that have been taken, or that are liable to be injurious to the "national entity" if the United Arab Republic and Syria continue to follow this course. The supporters of this rightist trend try to obscure the fact that the national duties, including the duty to eliminate the consequence of aggression, and the social duties of the contemporary Arab national liberation movement, are two aspects of one revolutionary process, and that any attempt to prevent the achievement of the tasks of either is liable to lead to the destruction of the entire revolutionary movement.

This trend tries to justify an understanding with American imperialism and bargaining with it, on the pretext that the key to the solution of the Middle East crisis lies in the hands of the United States. This trend also involves attempts to vindicate the aggressive and hostile policy of West Germany, Britain and the United States vis-à-vis the Arab peoples and their various forms

of national, political and military aid to Israel.

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*Tasks of the Nationalist and Progressive Forces;
Elimination of the Consequences of Aggression, Protection
of the Progressive Regimes and Developing the Arab
Liberation Movement:*

In the light of all these facts, the Communist and Workers' Parties in the Arab countries believe that it is possible to define both the immediate and long-range tasks of all genuine national and progressive forces as follows:

The elimination of the consequences of aggression requires:

1. Intensification of the struggle against imperialism and Zionism in all political and economic fields, by destroying imperialism's economic, political and strategic bases...

2. Struggle to implement the United Nations Security Council resolution adopted on November 22, 1967, since this is an important step towards settling the Middle East conflict and achieving a just peace which will safeguard Arab rights in Palestine, including the rights of the refugees.

3. Exposing the crimes committed by Israel in the occupied Arab territories with the encouragement of American imperialism, against the peaceable civilian population, disclosing the aggressive intentions which still impel the Zionist rulers to continue in their policy of expansion at the expense of the territories of Arab countries, and, finally appealing to democratic world opinion to cooperate more closely with the Arab peoples in forcing Israel and her masters to retreat and to implement the United Nations resolutions on withdrawal from territories occupied in the June 5 aggression.

4. Enabling the popular masses, particularly the working classes, to perform their role and meet their responsibilities in the battle, abolishing all restrictions which fetter their democratic and trade union freedoms, and providing all nationalist and progressive forces, without distinction, with opportunities to engage in political activity and organised action to mobilise the popular forces and direct them towards the struggle to eliminate the consequences of aggression.

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5. Strengthening relations to the greatest extent possible, in all political, economic, cultural and military fields, with the Soviet Union, which has restored the military capacity of the progressive Arab countries and made up all the losses they incurred, and fostering friendly ties with the other socialist countries. . . .

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Interview with Yasser Arafat Spokesman of the Palestine National Liberation Movement "Fateh".¹ [Excerpt]

August 1968

Q.—One view, however, is that the physical geography of Palestine differs from that of Vietnam and from that of Algeria.

A.—This is a sound view from the strategic aspect, and those who express such a view are right. But is Israel like America? Is it possible for her to withstand resistance for long? Does she have the potentials and resources which are so abundant in America, for example? In spite of this, America is up to her neck in Vietnam. In the final analysis every struggle has its own particular circumstances, its own geographical setting and its own men. Revolutions do not imitate one another, but they have the same spirit and should benefit from one another's experiences and get acquainted with each other's methods.

Q.—Another point of view is that commando action is limited in extent and ends when its task is completed.

A.—Who said that our work is confined to commando action alone? Commando action is part of our overall task. It must be understood that *Fateh* is a revolutionary movement before being a commando organisation. The stress on commando action, in present circumstances, however, is due to our belief that fighting and

resistance will induce the popular overall revolution. It must also be understood that Palestine was lost by blood and iron, and that it can only be recovered by blood and iron; and blood and iron have nothing to do with philosophies and theories. We are not a mere handful of commandos—as our enemies imagine—we are the vanguard of a people in revolt against tents, against ration-cards, against the loss of twenty years.

Q.—Are not the Palestinian people responsible for this to a certain extent, and for the stagnation that has beset the cause during all this time?

A.—No! No! The Palestinian people have never neglected their cause. If armed resistance only emerged during the three years before the events of June 5, and embarked on positive action only after the setback, this does not mean that it did not exist earlier or that it was inactive. On the contrary, resistance was carried on by the Palestinian Arabs inside Israel, but in an organised manner. We must also take into account how relentless was the dispersion and how brutal the disaster. Nor was it a simple or easy matter for thousands of people dispersed in a large number of localities to reach unanimous agreement. But in spite of this the setback has established that the Palestinian people in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip are far from being unconscious, and a new generation, a generation of sacrifice, has emerged to confront the generation of patience and endurance which lives under occupation.

Q.—Are not the losses of the resistance remarkably high in view of the long time required for the struggle? To what extent is it possible to make up for these losses?

A.—I say this frankly—so far we have been ashamed to give the numbers of our dead—we think that we have not yet given anything to the cause. We expect greater sacrifices and more losses; without them we cannot liberate our land. The nature of the struggle makes it inevitable that, at a certain stage, the problem should be a regional one. But we are not alone in the field; we are an extension of the hundred million Arabs and we consider ourselves the vanguard of the Arab struggle for liberation. No matter what the figures of probable and expected losses, they will be nothing compared with the great goal. Take an example: in resuming commando action after

¹ *Al-Anwar* (Beirut), 2/8/1968. The interview with Mr. Yasser Arafat was conducted by a representative of the Egyptian weekly *Akher Sa'a* at a commando position.

June 5 we employed our best combat commands. Later on, moreover, sound planning of the movement selected new cadres capable of continuing the struggle and broadening the Palestinian resistance.

Q.—I have heard the contents of Communiqué No. 113 being repeated by members of Al-Asifa. Does it have any special meaning?

A.—This communiqué could become a significant turning point in Palestinian commando action—it is the communiqué announcing the death of the Lebanese commando Khalil al-Jamal—because it means that all Arabs share in the responsibility for the battle and that commando action is open to all Arab youth, even through existing circumstances make it necessary that such action be confined at present to Palestinians only so that Israel may not attack surrounding Arab countries under the pretext of striking at the bases of the Palestinian resistance.

Here I should like to make another important point. Most of the courageous operations which are carried out inside the occupied territory are undertaken by men of the internal resistance. The blowing up of the Dodge car factory, for example, was carried out by Palestinians who never left Palestine. After the operation of striking the rear of the military parade on May 2, Ramallah was punished because the commandos who carried out the operation were from there. The objective we must eventually achieve is the transfer of all resistance bases inside occupied territory, so that the resistance may be gradually transformed into a popular armed revolution. Some people have expressed the view that whenever we blow up an Israeli factory, they in return blow up an entire Arab village, forcing the people to leave and depart from their land, so that the operation must, in fact, be regarded as a loss. My answer to this is that in the revolutions of nations there is a balance of losses and gains. But what is important is survival, existence and the recovery of rights. Compared with this everything else is insignificant. The loss of money and possessions is nothing as compared with the loss of lives.

Q.—How does future action look to the Resistance? What is likely to happen?

A.—It is the commandos who will decide the future, taking as their starting point the path of glory towards the future state. This is because the commandos, in my opinion, are the real source of the strength of the nation and its revolutionary being. Emphasis on persons is of no use in the stage of struggle, if the revolution is not to lose its revolutionary effectiveness, its capability for renewal and its real impact. From the point of view of commando action, armed resistance in the occupied territory must escalate so that Israel may not enjoy quiet and stability, so that her population may not feel secure. Resistance is legitimate and has been practised by all peoples—in the past—against Nazi and Fascist occupation.

Q.—What is the attitude of the Movement towards the various proposals that have been made about the problem?

A.—Naturally, it rejects all proposals involving surrender, for we have not lost the war, but only the battle of June 5. If we go back to the history of our struggle in this area, what do we find? Our ancestors fought the crusaders for a hundred years, and later Ottoman imperialism, then British and French imperialism for years and years. It is our duty to take over the banner of struggle from them and hand it on untarnished and flying as proudly as ever to the generations that come after us. We shall never commit a crime against them, the crime of permitting the existence of a racist state in the heart of the Arab world. Shall we pass on this blemish to our children?

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Monthly Report on Palestinian Displaced Persons in Jordan During June and July 1968.¹ [Excerpts]

Amman, August 3, 1968

The Israeli authorities are still evicting people across the river Jordan in increasingly large numbers, as part of a deliberate organised plan

¹ Archives of the Institute for Palestine Studies. The report was prepared by the Jordanian Higher Ministerial Committee for Relief. See also *ante*, docs. 323,349.

aimed at evacuating the occupied Arab territories of their inhabitants.

In the month of June this year 1814 persons left for the East Bank, 127 from the West Bank, 1556 from the Gaza Strip, and 131 from Al-Arish. In the month of July 2949 persons left for the East Bank; 301 from the West Bank, 2560 from the Gaza Strip, and 88 from Al-Arish.

The continued emigration of such large numbers fourteen months after the June War clearly indicates Israel's intentions and her long-term expansionist plans which are being implemented by local military governors.

It is clear from the statements of these displaced persons that they were forced to leave after the Israeli military authorities had warned them that they must leave for the East Bank. Some of them were given no more than a few hours to leave their homes, after which they were transported by trucks made available by these authorities. They were given no choice.

The Israeli military authorities are resorting to methods of brutal oppression and torture, and to punishments, such as the blowing up of houses and the sealing off of camps and villages to starve and terrorise their inhabitants, the object being to force the population of the occupied Arab territories to leave. The Israeli authorities have repeatedly announced that they have carried out such retaliatory measures against civilians, utterly regardless of the fact that these measures violate the Geneva Convention, which was originally drafted to protect the European Jews from the persecution and annihilation involved in the policy of the "final solution", which the Nazi authorities adopted and which is now being adopted by the Israeli authorities themselves against the Arabs of the occupied areas.

The Jordanian government and people are watching with concern and anxiety the continued influx of hundreds of refugees across the river Jordan. The situation has been aggravated by reliable reports recently received of the Israeli military authorities' decision to evict the 50,000 inhabitants of the Jabaliya Camp in Gaza to the East Bank.

The Jordanian government has taken all necessary measures at international and local levels to counter the Israeli policy of eviction and to prevent the uprooting of the population of the

occupied territories. These resolute steps, which have expressed the will of our brethren who are standing fast in the face of occupation in the Gaza Strip, have received the full support and appreciation of our people, the refugees and the other Arab countries.

Jordan has repeatedly drawn the attention of the Great Powers to the grave consequences of Israel's policy of eviction. We hope that these countries will face up to their moral obligations and foil this criminal policy. We also hope that the United Nations will send an envoy to investigate the conditions of civilians suffering under the terror of Israeli occupation. But it must be borne in mind that it is the duty of the Arab population to resist, rather than any other institution.

Return of Displaced Persons

No noticeable progress has been made towards the implementation of the United Nations Security Council resolution of June 14, 1967,¹ which urges the Israeli government to ensure the safety and security of the population of the territories which were the scene of military operations, and to facilitate the return of displaced persons to the places they left. It is regrettable that this unanimous United Nations resolution should remain unimplemented to this day. The moral responsibility rests, in the first degree, with the Israeli authorities, and also with the Great Powers, which have not so far made sufficient efforts to ensure the implementation of this United Nations resolution.

Social Conditions of the Displaced Persons

The displaced persons are still living in inhuman conditions despite all the efforts that have been made to alleviate their sufferings by providing them with increased social services.

Human misery may be more evident in the camps than in towns and villages. In fact, however, the displaced persons who live outside the camps have to cope with housing, social and economic problems no less severe than those of the refugees who live in tents.

The services that have been offered to the refugees so far have not been adequate. There

U.N. doc. S/RES/237, text in *International Documents on Palestine, 1967*, p. 251.

are still many problems to which full attention and consideration are being given by the Ministerial Committee which is trying to solve them, as far as available means permit, and in cooperation with international agencies and welfare organisations.

The most urgent problem that requires an immediate solution is that of the worn-out tents in which the displaced persons are living. They protect them neither from the heat of summer nor from the cold of winter. Moreover, these tents are overcrowded. Sometimes there is more than one family and more than one generation living in a single tent, with all the social and psychological problems and dangers inherent in such conditions.

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Another urgent requirement is aid for mothers who lost their husbands during the War, for they and their children no longer have any means of support. These families are in need of more than merely ordinary monthly rations, which only provide for food and do not meet other basic needs.

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Statement by the Iraqi Foreign Minister Al-Shaikhli on the Palestine Problem.¹
[Excerpts]

Baghdad, August 8, 1968

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Iraq abides by the resolutions of the Arab Summit Conferences, in particular the resolutions of the Arab Summit Conference in Khartum,² regarding these as the absolute minimum for joint Arab action as regards the Palestinian problem. Iraq also insists on the withdrawal of the Israeli occupation forces from the Arab territories which they occupied after June 5, 1967, within the framework of the basic principles adhered to by the Arab governments, which are:

No peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel and no negotiations with Israel. The Arab governments have also resolved to uphold the right of the Palestinian Arab people to their homeland and to reject any United Nations resolution or any attempt by a foreign country which conflicts with the resolutions of the Khartum Conference.

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The revolutionary government supports and backs the Arab commando action being carried out by our Palestinian brethren, on the grounds that such action is a legitimate right and a sacred national duty, in performing which the Palestinians are defending their existence, their nation and their homeland. In this connection, Iraq affirms the necessity for united commando action and for such united action on the battlefield itself.

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The revolutionary government determines its attitude to the countries of the world in the light of their attitudes to the Palestine problem, and affirms that the understanding shown by these countries of Arab problems constitutes the principal basis for the establishment of close relations with Iraq.

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The revolutionary government also stresses the importance of its relations with France, and welcomes the wise and independent policy followed by General de Gaulle, which has won the respect and appreciation of the Arab nation and of all peace-loving nations throughout the world. The revolutionary government also appreciates the stand of India, Spain and Greece in support of the just Arab cause. It also hopes that the Western countries will come to understand the Arab point of view and resist the pressure applied on them from Zionist quarters. We do not intend to restore diplomatic relations with the United States because she is continuing in her policy of hostility to the Palestinian people and the Arab countries and continuing to supply the aggressor, Israel, with material and moral support.

¹ *Al-Jumhuriyya* (Baghdad), 9/8/1968.
² See *International Documents on Palestine, 1967*, pp. 655-657.

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Replies by the Syrian President Al-Atasi to a Question on the Peaceful Settlement of the Middle East Problem.¹ [Excerpts]

Damascus, August 10, 1968

Q.—Mr. President, Syria has rejected the Security Council resolution. Attempts are at present being made to find a political settlement of the Middle East problem, but Syria has refused to receive the United Nations envoy, Dr. Jarring. What then is the solution of the Middle East crisis in terms of a political and military solution? Are you pessimistic, Mr. President?

*A.—*What happened on June 5 was clear and naked aggression. There was occupation of new territories by the use of force and various inhuman methods as well as by the use of destructive weapons such as napalm.

What happened on June 5 should have been met at the United Nations by a denunciation of the use of force to occupy territory, of the use of such weapons, and of the Nazi methods employed by the Zionist base in Arab territory, as called for in the United Nations Charter. This is the response that should have come from the United Nations, which was created in the aftermath of the victory over Nazism to confirm the right of peoples to live in peace and security in their own lands...

We have therefore rejected the British draft resolution because it does not condemn aggression and because it encourages aggression and compensates the aggressor. This is why we have also refused to receive Jarring, the United Nations envoy, for we realise, from the experience of our political struggle, that this course will not give our Arab people what they want. We also believe that this method will serve Zionist aggression and give the Zionist bases an opportunity to prepare for new aggression and consolidate its efforts in the occupied territory.

¹ *Al-Thawra* (Damascus), 11/8/1968. President Nur al-Din al-Atasi was questioned by the delegations of the International Labour Press Seminar which opened in Cairo on August 5, 1968.

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Statement by the Palestine National Liberation Movement, "Fateh", on the Stationing of U.N. Forces Along the Cease-fire Lines.² [Excerpts]

August 14, 1968

...Certain American imperialist sources are suggesting that United Nations forces should be stationed on the cease-fire lines, especially on the Eastern Front. This new American conspiracy is similar to all previous American conspiracies which the United States has implemented to protect the Zionist imperialist base in our occupied land...

In view of this plot, an important question arises. This question is: What is the attitude of the Palestinian revolutionaries and all the soldiers of the Arab nation to this American conspiracy which is being hatched by American imperialism? The attitude of the Palestinian Revolution to this conspiracy is the same as its attitude to all imperialist projects that are dressed up in United Nations clothing. Its attitude to this conspiracy is part of its attitude to the British resolution and the United Nations envoy...

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Petition by West Bank Lawyers and Judges to the Israeli Premier Eshkol Protesting Against the Draft "Legal and Administrative Matters (Regulation)" Law of 1968.³

August 15, 1968

On 27/6/67 the Israeli Parliament enacted an Amendment No. 11/67 to the Law and Administration Ordinance which provided, *inter alia*, that Israeli administration and judgments should apply to all Israeli territory. On 28/6/67 the Minister of the Interior promulgated an order

² *Al-Jumhuriyya* (Baghdad), 15/8/1968.

³ Archives of the Institute for Palestine Studies. See also *post*, doc. 386.

entailing the extension of the Jerusalem municipal boundaries, whereby the Arab sector of Jerusalem and all its suburbs were annexed to Israel, in contravention of the rules of international law, the provisions of the United Nations Charter, the 1949 Geneva Convention, and the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly and the Security Council since June 1967. The Israeli authorities have further unlawfully closed down Arab courts in Jerusalem, expropriated Arab property, driven away Arab nationals from their homes and settled Israeli nationals in Arab housing, thereby violating international law and custom.

A few days ago it was brought to the attention of the Arab inhabitants of Jerusalem that the Israeli Minister of Justice had submitted to Parliament a draft of a Legal and Administrative Matters (Regulation) Law of 1968. This draft law, which is an attempt to absorb the Arab population and all the city's institutions, confirms the earlier territorial annexation, with the intention of making it applicable to the Arabs of Jerusalem now living under military occupation, against their will and in violation of the Geneva Conventions, the United Nations Charter and United Nations resolutions relating to Jerusalem.¹

The Arab population of Jerusalem, including members of the judiciary and the legal profession, oppose the enactment of this law for the following reasons:

a) Because the annexation of Arab Jerusalem is unlawful, lacks support in international law and contravenes the provisions of the United Nations Charter which prohibits the use of force in international relations, the threat of force and the resort to conquest as a means of acquiring territories in international law.

b) It is a fundamental rule of international law that the will of the people in an occupied region should be respected. Our people had previously practised their right of self-determination by proclaiming that they were part of Jordan and the Arab homeland. Obviously the annexation of Arab Jerusalem to Israel was not carried out with the consent of its Arab population; on

the contrary, it was against their free and legitimate choice.

c) The bill in question is based on an enactment which is invalid and anything that rests on an invalid basis is itself invalid.

d) The said bill aims at the dissolution of the Arab population of Jerusalem by compelling all professional associations (lawyers, engineers, physicians etc.), firms and institutions to amalgamate, against their will, with their Israeli counterparts.

e) Because the enactment of such a law entails a flagrant breach of the General Assembly and Security Council resolutions invalidating Israeli measures taken in respect of Jerusalem, and an undisguised violation of the territory of a member state of the United Nations.

In view of the above, the judges and lawyers of the West Bank, including those of Jerusalem, demand the following:

1) That the above-mentioned bill be withdrawn from the Israeli Parliament, and that no similar legislation liable to infringe the rights of the Arab population of Jerusalem and the West Bank be enacted.

2) That the Arab courts in Jerusalem be re-opened so that Arab judges and lawyers may exercise their functions under the legal system in force before the occupation; also that all other Arab government departments which the Israeli authorities have closed down in violation of the Geneva Conventions and international law be reopened.

3) That international law and custom and United Nations resolutions on the rights of the Arab population in the occupied territories be respected.

Signed:

Husni al-Jayyusi (Public Prosecutor-West Bank), Rashed al-Jayyusi (President of Court of First Instance-Nablus), Istawri Da'dush, (Judge of Arbitration Tribunal-West Bank), Walid Tuqan (Assistant Public Prosecutor), Kazem Abu Ghazala (Judge, Court of First Instance) Said Abu Suwai (Judge of the Peace), Zuhair Murad (Jerusalem Public Prosecutor)

Lawyers:

Jiriyis Khuri; Falah al-Madi; Husain al-Jagh-

¹ U.N. docs. A/RES/2253 and 2254 (ES-V), July 4 and 14, 1967, respectively, texts in *International Documents on Palestine, 1967*, pp. 256, 260. See also *ante*, doc. 238.

ub; Mustafa Auda; Abd al-Rahman Hammad; Zuhdi al-Hashwa; Hafez Tahbub; Jaudi Shahwan; Jamil Habibi; Abu al-Muhsin Abu Maizar; Yusif Takruri; Isam al-Anani; Abdullah Abu Id; Hashem Khalil Isa; Zahi Marmish Adi; Hisham Shahin; Adnan al-Bakri; Bashir al-Shairi; Walid al-Asali; Ghiyath al-Khairi; Sharif Ali; Sa'id al-Husaini; Muhammad al-Ayyubi; Isa Abu al-Hawa; Zakariya Abdin; Basem al-Ghadban; Bahij al-Tamimi; Mitri Abu Aira; Zaidan al-Jailani; Mahmoud Shaikh Yasin; Taisir al-Nabulsi; Muhammad Hejazi.

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Statement by the Islamic Association in Jerusalem on the Shari'a Judicature and Islamic Waqfs.¹

Jerusalem, August 19, 1968

In spite of repeated protests, and of many denunciations of measures taken by the occupation authorities involving flagrant interference in the religious affairs of Muslims, their *Waqfs*, institutions and places of worship, the occupation authorities are persisting in these measures and continuing their attempts to exert pressure on Muslim affairs in Arab Jerusalem and all the other occupied areas in the West Bank of Jordan.

The Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem has been desecrated. One of its main entrances has been seized and the mosque has been opened to elements who have violated the sanctity of this, the first of the two *qiblas* and the third most holy place in Islam. Moreover, the Israeli occupation authorities have forcibly interfered with the Ibrahimi Mosque in Hebron, used it as a synagogue and turned it into a place where visitors conduct themselves utterly regardless of the modesty and decorum due to the sanctity of the shrine and the place it occupies in the hearts of all Muslims.

Islamic *Waqfs*, both in Arab Jerusalem and elsewhere, have been encroached upon. *Waqf* lands and Islamic holy places have been seized.²

Waqf institutions and mosques in Jerusalem and several villages have been entirely demolished and their inhabitants dispersed against their will.

Statements of protest by the Islamic bodies of Jerusalem and other places against this illegal conduct have been ignored.

After all these grave violations of the sanctity of Islamic shrines and *Waqfs*, the "Jaffa Shari'a Court", which was established by the Israeli occupation authorities and is sustained by and ruled according to their wishes, has taken a new illegal step, which constitutes a serious violation of the principles of law, tradition and international custom. It is a barefaced act of aggression against the existence and the jurisdiction of the Jerusalem Shari'a Court, which is entirely incompatible with international law and custom, for the following reasons:

1. This "court" has no legitimate authority, for it violates the Shari'a law both in logic and in context. It derives from a quarter that is not competent to administer the law to Muslims, and its presiding judge has, contrary to Shari'a law, taken an oath of loyalty and allegiance to the supreme head of the authority which appointed him.

2. This "court", because of its illegitimate status in the view of Islamic jurisprudence, has no authority to pass judgement with respect to the affairs of Muslims in Arab Jerusalem or other areas of the occupied West Bank.

3. This "court" is not competent to pass judgement in affairs concerning or lying within the jurisdiction of either the Jerusalem Shari'a Court or any other such court.

4. Interference by this "court" in the judicial and religious affairs of Muslims in Arab Jerusalem is a violation of the Geneva Convention and conflicts with the resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations and of the Security Council,³ which affirm the rejection by all countries in the world of the annexation to Israel of Jordanian Arab Jerusalem, regarding the measures taken by the occupation authorities in this respect as null and void, and as in no way altering the situation that prevailed prior to the occupation.

¹ Archives of the Institute for Palestine Studies.

² See *ante*, docs. 342, 345, 358.

³ U.N. docs. A/RES/2253 and 2254 (ES-V), July 4 and 14, 1967, respectively, texts in *International Documents on Palestine, 1967*, pp. 256, 260. See also *ante*, doc. 238.

5. The attempt by this "court" to grant a status of legitimacy to the illegitimate annexation of occupied Arab Jerusalem is an undisguised attempt to perpetuate illegitimate measures taken by the Israeli occupation authorities, such as annexation, expansion and interference in the affairs of Muslims, their legitimate right to administer them and a violation of the immunity of their judicature. For these reasons, we regard it as a political decision designed to serve the policy of the occupying state and having no connection whatsoever with Islamic Law.

6. The acts of this "court", in violation of the sanctity of Shari'a law and in flagrant contravention of both Islamic and international law and custom, in no way alter the invalidity of the annexation of Arab Jerusalem or whatever may have resulted from this measure, for whatever is based on an invalid act is itself invalid.

In raising its voice once again in denunciation of the repeated and continuous attacks on the judicature, *Waqfs* and places of worship of the Muslims, the Islamic Committee of Jerusalem is of the opinion that the time has come for the whole world to be made aware of these actions. In taking such action, the Committee is only being true to its mission, performing its duty and adhering to the precepts of the Shari'a law, which imposes on all Muslims the duty of declaring their intention of righting a wrong by all possible means. In asserting the determination of Muslims to reject the illegitimate measures of annexation, expansion and intervention in the affairs of the Moslems, the Committee demands that these acts be stopped and that Islamic jurisprudence be respected, Islamic *Waqfs* be safeguarded and the sanctity of Islamic holy sites be respected, and condemns any action incompatible with Shari'a law.

Signed: Shaikh Hilmi al-Muhtaseb; Shaikh Sa'ad al-Din al-Alami, Aref al-Aref, Fuad Abd al-Hadi, Kamal al-Dajani, Umar al-Wa'ri, Abd al-Muhsin Abu Maizar, Ishaq Darwish, Nuhad Abu Gharbiya, Shaikh Sa'id Sabri, Anwar al-Khatib, Shaikh Ali al-Taziz, Dr. Daud al-Husaini, Sa'id Ala' al-Din, Hafez Tahbub, Faq Barakat, Hasan Tahbub.

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Petition by the Representatives of Religious Bodies in the West Bank to the Israeli Military Governor Protesting Against the Treatment of Arab Detainees.¹

August 24, 1968

To the Military Governor of the West Bank,

The accused is innocent until proved guilty, and the same court that finds him guilty sentences him to the penalty he deserves. This is what is prescribed by justice and dictated by conscience.

Ever since the occupation of this country by Israel, large numbers of accused persons have daily been herded into prisons and detention camps. We know for a fact that from the moment they are thrown into these prisons or camps, even before they are interrogated or referred to any court, they are subjected to various forms of torture—persecution, beating and humiliation—in violation of human dignity and of the sanctity of the law. The majority of those taken to detention camps have suffered torture, irrespective of their sex or age. All this has taken place in the hearing and sight of the authorities. Some detainees have as a result suffered permanent disability. In many cases, the court has acquitted them, but only after they had suffered the severest forms of torture and indignity without any justification.

The various forms of odious torture, beating and indignity inflicted on Abia Taha, Sara Jawda, Lutfiya al-Hajj Ibrahim and other inhabitants of Jerusalem, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, before they were taken to any court, provide a few examples of this conduct. We wish to place this on record and to denounce these measures, which are bound to have a disastrous effect and lead to the most undesirable consequences, and at the same time we demand the immediate release of the above-named ladies and others. We demand, moreover, that orders be given to ensure the proper observance of human rights by the stopping of the infliction of injury, beatings and torture.

¹ Archives of the Institute for Palestine Studies.

cc, Gen. Odd Bull, Chief U.N. Observer,
 U Thant, U.N. Secretary-General,
 The Women's World Federation,
 The Head of the International Red Cross Association,
 Geneva,
 The Apostolic Delegate in Jerusalem,
 H.E. the Consul. . .

Signatures :

1. Mustafa Tahbub, Director of Awqaf, Hebron
2. Idris al-Khatib al-Tamimi, Preacher of the Ibrahimi Mosque, Hebron
3. Said Sabri, Qadi, Jerusalem
4. Hilmi al-Muhtaseb, Chief Qadi of the West Bank
5. Archbishop Hilarion Capucci of the Greek Catholic Community
6. Muhamed Sa'id Muhaisen, Qadi, Ramallah
7. Sa'ad al-Din al-Alami, Mufti of Jerusalem
8. Wasfi al-Misri, Shari'a Court
9. Rajab Bayyud al-Tamimi, Qadi, Hebron
10. Wasef Abdu, Qadi, Jenine
11. Minister of the Evangelical and Episcopal Congregation, Jerusalem and Nablus
12. Father Isa al-Khuri, Greek Orthodox Church
13. Father George Haida, Greek Catholic Church

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Petition by Inhabitants of the West Bank to the U.N. Secretary General U Thant Concerning the Demolition of Villages.¹

Ramallah, August 25, 1968

To U Thant, Secretary-General of the United Nations, New York:

Allow us to bring to your notice certain regrettable incidents of which citizens of the West Bank have been the victims, in the hope that we may win your support for our just cause and our legitimate struggle against the forces of the Israeli invasion.

We, the peaceable and unarmed inhabitants of the Latrun villages of Amwas, Yalu and Bait

Nuba, where no battles or fighting took place, were forced to evacuate our villages after the aggression of June 5 [1967]. The tragedy began as follows:

The occupation forces ordered us to evacuate our homes and villages in the early hours of the morning, without allowing us even a few minutes to supply ourselves with provisions for the road, if only for small children.

We were forbidden to take any blankets or other covers, or foodstuffs for our children. We tried to argue with the invasion forces about this arbitrary order but they absolutely refused to discuss it. All of us—men, women and children—had to abandon our land with the utmost speed, without being allowed a last glance at our land and our homes that were gradually receding in the distance—the villages we had inherited from generation to generation. Our party travelled on foot, followed by enemy tanks.

The long and wearisome march left its mark on us; we were exhausted, our feet in particular, which were bleeding from the rough stony road. The men had to carry their small children—who were unable to continue on foot—on their shoulders, lest they fall behind.

It was a sad journey, made even more heart-breaking by the cries of hungry and thirsty children—our own children at their mothers' breasts. But the cries of these innocents failed to evoke the sympathy of the invaders riding behind us in their military vehicles. The older people, unable to continue this march of persecuted humanity, were compelled to fall behind the exodus procession, and collapsed, overcome by thirst and fatigue.

Just before the procession of emigrants reached Ramallah, the occupation forces ordered us to stop. By then we were completely exhausted. They picked out the young men whom they suspected of belonging to the Arab army and cruelly beat them in front of us. They were then blindfolded and led away to detention camps. We still do not know what has happened to them.

At last we reached Ramallah, where every one of us had to find his own means of livelihood, without any help.

During our stay in Ramallah—which began on June 14, 1967, after the ceasefire decision had been announced and accepted by the contending

¹ Archives of the Institute for Palestine Studies.

parties—the occupation forces were busily occupied in blowing up our homes which we had left behind us—those homes which 10,000 Arabs had lived in and owned and which had been handed down from father to son for generation after generation.

Neither places of worship—mosques—nor educational institutions—schools—were spared by the destructive hand of the enemy.

Many of the old people who refused to leave the villages met their death in the rubble that fell upon them, and their death constitutes a crime against humanity, without a single voice being raised to denounce it.

UNRWA attended to our needs at first, but the enemy authorities ordered it to discontinue its assistance, hitherto our only means of sustenance, and UNRWA obeyed the order.

Those of us who were optimistic thought that the reason for this prohibition was that the occupation forces meant to attend to our needs themselves after they had committed their ugly crime against us.

Months passed by, however, without any assistance being offered to us from any quarter.

And now: the time has come for this fearful butchery to be exposed to all, and for all liberal-minded peoples to be informed of a crime which resulted in the demolition of three villages, and their inhabitants being turned into a group of miserable paupers with no one being allowed to lend them a helping hand.

Moreover, the occupation forces prevented the inhabitants of the three villages from returning to harvest their crops, on which they depend for food and sustenance.

The occupation forces believed that we would have no alternative, having lost our land and the means of our livelihood, but to surrender our land and sell it to them.

The occupation forces were willing to offer tempting material compensations if we declared that we were ready to relinquish our lands and sign deeds renouncing our ownership.

But our only desire is to go back to our homes. We are prepared to live among the ruins of our houses until we can rebuild them. We shall accept no less nor agree to anything but the granting of this request.

We shall never yield to the enemy's stratagems, for if we surrendered our land, we should be committing a great crime against it.

We are awaiting the dawn of a new day when justice is reinstated, and the persecuted refugee returns to his land and the land of his ancestors. On behalf of those who are groaning under the cruel yoke of the occupation, we call upon your conscience and the conscience of every liberal-minded man to stand by us in this ordeal of ours and to support our legitimate demand that the occupying invader be prevented from committing further crimes against our people and made to refrain from persisting in his crime against us.

Signatures :

Hasan Ahmad Hasan, Dib Hasan Ali, Abd al-Hamid Abu Ghaush, Saleh Muhammad Mustafa, Mahmud Abd al-Rahman, Ahmad Hamad, Muhammad Abd al-Rahim Ahmad, Auda Sulaiman Dib, Musa Ismail Muhammad, Ali Abd al-Aziz Mustafa, Habbas Abd al-Rahim Muhammad, Faris Abd al-Aziz, Musa Muhammad Alayan, Nur Atiyya Ziyad, Khamis Abd al-Latif, Husain Salim Abu Salim, Mustafa Ahmad, Ahmad Nassar, Mahmud Muhammad Ayyad, Jum'a Ahmad Is'id, Da'ud Nuassi, Umar Shehada, Husain Mustafa, Yusuf Mustafa Sa'ada, Abd al-Rahman Abbud, Ahmad al-Shaikh Abd al-Rahman, Tawfiq Shaker, Hasan Nur, Abd al-Karim Abu Abbud, Yusuf Yasin, Mahmud Dib Yusuf, Muhammad Ali Abd al-Qader, Musa Ahmad Husain, Mustafa Mahmud Ibrahim, Musa Ahmad, Mahmud Isa Kailani, Muhammad Mahmud al-Ghula, Ya'qub Haidar, Hasan Ahmad Abu Khalil, Hasan Saleh Ahmad, Isa Ahmad Isa, Mahmud Abd al-Hamid Abu Ghaush, Abd al-Majid Abd al-Rahman, Muhammad Saleh, Khamis Abd al-Rahman, Saleh Yusuf Saleh, Ahmad Umar, Muhammad Isa Kailani, Nuhad Zahir, Hikmat Dib Ali, Ibrahim Ali Hilal, Mahmud Abd al-Aziz, Sa'id Abd al-Aziz al-Ghula, Yusuf Khalil, Ibrahim Haidar Mustafa, Hasan al-Sa'id, Abd al-Aziz Darwish, Ali Umaira.

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Letter From the U.A.R. President Nasser to the 17th Conference of Arab Students in the U.S.A.¹ [Excerpts]

Cairo, August 26, 1968

I do not want, brothers, to draw a bright, rosy picture of the Arab future. You know very well that we do not face Zionism alone, but also the forces of colonialism, which have trodden underfoot all human and moral values and all respected and time-honoured usage in international relations, in order to support, with tyrannical arrogance, their spearhead, Israel, in its repeated aggressions against the Arab nation ever since its existence was imposed upon Arab territory.

If, however, our enemy possesses the power we possess the legitimate right and the determination to recover that right with blood and spirit.

They have dangled the political solution before us, and we have agreed to go along with it, not in the belief that it constitutes the only way to the restoration of our rights, but so that all may realise that we do not advocate war, but peace, that we want to live in peace so as to build up our country and to give the Arab individual the right to live his life as a self-respecting human being, after eliminating all vestiges of subjection and backwardness left in our land by colonialism.

But at the same time, we want this rebuilding to be effected with dignity and in an atmosphere of security, with no enemy at the borders lying in wait to pounce upon us and pull down what we have built.

It is for this that we continue our preparations and our struggle, so that our own efforts may achieve what a peaceful settlement may be incapable of achieving.

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Statement of Basic Policy of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)² [Excerpts]

August 1968

Introduction

Throughout history—ancient, mediaeval and modern—the Palestinian national question has always been linked to the situation in the area surrounding Palestine and to international conflicts. A critical historical glance at the map of the Middle East shows the permanent dialectical relationships between developments in the Palestinian situation and those in the Middle East in general, and the area surrounding Palestine in particular. It is the sum total of these developments that have, throughout history, determined and still determine the destiny of Palestine and that of its struggling people.

At the present stage, which is the gravest and most arduous in the history of the Palestinian national question—to be more precise, since the June 1967 defeat—certain Palestinians and other Arabs, both rightist and leftist, have advocated that the Palestinian resistance movement should be dissociated from events and developments in the Arab area, the slogan they employed being “non-interference in Arab affairs,” which, in the last analysis, has been transformed by the Palestinian resistance movement into “non-interference in Palestinian affairs”.

For what has been taking place in Arab territory is dialectically bound up with the Palestinian question, and the lessons of the 1936 Revolt, of the 1948 disaster, and of the June 1967 defeat still fresh and vivid in our minds. Since June 1967, “Arab affairs” have not been isolated from the Palestinian question, and all that has taken place in Arab countries has directly affected the Palestine problem.

Lessons of the June 1967 Defeat

The June defeat was not only a military

¹ *Al-Ahram* (Cairo), 28/8/1968.

² Archives of the Institute for Palestine Studies.

defeat; it was also a defeat for the whole of the economic, military and ideological class structure of the Palestinian and Arab national liberation movement (official and popular).

Thus the June War was not fought against the reactionary Arab regimes, but against the nationalist regimes and all sections of the Arab and Palestinian liberation movement. Why, then the defeat? And what programme of national action did the nationalist regimes and the Palestinian and Arab national liberation movement adopt for the confrontation of the June defeat?

Because of its class structure the petty bourgeoisie—which fears the masses as much as it fears feudal capitalist concentration—was unable, with its petty bourgeois ideological, political class programme, to “build up a national economy independent of and separated from the world-capitalist market in its development”. As a result, it was unable to sever all its links with neo-colonialism and with world imperialism in general, and with American imperialism in particular.

For these reasons the petty bourgeoisie entrusted the task of protecting the homeland and preparing the country (economically, politically and militarily) for the liberation of Palestine to the regular armies. It refused to arm and train the people and to organise them into a popular militia, thereby translating into concrete everyday fact the theme of “the People’s War of Liberation”—which the petty bourgeoisie so vociferously advocates.

The course adopted by Vietnam and Cuba is the only way in which under-developed countries can triumph and overcome the scientific and technological superiority of imperialism and neo-colonialism. To reject this course inevitably implies choosing the way of continuous retreat before Zionism and neo-colonialism, headed by the United States, enemy No. 1 of under-developed countries throughout Asia, Africa and Latin America.

Throughout the last fifteen months since the June defeat, the Arab governments (nationalist

as well as reactionary) have maintained unaltered their pre-June 1967 attitudes and policies, which resulted in defeat. By so doing, they have condemned themselves to a continuous retreat, a retreat which involved them first in rejecting the Security Council resolution [November 22, 1967], then regarding it as defective and obscure, then stipulating that some of its articles (passage through the Suez Canal in particular) be linked to the Palestinian question as a whole, and, finally, in accepting “the whole of the Security Council resolution unconditionally.”

The Palestinian Resistance Movement and the Palestinian National Question

In the light of day by day experience throughout the fifteen months since June 1967, the following have been the main lines of the resistance movement’s policy:

I – Within the Framework of Arab Relations

The resistance movement cannot be expected to deputise for the national liberation movement in any part of the Arab world in its struggle to solve the problems of national liberation and of the national democratic revolution hostile to colonialism and Zionism and to all Arab forces in league with imperialism. It is, however, the daily duty of the resistance movement, to pass judgement, critically, publicly and concretely for the benefit of the masses, on the attitude of the Arab states and the Arab position vis-à-vis the Palestine problem. It is also the duty of the resistance movement to pass judgement, critically and publicly, on the responsibility of the Arab position vis-à-vis the Palestine problem. If the resistance movement keeps silence about anything related to the Palestine problem, for the benefit of any Arab country, it is guilty of complicity—whether conscious or unconscious is unimportant—in a conspiracy against the Palestine problem.

II – The Question of Palestinian National Unity

The question under consideration is not whether the slogan of "national unity" is to be adopted or not. It is a question of setting this proposition in its proper context at national and political level.

Palestinian national unity is a national political necessity, but what kind of national unity? What is required is the kind of national unity that will lead to successes in the field of liberation and lead the resistance movement along the road to victory by mobilising the Arab masses, arming them and stimulating them to devote their national radical and collective endeavours to the course of long-term resistance—resistance based on the violent confrontation of an enemy who employs the strategy of the rapid strike to achieve a rapid victory.

This unity is the unity of all classes and all political forces under the leadership of the national-revolutionary classes that have borne arms throughout the modern history of Palestine and whose sons have borne arms since June. The recent history of the Palestinian people and the history of peoples' wars of liberation in all underdeveloped countries prove that the class of the poor workers and peasants is the class that is ready to carry arms and fight a long-term war, relying on themselves to repulse the enemies of national liberation—whether imperialists or hirelings.

The Palestinian national unity we want is a unity of "revolutionary fighting forces." With these forces at the head, all class and political forces will fall into line, forming a broad national liberation front, all parts of which will adhere to a programme of national political, military and popular action for the solution of the problems of national liberation and of the national democratic revolution.

A Concentrated Look at "the Present Crisis in the Present Resistance Movement"

The crisis in the Palestinian and Arab national liberation movement is strictly the crisis of the petty bourgeoisie...

The June defeat put the programme of the petty bourgeoisie to the test; the leadership of the petty bourgeoisie was also subjected to a severe test with respect to its reactions to defeat.

As we have seen in this report, when the defeat came, it provided palpable evidence of the failure of the programme of the petty bourgeoisie for the confrontation of the imperialist-Zionist attack and for solving the problems of national liberation in an underdeveloped country in this era, which is the era of colonialism and imperialism.

When it was put to the crucial test of choosing between the Vietnamese and Cuban method for the confrontation of the consequences of the June war... or adopting the alternative course of continuous retreat before the counter-revolutionary forces and the acceptance of the Security Council resolution which involved liquidation, the petty bourgeoisie made the choice that suited its interests and its class, ideological and political privileges...

The Way to National Salvation

... The way to national salvation begins and is linked to:

1. A revolutionary ideology opposed to colonialism, Zionism, reaction and backwardness—a scientific revolutionary ideology (the ideology of the proletariat). The masses must arm themselves with this ideology and rely fundamentally on the more revolutionary and radical classes in society—the classes that have no interest in coming to terms with colonialism, reaction and Zionism, and no interest in retreating—the classes whose only interest lies in bloody struggle. These classes have nothing to lose and everything to gain: their homeland, their country, and real political and economic independence.

2. The arousing without theatrical demagogy of a radical national political consciousness in the masses. Our people are face to face with a modern enemy who is supported and nurtured by the strongest imperialist country—the United States. A scientific political consciousness based

on "a concrete analysis of our concrete situation and that of the enemy" must form the fundamental basis of the relationship between the resistance movement and the masses. The first step towards the arousing of national political consciousness is to demonstrate the reasons for the failure of the Palestinian and Arab national liberation movement, the pattern of which appears in the defeat of the 1936 Revolt at the hands of Palestinian and Arab reaction, in the disaster of 1948, and in the defeat of 1967. The next step is to submit a programme for national salvation and liberation.

3. Rejection of programmes involving surrender and of the infamous Security Council resolution, and insistence on the initiation of a programme for a people's war of liberation, by arming the people and organising them into popular militia units. This will ensure that the war becomes the war of the whole nation, with its regular and popular columns forming a broad front to grapple with Israel and "those behind Israel" (colonialist interests and positions, plus Israel, plus hiring forces and forces allied to colonialism and protecting colonialist interests in our countries.).

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Petition by the Presidents of Municipal Councils and Representatives of Popular Organisations in the West Bank to the Israeli Authorities Protesting Against the Occupation.¹

August 1968

Twenty years have passed since Israel was established on the ruins of the people of Palestine who, leaving their property and belongings behind, were dispersed in various countries of the world. This disaster affected in particular the people of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, who lost most of their property in the occupied territory, while most of the refugees from the lost territory settled in the West Bank and the Gaza

Strip, sharing with their original inhabitants such a living as these territories provided. Scarcely had the inhabitants of the West Bank recovered their breath, scarcely had their economic situation begun to improve after their union with the East Bank, when they were submitted to the shock of the June 1967 occupation, during which they witnessed the slaughter of the innocent, the violation of dignity, torture in prisons and the demolition of houses, contrary to the most elementary principles of humanity. Even the greatest pessimists did not think that the occupation would last more than a few months, for we had seen how colonised people had regained their liberty, how the United Nations had decided to put an end to colonialism and how international law had denied any territorial gains to the aggressor.

Israel then proceeded to annex Arab Jerusalem with its Muslim and Christian holy places, in defiance of the peoples of the world and of United Nations resolutions.²

Only a few days ago a crowd of Jews set upon the peaceful inhabitants of Jerusalem and their property. How can we be confident of our security and our continued presence in our land, now that such intentions have come to light?

Fourteen months have passed, yet there is still a clear determination not to withdraw from the occupied territories, despite the Security Council resolution and despite what the people have suffered in terms of a ruined economy, massive unemployment, the prevention of those working in other places from returning to their homes and belongings, and especially the loss of their liberty.

The population have expressed their rejection of the occupation in all sorts of ways, through peaceful resistance and communiques, and by making their voice heard the world over.

We urgently desire that peace should prevail throughout the land, but in our opinion military aggressions and the slaughter of peaceable civilians stand in the way of its achievement. We assure you, once again, that peace cannot come about unless the occupying forces withdraw from the occupied territory.

² U.N. docs. A/RES/2253 and 2254 (ES-V), July 4 and 14, 1967, respectively, texts in *International Documents on Palestine, 1967*, pp. 256, 260. See also *ante*, doc. 238.

¹ *Al-Dustur* (Amman), 11/9/1968.

We, the undersigned, the Presidents of the Municipal Councils and representatives of popular organisations in the West Bank, have considered it our duty to tell you how the citizens of the occupied territory really feel about the occupation. They see the continuation of this occupation as a new form of colonialism. The greater freedom granted them by the military authorities in their daily life and movements only serve to strengthen their determination to be freed of the hateful occupation that has settled on their land.

In submitting this memorandum, we intend to address an urgent appeal to your government and to the conscience, of the world, announcing our absolute rejection of the occupation. Nothing but its termination will satisfy us, and we demand that we be once more reunited with the East Bank of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

(Signed: the President of the Municipal Council of Nablus, the Deputy Mayor of Jerusalem and the Presidents of the Municipal Councils of Tulkarm, Jenine, Ramallah, al-Bira, Salwad, Bani Zaid, Tubas, Bir Zait, Baituna, Bait Sahur, Dair Diwan, Salfit, Qalqiliya, Anabta, Ya'bud, Araba, Bethlehem, and Jericho. Dr. Hafiz Abd al-Nabi, Hikmat al-Hamawi and Sidqi al-Ja'bari of Hebron, Qadri Tuqan and Hikmat al-Misri of Nablus and Fahmi al-Abushi, of Jenine and Husni al-Jallad of Tulkarm).

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Resolutions Adopted by the Arab League Council at its Fiftieth Regular Session.¹ [Excerpts]

Cairo, September 3, 1968

Resolutions

The Situation in Arab Jerusalem

The League Council,

Having reviewed the serious situation which has arisen as a result of the measures taken by the

Israeli occupation authorities to change the status of Jerusalem, and having noted the defiance by the said authorities of the resolutions on this subject adopted by the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations, and having noted further to what lengths these authorities have gone in their attempts to change the Arab character of the Holy City and in their desecration of the holy places of Islam and Christianity,

Resolves that the governments of the Member States should redouble their efforts to influence all countries and peoples, not to mention international gatherings, with a view to ensuring the rescue of the Holy City from the Zionist peril.

(Resolution 2431/Session 50/Meeting 3—3/9/1968)

Support of the Jordanian Front

The League Council,

Extols the resolute stand of the Jordanian Front against repeated Israeli attacks, and resolves, so that this stand may be safeguarded and reinforced, that the Arab governments should at once contact the Jordanian government with a view to their immediate participation in consolidating the Jordanian front and reinforcing its defence in such a manner as the situation may require and to the utmost of each government's capacity.

(Resolution 2432/Session 50/Meeting 3—3/9/1968)

Support for the Palestinian Resistance

The Council,

Extols the heroic struggle of the Palestinian Arab people in their confrontation of Israeli aggression, and affirms its continued support for this struggle.

(Resolution 2433/Session 50/Meeting 3—3/9/1968)

Follow-up of the Implementation of the Resolution of the Teheran Conference on Human Rights to Appoint a Special Committee for the Investigation of Israel's Violation of Human Rights in the Occupied Territories²

The Council decides to approve the following recommendation of the Political Committee:

¹ Secretariat of the Arab League, *Communiqué and Resolutions of the Arab League Council*, 50th Regular Session, Cairo, September 1-3, 1968.

² *Ante*, doc. 253.

"The Committee recommends the Arab delegations at the United Nations to urge that the United Nations General Assembly should call on the Secretary-General to appoint a committee of five legal experts to investigate acts of violation of human rights in the territories occupied by Israel after the 1967 aggression, in consultation with the specialised and other agencies and after the necessary facilities have been provided for the satisfactory discharge of the task entrusted to the committee, it being understood that the committee shall be guided by the principles contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in international agreements and in United Nations resolutions on the subject.¹ The Council further recommends that the Member States give due consideration to the level of representation in the United Nations Third Committee where the question is to be discussed. (Resolution 2439/Session 50/Meeting 3—3/9/1968)

Report of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA to the UN General Assembly

The Council approves the following recommendation of the Political Committee:

"The Committee recommends that the August 28, 1968 report of the Arab host countries' representatives on the UNRWA Advisory Commission be approved and that it be forwarded together with the recommendations it contains, to the Arab delegations at the United Nations. The text is as follows:

I—In United Nations Circles:

The permanent Arab delegations to the United Nations are to undertake the following:

1. Supervise the enforcement of agreements concluded with the Commissioner-General, as set out in the report.

2. Make collective efforts to ensure that the United Nations Secretary-General takes the necessary measures to make the Israeli occupation authorities submit to the resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly and of the Security Council, and to make known the serious nature of the crimes perpetrated by these authorities in

killing and terrorising the Arab inhabitants, particularly in the Gaza Strip, to force them to leave their lands and homes.

3. Ensure that the Secretary-General intervenes to increase the Great Powers' contributions to meet any deficit in the UNRWA budget.

4. Emphasise that the Palestine problem is the problem of an Arab people that has been forcibly evicted from its homeland by an illegitimate occupation force, and that is fighting for the recovery of its usurped rights and country.

5. Condemn and expose Israeli attempts to minimise the numbers of refugees and displaced persons by presenting incorrect and misleading statistics on the numbers of Arabs in the occupied territory.

6. Ensure that the memorandum submitted to the Commissioner-General for the inclusion of his report on the views of the Arab host countries concerning syllabuses and textbooks, is adopted as a basis for a unified stand by the Arab countries in the international field, and particularly in the specialised agencies of the United Nations.

Recommendation of the Conference of Directors of Palestinian Affairs in the Arab Host Countries, Held in Beirut From 5-10 August, 1968.

The Council resolves to approve the following recommendation of the Political Committee:

The Committee recommends that the following recommendations submitted by the Conference of the Directors of Palestinian Affairs in the Arab host countries held in Beirut from 5-10 August, 1968, be approved.

—Lending Support to the Arab Citizens in the Occupied Territories:

The Conference opened its proceedings with a general discussion, and, during its first meetings heard statements by the heads of delegations on the resolute stand of the Palestinians and all citizens in the Arab areas, despite all the pressure, intimidation and threats of extermination they are being subjected to. The Conference salutes them with admiration and appreciation, and calls upon them to persevere in their determined stand,

¹ See *ante*, docs. 251, 255, 256.

their resistance, and their continued attachment to the Holy Land, urging them to stand up to Israeli provocations with faith in their hearts and with patient spirits until the last consequences of aggression are eliminated and the occupied territories are liberated.

The Conference also took note of the statements on Israel's colonialist policy, the measures carried out by the occupation authorities, and Zionist schemes to force the Arab inhabitants out of the occupied territories, in particular the Gaza Strip. These designs were clearly disclosed in a public statement made by Moshe Dayan on July 5 1968, in which he spoke of the map of Israel and the establishment of model villages, settlement policy, the liquidation of Jabaliya Camp and the expulsion of its refugees to the East Bank of Jordan, and the settlement of Israelis in their place. The Conference also took note of the commendable stand of the Jordanian government in its closure of the bridges to frustrate Israeli attempts.

The Conference recommended the following:

1. That the resolute stand of Arab citizens in the occupied territories be supported and that they be immediately provided with all possible aid, both material and moral, by all Arab countries, particularly those best able to do so, and that the Arab League Secretariat should be entrusted with the task of seeking the best means of securing the assistance required for continued resistance.

—*Forced Emigration of Jordanians and Palestinians on Israeli Laissez-Passers:*

The Conference considered the question of the forced emigration of Jordanians and Palestinians with Israeli laissez-passers. It took note of the contents of the memoranda submitted by the Secretariat, the Foreign Ministry of the Syrian Arab republic, the embassies of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and of the Iraqi Republic in Cairo, regarding the measures adopted by the Israeli authorities to induce Jordanian and Palestinian Arab citizens to emigrate by granting them laissez-passers furnished with entry visas for countries, particularly Latin American ones, that permit the immigration of such Arab citizens.

After hearing the opinions and statements of the delegates on this subject the Conference recommended:

1. That the question be raised of the ill-treatment by the Israeli authorities of Arab residents in the occupied territories to force them to emigrate from these territories.

2. That all possible measures be taken to urge the Arabs in the occupied territories not to emigrate but to insist on their right to stay in the country, for in abandoning the land they will be weakening the Palestinian cause.

3. That the Palestinian people be assisted to endure and resist by the Member States, particularly those best able to do so, supporting them with all their material and moral resources.

4. That all necessary efforts be made to induce the United Nations to shoulder its responsibilities to the refugees and other Palestinians in the occupied territories through the implementation of the General Assembly and Security Council resolutions, and those of the Teheran Conference on Human Rights.

5. That Arab embassies and consulates abroad be instructed not to grant Arab passports to Arabs in this category, as the granting of such passports contributes to the liquidation of the Palestine problem, and is also an infringement of the resolutions of the Arab League Council framed to ensure the preservation of Palestinian citizenship.

6. That diplomatic representations be made to such foreign countries as permit immigration into their territories of Palestinians at present residing in the occupied territories, to the effect that acceptance of such emigrés constitutes an unfriendly act to the Arab states, since it contributes to the liquidation of the Palestinian problem and is, moreover, contrary to the United Nations resolutions on that problem.

—*Assistance to the Palestinian Refugees and Displaced Persons:*

The Conference,

Having examined the Secretariat's report on the assistance provided to refugees and displaced persons by both governments and non-governmental organisations,

Having heard the opinions of the representatives of the host countries thereon,

Noting the recent decrease of this assistance at a time when the situation following the June 5, 1967 aggression calls for increased assistance owing to the evacuation of hundreds of thousands of refugees and displaced persons from their lands and country,

Recommends:

1. That the responsibility of the United Nations for the Palestinians should be reaffirmed by the implementation of its resolutions on their unassailable right to return to their homes and to recover their property.¹

2. That UNRWA should make every effort to obtain increased contributions to enable it to meet its obligations to the Palestinian refugees and to cope with the situation of the displaced Palestinians arising from the Israeli aggression of June 1967, in accordance with the resolutions of the United Nations, particularly the two resolutions of the General Assembly on humane assistance, Nos. 2252 of 4 July 1967² and 2341 (para. b) of 19 December 1967.³

3. That the heads of the Arab delegations at the United Nations and the United Nations Secretary-General be requested to make the necessary representations to the governments of the Member States concerning the granting of contributions in cash and in kind, to meet the requirements of the Palestinians in the occupied territories, until such time as the consequences of the aggression are eliminated and they recover their right to practise their callings and to enjoy civil liberties.

4. In view of the present heavy burdens the governments of the host countries are called upon to bear, the Conference recommends that the Secretariat of the Arab League should contact Arab and other countries with a view to demonstrating the extent of the problem of the Palestinian refugees and displaced persons and to requesting them to provide the necessary assistance to meet the requirements of these people.

—*Palestinian Students From the West Bank and the Gaza Strip Whose Incomes Have Been Cut Off:*

The Conference,

Having noted the steps taken to provide aid to the Palestinian students from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip whose incomes have been cut off, and having studied the proceedings of the meeting of the permanent delegates to the League's headquarters in Cairo on 3 August 1968,

Recommends that the refugee organisations should work together with the quarters concerned in the Arab countries.

—*Coping with Emergency Cases of Refugees and Displaced Persons:*

The Conference,

Having heard the statements submitted by the representatives of the governments of the Arab host countries on the hardships faced by refugees and displaced persons who are denied the services of UNRWA because it shirks its obligations towards them, with the result that they are exposed to such hardship and need that the lives of many of them are imperilled,

Recalling the resolutions adopted by the League Council to ensure the continued existence of this Arab people and to enable it to stand firm and persevere in its resistance,

Recommends that the governments of the Arab host countries should earmark sufficient sums to be placed at the disposal of the organisations responsible for refugee affairs in the respective countries to meet the urgent emergency requirements of the Palestinians.

—*The Situation in Jerusalem:*

The Conference,

Having reviewed the situation in the city of Jerusalem, noting the measures taken and the attempts made by the Israeli authorities to annex it,

Having recalled the United Nations resolutions, particularly the two resolutions of the General Assembly, 2253 of 4 July 1967 and 2254 of 14 July 1967,⁴ on the abrogation of the measures taken by Israel and the prevention of any further

¹ See footnotes to doc. 259, *ante*.

² Text in *International Documents on Palestine, 1967*, pp. 255-256.

³ Text *ibid.*, pp. 467-468.

⁴ Texts *ibid.*, pp. 256, 260. See also *ante*, doc. 238.

action designed to change the status of Jerusalem,

Having heard the statements of the head of the Jordanian delegation on the human tragedy that is being enacted in Jerusalem: the Judaisation of the City, the eviction of its Arab inhabitants and the settling of Israelis in their place,

Calls on the Conference of the Governments of the Arab and Muslim States to continue its contacts with the United Nations and its Member States, with the object of drawing attention to the gravity of the measures taken by the Israelis in the Holy City, recalling Israel's contravention and violations of United Nations resolutions, and initiating a wide-scale information campaign to win over world public opinion on this matter.

—*UNRWA and the Change of Syllabuses and Textbooks:*

The Conference,

Having considered UNRWA's attitude to the syllabuses and textbooks prescribed for Palestinian students in the schools under its supervision,

Having heard the statements of the representatives of the host countries, and noted UNRWA's obligation to prescribe the same syllabuses and textbooks as are in use in the host countries,

Having noted the steps taken by UNRWA after the June 1967 aggression in withdrawing a number of textbooks, in modifying syllabuses and examination systems, and in restricting students' freedom of movement on the pretext that these measures were taken in implementation of a resolution adopted by UNESCO's Executive Council in November 1967, enjoining that the Director-General of UNESCO should cooperate with the Commissioner-General of UNRWA on questions related to education in places where there are UNRWA educational institutions,

On the basis of this decision, the Director-General of UNESCO submitted three suggestions to the representatives of the Arab host countries at UNESCO, dealing with the following questions:

1. Revision of syllabuses, for which he suggested that a neutral committee should be formed,

2. The examinations system in the occupied territories,

3. Freedom of travel for students to continue their studies. At the last session of the UNESCO Executive Council held in Paris, a resolution was adopted on June 20 1968 to the effect that the proposed neutral committee for the revision of syllabuses and textbooks should be formed and that a report on the committee's recommendations should be submitted.

The Conference,

Having discussed the Agency's attitude in the light of these statements, and noted that in the Agency's annual report of 1967/68 (S) it explicitly admits to having, in cooperation with the Israeli occupation authorities, introduced changes in its syllabuses and then sought to disavow its obligations by referring the matter to UNESCO and taking cover behind that organisation, thereby giving free rein to the schemes of the Israeli authorities to obliterate the Palestinian personality, and to poison religious beliefs and nationalities among the rising generation of the Palestinian people,

Recommends:

1. That the Arab host countries should submit a joint memorandum to the Commissioner-General of UNRWA, confronting him with his responsibility and drawing his attention to the fact that he has no right to allow any changes to be made in the Agency's undertakings on this matter, that the Agency is bound to enforce the prescribed syllabuses and textbooks, on account of the implications thereof as regards the safeguarding of, and the respect due to the sovereignty of the state in its own territory; and that, at the same time, the Agency is obliged to condemn the measures taken by the occupation authorities to change syllabuses and textbooks.

2. The Arab delegations to the United Nations are to submit the host countries' memorandum to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, drawing his attention to the seriousness of the matter and calling upon him to lose no time in intervening to put a stop to the continued execution of these designs and to restore the syllabuses and textbooks in use prior to the aggression of June 1967.

3. The representatives of the Arab countries at UNESCO are to point out the grave dangers

¹ See *ante*, doc. 259.

underlying the measures taken in this connection, which measures are contrary to the principle of the sovereignty of the state, to the United Nations resolutions, to the Declaration of Human Rights and to the resolutions of UNESCO's Executive Council. They are also to point out the need for a guarantee for the continued use of syllabuses and textbooks in force prior to the Israeli aggression of June 1967, whether in the occupied territory or in the Arab host countries.

4. The delegates are to make every effort to ensure the implementation of the Arab League Council resolution that the Planning Council for the education of refugee children should meet as early as possible.

5. The delegates are to urge the Agency to hold the Annual Educational Conference with the representatives of the Arab host countries to discuss the Agency's general educational policy for 1968-69.

(Resolution 2455/Session 50/Meeting 3—3/9/1968)

—*Possibility of Appeal to the Geneva Convention on the Protection of Civilians:*

The Council decides to approve the recommendations of the Legal and Political Affairs Committees, the text of which is as follows:

The Committee has taken note of the recommendations of the committee appointed to examine the possibility of appealing to the Geneva Convention on the Protection of Civilians in Time of War, signed on August 12, 1949. In view of the ill-treatment to which Arabs in the occupied territories are being subjected at the hands of the Israeli authorities, the Committee recommends the following:

1. That the governments of the Member States, with the help of friendly countries, should this be necessary, should request the United Nations Secretary-General to take the necessary measures to ensure the protection of Arab civilians in the occupied territories, and to appoint one or more delegates to investigate and examine Israel's violations of human rights and of international principles and covenants, these delegates being empowered to demand that Israel put a stop to its violations and contraventions, reporting

these as they occur to the United Nations Secretary-General.

2. That these governments should call on the United Nations to meet all its obligations as regards taking the necessary measures to prevent Israel from committing further crimes and to make her respect the principles and resolutions of the United Nations.

3. That they should persevere in exposing Israel's criminal actions and brutal aggressions against the Arabs individually and collectively, and her arbitrary measures in the area designed to force the Arabs to abandon their homes and evacuate their country, and in making known Israel's aggressive and expansionist aims and ambitions in the Arab countries.

4. That they should follow up the implementation of the resolution adopted by the Teheran World Conference on Human Rights on 7 May 1968.

5. That the Arab governments should provide their delegations to the United Nations and the Arab League with all available information concerning Israel's actions and arbitrary measures in the occupied territory.

(Resolution 2456/Session 50/Meeting 3—3/9/1968)

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Address by the Syrian President Al-Atasi at the Opening of the Tenth Conference of the Arab Lawyer's Association.¹ [Excerpts]

Damascus, September 4, 1968

...Resistance is the only way to recover the occupied territories. Aware of this from the start, the Palestinian resistance fighters escalated their struggle immediately after the June aggression, [1967] both to harass the occupiers and to discomfit defeatists and advocates of surrender in the Arab homeland. The Palestinian resistance has put an end to the myth of Israeli superiority, thereby dealing a severe blow to the psychological

¹ *Al-Thawra* (Damascus), 5/9/1968.

warfare waged by the enemy... The Palestinian resistance is the nucleus of the overall Arab people's war against Zionism. If the Arabs wish to liberate their territories, the only course open to them is to associate the masses with them in an overall operation of people's war to confront the technological superiority of the enemy and the immense backing he receives from the colonialist powers, headed by the United States. The people's war of liberation is what led the Algerian Revolution to victory. In Vietnam today it is the weapon that is destroying the massive American colonialist forces.

Brother lawyers,

The Palestinian resistance is the epitome of the steadfastness of our people and the concrete symbol of their determination. It is therefore the duty of every loyal Arab to support this resistance and to supply it with everything necessary for its continuation and growth. This struggle will not attain its peak unless commando action and Palestinian resistance are unified. But this unification can only be achieved and become fully effective if liberated Arab forces, capable of performing their allotted task, ensure the necessary climate. To the extent that the Arab forces become unified, the ranks of the resistance will gain in organisation and effectiveness.

Believing as we do that the unity of the Palestinian resistance and the unity of the Arab revolutionary forces are the bulwark of this resistance, here in Syria we have always called for the meeting of fully liberated Arab forces. We have always felt that this meeting is an essential factor in the elimination of the consequences of the aggression and in the foiling of any new Zionist colonialist scheme. We have also urged that participation in resistance to Zionist aggression should take an active form and not be restricted to verbal declarations for cheap political gains. No Arab country, however far away it is from the cease-fire line, is in the slightest degree absolved of responsibilities as regards the one Arab battle. The military forces can, indeed they must, be on the firing lines, face to face with the enemy, not only to be ready for the coming battle, but also to repulse the Zionist aggressions to which Jordan is liable. Propaganda declarations have

been unmasked by the people and their aims disclosed, and the Arab masses will be content with nothing less than active participation in the battle that confronts our nation.

Brother lawyers,

We here in Syria regard the struggle that confronts us as a struggle for our very existence, and it is on this basis that the Ba'th Party has devised its strategy. We have always resolutely opposed, and we shall continue to do so, all attempts to liquidate the Palestine problem whatever slogan is employed in justification... Here in Syria we have, since the aggression, carried out a general and comprehensive mobilisation at all levels and in all fields, so that this country's total resources may be at the service of the battle of destiny that confronts our nation. In the military field, this country has made great strides in strengthening, arming and training the armed forces. We have realised that the battle of destiny requires the mobilisation of the whole nation; we have therefore created the national militia in which are enlisted all citizens willing and able to carry arms to assist the armed forces under all circumstances. Committees for the defence of the homeland have been formed; these are organisations of all patriotic people who wish to play their part in the battle for the mobilisation of the people and the indoctrination of the masses in the difficult circumstances imposed by the confrontation with which the homeland is faced...

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Report of the Preparatory Committee of the General National Congress of the Arab Socialist Union of the U.A.R. at its First Session.¹ [Excerpts]

Cairo, September 10, 1968

The Committee took account of the circumstances in which the Congress is being held and

¹ *Al-Ahram* (Cairo), 11/9/1968.

of the considerations which led to its being convened, bearing in mind the impressions it had formed as a result of the opinions and observations communicated to it.

The Committee further took account of the fact that it is unanimously agreed that no summons is or can be more imperative than that of the battle, no voice more sacred than its voice, that no thinking or calculation which does not grant priority to the battle and its needs is entitled to be called thinking, since the battle must come before all things; that on behalf of this battle and the attainment of the highest and most sacred of aims—the elimination of the consequences of aggression and the winning of victory—nothing is too difficult and no sacrifice too dear, be it in material things or personal endeavour or human life; and finally, that any course we choose to follow for the liberation of our land and the achievement of victory will prove a dead end if preparation for the battle is lacking.

The Committee therefore proposes that the Congress should concentrate its attention in this session on matters directly related to the full and comprehensive mobilisation of forces for the liberation of the land...

The Committee considers that the requirements of the present situation demand that the debates of the Congress should deal with the following:

—Military mobilisation. This means directing our resources, material and human, towards the service of the war effort and towards the immediate satisfaction of the needs of our armed forces, and expanding the United Arab Republic's army to include the whole nation.

—Internal mobilisation. This means bringing the people to a state of full preparedness, both moral and material, for the battle, and overcoming all obstacles and problems that prevent the release of all the active energies of the nation and of its various groups and organisations, national and governmental. These energies must be channelled into a creative operation, which if it is carried out with perseverance and determination, will be capable of meeting all challenges and of ensuring victory and the liberation of our territory.

—Serious political activity at national and governmental level—in the Arab field—to ensure

that all Arab fronts, with all their resources, are mobilised for a decisive confrontation of the enemy; and that a united Arab attitude is not only maintained but made more effective in all fields—political, economic and military.

—Constant and persistent political activity in international circles to win over ever widening sections of world public opinion to the support of our legitimate right to use all means to defend ourselves and to liberate our territory.

—All this to be accompanied by a well-integrated information machine designed to serve the battle in all its aspects, internal, external, psychological and economic, working on scientific lines, effectively drawing the citizen towards the battle, the battle of liberation, and making our legitimate cause known to all external fronts.

—Economic mobilisation designed to achieve a speedy increase in production and a retrenchment in such national expenditure as is not directed towards the war effort or towards economic development, thereby enabling the state to secure the necessary resources towards that end.

—Establishment of a genuine popular structure and of popular organisations cooperating with and complementing one another, to achieve the ends of this mobilisation.

II. *Military Mobilisation and Political Activity in the Service of the Battle:*

- A. Military mobilisation, popular resistance and civil defence.
- B. Political activity, official and popular, in both Arab and international fields.
- C. Information.

Analytical Report on the Second Item on the Agenda:

A. *Military Mobilisation, Popular Resistance and Civil Defence:*

1. The great challenge we face today is the success of the Israeli enemy forces in occupying parts of Arab territory and the failure of world society, so far—because it has been unable or unwilling to do so—to force the aggressors to withdraw to the lines from which they launched their treacherous attack of June 1967. To this must be added the fact that the Zionist movement

is trying, through occupation and other means of destruction and pressure, to reap the fruits of its aggression. These fruits can be clearly seen: geographical expansion in Arab territory, expulsion of its inhabitants, and the settling in their place of emigrés imported for the purpose. By pursuing this policy, the Zionist movement hopes to achieve its ends, namely, domination of the Middle East so as to exploit its raw materials, experience, markets, and manpower in its own interests and in the interests of those that assist and support it.

2. If we want to stand up to these challenges, our duty is clear. We must mobilise our forces to the full. Firstly, we must muster our own potentials; secondly we must bring together the Arab countries that are, like us, exposed to this aggression, and resist and overcome it. Thirdly, we must rely on friendly and fair-minded countries and peoples all over the world, regardless of disparities in their preoccupations, interests, and attitudes towards this most serious provocation.

B. Political Activity, Official and Popular, in Arab and International Fields:

4. Besides mustering all our potentials in the United Arab Republic, we must, in our stand against aggression, coordinate the efforts of the Arab countries that are exposed to it as we are, whether or not the enemy has actually reached their territories.

The existence and future of the Arab nation are both threatened. This threat should be sufficient to prompt the unification of all Arab forces that want a free Arab entity to continue to exist. Therefore we must seek to maintain a unified position in the face of aggression, striving to strengthen this position in all fields—political, information, economic, and military...

The Palestinian people are the vanguard of the Arab forces that bear this historic responsibility. The Palestinian resistance movement is a legitimate movement that we must all join in consolidating and supporting, so that it may take part in liberating the territory that has fallen a prey to aggression and in obstructing the realisa-

tion of the objectives that imperil the safety and future of all the Arab countries.

5. We must be politically active in all fields—world organisations, bilateral relations with all countries, particularly with the Asiatic, African and Latin American countries, popular organisations; and in the field of information.

Should the government of any country adopt a policy that is unfavourable to us, we must not despair. We must seek to win over that government's people or some sectors of its people by redoubling our efforts in all these fields.

C. Information:

6. Information work in the outside world is nowadays part of the national effort. All men with qualifications and ability must be enlisted, and all facilities, material and human, must be made available for the furthering of this effort.

A lasting peace, indeed the only peace, as we see it and as the world should see it, is a peace that is based on justice and on resistance to and elimination of aggression and injustice.

If we confront and surmount the challenge that has been forced upon us we shall in fact be serving the cause of peace throughout the world.

In the present stage of our struggle, the world must know that our aim is peace in our land and in the whole world. Only by achieving peace shall we be able to turn to the development and advancement of our country, and to contributing, within the limits of our ability and means, to human civilisation in the present and the future, just as we have contributed to it in both the recent and the more distant past.

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Message From the Jordanian King Hussein to the Prime Minister of Jordan Al-Talhuni on Current Issues.¹ [Excerpts]

Amman, September 13, 1968

First of all there is something I feel I must make clear. The Hashemite Jordanian Arab Kingdom is now indissolubly linked to the cause of Palestine and all Palestinians, and to that of right and justice. The bonds that unite them are those of a common destiny. For all Palestinians, therefore, this country is their homeland and their first base; it is the last free sector that is still struggling steadfastly in the face of danger, the blood of whose sons has intermingled upon the pure soil in the past and present. This country, moreover, will always be one great family, a family that has proved its oneness in the face of events and under the bitterness and tribulations of the occupation—under all circumstances and in the face of all pressures and temptations.

...Whoever believes in this national unity is of us, for us, and with us, and whoever does not is against us and against this cause. Strength has ever resided, and will ever reside, in unity and singleness of purpose. This is the case with all Palestinians, and the ties that bind them to their country—the ties that must be maintained absolutely intact, and the ties that bind all Palestinians to the cause of their very existence, their future, their destiny and the destiny of their nation, wherever they may be—in the occupied territories, in the Arab countries, or anywhere in the world.

In the past I have endeavoured to eliminate all that could impair this cohesion and weaken the unity of these forces, whether through alien currents or through trends leading to deviation from the true course of national action and from the general order laid down for the resources of this state, its organisations and institutions, to wandering, I mean, from the ranks of this one great family. Today, bearing in mind the far-

reaching dangers facing that family, I feel that the ideal, indeed the only course for all to take, the course of deliverance and victory, lies in our meticulously, firmly, and resolutely enforcing this policy, so that both form and content may radiate ever more clearly the image of a single family, united in sentiment and in action. This I repeat and stress... God is my witness that I have done all I could to lead all who deviated back to the right path, seeking constantly to clarify the most minute points, and to answer all questions and satisfy all doubts. Unfortunately, after every encounter I have found that the intention rather than the knowledge was at fault. In all such cases, the remedy must be applied with resolution, firmness and precision to protect public security to maintain the effectiveness of government institutions and safeguard society...

Israel still seems to us three-faced, with one or the other of these faces alternately dominating the other two. The first is the face of extremism, that extremism which lies at the root of the problem and provides the motivation of Israel's religious fanaticism, which aspires to dominate not only all the regions now occupied by Israel, but other areas in our Arab homeland as well, although, as a transitional stage, she may be content if she succeeds in completely controlling such of our territories as she now occupies...

The second face which Israel presents to us from time to time, is one that tries to tell the Palestinians and the world that the problem is a Palestinian-Israeli problem, and that, consequently, other Arabs have nothing to do with it. It offers to the Palestinians temptation after temptation, in an attempt to secure the establishment of a weak petty statelet, that will cooperate fully with Israel. Israel indulges in the hope of settling the question on this basis, seeking at the same time to destroy us here so that she may the more easily attain her ends.

The third face is a moderate one that wants a state with a Jewish majority and wishes to settle its problems with its neighbours. However, its features are not sufficiently well-defined to show how far it will go in this respect.

¹ *Al-Dustur* (Amman), 14/9/1968.

Before the whole world, our voice rises loud and clear proclaiming that we advocate a peace based on right and justice, that we have rights we shall never relinquish, whatever the circumstances. But for peace to be achieved, for it to return where it belongs, it must be a peace acceptable to the generations that come after us—an honourable peace which they can accept and defend, under whose wing they can build and construct. These are the foundations on which we seek to achieve peace, so that we may hand it on as a gift to all generations of Arabs succeeding the present one, which is the generation of confrontations, of danger and provocation, the generation which is called on to bear the gravest responsibility. Therefore our rights must be safeguarded in full in our land and in our city of Jerusalem, and this call of ours must find a receptive audience and ever increasing support throughout the world. Without question, the members of the family of nations, particularly the Great Powers, have a great responsibility for promoting a just and honourable solution to this tragedy. Unless this obligation is met, particularly by a great power like the United States, which has so far adopted an attitude which, to say the least, is negative—such an attitude could lead to the loss of all hope for the establishment of a just and honourable peace in this region because of its support for Israel's intransigence and extremism. If the chances of establishing a just and honourable peace are definitively lost at this stage and in this area, the United States will not be able to absolve itself of its responsibility for having allowed this to take place, nor will it ever be forgiven by the people of this area. The United States will be largely responsible for the disastrous results ensuing from such a policy—results that will not be in anyone's interest.

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Let everyone rest assured, the last weapon we shall need to fight the battles that are forced upon us, has ever been and ever will be our chief preoccupation and concern. In this connection, the following facts must be stated:

1. The material losses sustained by our armed forces in June 1967 in weapons, equipment and ammunition were estimated at 70 million Jordanian dinars.

2. An Arab Summit Conference was held in Khartum, the Sudanese capital, on August 29, 1967, to deal with the painful aftermath of the tragedy of June of that year¹. . . . This Conference decided to adopt the course of political action, to eliminate the consequences of the aggression, while taking into consideration the cruel circumstances under which our relations and brothers are living in the occupied territories. In addition, in its resolution on economic support for the states directly affected by the consequences of aggression, the Conference earmarked a specific annual sum to help those countries to stand firm in their ordeal. The Conference also decided to support these countries and back their efforts to eliminate the consequences of the aggression. Jordan's share of this aid was fixed at 40 million dinars per year. In principle, we have decided to divide this sum into two equal parts. The first part is to be used to reinforce our people's resistance in the West Bank and Gaza and to meet their requirements in the ordeal they are undergoing, and after that, if necessary, to help to relieve the plight of the refugees who have come to the East Bank, as UNRWA already sees to their needs, particularly the needs of the refugees of the 1948 disaster. Furthermore, funds will be needed to deal with the after-effects of the June disaster on our economy, to meet the deficit in our income, and to face up to the many demands made by the continued military attacks directed against us and to the situation which has grown so critical since June. Moreover, we shall need funds to ensure our progress towards the objectives we have set before us in the field of reconstruction, work and preparation, for without these we cannot muster the necessary energies for building up our power and ensuring its continued growth. For the battle, besides being an armed conflict, is also one of science and of constant reconstruction and development. The second part of this sum we decided to reserve to the needs of our armed forces. . . .

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Now, as regards resistance in the occupied part of our country, we have stated that we are unwilling to take responsibility for safeguarding the security and safety of the Israeli armed forces

¹ See *International Documents on Palestine, 1967*, pp. 655-657.

so long as they remain in this land, defying both us and the whole world. We have also announced that we firmly support legitimate resistance to the occupation, in both its negative and positive aspects—a resistance that has the sympathy of the whole world, particularly the nations that have, before us and like us, suffered from the evils of occupation and resisted it. We have, however, announced that we are opposed to destructive anarchy, that we favour instead purposeful organisation that leads to desired, tangible and effective results. We believe that we are equal to our responsibilities, responsibilities we shall not shirk, however heavy or trying. Our destiny, our very existence, depends on the triumph of right in Palestine; this being the case, it is our duty, and the duty of all who, along with us, are striving to achieve this, our sole objective, to state clearly the course we intend to follow. We are ready to shoulder our burden of fateful and historic responsibilities; we are therefore entitled to expect that others should scrupulously adhere to this course. Here we must reaffirm our determination to achieve complete coordination with all those who are working loyally to achieve our one objective and our noble goal, and to oppose all those who oppose or reject this course. Since this question is the chief preoccupation not only of all members of our Jordanian family but also of the majority of the Arab nation, perhaps, now that more than a year has elapsed, we should state our attitude to it with all frankness and precision:

I—We regard our brothers who are now experiencing the bitterness, harshness and trials of occupation with such steadfastness and such determination to hold on to our land and continue to live there, as an embodiment of true patriotism and genuine courage worthy of the admiration and appreciation of all Arabs. And there are very many people in the world who share our feelings. By exercising their legitimate right to resist the occupation both positively and negatively, they have won the sympathy of those peoples of this world who throughout history have experienced similar circumstances.

II—Our fundamental duty and clear objective is to enable these brothers of ours to continue to endure and stand firm, until they are delivered, and until our right and theirs is recovered in

full, whether by peace or war.

III—

Here it must be emphasised that the dissipation of energy in the sphere of legitimate resistance—the multiplicity and disunity of the organisations and the lack of coordination between them, not to mention the fact that they are not subject to any unified plan with well-defined objectives—does more harm than good, and has an adverse effect on the noble incentives that lie behind resistance. This lack of coordination allows the enemy to belittle these incentives and provides him with a pretext to continue in his policy of constant aggression and expansion.

Here however, we must turn to the subject of arming—what arms we require and how long it will take us to get them. However, before proceeding to describe what has been achieved in this respect, the following points must be stated:

1. We do not manufacture arms; we obtain them with the funds available to us.... In other words, the arms that are in our hands and in the hands of the rest of the Arab World are well known to be of high quality, and they become Arab arms as soon as they come into Arab hands.

3. After June 1967 I became convinced that we must obtain arms from whatever source we could, because of the difficulties we faced in obtaining them from our traditional arms sources for a certain time following June 1967. I therefore made every effort to do this, and my efforts were successful, for I found that, if necessary, we could obtain arms from any source, as long as we had the necessary funds.

4. In the face of the danger that threatens us, namely, the danger of an attack taking place at any moment regardless of where we buy our arms and of whether we have received them or not; and in view of the fact that we had accepted the United Nations resolution of November 22, 1967 and declared our readiness to implement it in full, I felt that it was our duty to examine the possibilities of obtaining direct military support

from foreign quarters capable of assisting us in the face of a possible all-out attack by Israel. I reached the conclusion that in such a case all we could expect from these quarters was that they should provide us with political and moral support and be prepared to sell us arms whenever we needed them. This was a basic factor in my deciding to exert every possible effort towards removing the obstacles in the way of our procuring arms from the traditional Western sources.

5. Here I must point out that if we bought non-Western arms—quite apart from training problems involved, which are not, perhaps, very extensive—Western sources would certainly stop supplying us with the ammunition required for the arms we already have. In other words, if there is to be a change, it must be a complete and comprehensive one, and the funds at our disposal are by no means adequate for that.

We now come back to the money question:

– Our losses in June amounted to 70 million dinars.

– The sums available to meet the needs of our armed forces amount to 15 million dinars, paid annually in instalments.

– The Amirate of Abu-Dhabi has contributed 5 million dinars.

– Qatar has contributed half a million dinars.

– Bahrain has contributed 150 thousand pounds sterling.

– Dubai has contributed 60 thousand dinars, which the members of the Jordanian community there helped to collect.

– Saudi Arabia has contributed 15 million pounds sterling, to be paid by instalments directly to the party which produces the arms, after we have chosen it and agreed with it on the date when the arms are to be delivered to us, the producing party in this case being Britain....

Also, a short while ago we signed an agreement with the United States by which the latter is to supply us with arms and military equipment to a total of 36 million dollars, paid in instalments over a three-year period. Large shipments of arms have already arrived by air and sea, and the rest will arrive according to schedule.

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Address by the Saudi King Faisal at the Annual Meeting of the Saudi Arab Monetary Fund.¹ [Excerpt]

Jeddah, September 17, 1968

...His Excellency the Governor referred to certain shocks sustained by our economy, our resources, as a result of the events of the past year. He also spoke of certain undertakings we have entered into towards some of our brothers in the Arab countries. When we enter into such undertakings towards our brothers, we do not feel—we can never feel—that we are bestowing favours on them. It is our duty to share in their joys and sorrows—more in their sorrows, since it is easier to share in joy. It is not hard to share in people's joys; the important thing is to share in their sorrows. We expect no thanks for fulfilling some of our obligations; it is only natural that we should do so; under no circumstances can we fail to do so. At a time when we profess to be ready to sacrifice our lives, can we withhold assistance from our brothers? Never. We pray that the Almighty will drive away this shadow of affliction from our Arab and Islamic nation, and grant us success in our urgent efforts to remove all the injustice and persecution that have fallen to the lot of our homeland and of all that we hold most sacred.

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Statement and Resolutions Adopted by the U.A.R. General National Congress of the Arab Socialist Union at its First Session.² [Excerpts]

Cairo, September 21, 1968

The General National Congress, formed by the people's will by means of and on the basis of democracy, to serve as a stimulus to the popular struggle movement which, sparked off by the

¹ *Al-Bilad* (Jeddah), 18/9/1968.

² *Al-Ahram* (Cairo), 22/9/1968.

masses on June 9 and 10 1967, marked their rejection of defeat and their determination to remove the stigma and surmount the consequences of defeat, is aware of the magnitude of its responsibility at a period during which the fate of our working people,—are they to be masters or slaves in their own land?—is being decided for many generations to come.

The challenge facing us today, of which Israel is both the facade and the instrument, is really and essentially an imperialist conspiracy with many aspects and a variety of designs. Zionism, world imperialism and anti-popular forces are partners in this conspiracy, which aims not only at usurping territory, but also at dominating the fortunes of the area, crushing all legitimate aspirations of the Arab individual and driving the Arab peoples back to positions of weakness, backwardness and dependence. These being the dimensions of the imperialist-Zionist plot, world monopolies and their puppet, Israel, cannot conceivably stand idly by while their designs to exploit all the Arab peoples are withering because the Arab individual is busy building his socialist society in the United Arab Republic and proceeding with the implementation of the development plan, trying to exploit every resource available to him by means of science and experience, and to master his capacities by means of sufficiency and justice. Therefore, it was natural that the Israeli aggression should have for its object the thwarting of the Arab individual's endeavours to achieve a socialist society before they are fully effective, when it will be impossible to implement the imperialist-Zionist plan for Arab territory.

Our enemies thought that the sudden military defeat suffered by our Army in the June 5 War of 1967 would be a knock-out blow to the aspirations of our people, and would put an end to the glorious Revolution which had released such tremendous energies in the Arab nation, spread its mission of liberation throughout Asia and Africa, and defeated imperialist influence time and again.

Israel too thought that the opportunity had come for her to get the upper hand in the Arab area, and to open the way to the imperialist plan to bleed the Arab peoples of their fortunes. But the people's upsurge on June 9, indeed, the upsurge of the entire Arab nation on that historic

night, was a resurrection and a renewal of the Revolution, and a demonstration of how strong is the attachment to its leader, in whom the spirit of the Arab Revolution is incarnated, and to the spacious future for which the Arab nation has been struggling since the beginning of this century.

During the period which has elapsed since June 9, the Arab nation has turned the slogan of endurance into a real fact in more ways than one. Arab economic solidarity, brought about by helping the Arab countries which faced the Israeli-imperialist aggression, was a stunning surprise to the enemy, who had thought that the setback would break up the bonds of Arab solidarity; on the contrary it has strengthened this solidarity and imbued it with more consciousness and solidity in facing the Zionist-imperialist plot. The rapid growth of the Palestinian resistance movement, engaged in a legitimate fight for the liberation of its land, came as a proof of the fact that the injustice suffered by the Palestinian people for 20 years has not been forgotten and that the determination to remedy this injustice is born and grows with every new Arab generation. Particularly in the United Arab Republic, this popular upsurge has made it possible to achieve a unique miracle which was the first pre-condition of endurance—namely the rebuilding of the United Arab Republic Armed Forces in the fields of equipment, training and organisation. Thus, the United Arab Republic Armed Forces have resumed their original role as the nation's shield against any aggression and its fighting vanguard in the battle to liberate its territory.

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If popular struggle has achieved great successes in the sphere of military reconstruction, and in those of economic endurance, preparing for change, and setting things to rights at home, it has also achieved equal success in the sphere of foreign action. It is this military, economic and popular endurance which has given our country the chance to take political and information action abroad, which has succeeded to a great extent in dissipating the haze of Zionist propaganda that formerly blurred the vision of many people, and in making it clear that the Arabs are entitled to condemn the aggression for the benefit of world public opinion. Today we

have friends throughout the world and our legitimate cause has won the support of large and ever growing sectors of world public opinion.

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The General National Congress, which emanates from the masses and is committed to their will to put into effect the principles outlined in the Programme of March 30,¹ not only asserts the inevitability of the battle with the enemy, but also the inevitability of victory in it. Our fate hangs on that battle, and we have no choice but to face it, and we are destined to win because victory is the lot of free men. The slogan of preparedness for the battle, framed by the Programme of March 30 and supported by popular unanimity, must be affirmed in actual practice in every aspect of our life and in all fields of activity. And, inasmuch as the Congress has approved the methods of military, political, economic and intellectual mobilisation, as set out in the report of the Preparatory Committee,² and decided to refer them to the Central Committee to form them into a programme of action to be implemented at all levels and in all spheres, it feels bound to stress certain fundamentals which, together with the battle, are linked by bonds of destiny, trust and honour, to the Congress's historic responsibility to follow up and direct all stages of the struggle:

First: Our battle with the enemy is not concerned only with the liberation of territory from the enemy; it also aims at ensuring in this land the right of man to sufficiency, justice and freedom in both its political and economic aspects—his liberation from the forces of exploitation at home and abroad. Thus our victory over the enemy can only be achieved if we safeguard the socialist system and eliminate all the deficiencies and shortcomings which have blemished socialist application. The defence of our socialist system and of our socialist gains and accomplishments, is an integral part of the fateful battle which we face; indeed, it is the very essence of this battle.

Secondly: Our battle with the enemy is not the battle of the Army alone; it is the battle of the entire people. The entire people must be an extension of their Armed Forces in their advanced position, facing the enemy on the battle front.

There must be complete fusion between the people and the Army. People are of course looking forward to the creation of the popular army that will organise every member of the population capable of carrying arms—a matter which must be kept in our minds and taken into account in our future planning. But there is a more urgent matter for which the Congress expects the Central Committee to work out the details. This is the establishment of popular defence organisations to shoulder the responsibility of protecting the rear of our advanced forces. These organisations will be concerned with all kinds of activity of a military and paramilitary character, in connection with any possible operations which the enemy may carry out behind our front lines, for the theatre of operations in any future battle with the enemy will include every inch of the territory of the Republic. . . .

Thirdly: Although military struggle is the main aspect of the battle, it is not its only aspect. It requires a comprehensive economic struggle to ensure it a permanent and constant supply of its military and civilian needs, and at the same time to cater to the essential needs of the people under whatever conditions may develop.

The people's appreciation of the vital role played by the economy in war means that today, more than ever before, they insist on the economy being made to serve the battle for liberation and victory. . . .

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Fourthly: While stressing that not a moment must be lost in directing all our resources and potentialities to meet the requirements of the battle, and the need to exploit all these resources and potentialities with the greatest possible efficiency, the Congress emphasises the necessity for scientific planning in all aspects of mobilisation—economic, military, political and information. It also stresses the importance of coordinating all these aspects through scientific planning. It was scientific planning that helped us to avoid certain errors in the past, and we cannot possibly afford to overlook it now. For, with scientific planning alone can we make our country and our people a living body capable of moving effectively, fused with its army and responding creatively to the necessity of serving the purposes of the battle.

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¹ See *ante*, doc. 314.

² See *ante*, doc. 381.

Fifthly: In facing this fateful stage, it is necessary that the authority of the working forces of the people should be asserted constantly and persistently and that their effective control over their fortunes, all organs of government and all activities of the State should be consolidated. Freedom of opinion and of criticism is the sure guarantee of the people's control. It is also necessary to affirm the sovereignty of law so that the law may be superior to the centres of power and stronger individual whims. The sovereignty of law safeguards the freedom of the homeland and of the citizen without allowing one to dominate the other. Respect for the rights of the citizen and the safeguarding of freedom of opinion are more necessary to us today than ever before; and the requirements of the battle make them absolutely essential, for we cannot afford to make mistakes without taking note of them.

Sixthly: The drafting of the permanent Constitution was an official and popular demand emphasised by the popular will when it approved the Programme of March 30. The Central Committee is called upon forthwith to prepare its draft and present it for popular discussion so that it may be ready for the plebiscite as soon as the consequences of the aggression are eliminated.

Resolution of the National Congress:

First: In the Field of Political Mobilisation and Defence Affairs:

1—To continue to provide the Armed Forces with all their requirements, and to make available to them all potentialities needed to raise their efficiency and combat capacity, so that they may perform their sacred task, that is, the liberation of the land and the protection of the nation.

2—To support the Palestinian commando movement, as the vanguard of the Arab liberation forces, and to extend to it all the human and material resources it requires to continue in its legitimate mission of liberating occupied territory and of fulfilling the aspirations of Arab youth to contribute their blood to the battle of liberation.

3—To adhere to the foreign policy proclaimed in the Charter of National Action—resisting imperialism, and seeking peace based on justice and cooperation. All political and popular

organisations are called on to adhere to and insist on this policy. This is the policy that armed our people with the slogan of non-alignment, and permitted the establishment of friendship between us and peace-loving peoples, many of whom have come to appreciate our causes and support our right. This makes it incumbent upon us to determine our relations with all countries in the light of the attitude of each of them to our lawful and just cause, and the extent of each country's understanding and support for this cause.

4—To release the energies of popular organisations, whether these be labour, professional or students' organisations, towards the establishment of relations with similar international organisations, and to organise the efforts of members of educational missions and Egyptians living abroad for the purpose of explaining Arab rights.

5—To devote more attention to the political drive abroad in official, popular and information fields. It is necessary to ensure full coordination among official and popular bodies operating in this field, and to select the most capable persons to shoulder the responsibilities of this work, which must be directed into the right course—the course that leads to the realisation of our objectives.

6—The Congress pays tribute to all the peoples and countries that have condemned the aggression and supported the Arab cause, and expresses its appreciation of the Soviet Union, its people and its government, for their material and moral support, which has been an important factor in strengthening Arab ability to endure.

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Address by the Kuwaiti Deputy Prime Minister Sa'd al-Abdullah al-Sabah at the Opening of the Third Conference of the Kuwaiti Students National Association.¹
[Excerpt]

Kuwait, September 24, 1968

On this occasion I wish to salute the heroic

¹ *Al-Ra'y al-Amm* (Kuwait), 25/9/1968.

struggle our Arab nation is now waging in Palestine, and to extol the holy war the Palestinian resistance fighters are fighting against the Israeli occupation. On previous occasions, both the Crown Prince and the Prime Minister have expressed the government's support for the Palestinian resistance and given it their blessing. Today, in reaffirming our support and solidarity, we look forward to the near future when the Palestinian resistance movements will be united, closing their ranks so as to ensure the escalation of commando action and the redoubling of its strength and effectiveness.

Having participated in the Arab Summit Conferences in an effort to secure Arab unanimity and united Arab ranks, and having pledged herself to abide by the various resolutions adopted by these conferences, Kuwait has fulfilled and will continue to fulfill all obligations undertaken in support of Arab resistance against Zionist aggression.

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Press Statement by the Mayor of Arab Jerusalem Ruhi Al-Khatib on the Israeli Legal and Administration Matters (Regulation) Law of 1968.¹ [Excerpt]

Amman, September 25, 1968

I want to talk to you today about a new law promulgated by the Israeli authorities last month. This law involves new and extremely serious offences against Jerusalem and the Arabs of Jerusalem, and is a new illustration of the Zionists' intention of hastening the process of changing the character of Jerusalem by liquidating its Arab population and Judaizing the city. It also illustrates the devious measures resorted to by this expansionist state in violating human rights and practising flagrant racial discrimination, in studied defiance of United Nations and Security Council resolutions and of the Geneva Conventions.

2. This law is called the "Legal and Administration Matters (Regulation) Law of 1968". It was approved by their parliament in its final form on August 23, 1968, and published in their *Official Gazette* No. 542, dated August 23, 1968.

I will give each of you a copy of this law. Here are my comments on it.

3. This law consists of 22 Articles. They are extremely complicated, and it is very difficult to understand what they are aiming at.

It may well be that those who drafted the law were deliberately ambiguous, to conceal from the ordinary reader the real aims of this pernicious document.

4. The first article links this law to the Israeli "Law and Administration Ordinance of 1948". At the bottom of the first page there is an explanatory note, which, however, gives the ordinary reader no idea of what this law has to do with the Arabs of Jerusalem or of the iniquitous intentions that lie in its apparently innocent phrasing, which will have the most noxious consequences as regards both their present and future situation in the city.

5. Only legal experts, politicians or research workers directly concerned with such matters, or those who have suffered cruelly from Zionist schemes and Israeli occupation, and those who have closely followed the course of events on the stage of Jerusalem are capable of appreciating what these intentions really are.

6. I had the opportunity to witness in person some scenes of the drama of Israeli annexation enacted between June 1967 and March 1968. Since then I have followed all reports on this subject as closely as possible. As a result of my personal observations in the city and my close attention to subsequent news reports I have arrived, just as any other thorough investigator would have done, at the conclusion that this law is inseparable from the decrees annexing Arab Jerusalem, proclaimed by their Parliament on June 27, 1967, which are, in fact, incorporated in the law. It is precisely for this reason that the enforcement of this law is meant for and, indeed, restricted to the Arab part of Jerusalem.

7. The Israeli decree of June 27, 1967 dealt with the subject of the annexation of the Arab part of Jerusalem. The present draft law covers

¹ Archives of the Institute for Palestine Studies. See also *ante*, doc. 372.

questions of property, population, economy, and Arab life in the city in its various forms, with the object of subjecting them all to direct Israeli rule and gradually absorbing them into the crucible of Zionist occupation. Any who do not acquiesce in this have no other choice open to them but liquidation and departure.

8. Israeli propaganda has enthusiastically acclaimed the alleged benefits of this law, investing it with a spurious halo of advantages for the Arabs of Jerusalem. It has claimed that the law restored their property and lands to them. Reuter's correspondent was taken in by these falsehoods, and published them under banner headlines proclaiming the restoration of Arab property to its owners. At that time some Arab papers reproduced this report word for word. Now, however, with the full text of the law in our hands, we can examine it and comment upon it objectively.

9. Article 2 of the law is apparently merciful but in fact will cause great suffering. The law excludes the holy places situated in the Jerusalem area from the provisions of the Absentees' Property Law. The Waqfs belonging to these holy places, which form a very considerable part of the lands and property of the city, are not mentioned at all in this Article. Since they are excluded, they are subject to the Law, and the measures applicable to companies and corporations are applicable to them. This is where troubles begin; this is where manoeuvrings, duplicity and forcible seizures start.

10. Articles 3-5 deal with absentees' property in the area in question, which is the area of Arab Jerusalem, as I have already mentioned. The Absentees' Property Law in Israel regards every person who was not resident inside its frontiers in 1950, that is, at the date the law was passed, as an absentee whose movable and immovable property is in the custody of an authority called the "Custodian of Absentee Property" (meaning Custodian of Arab Property). This authority has taken over all the Arab property in Palestine which has fallen into its hands. They have dealt with these properties in various ways. The greater part of the movable property they have plundered. The remainder of the property registered with the Authority has been sold at extremely low prices. As for immovable property, comprising

land and real estate, some they have sold at nominal prices, and the rest they have leased to Jewish beneficiaries at nominal rates.

11. This was the situation as regards the property of absentee Arabs in the western sector of the city before the occupation of the eastern sector. When the occupation took place on June 7, 1967 and after their Parliament had decided to annex the Arab part as of June 27, 1967, we were amazed to hear that our property and real estate in the zone we live in were regarded as being in their custody, in view of the Absentees' Property Law in force in Israel proper. The mere fact of their annexation of our sector and their considering it as an integral part of Israel has made it, by virtue of their strange law, subject to Israeli laws, and consequently, to the Absentees Property Law. Since the population of the Arab sector were not in Israel in 1950, from a legal point of view their property was liable to be placed in custody. Thus all Arab lands in the Arab sector of the city are faced with the threat of annexation.

12. They realised, however, that the enforcement of this inequitable law would be met with anger and indignation, for how can a people who have not left their homes be considered absentees, so that the Israelis should come and expropriate their property? The Israelis sensed this, and realised that such a proceeding would be too blatant and that they had to lose no time in disguising it. To save their faces they were obliged to issue an amendment with a new interpretation, declaring that the Absentees' Property Law is not applicable to the inhabitants of the Arab sector as far as their property in that sector is concerned. In other words, the law does not regard the Arabs residing in the Arab sector of Jerusalem as absentees, so that they can keep what property they own in that sector only. The extraordinary thing was that after producing this explanation, they proceeded to flood the world with misleading propaganda about their "benevolence" in restoring to the Arabs of Jerusalem their properties and lands. What properties and what land? The properties and lands which these Arabs are in possession of and have never left! It is these properties that the rulers of Israel are congratulating themselves on having restored to the Arabs, and are boasting they have renounced

in favour of their Arab owners.

The Arab population of Jerusalem never thought, never had the remotest idea, that this property of theirs was regarded by Israeli custom as absentees' property. As they saw it, this definition applied solely to the property and lands they owned in the area occupied in 1948. This was what was intended, and they succeeded in taking in those who had read Reuter's reports which were repeated by certain Arab papers in all good faith. But is it reasonable to expect that Israel will ever act in good faith and with forbearance? Impossible! These are simply new forms of manoeuvring and duplicity, which are shown up for what they really are by Articles 2-5 of the law—a law which they have released in praise of it.

These Articles were drafted in to serve the interests of the Jews first and foremost. They restore to Jewish owners the property they owned in the Arab sector, but do not restore to the Arabs any property they had held in the previously occupied sector. They simply leave in their possession the property they had held in the previously occupied sector. They simply leave in their possession the property they own in the sector they live in. It does not allow them to recover one inch of what they owned in the other sector of the city, nor in any other part of occupied Palestine. This is purely Jewish logic. We must not be deceived by the flowery language they employ to broadcast their boasts.

13. Articles 6-11 of this law were drafted with the object of Judaising Arab companies in Jerusalem. These Articles stipulate that existing Arab companies must either be re-registered at the Jewish courts or be sold to companies registered in Israel, within a period not exceeding six months.

14. Re-registration at the courts involves a number of steps and measures required by Israeli company law. This law also imposes concealed restrictions, our acceptance of which forms part of Zionist economic planning, which aims at binding Arab companies to the chariot wheel of the Israeli economy, if not absorbing them in it completely.

15. These Articles pave the way for their inevitable consequence—that their implementation will force the Arabs to liquidate or sell their

companies to Israeli companies or other companies registered in Israel. This is why instructions are appended regarding procedure in cases of sale or liquidation, to facilitate these operations.

16. There are more than 180 Arab companies registered in Jerusalem, some of them joint-stock companies, some ordinary and some private companies. Their registered and paid up capital amounts to over 5 million Jordanian dinars, and their assets are worth more than eight million dinars. No less than 4,000 persons are employed by or through them.

17. These Arab companies, their capital and their employees, are faced with the threat of becoming subject to Israeli control within a period not exceeding six months. They are threatened with absorption into Israel's economy and with subordination to the Israeli Histadrut. Whoever refuses to comply will be obliged to go into liquidation and either retire from business and stay at home, if he has anything to live on, or leave Jerusalem.

18. These Articles deal only with the companies registered in Jerusalem and operating in Jerusalem, and whose owners or shareholders are resident in Jerusalem. These include companies which operate in Jerusalem and have branches in the towns of the Jerusalem governorate which, for operational reasons, cannot be separated from their mother company. One example is the Electricity Company which has property and assets in the Ramallah and Bira districts, and also in the Bethlehem and Jericho districts. It has shareholders in all these towns and in the villages under their administration. Another example is the Ramallah Summer Resorts Company, which has interest and property in both Ramallah and Jerusalem. What will be the fate of these companies and their shareholders, when the law is enforced, and how will their affairs be settled?

It is not easy to deduce or forecast what the Israeli planners have in mind but I doubt whether it will be in the interests of the Arab.

19. Articles 12-14 deal with Arab cooperative societies established in Jerusalem in the same way as companies are dealt with. All these societies are obliged to re-register at the Israeli courts in accordance with regulations issued by the Israeli Minister of labour, within a period not exceeding

six months.

20. Arab registers show that there are twenty cooperative societies in Jerusalem with a membership of 1,518. All these societies face the threat of either being directly subject to Israeli rule or of liquidating their affairs and leaving Jerusalem.

21. Article 15 deals with all tradesmen and craftsmen who, under Israeli law, require licenses to practise their trades or crafts. These must submit their applications for licenses within a period not exceeding six months. Anyone who fails to do so will not be allowed to continue in the practice of his craft or trade.

22. It is difficult in this rapid survey to determine the numbers of those to whom this article is applicable, for in order to determine their numbers, it is first necessary to know the trades and crafts that require such licenses under Israeli law, and then to conduct a census of all those engaged in such trades and crafts, and it is not possible to do this at short notice. However it seems to me that, if Jordanian law is used as a criterion, they probably amount to more than five thousands. They represent a large sector of the population; they are faced either with compulsory registration or winding up their affairs and leaving Jerusalem. The obtaining of licenses is, of course, compulsory, and the Israeli planners will claim that the fact that Arabs do obtain such licenses is another indication of their implicit acceptance of the annexation, and will use it for further deception and falsification of facts.

23. Article 16 deals with "lawyers." It regards a lawyer or judge residing in the area at the date of the application of the law as a member of the Israeli Chamber of Lawyers. This Article is ambiguous; it confronts the lawyers with a *fait accompli*. I feel that I should leave it for a lawyer to comment on at a future occasion.

24. Article 17 deals with holders of patents for inventions and commercial trade marks. It stipulates that they must re-register their inventions, and trade marks in accordance with Israeli laws and regulations and within a period not to exceed six months.

A lot lies concealed behind this Article. I do not want to make premature deductions or conjectures, but I feel that this Article was drafted with extremely bad intentions, and that it is calculated to injure the morale of the city and its

Arab character more than anything else.

25. Article 18 deals with building works. It stipulates that those who already have licences for building not yet begun, or for buildings that had been begun but had not yet been completed at the time the law came into force, must immediately submit official applications, in accordance with Israeli laws, for the renewal of these licenses, within a maximum period of one year. It is left to the authorities concerned to decide under what conditions new licenses shall be issued. In other words, building and builders become subject to Israeli laws with the result that they will be forced either to accord their implicit recognition to the annexation or to wind up their projects, sell out, and leave Jerusalem.

26. Article 19 allows the Israeli Prime Minister to issue regulations for a specific period of time permitting any Arab in the area to be appointed to the Israeli civil service, without insisting that he should first become an Israeli citizen. They hope by this means to make a show of tolerance and to refute accusations of Israeli pressure to force Arabs to change their nationality. All this is designed to delude the world into believing in their good faith and their desire for peaceful coexistence in the Holy City.

27. But the fact that the words "for a specific period" occur in this paragraph shows that there is another step or phase to follow, and that this is merely a temporary measure to serve a particular situation. Once they are sure that Arab civil servants will continue to work for them and for their ends, once they have achieved their aim of establishing their government and administration on firm foundations, they will show their true colors and their dupes will discover too late that they are blind instruments for the implementation of Israeli ends.

28. Article 20 empowers the Israeli Minister of Justice to lay down regulations as regards the substantive and local jurisdiction of the courts, and the execution of final judgements, and the recognition and confirmation of documents in the Jerusalem area.

The way this Article has been drafted makes it possible for the courts to try cases and deal with matters that arose before the occupation, so that it is greatly to be feared that they may develop into courts of retaliation.

29. Article 21 abrogates the illegal measures taken by the Custodian of Enemy Property before this law came into force.

30. This law concludes with Article 22, which authorises the Israeli Minister of Justice to enforce the law and to issue such regulations as he deems necessary to that end, in cooperation with such other Ministers as are in any way concerned with its enforcement.

This is a rapid survey of this law, which offers the Arab of Jerusalem the choice of either being gradually Judaised or leaving the city of Jerusalem—a bitter fate either way.

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Telegram From Shari'a Qadis and Muftis in Jerusalem and the West Bank to the Israeli Defence Minister Dayan Protesting Against the Practice of Jewish Religious Observances in the Ibrahimi Mosque.¹

Jerusalem, September 26, 1968

We have been informed that, on Monday and Tuesday, September 23 and 24, 1968, Jews prayed in the Ibrahimi Mosque at Hebron, and prevented Muslims from praying and worshipping there.

This sanctuary has been an Islamic mosque ever since its foundation, and none but Muslims may worship there.

This action on the part of the Jews, in the sight and hearing of the government, under its protection and in the presence of its representatives, is a flagrant and provocative assault on Muslim sentiment, in wanton disregard of the rights of Muslims in this mosque.

We demand that the offenders be punished and that steps be taken to prevent the recurrence of such incidents.

Signed:

Hilmi al-Muhtaseb, Acting Chief Qadi of the West Bank.

¹ Archives of the Institute for Palestine Studies.

Sa'id Abdullah Sabri, Qadi of Jerusalem.

Sa'ad al-Din al-Alami, Mufti of Jerusalem.

Muhammad As'ad al-Imam al-Husaini, Qadi of Ramallah.

Jum'a al-Salwadi, Qadi of Nablus.

Rajab Bayyud al-Tamimi, Qadi of Hebron.

Adli al-Jawhari, Qadi of Qalqiliya.

Muhammad Abu Farha, Qadi of Bethlehem.

Muhammad Sa'id al-Jamal, Deputy Qadi of Jericho.

Abd al-Hayy Arafa, Mufti of Hebron.

Tawfiq Mahmoud Jarran, Mufti of Jenine.

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Statement by the Jordanian Communist Party on the Strengthening of Resistance in Both Banks.² [Excerpt]

September 1968

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The people want a united national government, which will perform the following tasks:

1. At domestic level:—Reconstruct the Jordanian army on modern lines, improving its combat capacity, and supplying it with up to date, reliable arms from the Soviet Union.

2. Allow the people the free practice of democratic liberties and abolish all regulations and measures restricting these liberties.

3. Mobilise the Jordanian people, arming and training them so that they may constitute our organised and effective popular resistance. Organise civil defense, and raise its standard of efficiency, so that it may be capable of performing the tasks required of it.

4. Support the resistance of the people of the West Bank by all ways and means, financial aid to be carefully controlled, and all precautions taken to prevent its misappropriation.

5. Put the country's economy on a battle footing, and combat the waste and extravagance of state funds, conduct a campaign against the unemployment that is so widespread among

² *Al-Akhbar* (Beirut), 13/10/1968.

workers, peasants and refugees, and against the high cost of living and exorbitant rents.

7. Purge the government cadres of suspect, corrupt and venal elements.

8. Pay serious attention to the living, health, educational, and housing conditions of the refugees, to prevent their becoming dehumanised; combat the theft and misappropriation of their rations.

II. At Arab Level:

1. Employ all means to strengthen Arab solidarity, on the basis of the struggle against imperialism, colonialism and Zionism, with the aim of eliminating the consequences of aggression. Establish true brotherly cooperation, military, political and economic, with the Arab countries surrounding Israel.

2. Reject all unilateral peace settlements based on surrender. Insist that it is essential that the armies of occupation should evacuate all Arab territories, and that the sights of the Palestinian Arab people be fully maintained.

III. At International Level:

Pursue a decisive national policy against imperialism and Zionism, and strengthen the ties of economic cultural friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union, the socialist countries, and all other friendly countries.

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Speech From the Throne Delivered by the Jordanian Crown Prince Hasan at the Opening of the Second Regular Session of the Ninth National Assembly.¹ [Excerpts]

Amman, October 1, 1968

Senators and Deputies,

Before we survey the events of the past year and draft the main lines of our advance during

the year ahead, we must take into consideration a number of facts, we must examine them and ask the world to examine them earnestly and in good faith.

1. The Israeli aggression, known as the June 1967 aggression, against the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and other Arab countries, constituted a new high by the colonialist tide of the world Zionist Movement. This movement is even striving to occupy more territory through the use of force and to dominate the Middle East area by building up a superior military force in Israel which will enable it, sooner or later, to gain access to the sources of wealth in the area and to control its affairs and the destinies of its countries and peoples in conformity with the requirements of the movement's long-term plans.

2. The adoption of the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967 was a first attempt on the part of the world organisation to eliminate the consequences of this aggression, and a preliminary formula for the refutation of the arguments which Israel has always employed to justify her persistently aggressive conduct in the Arab World. One of the most important principles affirmed by this resolution was its declaration of the illegality of acquiring territory by force of arms, which formed the basis of the resolution's call for withdrawal from all the areas occupied since June 5, 1967. Equally important was the resolution's call for a solution to be found for that great human problem, the problem of the refugees, which has been waiting for justice from the world for twenty years, and has grown even greater and become an even heavier burden on those involved in it, and on our country, as a result of the June War.

3. Jordan's attitude to this Security Council resolution derives from the fact that we are advocates of peace, being a peace-loving people and nation. It also derives from the requirements of the resolution itself, and is at the same time in full agreement and harmony with the common Arab attitude to this resolution.

We have declared that we accept the Security Council resolution. We have agreed to implement it as a whole and in detail. But we have affirmed, and we hereby reaffirm, that there must be a total and comprehensive Israeli withdrawal from all the Arab territories and areas occupied as a result of the June War. Any attempt by Israel

¹ *Al-Dustur* (Amman), 2/10/1968.

to achieve territorial gains or expansionist designs either by implementing this resolution or by not doing so, will make her guilty of infringing this resolution and of violating its principles, and will thereby disclose to the world the true nature of her designs, and make her alone responsible for impeding the peaceful settlement which the resolution has in mind.

4. Israel's attitude to the Security Council resolution has been the unyielding attitude of one who has been so blinded by the intoxication of military victory that he is no longer capable of seeing things as they really are. What is more, it is an attitude that is totally inconsistent with the whole trend of world public opinion, which Israel has misled for so many years by portraying herself as the weak, innocent lamb, and the Arabs as pugnacious aggressors in whose intentions peace has no place whatsoever. Because of this attitude Israel has defied the provisions of the resolution, thereby destroying all possibility of peace, and intoxication with victory has led her leaders to imagine that they could dictate their will from a position of strength and by virtue of their occupation of Arab territory. They have refused to accept the resolution; they have refused to commit themselves to its implementation, and proceeded to talk about direct negotiations with the Arab governments, insisting that they would not define their attitude to the withdrawal called for by the Security Council resolution until the Arab side submitted and accepted negotiation. In other words, it has now become clear to the world that, whereas the Arabs are in favour of peace based on right and justice, Israel seeks a peace based on humiliation and submission.

5. Not content with going on record as adopting this attitude, with all it implies in the way of contempt for the world organisation and defiance of its resolutions and principles, and all it involves in the way of scorn for world public opinion and insistence on imperilling peace in this area and in the whole world, Israel has, for the past several months, been carrying out a series of daily attacks on this country. In the morning she bombards peaceable towns and small villages with artillery fire and aerial bombing, while in the evening she uses napalm to burn the camps of the refugees whom she has already uprooted from their homes, farms and lands, little caring

if among her innocent victims are infants at the breast or the old and infirm.

Furthermore, Israel has been evicting large numbers of our people from the West Bank, driving them across the river, to swell the numbers of the old refugees, thereby intensifying the human tragedy with a new toll of victims and suffering.

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Senators and Deputies,

Our Arab policy has always been firmly based on our belief in the unity of our nation in all parts of the Arab world. With this as a starting point, the government has always endeavoured to foster cooperation and brotherly relations between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and other Muslim and Arab countries. Our country has always been an inseparable part of the greater Arab homeland. Our Jordanian family, in both banks, is a part of the Arab nation, united to it in affliction and in hope, in destiny and progress.

In the international field, the government has striven to maintain balance and friendship in our relations with all countries. It has always adopted an attitude calculated to consolidate the principles of peace and moderation in international policy.

Senators and Deputies,

We have pledged ourselves before God to continue to build and plan, to continue to strive and struggle to recover our beloved homeland and to rescue right and dignity. While offering our full support to all true and honourable efforts to achieve a just peace, we hereby frankly and explicitly declare that we shall continue to hold fast to the sacred soil of our sacred homeland like men and heroes, in defence of our existence, and the existence of all Arabs, preferring to die at any moment rather than to relinquish one jot of our legitimate rights.

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Reply by the Jordanian Senate to the Speech From the Throne.¹ [Excerpt]

Amman, October 7, 1968

Your Royal Highness,

The Senate shares the government's view of the Security Council Resolution, and joins it in calling upon the enemy to withdraw from all the territories he has occupied since the 5th of June. The Senate also agrees with the government that Israel's withdrawal from all the lands she has occupied must be total and complete.

It feels that Israel's continued aggression and attacks against this country, her expulsion of large numbers of the population of the West Bank, her disregard of the Security Council resolutions on these attacks, and her defiance of the General Assembly's resolution on Jerusalem, should spur us on to redouble our efforts to complete our preparations for the liberation and defense of our country. It makes it incumbent on us to ensure that every member of this nation is capable of meeting his responsibilities and of performing his national duty to fight to the best of his ability.

This was what the speech from the throne meant by the necessity for ensuring strength and impregnability in all fields and at all levels. The Senate hopes that the constructive, positive interaction between the powers of the state as a whole and the services connected thereto provided by the government to our brothers, the refugees and displaced persons alike, will aim at making these capable of performing their national duty in the battle of liberation in a manner compatible with the responsibilities imposed on them by the nature of the present stage.

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Reply by the Jordanian Parliament to the Speech From the Throne.² [Excerpts]

Amman, October 7, 1968

In the name of the proud Jordanian Arab people we hereby declare that, God willing, this country, under the leadership of King Hussein, and thanks to its undaunted armed forces, to its sons who are carrying the banner of struggle and self-sacrifice, and to the faith and determination of its people, will never bow down to aggressors and usurpers. It will not lay down its arms or desist from the struggle until the liberation of usurped Arab territory is achieved, the holy places and the Aqsa Mosque are rescued, and the demands of our nation are realised in full.

The critical situation which Jordan and the Arab nation are going through and the grave phase through which the cause of Palestine, which is the cause of all Arabs and Muslims, is passing, demand that we should exert the utmost efforts to ensure the mobilisation of the potentials and resources of the Muslim nation in support of Jordan and the cause of Palestine which, as far as Jordan is concerned, is a matter of life and death. The Arabs have ample and conclusive indications of the extent to which the Islamic countries can serve Arab interests and support and aid their causes in general and the cause of Palestine in particular, at the United Nations, in the international, political, and information fields, and at Arab and Islamic level. All these considerations should impel us to make the greatest possible efforts to strengthen the bonds of cooperation and brotherhood with the countries of the Islamic World, to which we offer our profoundest gratitude for the part they are playing in defending Arabism and Palestine and for their devoted endeavours to protect and preserve the Arab and Islamic character of Jerusalem.

Your Royal Highness,

It is with great satisfaction that we note the government's foreign policy and its efforts to preserve equilibrium and friendliness in our

¹ *Al-Dustur* (Amman), 8/10/1968. See *Supra*.² *Ibid.* See *ante*, doc. 389.

external relations with foreign countries and to consolidate the principle of equilibrium and moderation in international policy, and we express our grateful appreciation of the attitude adopted by friendly countries which stand beside us and support our rights and claims at international gatherings and elsewhere.

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Statement by the Palestine Commando Organisations on the Peaceful Settlement of the Middle East Crisis.¹ [Excerpts]

Amman, October 15, 1968

The Palestinian commando and popular organisations met at a meeting held in the office of the Palestine Liberation Organisation in Amman in the evening of Monday, 14 October, 1968. They reviewed the present critical situation, in which the cause of Palestine and commando action are being made the object of attempts to strike at commando action in preparation for the liquidation of the Palestinian cause.

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The Security Council resolution adopted on November 22, 1967 is designed to bring about the full liquidation of the Palestinian cause. Its implementation would involve the termination of the state of war with Israel and the establishment of agreed secure frontiers and permanent peace with her. All this would be followed by actual recognition of Israel, which would enable her to penetrate deep into the Arab homeland and to control its destiny and to strike at commando action, thereby putting an end to the Palestinian revolution of liberation to safeguard Israel's security. It would also involve surrendering the heart of the Arab homeland, which would thereafter be a permanent base for aggression and expansion and mean that the Palestine problem would be reduced to the status of a mere problem of refugees. These organisations affirm their categorical rejection of the above-mentioned Security Council resolution and their rejection of the peaceful settlements proposed by various

quarters, for these could only lead to the liquidation of the Palestine problem and the Palestinian revolution, which represents the determination of the Palestinian Arab nation to continue their struggle for national liberation and the return of the Palestinians to their usurped country, and for the elimination, from the heart of the Palestine Arab homeland, of the imperialist Zionist invasion. The Palestinian Arab people, who alone have the right to determine their own destiny, have time and again declared their rejection of such settlements; they will not accept any substitute for the complete liberation of their usurped homeland.

In view of the gravity of the situation facing commando action, the Palestinian struggle and the entire Palestinian cause at the present juncture, the Palestinian organisations and popular groupings call upon all citizens to rally round commando action and join the commandos in resisting any attempt to impede them and to impede their continued performance of their sacred task of liberation.

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Statement by the Palestine National Liberation Movement "Fateh" to the United Nations on the Legality and Objectives of the Palestinian Resistance.²

October 17, 1968

In view of the fact that the United Nations General Assembly is now in session in New York, and has been discussing the Middle East crisis arising from the iniquitous Zionist aggression against the Arabs in June 1967, the Palestinian National Liberation Movement, *Fateh*, wishes to inform the United Nations and its member states of the following:

1. The movement of Palestinian resistance to the colonialist Zionist invasion of Palestine has been in existence since 1918, when Britain occupied Palestine and proceeded to carry out the Zionist-colonialist conspiracy for turning Palestine into a Jewish state by removing its Arab popu-

¹ *Al-Nahar* (Beirut), 16/10/1968.

² Palestine National Liberation Movement, *Fateh, Al-Kitab Al-Sanawi*, 1968 (Beirut, 1968), pp. 147-148.

lation, the legitimate owners and original inhabitants of the country. For some years after the disaster that befell Palestine in 1948, although the will of the Palestinian people to resist remained as strong as ever, the insurmountable difficulties arising from a situation that was unfairly weighted against them led to Palestinian resistance being shelved.

2. However, the Palestinian Arab people were determined to liberate and return to their homeland and to recover their legitimate rights there. A number of them renewed Palestinian resistance to the foreign occupation of Palestine, and in 1965 the Palestine Liberation Movement, known as *Fateh*, was formed to undertake this task. Ever since then it has continued to perform its duty of holy war and self-sacrifice, and it will continue to do so until the demands of the Palestinian people are satisfied.

3. The Palestinian movement of resistance to the foreign occupation of Palestine is a legitimate movement. It is the duty of all peoples and countries that love peace and justice, that believe in the rights of peoples and the principle of self-determination, that subscribe to the United Nations Charter, the Declaration of Human Rights and the provisions of international law, to support and back Palestinian resistance. By doing this they will dissociate themselves from those who are now opposing and seeking to discredit it—colonialists and enemies of truth and humanity, actuated by nefarious ambitions and aspirations.

The Palestinian resistance directed by *Fateh* closely resembles the intrepid resistance movements against German occupation that arose in parts of Europe, such as France, Italy, Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, Rumania and elsewhere. All the Free World and the allied countries came to the support of these movements, and provided them with aid and assistance, regarding them as legitimate movements entitled to support from free men throughout the world.

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Letter From the U.A.R. Foreign Minister Riyad to the U.N. Envoy Jarring Concerning the Peaceful Settlement of the Middle East Crisis.¹

Cairo, October 19, 1968

Dear Mr. Ambassador Gunnar Jarring,
(Highly Confidential)

The attitude of the United Arab Republic vis-à-vis the peace settlement approved by the Security Council on November 22, 1967 is well-known to you, and I also stated it in my address to the General Assembly on October 10, 1968. I will once more summarise it as follows:

(a) The United Arab Republic accepts the Security Council Resolution adopted on November 22, 1967.

(b) The United Arab Republic is ready to carry out its obligations arising from this resolution.

(c) We feel that you should lay down a time schedule for the implementation of all the clauses of the resolution.

(d) We feel that the implementation of the resolution should be under the supervision and the guarantee of the Security Council.

You will recall that in our previous meetings I informed you of our views on all of the clauses of this resolution and on the manner in which they can be implemented within the framework of a time schedule.

What I said in my speech to the General Assembly on October 10, about Israel's aggression against three Arab states and her attitude to the Security Council Resolution, still stands.

We consider that the continued occupation by Israeli forces of Arab territories constitutes a continued aggression against the sovereignty and security of the territories of three member states of the United Nations.

Every day that passes without the withdrawal of the Israeli forces from Arab territory is a new aggression and a continued violation of the Charter, and at the same time creates a situation involving the gravest consequences as regards peace and security in the Middle East area.

¹ *Al-Ahram* (Cairo), 8/11/1968.

It is now clear to us, as a result of your recent contacts with Israel, that she still refuses to accept and implement the Security Council resolution and to carry out her obligations arising from this resolution.

Moreover, Israel has so far refused to answer the repeated questions you have asked her about "secure frontiers." It is now clear that the reason for Israel's refusal to answer your question is to be sought in her expansionist policy aimed at the annexation of Arab territories through her aggression of June 5, 1967—a policy that is prescribed by the United Nations Charter and that is in contradiction to the Security Council resolution, which reaffirmed the illegality of acquiring territory through war.

We further observe that Israel continues completely to ignore the rights of Palestinian refugees as established by the United Nations, refusing to implement the United Nations resolutions on the refugees.

I should like once again to affirm that the achievement of peace in the Middle East requires that Israel should be checked in her aggression against the Arab countries, that she should repudiate once and for all her expansionist policy, and that she should declare her willingness to implement the peace settlement approved by the Security Council on November 22, 1967.

We still hope that you will clarify Israel's attitude as regards the following matters:

(a) Will Israel implement the Security Council Resolution of November 22, 1967?

(b) Will Israel withdraw her forces from the Arab territories she occupied as a result of her aggression of June 5, 1967?

A declaration by Israel of her readiness to implement the United Nations resolution and to withdraw her forces from all the Arab territories she occupied as a result of her aggression against the Arab countries on June 5, 1967, could lead to peace in the Middle East area.

I should like to assure you that the United Arab Republic will continue to cooperate with you in the performance of your mission, hoping at the same time that we may receive from you answers to the above questions.

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News Conference Statement and Remarks by a Spokesman of the Palestine National Liberation Movement "Fateh" on the Peaceful Settlement of the Middle East Crisis.¹

[Excerpts]

Beirut, October 1968

Arab masses:

In the aftermath of the June 5 war, at a time when the Arab nation seemed incapable of confronting the forces of Zionism and imperialism, the Palestinian revolution was the main factor in prompting the Arab people to regain their self-confidence and recover their pride in their history of resistance, struggle and sacrifice. In doing so, the Palestinian revolution has been able to penetrate the iron curtain imposed by the Zionist movement on world public opinion, and has begun to reveal to all and sundry the falsity of the fabrications and lies which predatory Zionism has heaped on our just cause. The forward move of the Palestinian people and their armed uprising in resistance to the new as well as the old occupation, has aroused the hatred of imperialism, the ally of Zionism, for our people and their revolution. It has therefore begun to conspire against our nation, employing the slogan of so-called peaceful or political solutions.

Before resisting these grave attempts aimed at nipping our revolution in the bud and crushing the free will of our people, we resolve and affirm, in the name of the Palestinian revolution, that we are not opposed to peace and stability in the area. What we are opposed to is surrender and acceptance of the *fait accompli*. Our revolution emerged for the sake of just and benevolent peace and it is now engaged in a struggle with an alien enemy imposed upon us by the force of a Zionist imperialist conspiracy. The Palestinian revolution, which derives its ideals and values from the history of our nation, rejects in principle all ideas of ugly fanaticism, odious sectarianism and racial trends which are the very foundations of the Zionist movement and its alien existence on our occupied land. The Palestinian revolution also announces that it is not directed against the Jews

¹ Archives of the Institute for Palestine Studies.

as adherents of a religious denomination, but that it is fighting and will continue to fight Zionism as an imperialist movement which is an embodiment of neo-Nazism, and which is forever seeking to occupy more Arab territories and evict more Arab inhabitants. The Palestinian revolution is fighting the Zionist presence which must be uprooted from our occupied land so that peace and security will prevail in the Arab part of the world.

Our struggle strives to liberate the Jews themselves from the strangle-hold of intellectual terrorism and racial exploitation practised by the Zionist movement against world Jewry. Our revolution, which believes in the freedom and dignity of man, therefore gives priority to the consolidation of bases through which it can uproot racialism and end all forms of occupation by Zionist settlers. At the same time it is drafting a humanitarian plan which will allow the Jews to live in dignity, as they have always lived, under the aegis of an Arab state and within the framework of an Arab society.

This is the solution which the Palestinian people presents to all those who trade in political solutions. This is the solution in which our humanitarian revolution believes and does its best to achieve.

Struggling masses of the Arab nation,

With regard to the peaceful settlements which are currently being presented at the United Nations, within the framework of the Security Council resolution and the Jarring mission, or the solutions being presented which bear the stamp of bargaining over the rights of the Palestinian people, we declare our rejection of these solutions and our determination to resist them with all our might because they all agree on one point—the establishment of peaceful co-existence between the Zionist presence and the Arab governments at the cost of sacrificing the Palestinian people and their armed revolution. The proposed solutions deal with partial problems concerning secure frontiers, freedom of navigation, the problem of the refugees and the partition of territory. They ignore the essence of the existing conflict between the Palestinian people and the occupying Zionist enemy. They ignore the fact that the real issue is one of liberating all the territory and not merely eliminating the consequences of aggression. They ignore the fact that our revolution began

before June 5, and has since then escalated to confirm the validity of our viewpoint on the nature of the aggressive Zionist presence and to confirm the soundness of the method laid down by *Fateh* three years ago, of popular armed confrontation of this entity.

Masses throughout the Arab world,

At a time when there is much talk of peaceful settlement and United Nations mediation, we find "Israel" behaving arrogantly and defiantly, devoting herself exclusively to arming herself and strengthening her military power, from her firm belief in a policy of aggression and usurpation, and the legitimacy of force and domination. The Phantom deal which has been announced, and other deals which are being made in absolute secrecy, are clear evidence of the aggressive intentions of the Zionist entity, which is conspiring against our nation on behalf of criminal imperialism.

Arab masses:

The Palestinian revolution, which is an expression of the profoundest feelings of the Palestinian people, is today the master of its fate. The era of tutelage over the Palestinian problem has ended; and the time has passed when the fate of the Palestinian problem was determined in the absence of the Palestinian people.

The proposed peaceful solutions involve the crushing of our people's hopes of complete liberation and placing an effective check on their aspirations to recover their homeland. These solutions also mean that tutelage still exists and is still imposed on this people. For all these reasons, and on behalf of the Palestinian revolution and the steadfast Palestinian people, we announce our intention of taking the following action:

First: To reject the Security Council resolution and all Zionist imperialist plans or draft proposals put forward at the United Nations and elsewhere, and to appeal to all Arab countries to announce their explicit rejection of these plans and the termination of Jarring's Middle East mission.

Secondly: To appeal to Arab governments to conduct a free plebiscite on proposed solutions calling for surrender, so that the Palestinian problem may remain in the hands of the people who will determine what they wish and select the course they want.

Thirdly: To warn those quarters which conspire against the Palestinian revolution to stop their repeated attempts to conspire against our people and to impede their advance, because they consider the revolution as an obstacle in the way of solutions calling for surrender.

Fourthly: To appeal to the Arab governments to support the Palestinian revolution and refrain from obstructing, by any means or under any pretext, Palestinian revolutionaries and the course they have chosen, and also to appeal to the Arab masses to protect the Palestinian revolution and supply it with all the potentials and resources that will enable it to continue and escalate its activities.

Fifthly: To reject at all costs any bargaining over the termination of armed struggle and to consider any interference in the affairs of the Palestinian revolution as alignment with the Zionist enemy. Such interference will be opposed by the Palestinian and Arab masses with all possible violence.

Sixthly: To appeal to friendly countries in the world to change their attitude to the Palestinian-Zionist conflict to one of support for the Palestinian people and their right to decide their destiny through armed struggle, and to appeal to these countries to provide the Palestinian people with such material and moral aid as they give to liberating revolutions in Vietnam, Rhodesia, Angola, and other armed popular revolutions.

Seventhly: To call on all fighters to rise to their responsibilities and to adhere to the moral principles which must characterise true revolutionaries, rejecting rancour and differences and marching forward to the battlefield, the honourable meeting place of all fighters.

Arab masses and people of Palestine,

The Palestinian revolution, whose torch has been lighted by *Fateh*, gives its pledge to the Palestinian people and the Arab nation, that it will protect and uphold these demands and revolutions with the blood of its sons who have taken up arms, and will never lay them down until the land of Palestine is liberated from the last remnants of Nazi Zionism. It will resist all attitudes involving surrender, and thereby fulfill the pledge of those revolutionaries who have fallen and those who still stand fast, heroically

looking forward to the day of victory, the day of genuine peace based on justice, freedom and the dignity of man.

Q.—How should we describe the present relations between Jordan and yourselves after recent news of the occurrence of differences between the two sides?

A.—There are forces in Jordan that are trying to put obstacles in our way and to poison relations between us and Amman. We have recently succeeded in crushing the attempts of these forces. However, we expect these forces to renew their efforts at conspiracy.

Q.—Is there a conflict between you and Cairo?

A.—There is no contradiction between us and the Arab countries that are working for liberation.

Q.—Have you contacted the Arab countries to reject the proposed peaceful solutions?

A.—The activities of the commandos and those who are killed in battle every day confirm the rejection of these solutions. This is the most eloquent declaration of refusal.

Q.—Do you believe that political settlement is imminent, and has this prompted you to take the initiative in announcing rejection of peaceful solutions?

A.—Don't forget that we are now witnessing a spate of political solutions at the United Nations in New York. What I want to say is that we are not opposed to peace and security, but we do say clearly and frankly that we are opposed to surrender and acceptance of the *fait accompli*. We are not opposed to the Jews as members of a religious denomination, but we do fight and shall fight Zionism as an imperialist movement which embodies neo-Nazism, and we shall fight the Zionist entity. Our movement is an operation to redress the perversion of human principles in our occupied land, and to liberate the Jews themselves from the domination of the Zionist movement, and to restore their humanity.

Our movement is a national humanitarian movement which seeks the construction of an open Palestine instead of a closed Israel. In this open Palestine even Jews will be liberated from the oppression of Zionism.

Q.—Could you explain some of the characteristics of this open Palestine?

*A.—*The image of the open society for which we are fighting will become clear in the course of our armed struggle. It is unrealistic, at this point, to draw a detailed picture of this society.

Q.—Can your statement be considered a threat to Arab governments?

A.—Fateh is an unpretentious movement and it does not threaten anyone. All it does is to draw the attention of the Arab peoples to what is being hatched in secret. It is up to those peoples to exert pressure and to resist such solutions.

Q.—How far have the projects to unite commando action got? Why have not the commando organisations united?

A.—Fateh will produce a detailed plan to unite commando action on a realistic basis. This plan will soon be presented to the main commando organisations for consideration.

Q.—A commando operation is sometimes attributed to more than one commando organisation.

*A.—*A commando operation is the work of commandos, no matter to which organisation they belong. What is important is that the operation should be undertaken and succeed, and that it should be attributed to the Palestinian people and to the Palestinian armed struggle.

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Statement by the Palestine Liberation Organisation on the Formation of a Council for the Military Coordination of Commando Organisations.¹

Amman, October 20, 1968

It has been agreed, at a meeting held at the office of the Palestine Liberation Organisation in Amman, to form a council for the military coordination of the following commando organisations:

1. The Palestine Liberation Organisation.
2. The Palestine National Liberation Movement.
3. Vanguard of the Popular War of Liberation.

It has been agreed, moreover, to leave the door open to any other organisation which may wish to join this council.

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Statement by the Official Spokesman of the Syrian Foreign Ministry on the Palestine Problem.²

Damascus, October 23, 1968

At 10.30 a.m. on October 23 1968 Dr. Ibrahim Makhus, Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister, attended by the Secretary-General of the Foreign Ministry, the Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, and the Head of the Arab World Department, summoned the heads of the Arab diplomatic missions. He communicated to them the anxiety felt by the Syrian Arab Republic at the present state of Arab affairs, what is happening in New York as regards the Palestine problem, and the successive reports of further concessions, and of the possibility that certain parties may be intending to liquidate the Palestine problem.

He asked to be informed of the precise official attitudes of the Arab governments as regards the latest developments.

He also emphasised the necessity for all the vast potentials of the Arabs to be placed at the disposal of the battle of destiny, and for frank dealing with the masses who, he said, should be allotted the principal role in the confrontation of Zionist and imperialist designs.

The Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister also informed the heads of the Arab diplomatic missions that it was on this basis that the government of the Syrian Arab Republic would determine its attitude to all Arab countries, and that it would be perfectly frank with the Arab masses on all subjects without mincing matters, for the

¹ *Al-Dustur* (Amman), 21/10/1968.

² *Al-Ba'th* (Damascus), 24/10/1968.

question was closely connected with the existence and the destiny of the Arab people, so that nothing but the unvarnished truth could be tolerated.

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Memorandum by the Syrian Foreign Ministry to the Arab League Secretariat on the Middle East Crisis.¹ [Excerpts]

Damascus, October 26, 1968

3. The Syrian Arab Republic has declared its rejection of all [peaceful settlement] proposals, particularly the British proposal. It will not accept any formula that makes the withdrawal of aggressor forces from Arab territories subject to any conditions. For the restrictions imposed upon those who were the victims of aggression by the British proposal can only be regarded as a reward to the aggressor and as constituting a serious precedent in international life. Indeed, this proposal would open the door to all adventurers and invaders in the contemporary world, allowing them to achieve their ambitions by force, to imperil world peace and to expand through occupation, relying on the support they receive from the countries that share their views and opinions. Moreover, this proposal completely ignores the existence of the Palestinian Arab people, and is a scheme to liquidate their cause, their entity, and their existence as a people, as if it were a commodity put up for sale, and to impart legality to the Zionists' settling colonialism in the Arab land of Palestine.

5. Report after report is coming from the United Nations Headquarters and elsewhere to the effect that a move towards the enforcement of the so-called peaceful settlement of the imperialist Israeli aggression is now being made, in the form of negotiations between Israel and certain Arab countries, for the implementation of the United Nations resolution referred to above. This being the case, the Foreign Ministry of the Syrian Arab Republic wishes to state unequivocally that, in its view, this involves the successful culmination of the imperialist Israeli aggression, the realisation of all that the aggressors and their imperialist allies aim at, and the perpetration of the colonialist Zionist presence. For it will lead to the legalisation and recognition of this presence, and to the recognition of such frontiers as Israel herself may choose in occupied territory, whether in Palestine or in some other Arab state.

6. Moreover this would constitute an admission of the obliteration of the Palestinian identity and the existence of the Palestinian Arab people and a wanton disregard of all its sacred rights. The Syrian Arab Republic reaffirms that all these solutions involving surrender can never restore to the Arab people its rights and its dignity, nor leave it any possibility of hope in the future. On the contrary, they would plunge it into the depths of despair and frustration and shatter its aspirations to a free and honourable life.

The only alternative to these policies is to reject the Security Council resolution and terminate the mission of the United Nations envoy, to support Palestinian Arab resistance with all available resources and to mobilise all Arab potentials to repel aggression and liberate the usurped Arab territory, which Zionist colonialism has defiled by its presence and its crimes.

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The Amiri Speech at the Opening of the Third Session of the Second Legislative Term of the Kuwaiti National Assembly.² [Excerpt]

Kuwait, October 29, 1968

Foreign Policy

Honourable Members:

Sixteen months have passed since the Zionist aggression in the summer of last year, and yet there is no clear and definite proof that Israel intends to withdraw from the Arab territories she has occupied or to give up Jerusalem and the

¹ *Al-Ba'th* (Damascus), 27/10/1968.

² Archives of the Institute for Palestine Studies.

Islamic and Christian shrines in it. Israel continues to reject implementation of the United Nations resolutions, including those pertaining to the Palestinian refugees, as well as the unanimous Security Council resolution of November 22 last year, regarding the Middle East problem, emphasising thereby her imperialistic intentions and her expansionist designs.

Consequently, the United Nations envoy to the Middle East has not been able to achieve any significant progress in carrying out his mission. However, not only has Arab endurance in the face of aggression denied Israel the opportunity she has been seeking to dictate her terms to the Arabs, but the Palestinian resistance movement, with its heroic struggle against occupation has also added an effective and positive element to the Palestinian cause which has won the admiration and regard of the world.

We have fulfilled our responsibilities as regards supporting Arab endurance, and we shall continue to do our duty in full and abide by all our commitments. We also reaffirm our support and full backing for the Palestinian resistance and its just struggle against Israeli occupation for the sake of recovering legitimate Arab rights.

The convening of the Arab League Council in Cairo in its fiftieth session early last month was the first opportunity for the Arab Foreign Ministers since the Khartoum Conference in August 1967¹ to discuss the situation and evaluate all its aspects prior to their attending the current General Assembly session of the United Nations. The Foreign Ministers, within the framework of the Arab League, adopted several resolutions which included calling upon all Arab governments to consolidate the Jordan front and to continue backing the armed struggle of the Palestinian Arabs.²

Now that the world has realised the magnitude of the danger threatening it if the situation in the Middle East remains unchanged, we deem it necessary for all Arab states to continue their military preparations for confronting Zionist expansion and eliminating the consequences of aggression. Meanwhile, we watch with concern the efforts now being made at the United Nations

with a view to reaching a comprehensive solution for the Palestine issue on the basis of justice and right.

There is no doubt that Israel's acquisition of modern jet fighter aircraft is nothing but an encouragement for her to continue in her aggression and obduracy, and this in turn will render the prevailing situation more complicated and diminish the prospects of peace in the area.

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Interview Granted by the Iraqi President Al-Bakr to the Algerian Magazine Al-Jaish.³
[Excerpt]

Baghdad, October 29, 1968

Q.—The problem of Palestine and the elimination of the consequences of aggression—how in your opinion, can it be solved?

A.—The problem of Palestine is the product of the conspiracy between colonialism and world Zionism, which in 1948 succeeded, in collusion with treacherous rulers, in plunging the poisoned dagger of Israel into the heart of our greater Arab homeland.

Since that inauspicious date, the Arab nation has been exposed to a series of iniquitous acts of aggression, the last of which was the aggression of June 5, 1967 which intensified the disaster and increased the area of occupied Arab territory.

To be content to eliminate the consequences of the June aggression, and no more, is unacceptable, as it does not go to the root of the question. The latest aggression is simply a new manifestation of the expansionist character of Israel. The essence of the problem is the aggressive Zionist presence in Arab territory in Palestine.

¹ See *International Documents on Palestine, 1967*, pp. 655-657.

² See *ante*, doc. 372.

³ *Al-Jumhuriyya* (Baghdad), 29/10/1968.

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Attitude of the Jordanian Communist Party to the General Struggle Against Occupation and to Commando Activity.¹ [Excerpts]

October 1968

Our carefully studied policy, which is far removed from the extremism of the petty bourgeoisie, has helped us to maintain our cadres during the period of occupation, and to achieve a high level of consciousness in the ranks of the people. We have endured pressures exerted by certain quarters, which have sought to lure us into actions for which time was not yet ripe. What I want to stress here is the fact that our Party plays an extremely significant role in the occupied territories. The success or failure of our task there would have its effect on our future and on the future of the communist movement in the other Arab countries.

The defeatist trend which emerged immediately after the occupation has not made any noticeable progress. Those who advocate it would like to avoid a struggle west of the River Jordan. For our part, however, the future of this struggle is something vital. Our main object of concern is not Israel's illegal activities, nor her attempts to drive out the people, nor the confiscation of property and the persecution that are having their effect on our comrades. Our main object of concern is the future of Jordan when the territories occupied now under occupation have been recovered. The occupation does not affect the attitude of the rulers of Jordan. Such of them as owe allegiance to imperialism will seek closer ties with imperialism, they will erase the Palestine problem and encourage Israel in her expansionist objectives.

The re-organisation that is taking place west of the Jordan, such as the establishment of new trades unions, and teachers and students' associations, tends to encourage similar moves in the unoccupied areas. The authorities cannot interfere publicly, since these organisations perform

their tasks under the slogan of national unity, and join in the resistance movement.

Moreover, our work in the occupied territories has compelled the Amman authorities to relax the pressure on the Communist Party. The anti-communist line is not as obvious as it was previously; the authorities are not enforcing the anti-communist legislation, and, within certain limits, are permitting the exercise of democratic liberties.

Ruling circles are aware of the important role that our Party is playing in the occupied territories, some of them even going as far as to admit it publicly.

The Israeli Communist Party is enjoying increasing respect, not only in the occupied territories. This is due to the vigorous efforts of its members in the Knesset, to its demand for the sovereignty of law and to its dissemination of the printed word in the occupied territories, although the communist press there is semi-illegal, as the Israeli authorities enforce the Jordanian anti-communist laws. There is full understanding between us and our Israeli colleagues, and we cooperate with them whenever possible.

Similarly, we cooperate with the National Front in the Gaza Strip, where Marxist elements play an important role. Our contacts have proved their usefulness, and we must therefore expand them.

We have now stated the principal fields in which we are active, and given our appraisal of the situation in the occupied and unoccupied territories of Jordan. To complete this report, we must study the guerrilla organisations, which are receiving a great deal of publicity on the radio and in the press abroad. The masses view them with sympathy, as do the governments of the Arab countries.

We can understand this feeling on the part of the masses. The military defeat, followed by the expulsion of hundreds of thousands of people, the material and moral losses, the feeling of national humiliation, particularly in the ranks of the petty bourgeoisie, the lack of a national government in Jordan capable of pursuing a positive domestic and foreign policy, not to mention the slow rate at which the progressive regimes are carrying out the operation of reconstruction

¹ *Al-Hurriyya* (Beirut), April 14, 1969, p. 14. The excerpts are taken from an article by Fahmi al-Salfiti, the Secretary-General of the Central Committee of the Jordanian Communist Party.

and the unrealised hopes that had been reposed in them and their military strength—all these have aroused a reaction in the masses.

The masses are therefore being attracted to the movements that call for armed action rather than to those that advocate a peaceful settlement. The masses attach great importance to the resistance organisations because they believe that guerrilla action can recover our honour and avenge our national humiliation. This sympathy with the guerrillas is not incompatible with our Party's attitude and slogans, despite the fact that any concentration on armed action tends to reduce political activity among the masses.

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We have made it clear to the members of these organisations, through our contacts with them and through our dialogues with the various elements in their command that our attitude is based on the following principles:

1. That conditions are not yet ripe, either in Jordan or in any other Arab country, for commando action, whether inside or outside the occupied territory.

2. That the commando organisations have established their bases outside the occupied territories; hence their activity is always akin to the activity of the commandos of the regular Arab armies.

3. That commando action differs from the armed struggle being carried on by the people in the occupied territory. To support the commando organisations is to support unrealistic political objectives, which we do not accept. The methods they follow in their struggle, with their strongly extremist complexion, are incompatible with objective circumstances. They tend to isolate the resistance movement from the realities of life in Jordan and in the rest of the Arab world, and also from anti-imperialist movements. Furthermore, they neglect political and popular activity, and are opposed to the existence of political parties at the present stage.

4. It is the progressive Arab countries, like Syria and Egypt, that determine power relations in the area, and are aware of the serious consequences that might result from the provocation of the enemy. This is why they are opposed to commando action in areas adjoining the cease-

fire line. Their support of commando organisations is simply a tactical move to gain the sympathy of the masses, or perhaps to conceal a weakness on their part which they are loth to expose.

On the other hand, Saudi Arabia's and Kuwait's support of the commandos, and the size of the contributions made by Saudi amirs and prominent personalities in Kuwait, and the support enjoyed by *Fateh*, in Saudi Arabia in particular, are clear indications of the relations between certain *Fateh* leaders and these two countries, and explain why Saudi Arabia and Kuwait back the commandos. In our opinion, the aim of these two countries is to distract the attention of public opinion from their relations with imperialism. This would account for their slackness in contributing to the common war effort, while at the same time they encourage Jordan to be extremist. All this provides the other side with new pretexts to justify its acts of aggression, thereby serving the interests of American imperialism.

5. In most cases, commando activities find no response. They do indeed cause a certain amount of damage to the enemy, and they enjoy a certain amount of publicity, but at the cost of extremely high casualty figures and of the expulsion of Arabs from the most fertile areas.

In spite, however, of our opinion of the commandos, we do not rule out armed action. It may have something to justify it; this depends, however, on the extent and scope of the general battle in the occupied territories and on the preparedness of the masses to repel the enemy.

However, when the right movement for armed action comes, the nature of the commando organisations and the lack of realism in their programmes will restrict their capacity for effective participation in the resistance. It must be remembered, moreover, that they are unable to cross over to the occupied territories and that they do not have any bases there. Consequently, when they do manage to infiltrate, they can never assimilate with the local population, for in fact they are strangers.

The last thing we want to do is to attack the commando organisations. All that we want to do is to present an objective picture. We fully appreciate the sentiments of the members of the

resistance movement who are fighting so courageously against our enemies, but we cannot ignore their shortcomings. We have contacts with their leaders, and we are trying to deepen and develop their manner of thinking to enable them to continue the fight in the right way. We also have our relations with the bases, and we do our best to develop their political consciousness, to prevent any one from exploiting their sincerely patriotic inclinations for selfish ends against the interests of the people and the country—ends that have nothing whatsoever to do with the struggle to put an end to the nightmare of occupation.

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Speech by the Jordanian King Hussein on the Clashes Between Security Forces and a Commando Group.¹ [Excerpt]

Amman, November 6, 1968

... We have a state, organisations, a government, law and security which must be maintained. We also have a standing army, which has repelled repeated attacks and is at the ready day and night to forestall moves by the enemy, and to anticipate any extensive operations he may launch against us. Throughout all these years, the state authorities have provided ample evidence that they are unanimous as regards all matters. In this situation, as in any other, it was the duty of the state authorities to come out into the open against any group in this country, since it has never been my custom, nor has it been the custom of this country, to stab people in the back.

If we had really wanted to liquidate commando action, we should have proscribed it from the start. If we had wanted to liquidate it, we should have taken other measures; we should have

frankly stated our position and done what we had to do. It was not our object either to oppose or to liquidate it. But there were many who were doing their best to poison the atmosphere, and this was exploited by a group which is being investigated at this moment. As a result of the investigation, I am convinced that this group was brought in for this very purpose. It did what it could, but it has been opposed and silenced.

What I want to make absolutely clear is that I cannot allow that our army should be stabbed in the back, that our endurance should be stabbed in the back, that all of us, in fact, should be stabbed in the back, after so many sacrifices, so many resolute stands, and so much work for the cause.

We have a state, an army, a government and the law. This state and its sovereignty will be defended and protected. Whoever breaks the law will be severely punished. No right-thinking person in this country can accept that we should be forced into a position where we have to withdraw forces from the front to deal with a situation such as this, whether in Amman or elsewhere.

What has taken place today is over and done. But if ever we are forced to face a similar situation, rest assured that anyone either directly or indirectly responsible for it will be brought to book. The situation is such that irresponsible conduct of this kind cannot be tolerated; we must all cooperate in closing these gaps to prevent our enemy from achieving his aims and thereby destroying us.

The losses we have sustained, both military and civilian, are distressing. We shall put a stop to such wanton irresponsibility if it is repeated and if what nearly happened in Amman and elsewhere actually does take place. If, while confronting the enemy, I am forced to withdraw one single soldier from the position he occupies in confrontation of this enemy, I shall remorselessly eliminate both the situation and those responsible for it. For many years I have been proud that not a single drop of blood has been shed in this country. We have surmounted all problems and dissensions and stood steadfast and united in thought and action. But today it is no longer a question of my cause, or that of any other individual, but of the cause of this country's endurance, its duties and responsibilities in these fateful cir-

¹ *Al-Dustur* (Amman), 7/11/1968.

King Hussein delivered this speech at a meeting he called in the Royal Diwan, which was attended by Jordanian officials, including ministers, notables, deputies, presidents of municipal councils, trades unions leaders and others. The clashes between the Jordanian public security forces and a group of commandos called the "Legions of Victory" led by Taher Dablan took place on November 4, 1968, see also *infra*. [Ed.]

cumstances. It is the cause of our nation, our kinsmen and brothers in the occupied part of our country. All must perform their duties to the best of their ability; all must rally round the flag, united in hand and heart, to ensure that such regrettable incidents are never repeated and that the blot that has disfigured our country's scutcheon as a result of the incidents of the last few days may be wiped away.

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News Conference Statement and Remarks by the Jordanian King Hussein on the Clashes between Security Forces and a Commando Group.¹ [Excerpts]

Amman, November 6, 1968

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Again, as regards the confrontation with the commandos, I have stated Jordan's attitude to it time and again. I have said more than once: so long as Israel persists in rejecting the Security Council resolution, and its enforcement, and refuses to implement its principles in full, so long as Israel continues to occupy the West Bank and other areas, it is she that is responsible for the deterioration of the situation. Consequently, we are not responsible for the protection of the occupation forces in these areas.

We harbour feelings of the greatest respect for those who are prepared to lay down their lives for the cause in defence of their homes, their country and their rights. If the situation threatens to explode, all the blame for these developments falls on Israel herself. Moreover, if the opportunity of achieving a just and lasting peace is missed, Israel will have to bear the responsibility, because of her failure to make any contribution towards the achievement of peace, which she has been trying to convince the world is the objective she is striving to achieve.

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Now let us look at what has happened in the

last two days. On the anniversary of the Balfour Declaration, the people in both Banks gave expression to their feelings. It was expected that they would do so in Amman in a quiet and peaceful manner. However, certain elements tried to mar this picture. I find it extremely difficult to decide what were their motives. However, if we go back to similar circumstances in other places, we can say, in the light of what took place, that these elements or groups acted in accordance with a pre-arranged plan which did not emanate from any Arab country, and certainly not from Jordan either. The people challenged the authority of the state and fabricated incidents. When it was possible to look into the situation, we found that the numbers of this group were quite negligible. But their organisation was excellent, and they all had criminal records, although, of course, they sought to give the opposite impression. It is known for sure that they have committed numerous crimes against the people and against authority; they have even sullied the image of those who fight for the homeland and for the cause. This is what actually took place.

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In the early hours of the morning a number of armed men ambushed an army Land Rover belonging to the Amman garrison and opened fire on it, with the intention of killing the men who were in it—an officer, a driver and a private soldier. These were then seized and attacked. At the same time, members of the gang proceeded to use loudspeakers to stir up the population by spreading fabricated rumours in a number of places, and by obliging the inhabitants, including women, children and students, by force of arms, to walk in front of them to various localities in the city. This incident was reported to the Royal Guards and the police. Immediately afterwards, a police detachment went to the area with instructions to arrest those responsible. Arriving at the place, the detachment proceeded to perform its duties; it was fired on, and the first police casualty in these incidents occurred. The criminals took cover behind the women and children, and fired on the security forces. At the same time, shots were fired in all parts of the capital. The lives and property of citizens were imperilled by this gang, which set fire to a large number of establishments and opened fire indiscriminately in various

¹ *Ibid.* See also *supra* and *post*, doc. 405.

parts of the city.

Obviously this situation could not be tolerated, for the consequences would have been disastrous if it had been allowed to continue. The army was therefore called in, and ordered to restore law and order and to execute these orders in a thorough manner. Unfortunately there were some casualties, both military and civilian. A curfew was imposed, but was lifted for several hours yesterday.

Yesterday, at about 5 p.m. I held a meeting to discuss the situation. We found that the situation had improved greatly, and that the people in all quarters were assisting the authorities in restoring order and in arresting all those responsible for the incidents. We also found that there was no further need for a curfew. We therefore decided in the afternoon to lift it as of midnight. This was what actually happened...

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Civilian casualties were 24 dead, most of them killed by the men who fired at random, the men who were entirely responsible for creating this problem, and who tried to force people to come out into the streets—and 89 wounded. Casualties in the security forces were one killed and three wounded. Army casualties were four killed, including two officers, and eight wounded, including three officers.

Q.—There has recently been a good deal of conjecture to the effect that Your Majesty's government was trying to get all the commando organisations under its control.

*A.—*Quite frankly, I do not know if there is any clear or satisfactory answer to this question. I should like to repeat that the action taken in the last two or three days was merely a reaction to the attempts made by a small group of people in defiance of law and order and of the security forces in this country. This group had committed crimes against the civilian population and even sullied the image of those who live and die for their cause and country. It was not a prearranged plan, such a thing can never happen in this country. This is my answer to your question; there is no question of us trying to achieve other objectives.

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Q.—Does your Majesty believe that elements in government organisations had any connection with what happened?

*A.—*Government organisations exist for the protection of the Jordanian family as a whole and for the protection of law and order and the safety of citizens. These organisations have not so far reached the standard I hope they will eventually reach, and which is essential for the confrontation of the corresponding enemy organisations. But we are trying all the time to achieve perfection. We hope that the investigations now in progress will get at the truth and discover the motives for this civil strife. I do not think it is a good thing to encourage misgivings about the government organisations. On the contrary, every attempt should be made to strengthen them and to enable them to perform their role. For they are not an alien system, but one designed to serve the public interest and to protect the safety of the nation, the whole nation and its unity and resolute stand against threats and dangers...

Q.—What was the object of the measures taken by the security forces?

*A.—*The measures were taken by the authorities to deal with an operation that took place in Amman. I believe that the Arab army which is defending this country, the army that fought the Battle of Karameh, which was a turning point not only in our life but in that of our whole nation, has performed its duty. The information at my disposal proves that when it was fired on, it returned the fire and the events we have been discussing ensued. We thank God that things have returned to normal. Had there been any other objective, I would have said so frankly and have taken measures openly. I am not double-faced, and it is not my custom to stab in the back. The only object of the measures we took was to restore order and to nip sedition and faction in the bud. I believe that the security forces did their duty and only fired when they were fired on. I know that the situation was painful to all; it was so to me in particular, it was painful to every soldier who stood there doing his duty. This problem, this sedition, occurred in the rear, forcing us to withdraw some of our forces from the front, where they

were performing their duty in an exemplary manner. At a time when the security forces were trying to restore order, there was no way of knowing who belonged to what party; nevertheless, every effort was made to find out who a person was before measures were taken. It is my opinion that the object of the group responsible for the faction was to expand the operation and to undermine the situation in every sense of the word, thereby weakening this country and allowing the enemy every facility to achieve his ends. In such a situation, there was no alternative but to take the measures that were taken. The important thing was to restore law and order in the shortest time possible, so that we might be in a position where we can face any eventuality. In fact, order has been restored with the cooperation of all loyal elements in this country, with all possible speed.

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 Q.—On more than one occasion, Your Majesty has emphasised the need for the coordination of commando action...I should like to ask Your Majesty how you envisage this coordination of commando action. ...? ¹

A.—...Our one aim in advocating coordination in all fields is to avoid the recurrence of incidents such as those that occurred just recently, when certain elements infiltrated with the sole object of poisoning the atmosphere and undermining this country's endurance. Coordination, in its widest sense, means that everyone should know exactly what are his own responsibilities and duties. How else can we reach the point where we can close the gaps through which the enemy can influence our position as a whole and our advance towards our one objective?

Statement by the National Federation of Syrian Students on the Conspiracy Against Commando Action.² [Excerpts]

Damascus, November 6, 1968

Dauntless masses!

Current events in Jordan confirm that the great conspiracy against commando action has begun. Zionist, imperialist and reactionary quarters have completed their preparations; they have summoned their retainers and allies, distributed the roles and created favourable conditions for them through the atmosphere reflected from the labyrinths and dark paths of settlements involving surrender which are intended to destroy the relentless fervour of the masses and so to bring their struggle to an end. This is being done at a time when the finishing touches are being put to a dangerous surrender project, which depends on the liquidation of commando action to ensure the success of the most dangerous conspiracy against the Palestine cause—indeed the most serious conspiracy against Arab national liberation, is being hatched—a conspiracy to relegate the Palestine cause to the margin of history and to submit Arab existence to the yoke of neo-colonialism. But our vigilant Arab masses are not blind to the schemes that are being devised against them and against others like them. Through their continuous struggle they have come to sense how profoundly colonialism, Zionism and reaction are linked by their common destiny.

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 There has been a gradual escalation in the manufacturing of crises with the commandos, with tactical withdrawals at times, followed by the planning of clashes and then new withdrawals. This reveals beyond all possibility of doubt that the final stage has been reached in a carefully laid plan in which a variety of stratagems has been employed—psychological conditioning, the use of counter-insinuations to belittle commando action, and distortion of the glorious and heroic idea the Arab masses have of the commandos with the ultimate intention of preventing

¹ See *ante*, doc. 326.

² *Al-Thawra* (Damascus), 7/11/1968. See *supra* and *infra*.

the development of commando action into a popular war of liberation, in which alone lies final salvation. Our Arab nation firmly believes that its least patriotic member will not be content with less than the full consolidation and development of commando action. . . .

The National Federation of Syrian students confronts the progressive governments and forces with their responsibility to protect and consolidate commando action, whatever the cost. Should they hesitate in this, they must accept all the consequences, the first of which will be the liquidation of these very governments and forces, to be followed by the signing of a peace treaty with the enemy on devious and iniquitous political pretexts, such as peaceful settlement, or the British proposal, and finally, the disappearance of the Arab revolution and the Arab struggle for a long time to come.

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Statement by the Palestine Liberation Movement "Fateh" on the Crisis Between the Jordanian Government and Commando Organisations.¹

November 9, 1968

On the anniversary of the ill-omened Balfour Declaration on November 2, 1968, there were popular marches and huge mass demonstrations in the streets of Amman and its suburbs, in the larger towns of Jordan and in the refugee camps, to voice the demonstrators' indignation and their condemnation of what transpired on that black day and to express their support for and allegiance to commando action and the Palestinian revolution. The Jordanian intelligence services infiltrated a number of their men into the ranks of the demonstrators in an attempt to destroy and distort the image of commando action in the minds of the masses. Despite this, the marches and demonstrations proceeded in an

orderly manner, foiling all nefarious attempts to curb the people's will in its determination to protect the revolution. So that there might be no justification or pretext for the fabrication of a clash with the security forces, instructions were issued to the members and supporters of the Movement not to take part in the marches, and for the cadres to remain quietly on the alert in their headquarters.

2. At exactly 10 o'clock on Sunday morning, November 3, 1968, the Jordanian General Staff summoned some of our members, and a meeting was held with the Chief of General Staff, Amer Khammash, and his second in command, Mashhur Haditha. The talk was mainly of the arrest of Taher Dablan and of the government's desire for security in the country. On the same day Taher Dablan was arrested by the security authorities. Our men replied that this case would be submitted to the Military Coordination Council of the commando organisations, where a decision would be taken on it.

3. At 3:30 a.m. Monday, our men were informed by the General Staff that a group belonging to the Legions of Victory had opened fire on a military vehicle, arresting the men in it.

4. In the meantime, the Royal Guards went out into the streets of Amman, and occupied the crossroads, whereupon violent public demonstrations took place, the demonstrators shouting various slogans. Large numbers of members of the Jordanian intelligence service had succeeded in infiltrating the crowds. The Royal Guards and the Bedouin forces responded to these demonstrations by opening heavy fire, which resulted in the death of several civilians. Sirens were sounded, to make the people believe that there was an air raid. At the same time the hiringling groups began to spread false rumours to the effect that the commando leaders had been arrested, and that some of them had been killed, after which they cheered the commando organisations.

5. In the midst of this flood of events, our Movement sent an urgent call to all organisations to hold consultations on the situation. It was decided to broadcast a statement to the people to pacify them, and thus avoid civil strife and bloody clashes.

6. Immediately afterwards, a delegation

¹ Archives of the Institute for Palestine Studies. See *ante*, docs. 402, 403.

was formed. It met Prime Minister Talhuni, Akef al-Fayez and Ahmad Tuqan; it called upon the government to lift the curfew and to rescind all military measures. As a result of this meeting, however, it became clear that the government had no knowledge whatsoever of what had happened, being none too well informed on the situation. The representatives of the organisations explained the situation in all its aspects to the Jordanian government, telling the truth about Taher Dablan and his association with the Jordanian intelligence. The Jordanian Ministers confirmed this, and said that the offending group had been imprisoned.

At the same time, another delegation of our men went to the General Staff where they met with King Hussein, his brother Hasan, the Chief of General Staff Amer Khammash, and his second in command Mashhur Haditha. The atmosphere was tense and the King was in a violent temper, which frustrated the attempts of our men to explain the situation to him. What the King said showed that he had a premeditated plan to liquidate commando action. The meeting was also attended by the Commander of the Iraqi forces in Jordan, Hasan al-Naqib, who was informed of the whole situation.

8. Meanwhile, the Royal Guards continued to fire at the popular groupings and demonstrations, to terrorise them into dispersing. At the same time scores of tanks and armoured cars headed for the Wahdat, Hussein and Schneller camps, surrounded them and proceeded to open fire on them, thereby infuriating the masses still further. This resulted in a number of casualties, killed and wounded, on both sides. In spite of repeated attempts, neither the Royal Guards nor the security forces succeeded in storming the camps, for the people took shelter behind barricades. Meanwhile, orders had been given to the popular militia to maintain calm and quiet whatever the provocation by the Royal Guard, the Bedouin forces and the Sixtieth Armoured Brigade.

9. At noon on Monday, November 4, 1968, the Royal Guards detachment under the command of Zaid Ibn Shaker, proceeded to shell the provision store and bakery belonging to *Fateh* in the Wahdat camp. Three of our men were killed. In spite of this, however, the popular

militia maintained calm. In the meantime, the Jordanian authorities were asked to call off the firing, which had claimed scores of victims, creating an atmosphere of anxiety and tension among the masses.

10. In an attempt to calm the heated spirits of the people, Brigadier Mashhur Haditha, Colonel Hasan al-Naqib and a number of our men proceeded to the camps. But it was difficult to enter; 106 mm. guns, machine-guns (500) and tank guns were trained on the Hussein and Wahdat camps, with the Royal Guards encircling them on all sides. To avoid a clash between the Royal Guards and the popular forces, Brigadier Mashhur Haditha was asked to mitigate the military measures that had been taken and to put a stop to all kinds of provocation, including firing shots in the air to terrorise the people.

11. At 8:30 p.m. on the same day, Brigadier Mashhur Haditha arrived with a message from the War Council, to the effect that the commando organisations must withdraw the arms they had distributed to the people and hand them over to the army. Otherwise the army itself would perform this task, and we should be responsible for the consequences. Our men regarded this message as a threat, and rejected it outright, saying: "We reject all warnings, and we object to your speaking to us from positions of strength", adding that they would hold whoever had sent the message responsible for all consequences. All our men then set out towards the Ghor area. All commando sectors were called upon to be ready for any eventuality.

12. At 10 p.m. Brigadier Mashhur Haditha arrived with a written message from the King, which made the following points:

a. It was a question of restoring the government's prestige.

b. Military measures could only be mitigated when it was certain that there would be no recurrence of incidents.

c. The King appreciated the attitude of the commando organisations and their cooperation and concern for common interests.

d. There were no grounds for being suspicious of the government's good intentions as regards cooperation with the commandos.

e. In response to the commando organi-

sations, there would be no indiscriminate search for arms distributed to the people, either in Amman or elsewhere, provided the commando organisations cooperated in regularising arms distribution.

f. Arms would be listed, and could remain in the possession of respectable citizens.

g. The curfew would be lifted from 10:00 a.m. till 4:00 p.m. for a trial period.

h. The Royal Guards would remain where they were stationed; reduction of their members would depend on circumstances.

i. Immediate coordination and complete cooperation between the commando organisations and the army was to begin, to enable them to perform their essential duty.

j. Those responsible for the disturbances and the ringleaders were to be arrested, in cooperation with the commando organisations, as soon as the curfew was lifted.

13. In reply to this message the commandos made the following conditions: the curfew was to be lifted immediately; the military measures were to be rescinded and neither the Royal Guards, the forces or any other military forces were to enter the camps or undertake search operations in the towns and villages.

14. At enemy level, the Zionist state kept a close watch on the situation and on the events taking place in Jordan. Considerable numbers of Israeli planes flew over the central and northern regions (Irbid, Al-Salt). The enemy initiated an armed clash on the frontiers and Moshe Dayan announced that Israel had no intention of interfering in the strife between the commandos and the Jordanian authorities.

15. The Royal Guards shelled a training camp, killing 17 commandos of the popular militia.

16. The Royal Guards attacked a Land Rover belonging to the Popular Front, killing a number of commandos, including a second lieutenant.

17. The main commando force did not clash with the Royal Guards, the Bedouins or the Sixtieth Armoured Brigade, but stayed in their positions on the alert.

18. It was the masses, along with the popular militia forces, who stood up to the Bedouin army

and to the Royal Guards and their tanks, when they attempted to force their way into the camps or to come into conflict with the people.

Justifications for the Crisis and its Consequences

The Jordanian authorities attempted to justify the crisis by arresting the defecting hireling groups that were imperilling the security of the state—Taher Dablan's group was meant. However, the measures taken by the Bedouin forces, the Royal Guards, and certain army detachments which were withdrawn from the front, indicate that what lay behind the fabricated crisis was a serious attempt to liquidate commando action and those who supported it. That this is so is strongly suggested by the following:

1. Attempts were made to make the regime appear to be the defenceless victim of aggression.

2. The Jordanian home front was kept busy with fabricated incidents, to relieve the pressure on the enemy in the occupied territory.

3. The people were attacked with heavy mortars and hand grenades, particularly in Wahdat Camp, and all crossroads leading to the towns were surrounded by several military detachments.

4. There were prolonged attacks on *Fateh* provision stores in Wahdat Camp.

5. More than 70 civilians, mostly women and children, were killed and more than 100 wounded.

6. The wounded were left without treatment so that a number of them died.

7. The Bedouin forces and the Royal Guards treated the people in a harsh and inhuman manner.

Consolidating the Situation

In view of the above, it is clear that:

1. The crisis was fabricated, the instrument used being the "Legions of Victory", established by Taher Dablan and financed by the Jordanian military intelligence.

2. There was a premeditated plan in the Palace to strike and liquidate commando action, after gradually cutting the ground from under each commando organisation separately.

3. For us the battle is a matter of life or death, we cannot make light of the fate of the

revolution whatever the consequences, after having made all honest efforts to avoid the disaster and prevent the massacre of the people and the burning of towns.

4. The crisis has ended with the commandos triumphing, without foregoing their objectives. Our duty now lies in added vigilance and caution and in being constantly on the lookout for our enemies and the enemies of the Palestinian revolution. We are fully convinced that the fabricated crisis has ended only to begin again. All the past crises have been links in a chain of conspiracies carried out in stages to liquidate the Palestinian revolution and commando action, so as to impose a political solution.

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Talk by the U.A.R. Foreign Minister Riyad on Israel's Expansionist Designs.¹ [Excerpts]

Cairo, November 12, 1968

Israel did not announce her acceptance of the resolution.² At last, however, under pressure from world public opinion and from a number of countries, she has, with her habitual duplicity, announced her acceptance of it. However, she has explained this acceptance as being subject to the resolution being regarded as an agenda, the items of which are to be discussed with the Arabs.

This announcement by Israel does not mean that she is willing to implement the most important point in the resolution—the question of her withdrawal from Arab territory. This is what leads us to say that Israel rejects the Security Council resolution, notwithstanding this announcement.

As regards the subject of withdrawal, we

¹ *Al-Anwar* (Beirut), 14/11/1968. This talk was televised by the UAR Television Station. The present excerpts are from the text which appeared in the daily *Al-Anwar* based on the *Middle East News Agency* report.

² Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967.

note that Israel demands that the Arab states sit down and negotiate with her on what she calls safe and secure boundaries. In other words, if we do not reach an agreement with Israel, she will continue to occupy Arab territory until agreement is reached between her and the Arab countries. We have therefore always insisted on obtaining a frank and explicit statement from Israel in which she undertakes to withdraw.

A glance at Israel shows that she can never really have room for 15 million Jews, or for that matter even for the 5 million Jews who are asking to come to Palestine. This means that Israel will have to try to occupy more Arab territories outside Palestine, if she is to absorb the 5 million or 15 million Jews in the future.

The policy of Israel resembles Nazi policy during the last World War, when Hitler sought to occupy Poland and other territories and to evict their inhabitants—to evict or annihilate them. These are Israel's objectives with regard to the land and its people. But they are not the only objectives. The ultimate objective is to control the economy of the Arab countries. Numerous documents published in Israel refer to this policy and discuss how it can be realised. Thus when Israel committed her aggression of June 5 [1967], her object was to occupy Arab territory, and she is now seeking to keep the greatest possible area of this territory in her hands.

All Israelis subscribe to these Zionist objectives, as I have described them, but there are different points of view as to how they are to be achieved. In other words, there is one objective for all, the only question is whether or no Israel can now take permanent possession of all the Arab territories she now occupies. Here there are differences of opinion. Some feel that she cannot absorb all these territories, but only part of them. All are agreed on the one objective; the differences lie in the manner this objective is to be achieved. What is certain, however, is that all believe it essential to retain several parts of the territories Israel is now occupying.

It used to be said that Dayan belonged to the tough group, while Eshkol and Eban were

moderates. In my speech at the United Nations I referred to a statement made by Dayan at a time when Eban was once more talking of peace. In this statement Dayan said: Our fathers reached the 1947 Partition Plan frontiers. Dayan's generation reached the 1949 frontiers, and the generation of the Six Day War reached Suez, Jordan and the Golan Heights in Syria. Dayan then added that this was not the end, for beyond the present cease-fire lines, there were new lines. This shows his aggressive intentions.¹

On October 17 last, when Eban was talking about peace at the United Nations, Dayan stated that Israel must establish herself in the Golan Heights in Syria, fortify Sinai, and complete the administrative and economic annexation to Israel of the West Bank and Gaza. The term "fortification of Sinai" was obscure and ambiguous. However, it was recently explained, in statements made by Eshkol the day before yesterday.² All news reports from Israel have confirmed that this means the occupation of certain parts of the Sinai Peninsula. These were the words of the Israeli Premier, who used to be called an advocate of peace.

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Petition by Notables of Jerusalem and the West Bank to the Jordanian King Hussein on the Requirements of the Battle with Israel.³ [Excerpts]

Jerusalem, November 1968

I. The Jordanian army should, like those of several other Arab countries, be supplied with arms from sources other than the United States,

¹ See *Ha'olam Hazeh* (Tel Aviv), 7/8/1968, p. 10.

² Premier Levi Eshkol declared in the cabinet on November 10, 1968 that Israel would maintain a certain material presence in Sinai to ensure freedom of navigation in the Straits, see *Ma'ariv* (Tel Aviv), 11/11/1968. (Ed.)

³ *Al-Nahar* (Beirut), 12/11/1968.

According to *Al-Nahar* this petition was signed by a number of doctors, land-owners, lawyers, and men engaged in commerce, industry and agriculture, including Mr. Anwar al-Khatib, Mayor of Jerusalem, Mr. Aref al-Aref, Director of the Palestine Museum, Mr. Sa'ad al-Din al-Alami, Mufti of Jerusalem, Mr. Rashad Abu Gharbiya and Mr. Abd al-Muhsen Abu Maizar.

as it has been established that such arms are outstanding as regards quality and performance, and that they can be obtained at comparatively low prices. In addition, the uninterrupted supply of these arms is assured under all circumstances. In this connection we wish to place on record that we are not convinced by the arguments employed to justify a return to the Western colonialist powers, the United States in particular, for arms supplies.

II. All civil liberties must be ensured, and all regulations restricting the people's exercise of such liberties must be abolished. Only a free people can fashion victory and detect, unmask and bring to light irregularity and corruption of all kinds. It is a grave distortion of the concept of civil liberties and their role in life to restrict it to the question of whether or not there are any political prisoners. This false interpretation has been a black mark in the history of Jordan, and we hope that it has now gone for good. We wish to place on record that, had there been any respect for civil liberties, in the broad and real sense of the term, pressure would not have been exerted to prevent the people from saying a single word against the United States on the anniversary of the black 5th of June nor would the meeting called for by the national groupings have been prohibited.

IV. Every effort must be made to consolidate Arab solidarity, which is one of our chief weapons in the battle against Zionist-colonialist aggression, and to pursue a policy of coordination, with Cairo in particular.

VI. Our experiences and trials under the shadow of occupation have convinced us quite conclusively that the Israeli aggressors understand only the language of force. It is our own weakness, not commando activity, as he claims, that has tempted the enemy to violate our air space in such an insolent manner. Furthermore, peaceful settlements based on justice can only be reached from a position of strength.

VII. Friendly relations must be developed with those countries that have always stood firmly and faithfully on the side of the Arab peoples in their battle with Zionist-colonialist aggression.

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Statement by Representatives of Parliamentary Blocs in the Lebanese Parliament on Student Demonstrations.¹

Beirut, November 12, 1968

An ordinary session of Parliament was called for 5 p.m. on Tuesday, November 12, 1968, but as there was no quorum at the time prescribed, the Speaker adjourned the session. However the deputies present, who represented various parliamentary blocs, continued their meeting in the Speaker's office, he himself being present. They reviewed affairs of the moment, including the incidents of last week and yesterday (Monday).² After an exchange of views in an atmosphere of full understanding, it became evident to those present at the meeting that the picture that had been provided of the incidents was exaggerated and distorted. They therefore agreed unanimously to view the situation in its true context, and to adopt to it a positive attitude derived from the unity of the Lebanese, whose constructive awareness enables them to realise the true significance of issues vital to the nation's destiny, first and foremost, which are the cause of Palestine and an appreciation of how essential it is that commando action should continue, and that all steps should be taken to ensure that it is effective. All the deputies present expressed their appreciation of the attitude of the students in this respect, affirmed the necessity of respect for the rule of law and called on all citizens to safeguard their country's welfare by their vigilance, patriotism and cooperation.

Signatures

Rashid Karami, René Muawwad, Rafiq Shahin, for the "Democratic Bloc"; Pierre Gemayel, Edmond Rizk, Abdo Saab, for the "Phalange"; Nuhad Buciz, Emile Salhab, for the "National Bloc"; Amir Majid Arslan, for the Constitutionals and the "Aley Bloc"; Mahmud Ammar and Habib Mutran, for the "Liberal Nationalist Party"; and Anwar al-Khatib for the "National Struggle Front."

¹ *Al-Anwar* (Beirut), 13/11/1968.

² Students' demonstrations, resulting in disturbances, took place in support of Palestinian commando action on Monday, November 11, 1968.

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Speech From the Throne at the Opening of the Fifth Session of the Libyan National Assembly.³ [Excerpt]

Tripoli, November 17, 1968

In the Arab field my government will act in accordance with the spirit of the Arab League Pact, and on a basis of firm belief in the solidarity of the Arab nation and in the development of cooperation and brotherhood. It will strive to discover the right course for unified Arab action and will respond to any opportunity offered of furthering joint efforts for the service of Arab interests and causes. It is aware that it is in duty bound to support Arab causes, foremost of which is the Palestinian cause, which my government has spared no effort to provide with all possible support and assistance. Believing as it does in the legitimate right of the Palestinian people to liberate their usurped land, my government will support Palestinian commando action. It will not hesitate to use all its resources to resist Zionist aggression against other Arab countries and Zionist expansionist designs, nor will it waver in offering all the help and support it can to its brethren, who have suffered from this aggression.

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Interview With Yasser Arafat, Official Spokesman of the Palestine National Liberation Movement "Fateh" on the Crisis Between the Jordanian Government and Commando Organisations.⁴ [Excerpts]

November 1968

Q.—Is the crisis over?

*A.—*Definitely not. The crisis is simply frozen, and we are now trying to eradicate its

³ *Al-Ahram* (Cairo), 20/11/1968.

⁴ *Al-Ahram* (Cairo), 17/11/1968. See *ante*, docs. 402, 403, 405.

basic causes. The crisis has had consequences; this was bound to be so. We have taken this into account; we have also taken into consideration the possibility of unseen hands trying to stir up trouble once more.

Q.—I want to ask you about something people are talking about—have there been any settlements or concessions? Or has any written agreement been concluded?

*A.—*There have been no settlements or concessions. We cannot possibly bargain over the legitimacy and independence of the Palestinian revolution. Nor can we bargain over the question as to whether armed commando action shall continue. So there are no written agreements. All our work belongs to the masses, the only originators and the real moving spirit of the revolution.

Let me take you back again to the beginnings of the crisis. At dawn on Monday [November 4, 1968] I informed the resistance organisations that the government was about to start arresting the suspected members of Taher Dablan's group "The Legions of Victory". The first statement was issued at 11 a.m. on Monday morning, over the signatures of all the resistance organisations and the nationalist groupings in Jordan.

What could not be ignored in the afternoon, however, was the large number of troops that had taken up their positions in the outskirts of Amman. It was clear that the operation was too large to have been directed merely against Taher Dablan and his followers. We moved down to the places where engagements had occurred between these forces and the people, in the Wahdat and Hussein camps, and in Zarqa. Accompanying us in our capacity as commando organisations were Brigadier Mashhur Haditha, Assistant Chief of Staff, and Colonel Hasan al-Naqib, Commander of the Iraqi forces. We saw at once that these places had been battlefields. Later, we were convinced that other demands had been submitted concerning a number of serious matters, going far beyond the affair of Taher Dablan.

We then realised the extent of the conspiracy. All night long our representative, who was autho-

rising in the name of all the organisations to talk to the authorities, was kept busy. All night long negotiations went on; offers were made only to be rejected, time and again. We rejected all their conditions and all their proposals. We said in clear terms that we could not accept that any one should talk to the people from a position of power. The only power is that which resides in the people.

They asked us to disarm the people in the camps. We answered, and so did all the other organisations: "This is unacceptable. We are in a state of war. The reason why these arms are in the possession of the people is to prevent a repetition of the tragedies of the West Bank, the effects of which became clear after June 5 [1967]. We are still suffering from the disarming of the front-line villages. How can we now be asked to disarm our people? They have arms to use them against the enemy, for no other reason."

On the second day the curfew was lifted between 10:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. Then the representatives of the principal organisations met with the authorities at the highest level. At this meeting it was decided to withdraw the troops from Amman and to lift the curfew. It was agreed that the victims of the incidents should be compensated.

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Motion Unanimously Adopted by the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies Protesting Against U.S. Sales of Phantom Planes to Israel.¹

Beirut, November 19, 1968

News agency reports of the United States government's decision to sell Phantom jets to the enemy have inflamed the feelings of the Arab peoples throughout the Arab world. In their view this step, if it is taken, will constitute an act of provocation to them, an inducement to the aggressor to persist in his aggression and his defiance of the

¹ *Al-Anwar* (Beirut), 20/11/1968.

United Nations and a violation of its resolutions and the decisions of the Security Council, and, finally, a permanent threat to peace and security in the Middle East and, consequently, in the whole world.

While censuring this step, and protesting against it, the Chamber of Deputies, which represents the Lebanese people, calls on both the present President and the President-Elect, both of whom preach peace, to take steps to prevent the implementation of this measure, which will have the gravest consequences as regards the future of Lebanese-American relations.

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Interview with the Algerian President of the Revolutionary Council Boumedienne.¹
[Excerpts]

Algiers, November 23, 1968

Q.—Algeria has stressed since the first moment of the war of June 5 that it is essential that the battle in Palestine should be continued if real victory is to be achieved. It has clearly declared that the way to deliverance from aggression and to the liberation of Palestine lies through armed struggle, not political contacts... What is your view of this new theory, and do you agree that armed struggle has now become the only way to confront imperialism and neo-colonialism?

A.—

Moreover the actual experience of the Palestinian struggle proves that armed struggle is the only possible method for the confrontation of Zionism. The circumstances in which Israel came into existence were violent circumstances. The whole of Israel's existence is based on violence. To entertain thoughts of a political solution is tantamount to fraud, imposture and hypocrisy.

However, it is not only the nature of the confrontation with Israel, but also the character of the battle which is being fought by all Arab peoples everywhere, that has dictated the em-

ployment of the slogan of armed struggle.

For the Arab nation has always been confronted with the problem of recreating and regenerating itself. If the defeats of 1948 and 1956 have not sapped its strength, this is because possibilities of regeneration have always existed. One day I told an Arab in a responsible position that the question posed to us by the June 5 aggression was not a simple question of the manner of confrontation; it was a question of existence and of destiny. The June 5 aggression confronted us with a decisive choice, and brought us to a dangerous crossroads; for the June defeat, as our brothers in the East say, has introduced a note of doubt into the process of regeneration the Arabs have sought wherever they may be. The challenge facing the Arabs now is the following: they are challenged to make up their minds to come out from the ordeal victorious and, with that in view, to follow the only possible course, until it becomes second nature to them. If they do this the objective circumstances for the regeneration of the Arabs will not be lacking. For armed struggle is not an end in itself; it is a means that is indispensable for the fusion of the Arab in his new mould and for the reconstruction of Arab society in such a manner that it is capable of facing the age in which it is living and of performing the civilising mission which has been allotted to it since the dawn of history.

We shall be saying nothing new if we affirm that armed struggle is the shortest way to the realisation of this objective, for 'hot' revolution melts, purifies and prepares for life, just as fire does to metal. The alternative, the other face of the challenge, is surrender and admission that the Arab nation is finished as a nation with a civilising mission, now and for ever, and that all we can do is to relegate it to the back shelves alongside the ancient relics of other defunct civilisations.

The Palestinian cause is much too far-reaching and profound to be limited to the day by day activities of the commandos. Its true dimensions are embodied in the fact that it gives society the opportunity of purifying itself in the furnace of revolution from the impurities that cling to it, and of ridding itself of the decay which threatens it with old age, soon to be followed by senility and death. It is most regrettable that the extent

¹ Algerian *Ahdath wa Watha'iq*, 10/12/1968, pp. 17-18. President Boumedienne granted this interview to the Algerian daily *Al-Mujahed*.

and depth of the Palestinian revolution have not yet become clear to all Arabs. It is also regrettable that its true dimensions have been obscured by purely temporary and local considerations, which has led more than one Arab capital to see the battle as a battle to win the greatest possible number of Palestinian supporters. This situation has led to the misrepresentation of the Palestine cause, and, in consequence, to deviation from the right course in the confrontation of the problem. This is our analysis of the situation in Palestine.

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Address by the U.A.R. President Nasser at the End of the Emergency Session of the National Congress of the Arab Socialist Union.¹ [Excerpts]

Cairo, December 4, 1968

... We will now turn to a greater problem, a greater danger that faces us. This is the danger of Israeli aggression, the danger of Israeli expansionism, the danger of declarations that are said to have been made to the effect that the United States will give Israel enough arms to maintain her superiority over the Arab countries; the danger of all kinds of pressure on us—political, military or economic; the danger of being exposed to attacks on us by the enemy in any part of our country.

Since June 9 we have been determined to resist and stand firm. The Arab people everywhere has resolved to resist and stand firm. The Arab people is firmly resolved not to accept defeat or surrender in any form whatsoever. When we agreed to work for a political solution, we certainly never meant or intended that a political solution should mean surrender. The political solution, as we see it, is an honourable solution, which will not allow Israel to take one inch of Arab territory from any Arab country—I repeat, not one inch of Arab territory. Today there are news reports to the effect that there is an American

project for every country to solve its problems with Israel separately, that Egypt is to solve her problems with Israel, without reference to other Arab countries. We say that we reject this method, and reject this way of thinking.

In spite of the military defeat that we suffered, we are not inferior to other peoples that have won life through sacrifice, through death and blood, achieving honour through their sacrifices. We are in no way inferior to any other country or any other people that has sacrificed its sons and its blood. The Soviet Union has told me that they lost twenty millions in the Second World War. Our brothers in Algeria lost one million martyrs for the sake of liberation. We ourselves are facing this great battle, this great danger. We must realise that we are facing this great danger, the danger of Israeli aggression and Israeli pressure, the danger of our country, our towns, our villages being raided, being raided with bombs. But we are ready to meet this for the sake of our freedom, our dignity and our honour, and so that we may not surrender, under any circumstances whatsoever.

... What does sitting down with Israel to negotiate mean? What does it mean exactly? It means that we are to surrender, for Israel would be talking from a position of strength. Israel is now occupying our territory in Egypt, Jordan and Syria. Israel is in a position that allows her to dictate terms. An Israel that refuses to withdraw, that seeks to expand, that wants to annex Jerusalem and other Arab territory, can never accept an honourable peace. So we must be prepared everywhere, in every town and every village. We must build up the people's army as we are building up the armed forces. ...

This, brothers, is the basis of our survival, the survival of the Arab nation. For, if Israel expands today she will never rest content with this expansion; she will seek to expand in the future. Israel has always said that her sway extends from the Euphrates to the Nile; that she has a right to Mecca and to Medina; and that she has a right to parts of the Arab world in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. If we allow Israel to expand now, this will not

¹ *Al-Ahram* (Cairo), 5/12/1968.

satisfy her appetite; she will continue to expand until she achieves her objective. Israel follows a deliberate plan. The Zionist Movement arose in the last century, and the Balfour Declaration was made in 1917. Things then proceeded step by step according to plan until Israel came into existence in 1948.

In 1949 the armistice was signed. In 1956 there was the aggression. It was Israel that attacked; we did not attack Israel. In 1967, there was once again a planned aggression by Israel and those backing Israel, which resulted in Israel's occupying all Palestine and Sinai. Israel now sees herself as having taken one more of the steps she has planned. We must therefore oppose Israel by means of resistance and a war of liberation, if political solutions do not lead us to an honourable peaceful settlement.

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Statement by the National Congress of the Arab Socialist Union of the U.A.R. at the End of its Emergency Session.¹ [Excerpts]

Cairo, December 4, 1968

The Congress considers that it is its duty to present a complete analysis of the circumstances attendant on recent events, to serve as a guideline in determining what courses of action should be agreed on and adhered to by all of us. For thus only can we protect our homeland and ensure its victory in the desperate battle it is obliged to wage against the enemy occupying our territory, against world colonialism which supplies him with all means of support and assistance, and against the counter-revolutionary elements which have gone so far in their hostility to the people that they allow themselves to be used as tools in further colonialist schemes directed against the future and, indeed, the very existence, of all the Arab peoples.

In this connection, the Congress feels it must stress the following points:

1. Important developments and changes have taken place in all fields since the War of June, 1967, as regards the reorganisation of the armed forces, the achievement of economic endurance, and political moves towards friendly and other countries. These robbed the enemy of his hopes of being able to dictate his will to us or to impose surrender on us by force.

2. These changes have been achieved because we have had a steadfast home front, which, in the dark days of defeat, succeeded in preserving its will and its unity. The enemy has realised that this front's continued steadfastness will inevitably lead to victory.

The colonialist forces have therefore tried their best to penetrate our home front through vicious psychological warfare, which has raised the hopes of counter-revolutionary elements in Egypt. In this, colonialism and the counter-revolutionary forces all had the same objectives.

3. It was natural that the counter-revolutionary forces should seek a point from which they could penetrate the home front, in an attempt to undermine its unity and steadfastness.

The state of anxiety and gloom left behind by the setback had a profounder effect on the students and the young people at the universities, who had experienced both the glories of the Revolution and the military defeat, than it had on those who had lived through the events, crises and odious exploitation which characterised the pre-Revolutionary period of modern Egyptian history. It was the former who were the target of the counter-revolutionary forces and of the psychological warfare of Israel and the forces of colonialism, which concentrated its greatest efforts on an attempt to influence the students.

The colonialist-reactionary conspiracy's first move was a campaign of instigation and deception, which has lasted through the present academic year. Pamphlets were distributed, and there was instigation of individuals, both by those whose intention it was to mislead and those they succeeded in misleading. This campaign, however, had no results until the staging of the regrettable incidents at Mansura, in which a group of students who had failed in their examinations was induced to take part.

The campaign later spread to a small group of students in the Faculty of Engineering at the

¹ *Ibid.*

University of Alexandria, sparking off acts of irresponsible and pointless violence, including sabotage, incendiarism, and looting—all of which were planned, led and instigated by enemy and reactionary agents.

Thus a small number of our students fell prey to a plot, the least that can be said of which, in view of the circumstances through which our nation is passing, is that it was a stab in the back for our toiling people.

4. A serious and fair appraisal of what took place leaves no room for doubt that the counter-revolutionary forces are engaged in a deliberate conspiracy, and that their objects are the same as Israel's—to threaten the rearguard of our armed forces and to dissipate the country's resources in unnecessary expenditure on national security. Determined as they are to liberate their country, our people cannot ignore incidents of this kind or allow the enemy to determine their destiny by exploiting the activities of counter-revolutionary forces. Only the revolutionary forces, representing the alliance of the forces of the toiling people, can be permitted to lead or control the nation's struggle. It is their duty to confront the counter-revolution with all the firmness required to defend our homeland and purge its territory of the consequences of aggression.

Only the toiling masses can stand up to hiring forces, defeat their purposes and destroy them. They alone are capable, through political action, of nipping in the bud any move that serves colonialist and reactionary schemes designed to undermine our home front, our national unity, our revolutionary system or our socialist society.

In condemning in the strongest terms the regrettable and disgraceful series of incidents that took place in Mansura and Alexandria, and in disclosing to the masses of our great nation the extent of the Zionist colonialist-reactionary conspiracy, we are aware of how immense is the task that is required of us as members of all levels of the National Congress of the Arab Socialist Union, and of all loyal and patriotic elements among the toiling masses. Since it was we who called for criticism and self-criticism, it is our duty to criticise ourselves. Reaction has made a move; we have been too slow in moving. Had

our young people realised the aims of reaction and the colonialist Israeli schemes which are concerted with reaction, had they been aware of what is going on, none of the things that happened in Mansura and Alexandria would have taken place. We must now move and move fast, to make it known to the toiling millions whose real interests are bound to Revolution and to socialism, be they peasants, workers, intellectuals, or the national bourgeoisie, what Israel and Arab reaction are plotting against them, against their country and against their posterity. Only the people can be depended upon to identify counter-revolutionary elements, and unmask them to the masses. As for agents, traitors and conspirators, the law will see to them.

The Congress feels that at the present stage political action should follow several basic lines for the guidance of our movement in its confrontation of any moves on the part of the alliance of reaction with colonialism, these lines being:

First: that it is to the forces of the people that revolution belongs, and this homeland belongs; they are the source of sovereignty therein. The forces of the people are unanimously agreed on fighting the battle of destiny to the end. With true intuition and awareness they have seen that they must heed no other summons but the call to battle, which unites them in the critical period our nation is now passing through, and forms them into an indivisible bloc that defies all the artifices of Israel, reaction and colonialism.

Any attempt to distract attention from the call to the battle is condemned out of hand by the toiling masses in their struggle.

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Statement by the National Command of the Ba'th Party on the Proceedings of the Fourth Regional and Tenth National Congresses.¹
[Excerpts]

Damascus, December 8, 1968

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The struggle has been long and great efforts have been made, but what has been achieved in the field of military coordination is still not up to the standard required for the confrontation of the dangers that face us and the aggression of which we have been the victims. Struggle must continue so that the picture may acquire a real and practical significance through the unification, in the most efficient manner possible, of all military resources.

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Arab masses;

The Tenth National Congress fully realises, as does the whole Arab nation, that, from a positive point of view, the present situation of the Arab world is entirely inadequate to meet the requirements of the defeat or the demands of liberation. Nor have the collective steps taken by officials been of the standard demanded by the masses' will for struggle, which pervades the entire Arab homeland, or by the minimum requirements for the emergence of a common Arab confrontation.

All that has taken place since the Zionist colonialist aggression confirms the Party's view of the futility of so-called political solutions and the soundness of its fundamental revolutionary attitude to the Security Council resolution and the mission of the United Nations Secretary-General's envoy, Mr. Gunnar Jarring.

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Perhaps we should take the Arab masses into our confidence and tell them that official decisions were taken at the meetings of the Arab League at that time, to the effect that commando

action must be combated and opposed and accused of all sorts of things. However, this heroic action, embodying as it does the will of the Palestinian Arab people, has imposed itself, despite all difficulties and obstacles, and, through blood and sacrifice, provided a practical demonstration of how endurance and struggle can continue and how defeat and surrender can be rejected. The Arab resistance movement has become the flame which is tended and protected by the Arab masses, and provided by them with all kinds of material and moral support.

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...The Tenth National Congress affirmed its absolute belief that, being an essential part of the strategy of the war of liberation, commando action must continue and be intensified, and that all must join in sincere efforts to unify its organisations so that it may play its role to the full in this comprehensive strategy.

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At official level, the Tenth National Congress stressed the need for continued struggle to implement the resolutions of the Ninth National Congress and the Ninth Extraordinary National Congress,² calling for the achievement of any possible form of unity between the progressive Arab states that are qualified to lead the battle.

The Tenth National Congress laid special stress on the need to establish unity between Syria and Egypt, and for continued efforts to be made to overcome all obstacles and to disregard all circumstances that may impede this great national objective, which will provide the Arab nation with an effective weapon with which to confront present and future challenges.

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The Congress is convinced that if attitudes based on revolutionary principles, and expressing the conscience of the Arab people, are adopted, this must, through revolutionary perseverance and continued serious and objective dialogue, inevitably win the respect and support of all progressive and liberal forces all over the world. It believes that to adopt such attitudes, in conformity with the objective circumstances obtaining

¹ *Al-Thawra* (Damascus), 9/12/1968.

The Tenth National Congress was held at the end of September 1968, after the Fourth Regional Congress had been held in the Syrian Arab Republic.

² See *International Documents on Palestine, 1967*, pp. 665-675.

in each Arab state and with the extent of what their resources allow, is to render the greatest service to our one Arab cause.

The Congress affirmed the need for continued political struggle of all kinds and at all levels—official, party and popular—to show that the Zionist invasion, inasmuch as it involves permanent settlement on the land, constitutes the most advanced stage of colonialism and of the intermarriage of imperialism and Zionism in their appalling schemes for obtaining control of the entire world.

Another object of this struggle should be to persuade progressive forces throughout the world to adopt, vis-à-vis the Palestine problem, uncompromising attitudes based on theory and principle. Every effort should then be made to bring these attitudes into conformity with each other. Many of these forces, though providing extensive moral and material support and aid, which is greatly appreciated, are still far from adopting the only correct viewpoint, which is based on sound principles and justice with regard to the Palestine problem. In our coming political struggle this must be one of our most urgent and fundamental objectives.

The Arab homeland, with its important strategic position, its immense oil and mineral wealth and its great diversity of other resources, is the second field in the battle of progressive humanity against colonialism and Zionism. The victory of the Arabs will decide this battle in favour of the peoples of the world, and form another base for the radiation of liberty throughout the continents of Asia and Africa.

Therefore, colonialism will never abandon this area without a struggle. The battle with colonialism will be no easy one—it may be regarded as a certainty that the attitude of the United States and its allies, the Zionist colonialists, will grow more vicious every day. Any further suggestion that it is possible that their attitude may change in favour of the Arab cause is a blatant form of deception. The despicable overbidding in favour of Israel, which was such a feature of the American presidential elections, taken in conjunction with America's permanent undertaking to supply Israel with Phan-

tom planes and with various other forms of offensive weapons of destruction, leaves no room for doubt that America intends to continue the pursuit of her schemes for reaping the fruits of aggression. These facts also confirm that America's policy is to foment internal conspiracies by psychological warfare and by exploiting the situation that has arisen as a result of the occupation, the adverse economic situation, and the various negative repercussions of aggression and occupation. When, however, she sees that this method is not successful, she will once more incite Israel to commit a new and more extensive aggression. It is thus a certainty that Israel will continue to commit further aggressions on all Arab fronts.

The Congress also emphasised the importance of developing friendly relations at the level of the Party, the government and the popular organisations, between us and the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. It recommended that this friendship should be developed and strengthened in the interests of the Arab people, of socialist countries, and of the common struggle of humanity.

The Tenth National Congress of the Ba'th Party, having taken note of the report on domestic, Arab and international policy, and of the resolutions of ordinary and extraordinary sessions of the Ninth National Congress, resolves:

(c) The Congress affirms that it is essential that the strategy of armed struggle established by the Command after the Ninth Extraordinary National Congress be put into effect.

The following are the most important resolutions as regards domestic, Arab and international fields:

Thirdly—At Arab Level:

1. In connection with the encounter of Arab progressive forces:

the Tenth National Congress of the Ba'th party believes:

(a) That the general strategy established by the Ninth National Congress, at its ordinary and extraordinary sessions, as regards the encounter of progressive Arab forces, still holds good for the coming phase. For the consequences of this encounter at the level of political and military unity will provide an effective retort to the challenges of continued aggression and the possibility of its escalating at any moment. This is particularly the case now that the Party's view as regards the failure solutions involving surrender has been confirmed.

The Congress recommends that the National Command of the Party should continue its activities and contacts to ensure that the objectives of this strategy are achieved. In conformity with the declaration issued by the National Command just after the reverse, the practical and natural response in the Arab field will lie in efforts to find a better formula which will lead to the realisation of the slogan of unity, so that it may be possible to establish a base capable of confronting the Zionist colonialist challenge and to enable the Arab nation to consolidate its resistance and its ability to liberate the occupied territory.

(b) The military coordination which the revolution has struggled to achieve must become a reality in the shortest time possible. Furthermore, the parties concerned must offer all their resources so that this preliminary formula may be capable of supporting resistance and preparing for the battle of liberation.

2. In the field of Arab Resistance and Armed Struggle:

The Congress examined a detailed report on the activities of Arab resistance in the occupied territories, the methods it employs, and the consequences of the escalation and expansion of its activities. In view of this positive and encouraging situation the Ba'th Party believes that:

(a) The Palestine cause belongs to the Palestinian Arab people and to the Arab generations that believe in armed struggle, whose vanguard is the commando organisations engaged in combat on the field of the struggle. The Palestinian masses and their revolutionary vanguards will not permit any one to bargain over their homeland and their honour, or to ignore the struggle they are engaged in and the sacrifices they are making to liberate their land from usurp-

ing invaders.

(b) The Tenth National Congress of the Ba'th Party condemns in the strongest terms all attempts to impair the struggle and the heroic acts of Arab resistance fighters in the occupied territory, and all efforts to draw them into side issues, to distract them from their sacred task and from revolutionary movement, and calls on the Command of the Party and the Revolution to resist all attempts of this kind by all available means.

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Letter From the U.A.R. Foreign Minister Riyad to the U.N. Envoy Jarring on Israel's Attitude Towards Peaceful Settlement of the Middle East Crisis.¹

Cairo, December 8, 1968

United Arab Republic,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
December 8, 1968—Highly Confidential

Dear Ambassador Gunnar Jarring,

The Security Council Resolution on a peaceful settlement in the Middle East was adopted on November 22, 1967. A year has elapsed since this resolution was adopted, but Israel still persists in distorting facts, manipulating words, and refusing to meet the obligations required of her by the Security Council resolution. In view of this I wish to place on record the following observations:

Israel still refuses to accept the Security Council Resolution and to withdraw from all the Arab territories she occupied after her aggression against the Arab countries on June 5, 1967. She is thereby refusing to establish peace in the Middle East region by rejecting a settlement unanimously approved by the Security Council.

The continued presence of Israeli forces in Arab territory constitutes a constant and con-

¹ *Al-Ahram* (Cairo), 13/12/1968.

tinued aggression against the sovereignty and security of the Arab states.

And now, not content with rejecting the Security Council resolution, Israel has started to take action against it. Officials in Israel have made statements confirming her expansionist designs, giving expression thereby to the policy mapped out by world Zionism since its inception, a policy it has persistently striven to carry out by first establishing a Jewish state in Palestine, and then gradually expanding through war and aggression.

As soon as world Zionism started to execute this plan, disturbances started in Palestine and the Middle East area.

When the Palestine problem was submitted to the United Nations in 1947, the General Assembly adopted a resolution for the partition of Palestine between the Arabs of Palestine and the Jews. It established frontiers for Israel in accordance with its 1947 resolution.

Although the people of Palestine, the Arab countries, and many other countries regarded the wresting of Arab territory from the Palestinian people so that it might be given to Israel as a violation of their rights, Israel was not satisfied with the frontiers determined for her in the 1947 Partition Plan. On the contrary, she was determined to expand, and in 1948 occupied 20% more territory than had been allotted to her by the Partition resolution.

But this did not satisfy Israel's leaders. On the very day Israel was established in 1948, her Prime Minister, Ben Gurion, announced:

"This (the establishment of Israel) is not the end of our struggle. Today we have made a start, we must go on and establish the state for which we have struggled from the Nile to the Euphrates."

In October 1951 he declared:

"The maintenance of the *status quo* cannot be considered advantageous; we have established a dynamic state based on expansion".

And in a speech in Beersheba in 1952 he said: "I agree to form a government, on condition that I am allowed to use all possible means for expansion southwards. Let it be known to all that Israel was established through war, and that she will not rest content with the frontiers she has

reached so far. The Israeli Empire shall stretch from the Nile to the Euphrates". Israel began to implement her expansionist policy in 1955. In September of that year she occupied the Al-Auja area, which was a demilitarised zone according to the Armistice Agreement (1949); all of whose articles Israel had undertaken to respect and implement. She expelled the United Nations observers from the area and announced that it was annexed to Israel, completely ignoring the fact that she had signed this Agreement.

Israel did not stop at this. In 1956 she launched an attack against Egypt with the intention of achieving her expansionist objectives. Ben Gurion proclaimed the annexation of Sinai to Israel, at the same time declaring that the Armistice Agreement was dead and buried.

However, Israel was forced to withdraw from Sinai when the international community rejected Israeli expansion.

Nevertheless, Israel, backed by world Zionism, continued to prepare herself for the time when she would be in a position to achieve her expansionist objectives. Then, on June 5, 1967 she again attacked the Arab countries with the object of annexing further territory.

On June 12, 1967, shortly after the Israeli aggression, Eshkol declared: "Israel, having occupied new territories, will not go back to the previous boundaries."

Moshe Dayan similarly declared on June 11, 1967:

"My forces must remain in Sinai. Jerusalem must remain the capital of Israel and under Israeli sovereignty. Israel must not relinquish the Gaza Strip or the West Bank of Jordan."

Dayan declared on August 10, 1967:

"Israel refuses to return to the old 1949 frontiers. Nor must Israel allow other countries, working in their own interests, to force her to return to the previous situation.

"Israel will not return to the Armistice Agreements, or to the frontiers established by those agreements.

"Israel must retain part of Sinai, including Sharm al-Shaikh. The frontiers of Israel must stretch from the Jordan to the Mediterranean, and the heights to the west of the Jordan must form a base for the defence of Israel's frontiers".

On July 5, 1968, addressing the Youth Federation of the Israeli Kibbutz Movement, at a meeting held in the occupied Syrian territories, Dayan declared:

"Our fathers reached the boundaries acknowledged by the Partition Plan in 1947. Our generation has reached the boundaries of 1949. As for the generation of the 'Six Days' (i.e., the generation that committed the June 5 aggression), it has succeeded in reaching Suez, the River Jordan and the Golan Heights in Syria." Dayan added "This is not the end; beyond the present cease-fire lines, there are new lines that stretch beyond the River Jordan and may well reach into Jordan and Central Syria."

On July 15, 1967, Yigal Allon, who is at present Deputy Prime Minister, declared:

"The security and safety of the northern Israeli frontiers require that we should not relinquish the Golan Heights in Syria. Similarly, the river Jordan must be regarded as the eastern frontier of Israel."

On October 17, 1968 Dayan made the following statement:

"We must establish colonies in the Golan Heights, fortify Sinai, and incorporate the West Bank and Gaza economically and administratively into Israel."

On November 15, 1968, the Israeli Premier stated in the Knesset:

"When we say that the river Jordan is a safe and secure frontier for Israel, we mean that as soon as a peace agreement is concluded we shall not allow any foreign forces to cross this frontier, not even after the conclusion of a peace agreement. Israel will not allow Jordanian or other Arab forces to remain in the West Bank of Jordan in any final settlement.

On November 11, 1968, he further stated:

"Israel will retain possession of the Tiran Straits as part of any settlement of the Middle East."

Thus Israel's expansionist policy has been illustrated by her aggression against three Arab states on June 5, 1967. The explicit statements of Israeli authorities disclose that this policy aims at:

1. The annexation of Jerusalem.
2. The maintenance of Israeli forces in

Sinai, the West Bank and the Golan Heights in Syria.

3. The establishment of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and the Golan Heights in Syria.

4. The economic incorporation of the West Bank and Gaza into Israel.

5. The demilitarisation of all Arab territories Israel is now occupying. In other words, there will be no Arab forces there, but there will be Israeli military forces, and Israeli settlements will be established there.

This is what Israel understands by peace. This is the settlement that she seeks to impose on the Arab states, a settlement based on her continued occupation of Arab territories, in preparation for their usurpation after their Arab population has been expelled so that more Jewish immigrants may be brought into Israel.

This policy of Israel's, her territorial ambitions, and her aggressive expansionist policy, explain her refusal to implement the Security Council resolution requiring her to withdraw from all the Arab territories she occupied after her aggression of June 5, 1967, and affirming that it is impermissible to annex territories as a result of war.

But Israel is trying to give the impression that she is trying to find a peaceful settlement in conformity with the Security Council resolution, by raising a number of questions in the memorandum she has submitted to you. In this Israel is being two-faced. Her first face is shown in her aggressive policy which is incompatible with the United Nations Charter, the policy which has been clearly stated by the Israeli Prime Minister and other officials. The other face appears in the memoranda Israel submits to you, which are full of duplicity and playing with words, as if the world cannot hear the statements of the Israeli Prime Minister and other officials on their idea of the peace settlement which they are trying to impose on the Arab countries, and cannot see the acts of aggression and expansion Israel is committing in the territories she occupies.

While Israel continues to repeat these questions, she has refrained from answering the following basic question: "Is Israel ready to implement the Security Council resolution, and to withdraw from the territories of the Arab countries?"

"Can Israel explain to you how the state of war can be terminated, while Israeli officials continue to declare their determination to annex Arab territories and to maintain Israeli forces in a number of Arab areas?"

We also observe that Israel has so far persisted in refusing to answer the repeated questions you have asked her about safe and secure frontiers.

The United Arab Republic is still convinced that the implementation of the Security Council resolution will lead to a state of peace in the Middle East, and that for this aim to be achieved it is essential that Israel should withdraw her forces from all the Arab territories she occupied as a result of her aggression of June 5, 1967.

I should like to assure you that I shall always be ready to get in touch with you, and that the United Arab Republic will continue to cooperate with you to ensure the implementation of the task you are engaged in.

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Resolutions of the Regional Arab Conference on Human Rights.¹ [Excerpts]

Beirut, December 10, 1968

V. Violation by Colonialism of Human Rights in Palestine

The Regional Arab Conference on Human Rights;

On the strength of the Provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the universal principles of justice and of moral values,

And of the 1907 Hague Regulations on land warfare, the 1945 London Agreement for the punishment of war criminals, the 1948 Agreement on Genocide, the 1949 Geneva Convention for the protection of civilians in wartime and during periods of occupation,

Recalling the resolutions adopted by the United Nations, its various organisations and its agencies, on the Palestine problem,² requiring

that civilians in the occupied territories be protected and allowed to return to their homes, General Assembly resolutions No. 2252 of July 4, 1967³ and No. 2341 of December 19, 1967⁴ affirming the same and requiring respect for the principles of human rights and fundamental liberties, resolution No. 6 of the 24th session of the Commission on Human Rights in 1968,⁵ the Commission on Human Rights' cable calling on the Israeli government to desist from demolishing houses,⁶ and the resolution of the International Conference on Human Rights held in Teheran on May 7, 1968,⁷

Having reviewed the criminal actions—collective killings, torture, destruction, blowing up of houses, and the inhumane actions—refusal to allow the refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes, intimidation, impeding the Red Cross, UNRWA, and other organisations in the performance of their duties, distortion of educational syllabuses and desecration of places of worship—not to mention other acts of racial fanaticism that have been, and are still being perpetrated by Israel against the Palestinian people, and the civilian population of Palestine and the occupied Arab territories;

And in view of the fact that all these actions involve the violation of the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Conference resolves the following:

1. That Israel is a racist colonialist base, supported by the violation of the right of the Palestinian Arab people to self-determination and to the exercise of their natural rights in their homeland, which is completely incompatible with the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Conference therefore calls on all forces which support human rights to assist the Palestinian people in their struggle for the recovery of their full rights.

2. That criminal acts perpetrated by Israel are crimes against humanity and a form of genocide, and must therefore be internationally outlawed in accordance with the 1945 London Agree-

³ Text *ibid.*, pp. 255-256.

⁴ Text *ibid.*, pp. 466-468.

⁵ *Ante*, doc. 251.

⁶ *Ante*, doc. 252.

⁷ *Ante*, doc. 253.

¹ Archives of the Institute for Palestine Studies.

² Text in *International Documents on Palestine, 1967*, p. 251.

ment on the punishment of war criminals.

3. It is the duty of the United Nations, which has condemned Israel many times, to impose on her the sanctions prescribed by the United Nations Charter.

(R. 5 - 10/12/1968)

VIII. *Report of the Study Group*

The Conference took note of the report of the Study Group, the text of which is as follows:

After discussion and study the Group decided:

I. Concerning the first topic, namely, the treatment of Arab and Oriental Jewish individuals in Occupied Palestine:

(a) To condemn Zionist racist theory in Israel, which is based on discrimination in favour of those who, it is alleged, belong to a single race, whereas in fact all they have in common is their religion, Judaism.

In pursuance of this theory, the name of Palestine has been changed to one which expresses this racist theory—Israel, the object being to eradicate the Arab national presence and to establish in its place an artificial, fanatical and racist entity.

(b) To support resolution No. 1 adopted by the Teheran Conference at its 23rd session on May 7, 1968 calling on the United Nations to appoint a committee to investigate Israel's violations of human rights and later submit a report to the General Assembly.

(d) Arab opposition to Zionist racial discrimination in Israel applies just as much to the humiliating status of the Oriental Jews as to that of the Arabs in Israel. This is in conformity with the Arab view that all forms of racial discrimination are to be opposed and that the introduction of any racist tendency into the struggle between the Arabs and Zionism is to be condemned. It is also an affirmation of the fact that there is no hostility between Arabs and Jews as such, but only between Zionism and the Arab movement, which seeks liberation and progress and resists all forms of colonialism, discrimination and persecution on racial grounds.

(e) The same attitude is apparent in the Arabs' view that anti-Zionist Jews in other countries should be defended, that allegiance to Israel should not be forced on them, and that they should not be subjected to Zionist persecution and propaganda. This attitude is in keeping with the Arab struggle against Zionism, which is a universal human struggle that makes no distinction between Arabs and non-Arabs.

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Speech by the Kuwaiti Amir Sabah al-Salem al-Sabah at a Banquet in His Honour Given by the U.S. President Johnson.¹ [Excerpt]

Washington, December 11, 1968

Almost a year and a half has passed since the war of June 1967, and large parts of three Arab countries which are members of the United Nations remain under occupation.

More important than that is the fact that the main victims of this conflict are the 2½ million Arab people of Palestine who continue to live as displaced persons, denied their right to their homes, property, and homeland.

This, Mr. President, is the basic cause of the so-called Middle East problem. Peace will never be established in the area and stability will never be restored unless the problem is dealt with at its roots.

We do realize, Mr. President, that there are differences in opinion between our two Governments on this subject. But all that we hope for is that any judgment on your part regarding any issue arising in the sensitive area should be a just and fair one—a judgment which does not rest on the implications of the new issue but rather on the fact that this new issue is but a subsidiary issue resulting from a long dispute, one which has been in existence more than a half a century and which has culminated in the catastrophe now besetting the Middle East area.

¹ U.S. Department of State Bulletin, 30/12/1968, p. 694.

Any judgment on any issue made without regard to the original dispute would serve only as a sedative for some time, but will not serve the cause of lasting peace and justice in the area.

These, Mr. President, are some of the thoughts which I wanted to convey to you personally, because it is my belief that frankness is imperative if we are to try to solve the difficult problems of our area.

If there are nations in the world today that seek peace, the Arab nation with its long record of struggle, strife, and turbulence in the last half century and with its consequent need for peace so as to be able to devote its efforts to reconstruction and development, that nation is certainly among these nations that want peace in the Middle East.

But this does not mean that it needs or could accept peace at any price. What it needs is peace based on justice and fair play.

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Interview Granted by the Jordanian King Hussein to the American Broadcasting Corporation.¹ [Excerpts]

Amman, December 13, 1968

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Q.—Does Your Majesty believe that there is any chance of reconciling the attitude of the Arabs, who insist on recovering their lands occupied by the Israelis in the June War in 1967, with that of the Israelis, who insist that these territories must be retained so that it may be possible to establish a guaranteed peace in the Middle East, despite the incompatibility of the two attitudes; and does Your Majesty feel there is a possibility of concessions being made?

A.—I do not believe that it is a question of bargaining, but of having a general idea of what principles are acceptable to all parties before we start talking of implementation. We feel that the Arabs are in a reasonable and strong position. We have accepted the Security Council resolution

[November 22, 1967] and the principles it involves. All that Israel has to do is that she, in turn, should accept these principles and show a readiness to put them into effect. We can then advance towards a just and permanent peace and towards finding solutions for all the problems of the area, the occupied Arab territories being part of these problems.

Q.—Do you feel that war with Israel is inevitable?

A.—I do not think that war is ever inevitable, but I do feel that it is Israel that will actually decide, in the immediate future and as a result of her attitude to the Security Council resolution, whether we make any progress towards the implementation of this resolution or not. If Israel continues to maintain this obscure attitude, and if the Israeli authorities continue to insist on holding on to the territories she occupied in June 1967, and give no indication of their intention of giving them up or of playing their part in establishing a just and permanent peace in the area, then I fear that the situation will become so complicated that peace will be threatened not only in this area but the whole world over.

Q.—Do you think that the United States and the Soviet Union could have a very strong influence on the state of affairs in the area and its possible consequences? Is there a possibility of surmounting all difficulties and finding a way out to a better future for all the peoples of the area?

A.—As regards the Soviet Union, the information I have received to date about its attitude suggests that it wants to prevent the situation from deteriorating to such an extent that it explodes. The fact is that the Soviet Union encourages all efforts towards establishing a just and permanent peace in this area, and this is certainly a good thing.

Q.—Does Your Majesty believe that the United States also encourages the establishment of a just and permanent peace in this area?

A.—I do believe this; but I should like to see the United States playing an effective role in this tragic situation. I am convinced that it has a great potential for the exercise of its influence in the interests of the area and its peoples. I also think that United States policy so far has not

¹ *Al-Dustur* (Amman), 16/12/1968.

been a balanced one, and that it has, to some extent, been at variance with what is taking place in this area.

However, I have some hope that this policy will change; that the United States authorities will make greater efforts on behalf of the future of this area, in view of its importance to the whole world.

Q.—In view of what you have said, does Your Majesty feel that you would like to see the United States playing a more balanced role in the Middle East, and that the United States is very strongly aligned with Israel—a feeling shared by many peoples, particularly since the United States has expressed its intention of selling Israel more Phantom planes?

A.—Yes, I do feel that.

Q.—Would you like to suggest anything the United States might do, as part of her policy of achieving a just and permanent peace in the area?

A.—

There is nothing definite except for the feeling that the United States has not so far adopted a balanced attitude to this problem. Its attitude has tended to maintain the *status quo*, which is not in the interests of anybody, even Israel herself. It is certainly not in our own interests nor in the interests of anyone who wants just and permanent peace in this area.

By supplying Israel with arms and equipment at intervals, by its alignment with Israel in certain situations, by its failure to adopt any attitude whenever the problems of the Middle East have been raised in the Security Council or the General Assembly—the United States has encouraged extremism in Israel, and this runs counter to Israel's own interests, especially as regards the future, and to the interests of all concerned in this area. However, we hope that this attitude will change, and that the United States will show what sort of role it is capable of playing in this area, with the assistance of all parties concerned, for the establishment of a just and permanent peace.

Interview With Yasser Arafat, Official Spokesman of the Palestine National Liberation Movement "Fateh".¹ [Excerpts]

December 1968

Our battle is a desperate and relentless one—a battle of "to be or not to be". In our opinion Israel is playing the role played by the East India Company when it succeeded in occupying the Indian subcontinent, after which our Indian brothers had to sustain the burden of English colonialism for centuries.

In our view Israel is sustaining the role of the East India Company in a new and more extreme form.

Israel now wants to play the same role in the Arab countries in the Middle East. She wants to subject the Arab nation, from the Ocean to the Gulf, to a new domination, that of Zionism, supported by American colonialism. In the face of this constant danger, which threatens our existence, our civilisation, our future, our children,—all that makes us what we are—it is the duty of all of us to stand as one man in a compact structure to confront this savage enemy with his innumerable resources. But this does not mean that his vast resources will block our way to victory.

The ambitions our enemy hopes to achieve are illustrated by maps hanging in the Israeli Knesset, which indicate Israel's desire to expand by showing the country as stretching from the Nile to the Euphrates. This means that the enemy is determined, if not now, then in the future, to expand his state from the Nile to the Euphrates.

Let us cast our minds back to 1948. Did any of us then have any idea that this handful of people would succeed in occupying what they are occupying today? None of us ever contemplated such a thing.

Israel is not alone; she is backed by world Zionism and by the resources of colonialism and

¹ *Al-Jumhuriyya* (Baghdad), 16, 31/12/1968. Mr. Arafat granted this interview to *Al-Jumhuriyya's* correspondent in Jordan.

imperialism. She is also backed by all international monopolies, through America and those Western countries that side with America.

Thus this tiny state has all the resources of colonialism. It is not fighting us with its own resources alone, but with the full support of imperialism and the arms and propaganda of imperialism.

Western colonialism sees Israel as the cornerstone in its schemes for gaining possession of the resources of the neighbouring peoples. This is why it supports and backs Israel, so that she may help it in the execution of its conspiracies against the Arab nation.

War has been forced upon us, so that we have to fight, to prove that we still exist and to recover our lost rights.

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Q.—What view should be taken of the terrorisation and persecution of our brothers in the occupied territories?

A.—The repression, intimidation, destruction and torture that are such prominent features of life in the occupied territories, are to be seen as the toll exacted by the struggle, an inevitable concomitant of the epic tragedy of a people struggling against a brutal form of colonialism. Our attitude must be to meet repression, intimidation, destruction and torture with redoubled struggle, redoubled revolutionary ardour and redoubled attacks on the enemy. . . .

The staunch resistance of our people in the occupied territories, shows how relentless and unyielding is our revolution. Our people in Palestine have decided on revolution, proclaiming their determination either to win victory or to die in the attempt. The demonstrations in Nablus, Gaza, Ramallah and Jerusalem, in which our sisters and daughters have shown how resolute and courageous Arab women can be by confronting the forces of Zionist tyranny and overcoming it at such a cost in sacrifice, are an integral part of the revolution, as is the steadfastness of our struggling people in the occupied territories.

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Q.—What do you have to say about what people call the “generation of the disaster” and the “generation of the revolution”?

A.—What has come to be termed the “generation of the disaster” is that generation which is now bearing arms to deliver itself from the disaster. Many of our fighters, indeed the vast majority of them, were children in the days of the disaster, or were born under its shadow. As for the “generation of the revolution”, we have ensured that it should grow up fully aware of the struggle and the revolution that are its duty. . . .

Our revolution is Palestinian in outward appearance, Arab at heart. Our revolution faces a fierce enemy; it faces world imperialism, and its ally Zionism, which it created and brought into being. Thus our revolution will be long-drawn-out. As the revolutionary tide rises, our revolution will be in greater need of supporters; the need for them will be greater and they will have a greater role to play.

The Arab front which supports the revolution will be transformed into an Arab front that actually plays a part in the Palestinian revolution and bears its responsibility in the battle—the battle for the destiny of all Arabs, which is always in need of greater mobilisation, and further potentialities and resources with which to confront our powerful enemies with all that they have and that is behind them in the way of colonialist forces that support them.

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Q.—What would be the attitude of the revolution if the Security Council resolution based on the British proposal of November 22, 1967 were to be implemented?

A.—We have always said that we reject political solutions because they will not grant us our full rights or realise our objectives. At best, this resolution deals with the elimination of the consequences of the 1967 aggression, which was but one aspect of the Zionist menace; it expresses no objection to the source of this menace, namely the Zionist entity. Our case will never be resolved until the source of aggression is eliminated by the liquidation of the Zionist entity. This is what we have proclaimed, and this is what we are determined to do and what we shall persist in, even if the Security Council resolution is implemented.

We have proclaimed the revolution and our revolution will not end until victory is won.

Q.—To what extent have the Palestinian Arab people responded, and how far are they willing to merge with the fighting vanguard? And has the revolution been changed from a military vanguard to a popular revolution?

A.—Our revolution has never been merely a military vanguard only. Our revolution spent nearly ten years in tireless political and revolutionary activity, with the object of establishing a political organisation capable of forming the revolutionary popular vanguard. Then the first shot was fired on January 1, 1965. In my answer to your first question I spoke to you of the extent to which our people have responded to the revolution. A few examples will show you what a hold the revolution has on the hearts of our people.

What do you think of the mother who greets the report of her son's death with cries of joy, and, not content with this, does not hesitate to offer his brother? This is only one example. One glance at our people's enthusiastic support of the revolution shows how profoundly they have responded to it.

The humblest citizen gives freely of all he has to the revolution. Did you know that a few days ago we received a handkerchief from a village in the occupied territories? Wrapped in it were the earrings and wedding rings of the young women of the village, which they had collected and sent to us to pay for arms to liberate them from occupation. And there are dozens of other examples.

Q.—What is the international response to Fateh's slogan: the toppling of the Zionist regime in Israel?

A.—I have told you that important sectors of international public opinion have begun to perceive how serious this slogan is, and how essential that it should be realised—though, admittedly, this perception has not yet gone as far as we should like. The way our delegation was received at the World Youth Conference in Sofia is an excellent illustration of this. Many Asian and African countries have begun to agree with this slogan, and to approve of the objective it expresses. Many countries in Latin America, Europe, Africa and Asia have begun to take our objective seriously, although there are many countries in the

imperialist world that still reject it, though they regard it with increasing anxiety and fear.

Q.—Have repeated Israeli attacks shaken the determination of the people, and weakened their cohesion with Fateh?

A.—On the contrary, experience has shown and statistics have confirmed that every Israeli attack strengthens the people's determination and bolsters their morale. Every bomb that is dropped on an Arab house brings new fighters to the ranks of the revolution, and makes our people more active in their struggle against the enemy.

Every house that is blown up is another gain for the revolution, another nail in the coffin of the Zionist imperialist occupation. Volunteers always come forward in the largest numbers from places where there have been Israeli attacks and aggressions, whether this is inside or outside, as you can see from the lists which show where they come from.

Q.—Do you believe that Fateh is the prelude to an overall popular clash with imperialism in all parts of the Arab homeland?

A.—We believe that *Fateh* is an armed national liberation movement, Palestinian in outward appearance and Arab at heart.

Q.—How far is armed action linked to political ideology, and is there a separate ideological policy running alongside military policy?

A.—Revolutionary military action must be based on revolutionary ideology. The revolutionary ideology which we have always proclaimed is that liberation can only be achieved through the armed struggle of the Arab masses under the leadership of vanguards derived from the masses and adhering to their principles and objectives. Consequently, this revolution cannot derive from or be directed by any organisation, party or power, other than the masses that have pledged themselves to its principles and objectives, so that their objective of full deliverance may be achieved. This is the revolutionary ideology on which our military action, and indeed all our actions are based.

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Speech by the Lebanese President Helou at the New Year Reception for the Heads of Diplomatic Missions.¹ [Excerpt]

Beirut, December 31, 1968

When in the Arab East we defend a cause wherein we are the victims of the acts of violence it involves, we are defending an integral part of the laws of justice and morality. We feel, indeed that every country is threatened with the same fate as Palestine, that every human being, willy-nilly, bears within him a temple that has been desecrated and a holy land in mourning, and that every country is, willy-nilly, concerned with the consequences of this policy—which is undisguisedly based on expansion and usurpation, and whose repercussions serve as a warning to all parts of the world, however remote, of the most serious consequences.

Gentlemen,

In this small country where, in full solidarity with our Arab brothers, we are confronted with racist ambitions of extreme inhumanity, it seems to us that, in exposing them, we are not only appealing to the conscience of the world, but also acting in the interest of the safety of all nations, even the greatest and strongest.

It is our right, indeed it is our duty, to proclaim this, not simply because we stand on a front line that is threatened, but because, from this front line position we can see clearly and far, and moreover, because our constitution, our traditions, the ideals we embody and the role we play cannot be exposed to danger without that link upon which relationships between human beings rest being exposed to danger at the same

time at both national and international levels.

Contingent phenomena and transient victories do not arrest us, and arguments and pretexts are vain. If the enemy has the audacity to launch a sudden attack against us under the pretext of retaliation—a pretext as treacherous and ferocious as the attack itself—we know that all his efforts and all his arguments are branded with the stigma of original sin, to which he owes his existence. We also know that he can only exist, continue to be, and expand, by defying the laws of history, the rights of man, and God's Commandments. Above all, we know that the ordeal we are passing through will only serve to make us more determined to defend our land, our dignity, our freedoms, and all our spiritual and secular heritage. Finally, we know that by resorting to the Security Council and giving it the opportunity to remove the mask from and to pass judgement upon a most insolent challenge to all its members, we are concerned to protect not so much our own rights as the statutes of the international organisation. Furthermore, we are concerned not so much with our present existence and our future destiny as with the future and *raison d'être* of that body.

This is what leads us to see, in the expressions of sympathy that are tendered to us from every quarter, a sign that justice is taking its course, in the interests not only of Lebanon and the Arab world, but of all who suffer from injustice on this earth.

In her present ordeal Lebanon, as always, is performing a great task. By counting her friendships she has found that she has enlisted the human conscience in the service of those values for which it is as sweet to die as it is to live.

¹ *Al-Jarida* (Beirut), 1/1/1969.

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